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The 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions protect socio-economic rights as justiciable 
rights. As legal guarantees, these rights have the potential to address the socio-economic 
hardship experienced by many South Africans today. However, their contribution towards this 
will depend largely on how these rights are interpreted. The 1993 and 1996 Constitutions 
oblige courts to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. This 
dissertation examines the relationship between this interpretative mandate and the 
Constitutional Court’s adjudication of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights. In particular, this dissertation investigates whether the Court has developed a clear 
methodological approach to the consideration of international law in its interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights, and how the Court has applied such an approach to the interpretation of socio-
economic rights.  
This dissertation shows that, while the Constitutional Court has developed a 
methodological approach to the consideration of international law when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, its approach remains embryonic. In particular, the Court has not fully developed 
clear analytic guidelines indicating how courts should consider international law sources. In 
addition, the Court has not fully explored the relevance of specific sources of international 
law to the interpretative exercise. Nevertheless, this dissertation argues that the 
methodological approach developed thus far provides the Court with an important means of 
engaging with international law in judicial reasoning, which can enrich the Court’s 
interpretative process. Moreover, a detailed investigation into the Court’s socio-economic 
jurisprudence reveals that the Court’s consideration of international law is inconsistent and 
sporadic. However, the analysis also demonstrates that when the Court has considered 
international law in its adjudication of socio-economic rights, it has done so in various ways 
and to various degrees. In addition, the analysis reveals how the Court’s application of the 
reasonableness model of review, developed within the context of positive duties imposed by 
socio-economic rights, limits a substantive consideration of international law in the 
development of the normative content of socio-economic rights. A key contribution of this 
dissertation is the detailed analysis of the Court’s methodological approach to the 
consideration of international law sources developed thus far, and the demonstration of how 
this can be applied within the field of socio-economic rights. In addition, this dissertation 
identifies relevant international human rights standards and adjudicative approaches 
pertaining to socio-economic rights and illustrates how the Court can engage with these 

































Die 1993 en 1996 Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet beskerm sosio-ekonomiese regte as beregbare 
regte. As wetlike waarborge het hierdie regte die potensiaal om sosio-ekonomiese swaarkry 
wat tans deur baie Suid-Afrikaners ervaar word, aan te spreek. Die bydrae van hierdie regte is 
onderworpe aan die wyse waarop dit geïnterpreteer word. Die 1993 en 1996 Suid-Afrikaanse 
Grondwet verplig howe om internasionale reg in ag te neem wanneer hulle die Handves van 
Regte interpreteer. Hierdie tesis ondersoek die verhouding tussen hierdie interpretatiewe 
mandaat en die Grondwetlike Hof se beoordeling van sosio-ekonomiese regte soos verskans 
in die Handves van Regte. In die besonder, ondersoek die tesis of die Hof ‘n duidelike 
metodologiese benadering tot die inagneming van internasionale reg in terme van sy 
interpretering van die Handves van Regte ontwikkel het, en hoe die Hof hierdie benadering 
toegepas het ten opsigte van die interpretering van sosio-ekonomiese regte 
Die tesis toon dat, alhoewel die Grondwetlike Hof ‘n metodologiese benadering tot die 
inagneming van internasionale reg ontwikkel het wanneer die Handves van Regte 
geïnterpreteer word, die benadering nog grootliks onontwikkeld is. In die besonder het die 
Hof nie duidelike analitiese riglyne ontwikkel hoe internasionale regsbronne oorweeg moet 
word nie. Daarbenewens, het die Hof nie die relevansie van spesifieke bronne van 
internasionale reg vir die interpretatiewe oefening verken nie. Hierdie tesis argumenteer dat 
die metodologiese benadering wat wel tot dusver ontwikkel is ten opsigte van die interaksie 
met internasionale reg in terme van regspraak, die Hof se interpretatiewe proses kan verryk. 
Bowendien toon ‘n gedetailleerde ondersoek rakende die Hof se sosio-ekonomiese regspraak 
dat die Hof se oorweging van internasionale reg teenstrydig en sporadies is. Die ondersoek 
toon ook dat wanneer die Hof internasionale reg in die beoordeling van sosio-ekonomiese 
regte oorweeg het, dit op verskillende wyses en grade gedoen is. Daarbenewens onthul die 
ondersoek ook dat die Hof se toepassing van die redelike model van hersiening, ontwikkel 
binne die konteks van positiewe verpligtinge soos opgelê deur sosio-ekonomiese regte,‘n 
substantiewe oorweging van internasionale reg in die ontwikkeling van die normatiewe 
inhoud van sosio-ekonomiese regte beperk. 
‘n Sleutel bydra van hierdie tesis is ‘n gedetailleerde analise van die Hof se 
metodologiese benadering tot die oorweging van bronne van internasionale reg tot dusver en 
hoe dit toegepas kan word ten opsigte van sosio-ekonomiese regte. Daarbenewens identifiseer 
die tesis relevante internasionale menseregte standaarde met betrekking tot sosio-ekonomiese 
regte. Dit illustreer hoe die Hof betrokke kan raak by hierdie bronne met die doel om Suid-
Afrika se sosio-ekonomiese regspraak te ondersteun en te versterk. 
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1 1 Research Problem  
International law has developed rapidly in the last few decades. The relatively recent 
development of the international legal landscape has been spurred on by, amongst others, the 
emergence of new fields of international law, regional legal developments, globalisation, and 
the rise of new international actors. Consequently, international law has expanded in terms of 
both its subject matter and the variety of international sources available today.1 Courts 
engaging with international sources of law are therefore confronted with a vast, complex area 
of law, and judges are required to possess both knowledge and skill in order to navigate 
through, and successfully, apply it. In particular, judges would arguably have to possess a 
sound knowledge of the relevant fields of international law, and be able to identify its various 
sources. Furthermore, judges would have to possess the skill to engage with these sources 
methodically and apply them in a relevant manner.  
International law features prominently in South Africa’s new constitutional landscape. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (“1993 Constitution”) and 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“1996 Constitution”) add further 
complexity to a court’s task of engaging with international law by providing for various ways 
in which international law can interact with municipal law. In particular, section 39(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution obliges courts, tribunals or forums to consider international law when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.2 When applying this interpretative mandate to the field of 
socio-economic rights, which is the focus of this dissertation, it is clear that South African 
                                                
1 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) defines international sources of law in 
the following way: 
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.” 
2 Similarly, section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution states that: 
“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to 
public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may 
have regard to comparable foreign case law.” (Emphasis added). 




courts (“courts”) are presented with the intricate task of engaging with relevant international 
law sources in the complex process of socio-economic rights adjudication. 
Socio-economic rights are included in both the 1993 Constitution and the 1996 
Constitution as justiciable rights.3 Their inclusion as such signals the State’s recognition of 
the grave socio-economic violations and inequalities that pervaded the previous era of 
apartheid, and its responsibility to realise socio-economic rights. This is further highlighted by 
the constitutional obligation placed upon the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights”.4 The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights is 
furthermore an important means of advancing the broader aims of the 1996 Constitution, 
which is clearly stated in its Preamble. It states that the 1996 Constitution was adopted to 
“[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights”.5 In addition, socio-economic rights have the potential 
to advance the commitment, stated in the Preamble, to “[i]mprove the quality of life of all 
citizens and free the potential of each person.”6 The 1996 Constitution entrenches the right of 
everyone to have access to adequate housing,7 healthcare, food, water, and social security.8 In 
addition, it protects the right of every child to “basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services and social services”,9 and entrenches rights related to education.10 It also protects the 
                                                
3 LM Du Plessis & H Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994); S Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 7-22. See section 3 2 1 of 
chapter 3. The 1993 Constitution included only a limited number of socio-economic rights. However, these still 
formed the foundation upon which a more comprehensive list of socio-economic rights was included in the 1996 
Constitution. See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 16. 
4 Section 7(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
5 Preamble, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6 Preamble, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7 Section 26 of the 1996 Constitution. This right is qualified in section 26(2), which states that: “[t]he state must 
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right.” Furthermore, section 27(3) states that: “[n]o one may be evicted from their home, or 
have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” 
8 The right to have access to health care, food, water, and social security is entrenched in section 27 of the 1996 
Constitution. These rights are qualified in section 27(2), which states that: “[t]he state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of 
these rights.” Section 27(3) of the 1996 Constitution states that: “[n]o one may be refused emergency medical 
treatment.” 
9 Section 28(1)(c) of the 1996 Constitution. 
10 Section 29(1) and (2) of the 1996 Constitution state the following: 
  “(1) Everyone has the right- 
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and 
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make 
progressively available and accessible. 
  (2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in 
public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the 
effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational 
alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account- 
 (a) equity; 
 (b) practicability; and  
 (c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.” 




right of detainees, including sentenced prisoners, “to conditions of detention that are 
consistent with human dignity, including at least … the provision, at state expense, of 
adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment, …”.11 These 
legal guarantees are also important in the struggle against poverty in South Africa and the 
upliftment of the poor and marginalised sectors of society. The violations of socio-economic 
rights are likely to, amongst others, leave individuals homeless, without water, sanitation, 
electricity or even basic health care. These violations may result in severe human suffering 
that deeply affects the quality of human life and impedes on an individual’s ability to live a 
life of dignity. In addition, the prevalence of poverty threatens the economic security and 
independence of many South Africans, and in turn, negatively affects the realisation of 
individual freedom and their ability to participate as equals in society.12 The entrenchment of 
socio-economic rights as justiciable rights are therefore a crucial means of enabling 
impoverished people to turn to the courts to challenge infringements of their rights.13 
 Furthermore, the interrelatedness between socio-economic rights and civil and 
political rights necessitates that socio-economic rights be addressed to allow individuals to 
flourish socially, economically, and politically.14 In addition, former Chief Justice Pius Langa 
draws a strong connection between socio-economic justice and reconciliation in South Africa. 
He argues that reconciliation that facilitates the nation’s development is dependent on 
redressing poverty and the gap that exists between the poor and the affluent in South Africa.15  
Twenty years have passed since South Africa’s first democratic Constitution entered 
into force. However, many South Africans continue to live in abject poverty, and are 
increasingly voicing their dissatisfaction over service delivery in various parts of South 
Africa. The prevalence of poverty, and the heightened frustration with the social conditions 
under which many South Africans continue to live in today, question the relevance of socio-
economic rights in South Africa as a means of responding to these hardships. While courts are 
not the only actors that influence the enforcement and realisation of socio-economic rights in 
South Africa, courts have an important role to play in developing the role of social-economic 
rights in South Africa.16 The manner in which courts engage with the nature and scope of 
socio-economic rights will largely determine how the judicial enforcement of these rights will 
translate into transformative outcomes and impact the social and economic hardship that 
                                                
11 Section 35(2)(e) of the 1996 Constitution. 
12 P Langa “The Role of the Constitution in the Struggle against Poverty” in S Liebenberg & G Quinot (eds) Law 
and Poverty: Perspectives from South Africa and Beyond (2012) 4 5. 
13 Socio-economic rights bind the State and, to a certain extent, private parties.  
14 Langa “The Role of the Constitution in the Struggle Against Poverty” in Law and Poverty 5. 
15 6-7. 
16 In South Africa, socio-economic rights are also enforced and realised through, amongst others, national 
legislation, socio-economic policies, and civil society groups and organisations. 




many South Africans face on a daily basis.17 In this regard, Liebenberg states that courts 
primarily serve as an “influential forum”, in which different aspects of poverty and the social 
responses to this can be evaluated within the context of constitutional rights and values.18 
Courts therefore create a normative context within which to understand socio-economic 
rights. 
The South African Constitutional Court (“Court”)19 has developed a reasonableness 
model of review to adjudicate claims based upon the positive obligations arising from socio-
economic rights entrenched in the Constitution. The reasonableness model of review was 
developed in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 20  Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,21 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 
(no. 2),22 and more recently confirmed in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg.23 An important 
feature of the reasonableness model of review is that the Court affords a generous margin of 
discretion to the executive in respect of the assessment of the measures taken by the State in 
fulfilment of its obligations. In this regard, the Court has held that it will not enquire into 
whether a more favourable measure would have been appropriate, but rather whether the 
measure adopted by the State was reasonable.24 Therefore, the Court has clearly adopted a 
deferential approach towards the adjudication of socio-economic rights. Scholars have 
criticised this approach as arguably avoiding an interpretation of socio-economic rights that 
engages with, and substantively develops, the scope and content of these rights.25 In this 
regard, Liebenberg argues that this model of review can be developed so that it includes a 
more substantive interpretation of socio-economic rights.26 This raises the question of what 
interpretative approach and tools could be used in the development of a substantive 
interpretation of socio-economic rights. 
As indicated above, the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions expressly provide a set of 
interpretative tools that can assist courts in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In 
particular, section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution states that when a court, tribunal, or 
forum interprets the Bill of Rights, these bodies must “promote the values that underlie an 
                                                
17 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 37. 
18 37. 
19 Unless the context provides otherwise, “the Court” refers to the Constitutional Court, while “courts” will be 
used as general reference to all South African courts. 
20 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) (“Soobramoney”). 
21 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) (“Grootboom”). 
22 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) (“TAC”). 
23 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) (“Mazibuko”). See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 151-155; D Bilchitz Poverty and 
Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007); K McLean 
Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009). 
24 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41. 
25 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 175-177. 
26 227. 




open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.27 Furthermore, 
these bodies are obliged to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
The Constitutional Court has considered international law as an interpretative tool in 
accordance with section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution in the interpretation of a broad spectrum of rights. In this regard, the Court has 
made important pronouncements concerning the manner in which courts are to approach the 
exercise of considering international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In 
particular, the Constitutional Court’s seminal decision of S v Makwanyane28 establishes that, 
within the context of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, “public international law would 
include both binding and non-binding international law”. 29  Furthermore, the judgment 
establishes that international agreements and customary international law provide a 
framework within which the Bill of Rights is to be evaluated and understood.30 Consequently, 
this statement provides a first step towards a methodological approach for the use of 
international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.31 The judgment is also significant 
for its recognition of a generous breadth of sources, which includes soft law,32 in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Although the Constitutional Court has engaged with 
international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, it does not appear as though it has 
developed a clear methodological approach in respect of the consideration of international law 
subsequent to Makwanyane. In addition, scholars such as Botha and Oliver argue that the 
Court’s practice of invoking international law is often fraught with inconsistencies.33  
Notwithstanding, the interpretative mandate has the potential to be particularly 
relevant to the interpretation of socio-economic rights in South Africa when the vast field of 
international human rights law that affords protection to socio-economic rights is considered. 
Various international and regional courts, tribunals, and committees have interpreted these 
provisions in an effort to develop these standards and guide States parties in their 
implementation of socio-economic rights. While I do not depart from the assumption that 
international law is the panacea to the challenges facing socio-economic rights adjudication 
today, this source of law may form one part of the Constitutional Court’s interpretative 
                                                
27 Section 39(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution. 
28 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) (“Makwanyane”). 
29 Para 35. 
30 Para 35. 
31 The term “methodological” has been used by E De Wet in her analysis of the South African Constitutional 
Court’s treatment of international law in its jurisprudence. See E De Wet “The ‘Friendly but Cautious’ 
Reception of International Law in the Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some Critical 
Remarks” (2004) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1529-1565. 
32 For a discussion on the definition of soft law, see chapter 4. 
33 See N Botha & M Olivier “Ten Years of International Law in the South African Courts: Reviewing the Past 
and Assessing the Future” (2004) 29 SAYIL 42-77. 




strategy. When considering the relative novelty of socio-economic rights adjudication in 
South Africa, international law may assist courts in developing both the positive and negative 
obligations placed upon the State and in this way, assist in substantively developing the nature 
and scope of socio-economic rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
Moreover, in 2011 the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in the case of 
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa34 in which it made an important 
statement concerning the relevance of international law to the application of the 
reasonableness model of review. In this case, the Court concluded that a consideration of 
international law must form part of the process of determining which reasonable measures the 
State must take to protect and fulfil the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.35   
However, the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence appears to 
indicate a minimal and sporadic consideration of international law. In light of the above 
discussion, I aim to explore the underlying reasons for this. In particular, I investigate firstly, 
whether this apparent neglect is connected to the methodology employed by the Court in its 
consideration of international law. Therefore, I question whether the Constitutional Court has 
developed a general methodological approach to the consideration of international law in the 
interpretation of fundamental rights and applied this to the interpretation of socio-economic 
rights. Secondly, I investigate whether the Court’s minimal and sporadic consideration of 
international law is connected to the relevance of international and regional human rights 
standards to socio-economic rights interpretation. I therefore question whether international 
and regional human rights standards are able to contribute towards the interpretation of socio-
economic rights in South Africa.  
 
1 2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In light of the above discussion, I address two over-arching research questions in this 
dissertation. Firstly, whether the Constitutional Court has developed a general methodological 
approach to the consideration of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights in 
light of the mandate entrenched in section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) 
of the 1996 Constitution. Secondly, whether the Constitutional Court has applied section 
35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, and the 
methodological approach developed in this regard, in its interpretation of socio-economic 
rights in South Africa, given the Court’s adoption of the reasonableness model of review. 
                                                
34 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) (“Glenister”). 
35 Para 192. 




The hypothesis I set out to explore in respect of my first research question is that, 
despite elaborating on the role of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, 
the Constitutional Court’s methodological approach remains largely embryonic. A primary 
objective of this thesis is therefore to establish whether this assumption is correct, and if so, 
what are the consequences thereof. In respect of my second research question, I explore the 
hypothesis that the Constitutional Court has been inconsistent in its application of section 
35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights. Furthermore, I investigate the hypothesis that the 
interpretative mandate has, on occasion, been neglected, despite the availability of relevant 
international human rights standards that can strengthen and support judicial reasoning in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights in South Africa.  
 
1 3 Overview and Methodology 
The abovementioned research questions and hypotheses are investigated over four substantive 
chapters. In particular, the first research question is addressed over chapters 2, 3 and 4. In this 
regard, chapter 2 canvasses the methodological approaches of colonial and apartheid courts to 
international human rights law, while chapter 3 focuses on specific provisions contained in 
the 1993 and 1996 Constitution that regulate international law in municipal law and impact 
the consideration of international human rights in constitutional interpretation. In addition, 
chapter 4 provides a critical evaluation of South African Courts’ application of section 35(1) 
of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. The second research 
question is explored in chapter 5, which investigates the role of international human rights 
law in the interpretation of socio-economic rights in South Africa. 
More specifically, the aim of chapter 2 is two-fold. Firstly, I seek to provide a 
historical overview of the status of socio-economic rights in South Africa during the periods 
preceding the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. My first point of departure is that socio-
economic rights were not protected as justiciable rights during these periods. Furthermore, 
national policies and legislation aimed at advancing racial discrimination and segregation in 
South Africa frequently left many Black South Africans36 exposed to grave human rights 
violations that could not be addressed as infringements of constitutionally protected rights. In 
order to investigate the above statements, I evaluate legislation37 and the effects of these on 
                                                
36 This historical discussion of racial classification under apartheid has unfortunately made it necessary to refer 
to racial categorisations in this chapter. The term “Black” is used in this chapter to collectively describe 
individuals classified as African or “Bantu”, Coloured, Indian, or Asian, under apartheid legislation. 
37 Such as the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. 




the socio-economic interests of the Black majority in South Africa. This evaluation provides 
an important historical context that illustrates the effects of racial discrimination on socio-
economic interests that did not enjoy constitutional protection.  
Secondly, I give a comparative, historical account of South African courts’ 
relationship with international law generally on the one hand, and its relationship with the 
specific field of international human rights law on the other, during the periods preceding the 
1993 Constitution. In particular, I examine how South African courts used these sources of 
law during this time. The main assumption I set out to explore is that during these periods, 
and in particular, the period of apartheid, international law was applied frequently in South 
African courts. However, South African courts only applied international norms that did not 
contradict its racial policies and ignored important developments in the realm of international 
human rights law, especially with regard to socio-economic rights. In order to investigate 
these assumptions, I examine South African jurisprudence and in particular, the 
methodological approaches to the application of international law in the form of customary 
international law and international treaties. I compare these methodological approaches with 
the courts’ treatment of international human rights law, in order to determine whether 
international human rights law played any significant role in the jurisprudence of the South 
African courts. This historical overview will serve to illustrate the effects of South Africa’s 
political ideology on the recognition and application of international human rights law by 
South African courts prior to the adoption of the 1993 Constitution.  
In Chapter 3, I explore the significant changes brought about by the adoption of the 
1993 and 1996 Constitutions concerning firstly, the inclusion of socio-economic rights, and 
secondly, the relationship between international law and municipal law. In terms of the 
former, I examine the status of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in the 1993 and 
1996 Constitutions. Furthermore, I seek to establish the extent to which international human 
rights instruments influenced the selection and drafting of socio-economic rights included in 
the constitutional texts. My assumption in this regard is that the relevant provisions for socio-
economic rights are genetically connected to provisions found in various international human 
rights treaties, given the major influence of the latter on the drafting of these in the 1993 and 
1996 Bill of Rights. In order to investigate this assumption, I analyse which international and 
regional human rights instruments were relied upon during the drafting processes and explore 
the extent to which these assisted drafters in the formulation of socio-economic rights. To do 
so, I rely on literature outlining the drafting processes preceding the adoption of the 1993 
Constitution and undertake a detailed analysis of the preparatory materials created by drafters 
during the drafting of the 1996 Constitution. The significant role of international and regional 




human rights instruments in the drafting of provisions for socio-economic rights may 
strengthen the argument that these instruments should remain a relevant source to be 
considered when interpreting these provisions. 
Moreover, I explore the relationship between international law, international human 
rights law, and the 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions. My hypothesis is that the 
inclusion of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution affords international law, and particularly international human rights law, a 
profound role as an interpretative tool in constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, these 
provisions allow courts to engage with international norms and standards in an unprecedented 
manner in South Africa. Consequently, these international norms and standards have the 
potential to assist courts in informing the values underlying our society as well as guide them 
in the development of the nature and scope of the rights entrenched in the 1993 and 1996 Bill 
of Rights. To test these assumptions, I focus on those constitutional provisions that regulate 
the status of international treaties and customary international law in the South African 
municipal system. I proceed to distinguish these from the interpretative mandate entrenched 
in section 35(1) and section 39(1)(b) of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, respectively. 
Furthermore, I address arguments that support the consideration of international law in 
constitutional interpretation and examine the increasing trend among courts to do so. Lastly, I 
analyse the benefits that may be derived from the consideration of international law in 
constitutional interpretation in general, and socio-economic rights in particular. This inquiry 
requires that I examine the 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions and consult literature 
analysing the advantages of international law in constitutional interpretation. Against the 
backdrop of chapter 2, this analysis is relevant to my research for its elaboration on the 
significant changes ushered in by the new constitutional dispensation in respect of 
international law. In particular, it explains how the relevant provisions of the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions contribute to regulating the relationship between international law and 
municipal law and highlights the new status conferred upon international law through the 
interpretative mandate entrenched in section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. This provides an important background to the following 
chapter, which analyses the Constitutional Court’s application of these provisions. 
In chapter 4, I explore whether the Constitutional Court has developed a general 
methodological approach to the consideration of international law in light of the interpretative 
mandate entrenched in section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution. Thus, I examine the Court’s approach in relation to international law in general 
and not only within the specific field of international human rights law. My hypothesis is that 




the Court’s methodological approach towards the consideration of international law, in 
general, within this context is largely undeveloped. In order to assess this, I analyse all the 
decisions delivered by the Constitutional Court between 1993 and 2014 that have invoked 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution or section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, to be able 
to select those cases that refer specifically to the existence or development of a 
methodological approach towards the consideration of international law in the interpretation 
of the Bill of Rights. In particular, I analyse the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Makwanyane and the development of the so-called “framework dictum”.38 Furthermore, I 
examine subsequent case law that may assist in developing the framework dictum and provide 
further insight into the manner in which courts should consider international human rights law 
in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. These include the decisions in Grootboom,39 
Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa,40 and 
Glenister.41 Through this evaluation, I determine the extent to which the Constitutional Court 
has engaged with the interpretative mandate and explored the development of a 
methodological approach to the consideration of international law in the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights. Furthermore, I illustrate the guidance presently available to courts when 
adhering to the interpretative mandate in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. This 
evaluation therefore lays the foundation for the following chapter, in which I determine 
whether the Constitutional Court has applied section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and 
section 39(1)(b), and the methodological approach developed in this regard, to the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights.  
Secondly, I analyse how courts have applied section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution 
and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and in particular, the manner in which courts 
have engaged with international human rights law sources generally in the interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights. In this regard, my hypothesis is that South African courts have, on occasion 
erred, in their application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution, therefore advancing methodological misconceptions in their jurisprudence. 
To address this hypothesis, I examine reported decisions of the Constitutional Court and High 
                                                
38 As will be discussed below in section 4 2 1 of chapter 4, Chaskalson P elaborated on the sources of 
international human rights law that are to be used when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Du Plessis has phrased 
this elaboration as the “framework dictum”. See LM du Plessis “Beyond Parochialism? Transnational 
Contextualisation in Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa (with Particular Reference to Jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court)” in M Faure & AJ van der Walt (eds) Globalization and Private Law: The Way 
Forward (2010) 145-168. 
39 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
40 1996 4 SA 671 (CC) (“AZAPO”). Although this case illustrates a more restrictive approach to the role of 
international law within the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, it inadvertently underscores the relevance of the 
framework dictum. 
41 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 149. 




Courts handed down from 1996 up until 2014. This includes searching for relevant law 
reports on the legal databases provided by LexisNexis Butterworths and Juta. These search 
engines allow me to search for specific constitutional provisions that have been relied upon in 
case law. Accordingly, I am able to locate law reports that invoke section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution or section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights. These cases are selected on the basis of their reliance on section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution or section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, with the specific aim of identifying 
the manner in which courts relied upon international law and the extent to which it was used 
as an interpretative tool. Therefore, this evaluation is not limited to socio-economic rights, but 
explores courts’ application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution over a broad spectrum of rights. This investigation revisits and builds 
upon a study conducted by Botha and Olivier in which they identify various trends that 
characterise courts’ use of international law within the context of section 35(1) and section 
231 of the 1993 Constitution, and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. 42  The 
investigation also draws on the works of De Wet in which she identifies inconsistences in 
courts’ treatment of non-binding international law.43 In addition, I explore various factors that 
may influence courts’ consideration of international law, such as legal education in South 
Africa, potential challenges that courts encounter in their fulfilment of the mandate to 
consider international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and the role of legal 
representatives, amici curiae, and judges. Although these findings may not necessarily 
characterise the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence, they are still 
relevant to the extent that they highlight patterns that are generic to court’s application of the 
interpretative mandate more generally. 
In chapter 5, I explore the Constitutional Court’s application of section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution in the interpretation of socio-
economic rights and in particular, the application of the Constitutional Court’s 
methodological approach which is set out in chapter 4. The assumption I investigate is that the 
Court has applied the interpretative mandate entrenched in the abovementioned provisions 
inconsistently and has not fully utilised the methodological approach which it has established 
thus far. Furthermore, the Court has missed opportunities to draw from relevant international 
human rights standards that may have assisted it in substantively interpreting socio-economic 
rights. However, international human rights law will only be relevant to the substantive 
interpretation of socio-economic rights if the Constitutional Court adopts a substantive model 
                                                
42 Botha & Olivier (2004) SAYIL 42-77. 
43 De Wet (2004) Fordham International Law Journal 1529-1565.  




of reasonableness review. I contend that through the application of a substantive model of 
review in the adjudication of socio-economic rights, the Court engages with the scope and 
content of the rights and is consequently afforded greater opportunity to evaluate socio-
economic rights against the framework of international law, as envisaged in Makwanyane.  
In order to test this hypothesis, I seek to determine firstly, the extent to which the 
Constitutional Court has applied section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) 
of the 1996 Constitution and considered international human rights standards in the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights. Secondly, I address the Court’s application of the 
reasonableness model of review to determine whether this model of review permits 
substantive engagement with international human rights law. Thirdly, I assess international 
human rights standards with the purpose of determining whether, and to what extent, these are 
relevant to the interpretation of socio-economic rights in South Africa. Finally, I analyse the 
variety of international human rights standards considered by the Constitutional Court in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights to determine which of these the Court appears most 
comfortable or familiar with, which standards remain underutilised, and possible reasons for 
this.  
To address these questions, I conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Constitutional 
Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence. In addition, I examine international human 
rights standards canvassed in instruments and developed in jurisprudence. This includes 
examining the relevance of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights44 and the normative standards developed by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) for the Court’s interpretative process. It also includes discussing 
relevant regional human rights instruments and jurisprudence developed in the African, 
European and Inter-American human rights systems. The relevance of international and 
regional human rights standards is determined according to their ability to afford substantive 
content to socio-economic rights as well as their potential to assist the Constitutional Court in 
providing a clearer description of the obligations placed upon the State by these rights.  
In chapter 6, I set out the conclusions I have reached in my investigations into the 
historical treatment of socio-economic rights, international law and international human rights 
law in South Africa, the South African court’s application of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and the Constitutional Court’s 
development of a methodological approach to the consideration of international law in the 
                                                
44 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (“ICESCR”). As of October 2014, there are 70 signatories and 162 parties to 
the ICESCR. 




interpretation of socio-economic rights. Furthermore, I set out the conclusions I have reached 
concerning the Constitutional Court’s compliance with the interpretative mandate established 
in the above mentioned provisions and its application of the methodological approach 
developed in this respect, to socio-economic rights adjudication. In addition, I indicate my 
findings pertaining to the relevance of international and regional human rights law for socio-
economic rights interpretation in South Africa. Lastly, I make recommendations in light of 
my findings. 
 
1 4 Significance of the Research Project 
Although the South African Constitution entrenches a range of socio-economic rights, courts 
must engage with the meaning of these rights in order to determine their role in addressing 
social and economic hardship. This study highlights international law as an important 
interpretative tool that the Constitutional Court must consider when interpreting socio-
economic rights. An investigation into the application of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, and the Constitutional Court’s 
development of a methodological approach in this regard, may offer insight into ways in 
which the interpretative mandate can be applied in a more effective, consistent, and relevant 
manner. This study also emphasises the need for greater engagement with international law 
and the provision of more in-depth justifications in judicial reasoning if this source is not 
considered in the interpretation of fundamental rights. An examination of the Constitutional 
Court’s consideration of international law within the specific field of socio-economic rights 
provides a “testing ground”, the outcome of which may provide a point of departure for 
further work in areas such as children’s rights and the rights of prisoners in South Africa, as 
well civil and political rights. Furthermore, this study, importantly, draws attention to 
international and regional human rights law that has substantively developed interpretations 
of socio-economic rights. The study highlights that these interpretations may assist courts in 
substantively interpreting socio-economic rights, and in this way engage more specifically 
with the realities of socio-economic hardship in South Africa. In addition, this study draws 
attention to those international and regional human rights instruments that South Africa has 
signed and ratified, highlighting that these should play a more prominent role in the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights.  





1 5 Scope of the Study 
Although the 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions contain a number of provisions 
pertaining to international law,45 I focus primarily on the role of international law in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights in this dissertation, as provided for in section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, I examine the 
relationship between the abovementioned provisions and section 231 of the 1993 Constitution 
and section 231 and 232 of the 1996 Constitution. In addition, I only evaluate those socio-
economic rights entrenched in section 26, section 27 and section 29 of the 1996 Constitution. 
The scope of this study has been limited in this way to prevent an overly broad analysis by 
focusing only on those socio-economic rights that are applicable to “everyone” in the general 
sense. This study therefore excludes an evaluation of socio-economic rights applicable to 
specific categories of persons namely, those entrenched in section 28(1)(c) of the 1996 
Constitution, which protects socio-economic rights pertaining to children, and section 
35(2)(e) of the 1996 Constitution, which protects the socio-economic rights of persons 
detained, including sentenced prisoners. As the main focus of this study concerns the role of 
international law in the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it is 
important to note that the Court has adjudicated upon section 28(1)(c) and section 35(2)(e) of 
the 1996 Constitution in very few cases that do not contribute significantly to an evaluation of 
the role of international law in the interpretation of these rights.46  
Due to the language used in section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution47 and section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, 48  I refer to both “international law” and “public 
international law” in this dissertation. Amongst international scholars, the term “international 
                                                
45 The 1993 Constitution contains a number of provisions that concern international law. Section 82(1)(i) 
governs the negotiation and signing of treaties by the President. Section 116(2) concerns the duty placed upon 
the Human Rights Commission to report any proposed legislation to the relevant legislature if it is of the opinion 
that such proposed legislation conflicts with chapter 3 or with the norms of international human rights law. 
Furthermore, section 227(2) concerns international humanitarian law. Within the 1996 Constitution, section 233 
regulates the use of international law in the interpretation of legislation. In addition to this, section 35(3)(l), 
section 37(4)(b)(i), and section 37(8) include references to international law. 
46 For example, while section 28(1)(c) was adjudicated upon in both Grootboom and TAC, there was only limited 
consideration of this section, which was subsidiary to section 26(1) and section 27(1) of the 1996 Constitution 
respectively. 
47 Section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution states the following: 
“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to 
public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may 
have regard to comparable foreign case law.” 
48 Section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution states the following: 
 “(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
  … 
  (b) must consider international law”. 




law” is largely used to mean “public international law” and refers to that body of law that 
“primarily governs the relationship between states”.49 Express reference is usually made to 
“public international law”, as opposed to “international law”, within the context of 
distinguishing international law described above, from private international law.50 Although I 
use “international law” and “public international law” interchangeably, I refer primarily to the 
term “international law”, and only make use of the term “public international law” when 
discussing section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, and where courts and academic literature 
refer expressly to this term. Lastly, within the context of this study, international treaties 
should be understood as including international conventions. 
In addition, both section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution direct courts to consider international law sources specifically within the 
context of interpreting fundamental rights entrenched in these Constitutions. 51  While 
international human rights law is likely to be the most relevant branch of international law to 
the interpretation of fundamental human rights in South Africa, South African courts have 
considered international law sources relating to other branches of international law when 
applying these provisions.52 Thus, within the context of section 35(1) and section 39(1)(b), I 
refer to both “international law” and “public international law” in a broad, general sense that 
includes international sources of law from the different branches of international law, such as 
international human rights law, humanitarian law, and regional human rights law. 
  
                                                
49 P Malanczuk Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 7 ed (1997) 72. 
50 72. Dugard defines private international law as concerning “the relations between individuals whose legal 
relations are governed by the laws of different states.” J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 
4ed (2011) 2. 
51 N Botha “International Law and the South African Interim Constitution” (1994) 9 South African Public Law 
245 246. 
52 For example, in the AZAPO judgment, reference is made to international instruments that concern international 
humanitarian law, while in the Glenister decision the Court refers to international instruments pertaining to 
international criminal law. See chapter 4.  





The Methodological Approaches of Colonial and Apartheid 
Courts to International Human Rights Law 
 
2 1 Introduction 
The position of human rights and the role afforded to international human rights law 
during apartheid was epitomised in a statement made by the South African Law 
Commission in 1989.1 The Commission was instructed to investigate and make 
recommendations on the definition and protection of group rights, the possible 
extension of existing individual rights, and the role of the courts in this regard. Within 
this context, the Commission concluded the following:  
 
“[I]n practical and realistic terms it cannot be envisaged that human rights norms as 
enshrined in international law can to any extent play a part - let alone a significant 
part - in the decisions of our courts. The salvation of the protection of group and 
human rights in South Africa therefore does not lie in the hope that our courts will 
apply the norms of international law in this regard.”2  
 
In this chapter, I investigate the conclusion reached in the statement above and 
examine the manner in which courts invoked international human rights law under the 
apartheid legal system. To achieve this, I briefly examine legislation enacted both 
before and during the era of apartheid in South Africa to analyse how racial 
discrimination was institutionalised in the State, its impact on socio-economic rights, 
and the limited role afforded to international law in the protection of fundamental 
rights. Furthermore, I investigate how international law was accepted and applied in 
South Africa over various periods of time in order to examine the application of 
international human rights law in the protection of fundamental rights in South Africa. 
In particular, I focus on the historical development of different methodological 
approaches used by the courts. Firstly, I analyse the courts’ treatment and utilisation 
of international law in the form of international treaties and international customary 
law from the period of Dutch occupation until the end of the apartheid legal order. 
                                                
1 South African Law Commission Working Paper 25 Project 58 Group and Human Rights (1989). This 
paper was prepared for the Commission under the leadership of Mr Justice PJJ Olivier and did not 
represent the final view of the South African Law Commission, but was intended to initiate 
deliberation. As a result, subsequent reports were submitted in 1991 and 1994 respectively. 
2 182. 




Secondly, I evaluate the courts’ methodological approach to the application and 
utilisation of international treaties and international customary law within the specific 
context of international human rights law during the period of apartheid. Lastly, I 
address the extent to which these different approaches contributed towards the erosion 
of socio-economic rights in South Africa, specifically during the era of apartheid.  
 
2 2 A Historical Background to Racial Discrimination in the Socio-
Economic Sphere in South Africa 
Legislation discriminating against South Africans on the grounds of race existed in 
South Africa before the rise of the apartheid regime in 1948. For example, White 
supremacy had been established and affirmed in the Union of South Africa in the 
Constitution of 1910.3 After 1910, the creation of discriminatory laws specifically 
authorising control over the administration of Black South African citizens in various 
matters, steadily gained momentum. Under the Union, various Acts governed the 
administration of so-called “natives” in South Africa.4 This included the Native 
Affairs Act 23 of 1920, which created the Native Affairs Commission and councils 
that would, amongst other responsibilities, consider both matters concerning the 
“native” population and legislation governing the administration of “native” affairs.5 
The Native Administration Act 38 of 1927 provides another example. Through this 
                                                
3 The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 after the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Orange 
River Colony and the Transvaal, all British colonies, joined to form the Union. The Union of South 
Africa was constituted through the South Africa Act, 1909. Section 147 dealt specifically with the 
vesting of control and the administration of “native” affairs and matters affecting asiatics, in the 
Governor-General-in-Council. The Act also referred to land used for the purposes of reserves for 
“natives”, indicating that distinctions based on race were already prevalent at this time, and used for the 
purposes of segregation amongst South Africans. Furthermore, the Act specifically provided that:  
“No lands set aside for the occupation of natives which cannot at the establishment of the 
Union be alienated except by an Act of the Colonial Legislature shall be alienated or in any 
way diverted from the purposes for which they are set apart except under the authority of an 
Act of Parliament.” 
Legislation discriminating against persons based on race also existed before the creation of the Union 
such as Act No 3 of 1885. This Act concerned Indians and amongst others, regulated the areas in which 
Indians lived as well as where fixed property could be purchased. Also see J Trengove “Perspectives 
on the Role of Judges in a Deeply Divided Society” in H Corder (ed) Democracy and the Judiciary 
(1989) 125 126. 
4 Many of the Acts enacted in the apartheid and pre-apartheid era that discriminated between different 
races made use of the term “native”. The term is used in this context because of the terminology used 
in this legislation. 
5 Section 2. Section 5 and section 7 of the Act provided for the establishment of local councils in any 
portion of the “native” areas. These councils were to advise the Commission on matters affecting the 
“native” population it represented. Section 14 of the Act also provided for the establishment of general 
councils. 




Act, the Governor-General could amend or appeal any law in force in “native” areas, 
while new laws could be enacted, amended, and appealed by way of proclamation in 
the Government Gazette.6 Devenish argues that section 25 of the Act in particular 
transferred legislative power to the executive.7 Although section 26 of the Act stated 
that all proclamations must be tabled before Parliament, Devenish states that this was 
merely a “chimerical protection” as Parliament rarely controlled the actions of the 
executive during this time.8 
In 1948, the National Party came into power and introduced a more rigorous 
system of institutionalised discrimination based on race. Consequently, the political, 
civil, social and economic interests of South Africans received differential treatment 
based on racial grounds. On occasion, individuals were further classified into a certain 
ethnic, or other group, within a designated race.9 Despite international criticism, the 
Government defended these racial classifications as a form of differentiation rather 
than discrimination on the basis that all South Africans were subject to classification 
regardless of race. Once an individual was classified as Black,10 the individual was 
demoted to a race group that suffered, amongst others, inferior social, economic and 
political status and was afforded limited rights.11  
                                                
6 Native Administration Act 38 of 1927 section 25. 
7 GE Devenish “The Development of the Administrative and Political Control of Rural Blacks” in AJ 
Rycroft, LJ Boulle, MK Robertson & PR Spiller (eds) Race and the Law in South Africa: A Volume of 
Essays by Members of the School of Law, Howard College, University of Natal, Durban, to 
Commemorate the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Durban School (1987) 27. The use of the term “native” 
in this section of the chapter is, unfortunately, as a result of the language used in the Native 
Administration Act. Under this Act,  “native” was defined as including: 
“any person who is a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa: Provided that any 
person residing in an area proclaimed under section six (1) under the same conditions as a 
Native shall be regarded as a Native for the purposes of this Act.” 
9 The Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 formed one of the pillars of the apartheid legal order. 
This Act authorised the Secretary of the Interior to compile a register of the South African population 
and classify South African individuals as either “White”, “Coloured” or “Bantu” and to be placed as 
such on the register. Furthermore, section 5(1) of the Act stated that every “coloured person” and 
“Bantu” person was to be further classified into ethnic or other groups. According to the Act, racial 
classification was determined on the basis of a person’s “habits, education and speech and deportment 
and demeanor in general ... .” See also section 1, 1(2) and 5(5) of the Act. However, this Act is one of 
many that created racial classifications. Dugard argues that as a universal definition of races had not 
been enacted by the legislature, and as various Acts provided for various classifications and definitions, 
there was a lack of universal definitions of races. Furthermore, Dugard argues that this resulted in 
individuals being classified into more than one racial group depending on the purposes of the 
legislation. See J Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 60. 
10 This historical discussion of racial classification under apartheid has unfortunately made it necessary 
to refer to racial categorisations in this chapter. The term “Black” is used in this chapter to collectively 
describe individuals classified as African or “Bantu”, Coloured, Indian, or Asian, under apartheid 
legislation. 
11 Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 62.  




  The Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951 further illustrates the authorisation 
given to Government to exercise control over the affairs of “natives”. This Act was 
responsible for establishing “Bantu” authority in the form of “tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities” over “native” tribes or communities as a hierarchical form of 
local government to attend to matters relating to “natives”. A further objective of the 
apartheid legal order was the realisation of the policy of “separate development” 
between the races in South Africa through the creation of self-governing units. This 
was advanced through the enactment of the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act 
46 of 1959. This Act provided for the division of “Bantu peoples” into separate 
national units based on language and culture, which were to be governed by the 
“Bantu systems of government”.12 Furthermore, the Act removed the White members 
of Parliament who had previously represented African citizens.  
Legislation created under the Union of South Africa and later, under the 
Republic of South Africa,13 proved detrimental to the socio-economic aspects of life 
for those classified as Black in South Africa. Under the Union of South Africa, 
legislation was enacted that endorsed the large-scale dispossession of “natives” from 
their land and their subsequent relocation to allocated “reserves”. The Natives Land 
Act 27 of 191314 and the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 193615 in particular, 
established the so-called “reserves”, which were areas specifically demarcated for the 
occupation of “natives”.16 Furthermore, the Native Trust and Land Act authorised the 
Governor-General to demarcate certain areas as “black spots”, which were areas 
characterised as “native” owned properties surrounded by White owned farms. The 
                                                
12 Preamble to the Act. According to section 2 of the Act, the “Bantu population” was to be divided up 
into the following national units: North-Sotho unit, South-Sotho unit, Swazi unit, Tsonga unit, Tswana 
unit, Venda unit, Xhosa unit and Zulu unit. 
13 South Africa gained its independence in 1931, by way of the Statute of Westminster 22 Geo. V, c.4. 
(1931). In 1948, the National Party come into power and in 1961, under the National Party 
Government, South Africa became a Republic by way of the South African Constitution Act 32 of 
1961. 
14 In this Act, “native” is defined as:  
“[A]ny person, male or female, who is a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa; and 
shall further include any company or other body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, if 
the persons who have a controlling interest therein are natives”.  
This Act established extremely strict regulations concerning transactions and agreements entered into 
with “natives” regarding land. 
15 Section 4(2) of this Act provided for the establishment of the South African Native Trust, a 
mechanism used for “the settlement, support, benefit, and material and moral welfare of the natives of 
the Union”. Furthermore, specific land was vested in the Trust and was allocated towards the exclusive 
use, and for the benefit, of “natives”. The Governor-General could do so based on reasons of public 
health or any reason promoting public welfare or was in the public interest.  
16 The legislation refers to the term “natives”, which is defined in section 49 of the Act. 




Governor-General was authorised to expropriate these “black spots”, which resulted 
in the relocation of the inhabitants, while the expropriation often deprived “native” 
landowners of their title deeds.17 Occasionally, “native” landowners were offered 
meagre compensation, but challenges to these offers were often too expensive to 
pursue.18 
After South Africa became a Republic, the National Party Government 
increasingly enacted laws discriminating against South African citizens on the 
grounds of race. This included the enactment of legislation such as the Group Areas 
Act 36 of 1966,19 the Rural Coloured Areas Act 24 of 1963 and the Community 
Development Act 3 of 1966. From 1960 until 1980, roughly 3.5 million people were 
relocated from rural areas to urban areas.20 The relocation of people on such a large 
scale resulted in the uprooting and separation of many communities and families.21 
Numerous problems followed as a result of these resettlements as the homelands were 
subject to severe overcrowding and restrictions were placed on access to clean water, 
sanitation, and electricity.22 Furthermore, the locations demarcated for resettlement 
were often rural areas far removed from places of employment in the cities, which 
limited the opportunities of employment and promoted the increase of migrant labour. 
Moreover, the inhabitants of the homelands were often used as a cheap source of 
migrant labour for mines and farms.23 Even before the enactment of apartheid 
legislation, a migrant labour system existed, which provided a vital force behind the 
economic and social development of the country. Due to the racial segregation 
                                                
17 Section 13(2) of the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. This referred to land located outside a 
“Scheduled native area” and a “released area” that was owned by a “native”. 
18 South African Human Rights Commission South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) 
Report on Poverty and Human Rights (1997-1998) 5 7. 
19 This Act is the product of pre-Union legislation that was aimed at controlling the influx of Indians 
into urban areas in the colonies. The various laws were later brought together under the Group Areas 
Act 41 of 1950, the Group Areas Act 77 of 1957 and finally culminated into the Group Areas Act 36 of 
1966. For a historical account of this process and aims of the final Act see Dugard Human Rights and 
the South African Legal Order 79-83. 
20 South African Human Rights Commission SANGOCO Report on Poverty and Human Rights 7. 
21 The removal of communities and families were often preceded by stopping essential services such as 
transport systems, clinics, postal services and schools, as seen in the case of the removal of the 
Roosboom Community in Northern KwaZulu Natal. Identified as a “black spot” under the 1913 and 
1936 Land Acts, the removal and relocation of the members of this community to Ezakheni (25 km 
outside Ladysmith) is just one example of many such cases that arose under the National Party 
Government. See B Xulu & B Maharaj “Land Restitution during Apartheid’s Dying Days: The 
Struggle for Restoration and Resolution in Roosboom” (2004) 34 Africa Insight 48 48.    
22 SF Khunou “Traditional Leadership and Independent Bantustans of South Africa: Some Milestones 
of Transformative Constitutionalism beyond Apartheid” (2009) 12 PER 81 89-90. 
23 H Coovadia, R Jewkes, P Barron, D Sanders & D McIntyre “The Health and Health System of South 
Africa: Historical Roots of Current Public Health Challenges” (2009) 374 The Lancet 817 823. 




enforced in urban areas, Black migrant workers were restricted to Black urban areas 
that were often characterised by poor living conditions in overcrowded and unsanitary 
hostels and slums.24 
Policies and laws under the apartheid regime also affected the way Black 
South Africans were able to gain access to health services and the resources necessary 
to attain a certain level of health. Under the system of apartheid, health care facilities 
were segregated in accordance with race and health care services provided to the 
Black South African majority were of an inferior quality when compared to health 
care services provided to the White South African minority.25    
Within the context of education, legislation was enacted for the purposes of 
segregating learners as well as discriminating between White learners and Black 
learners.26 Legislation such as the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 contributed 
significantly towards this.27 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) reported that this Act aimed to regulate the African 
education system as well as effect control over the system in accordance with State 
policy.28 This legislation provided that the administration and control of “native” 
education was transferred from provincial administrations to the Government of the 
Union. Furthermore, the Minister was authorised to prescribe the medium of 
instruction to be used by so-called “Bantu schools”. 29  However, the “Bantu 
education” system developed by the apartheid Government resulted in the inferior 
educational development of the Black population. In 1976, Black students’ 
dissatisfaction with the “Bantu” system of education led to uprisings that ultimately 
                                                
24 819. 
25 World Health Organization Apartheid and Health (1983) 25.  
26 However, Woker argues that even at the time of the establishment of the first missionary schools in 
1658, discrimination existed. Woker states that the children of colonists were educated in preparation 
for their role as “masters”, while the education of Blacks was aimed at preparing them to serve these 
“masters”. See K Govender & TA Woker “Race and Social Rights” in A Rycroft, LJ Boulle, MK 
Robertson & PR Spiller (eds) Race and the Law in South Africa: A Volume of Essays by Members of 
the School of Law, Howard College, University of Natal, Durban, to Commemorate the Sixtieth 
Anniversary of the Durban School (1987) 229 235-236.  
27 Section 1(i) of the Act stated that the term “Bantu” was defined as being synonymous with the term 
“native”. Section 1(v) of the Act defined “native” as “any person who is or is generally accepted as a 
member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa”. Legislation such as the Coloured Persons Education 
Act 47 of 1963 and the Indians Education Act 61 of 1965 advanced governmental control over other 
races in South Africa within the sphere of education. 
28 UNESCO Apartheid: Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture and Information (1967) 31. 
29 Section 15(1)(e). Section 1(vi) of the Act defined a “native school” or “Bantu school” as the 
following:  
“[A]ny school, class, college, or institution for the education of Bantu children or persons, or 
for the instruction and training of Bantu persons who desire to become teachers or to improve 
their qualifications as teachers”. 




resulted in demonstrations across the country. 30  Initially, this manifested as 
disapproval among African learners with the use of Afrikaans as the medium of 
instruction. However, this disapproval soon escalated to include dissatisfaction with 
the entire “Bantu” system of education. Although the Government introduced changes 
to address this dissatisfaction, there were still great disparities in the quality of 
education provided to White and Black learners, as indicated, for example, in the 
pupil-teacher ratios.31  
Furthermore, the Extension of University Education Act 45 of 1959 provided 
for the establishment of university colleges for “Bantu” persons only32 and for “non-
white persons other than Bantu persons”.33  The Act provided that “non-white” 
students were not permitted to register with any university other than the University 
of South Africa without the written consent of the Minister.34 Accordingly, non-white 
students could still attend “Open Universities”, however, White people were 
prohibited from registering and attending the university colleges 35  and such 
attendance constituted a criminal offence. 
In conclusion, although not an exhaustive list of apartheid legislation, the 
above laws illustrate the manner in which apartheid was established through 
legislation in South Africa and how apartheid was strengthened under the guise of 
                                                
30 Dugard The South African Legal Order 83. 
31 In 1978, the following statistics were made available using educational statistics provided by the 
National Department of Statistics. These ratios included primary, secondary and special classes: White 
- 1:19,7; Coloured - 1:29,2; Asian - 1:27,2; African - 1:49,2. South African Institute of Race Relations 
Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979 33 (1980) 487. 
32 Section 2 of the Act. 
33 Section 3 of the Act. Before the adoption of this Act, Blacks were excluded from attending 
universities such as the University of Stellenbosch, the University of Pretoria, the University of the 
Orange Free State and the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education. However, the 
University of Cape Town and the University of Witwatersrand were regarded as “Open Universities”, 
which permitted the attendance of Black students with a certain amount of segregation. The University 
of Natal also admitted Black students, but was not consistently referred to as an “Open University”. 
See UNESCO Apartheid 84. The University of Rhodes technically allowed Black students into certain 
programmes. However, Landis states that this was not done in practice. In addition, the University of 
South Africa established correspondence courses, for which Black students registered. Furthermore, 
Black students attended the University of Fort Hare. For a detailed discussion, see ES Landis “South 
African Apartheid Legislation II: Extension, Enforcement and Perpetuation” (1962) 71 Yale Law 
Journal 437 496-499. The Extension of University Education Act 45 of 1959 established the creation 
of separate universities for each ethnic group to prevent Black students from attending “Open 
Universities”. In addition, Africans were furthered divided into “tribal groups” and were forced to 
attend the colleges established for their respective “tribal” groups. Consequently, The University 
College at Fort Hare, the University of the North, the University of Zululand, the University of the 
Western Cape, and the University of Westville, were used for these purposes and were controlled 
entirely by the State. See Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 84. 
34 Section 31 and 32 of the Act. 
35 Section 17. 




“separate development”. Furthermore, the discussion illustrates that the system of 
institutionalised racism was geared at attaining various degrees of segregation and 
discrimination between different races living in South Africa in all areas of life. 
Consequently, this resulted in the infringement of a broad spectrum of rights and 
interests, which included socio-economic interests.  
 
2 3 The Reception of International Law into the Colonial Legal 
Order 
As will be elaborated upon below, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty did not 
allow individuals the opportunity to challenge discriminatory legislation by way of 
judicial review.36 In addition, socio-economic rights did not exist in the colonial and 
apartheid legal systems as justiciable or enforceable rights, which could be relied 
upon for the protection against infringement, or as a means to claim redress.37 
Citizens who were negatively affected by social legislation that promoted racial 
discrimination were left with little recourse to justice and few opportunities to rely 
upon human rights as recognised and protected under international law. In this 
discussion, I trace the reception, and use, of international law in the South African 
legal order over various periods to determine how the courts engaged with this source 
of law, and why it played such a limited role in the protection of human rights. 
The emergence of the international community as it is known today began 
largely as a consequence of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the end 
of the Thirty Years War. 38  Consequently, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
witnessed the rise of countries such as England, Spain, France, and later, the 
Netherlands, as powerful forces desirous of independence and colonial expansion.39 
                                                
36 For a history of the reception of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty into the South African 
legal system, see Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 14-36. 
37 In fact, the Preamble to the Constitution stated that: 
“ WE DECLARE that we 
… 
ARE CONVINCED of the necessity of standing united and of pursuing the following national
  goals:  
… 
To respect and to protect the human dignity, life, liberty and property of all in our midst, 
To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples,  
To further private initiative and effective competition; …”. 
However, this Constitution did not have a bill of rights which constitutionally protected any 
rights as justiciable. 
38 The Peace Treaty of Westphalia was signed at Münster and Osnabrück in October 1648. 
39 A Cassese International Law (2005) 23-24. 




These developments caused, amongst others, a change in the nature of State 
behaviour, which required a form of international regulation that differed from 
previous periods.40 Scholars working in the field of law and inter-state relations 
during this time contributed significantly to the creation of a systematic body of rules 
that provided for such regulation. In particular, the Roman-Dutch writer, Hugo de 
Groot, more commonly known as Grotius, published a major treatise on international 
law known as the De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres41 in 1625. Grotius developed his 
treatise on international law based on natural law.42 A more positivist approach to 
international law was only developed later as evidenced, for example, in the views of 
scholars such as Van Bynkershoek who argued that the consent of nations, as found in 
custom or treaty, formed the basis for international law.43 Despite these differing 
views regarding the basis of international law, Grotius and Van Bynkershoek, along 
with other Roman-Dutch scholars, blended references to municipal law and aspects of 
international law in their works.44 This was done in a manner that did not distinguish 
between international law and municipal law.45 De Jure Belli ac Pacis for example, 
dealt with aspects of international law and in addition to these, canvassed areas of 
contract law, the law of delict, criminal law, and family law.46 International law and 
municipal law were dealt with as part of the same universal legal order, thereby 
confirming a monistic approach to the reception of international law into municipal 
law.47  
Since the works of Grotius were widely accepted by Roman-Dutch writers, 
international law was never regarded as a foreign system of law for practical purposes 
                                                
40 23-24.  
41 Grotius produced legal works before this namely, De Jure Praedae (1604-1606) which dealt with the 
law of prize and Mare Liberum (1609), which consisted of one chapter of his previous work from De 
Jure Praedae. However, none of these writings expounded upon international law as was done in the 
De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, translated as “On the Law of War and Peace” (“De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis”). 
42 For a detailed description on the works of Grotius, see CS Edwards Hugo Grotius, the Miracle of 
Holland: A Study in Political and Legal Thought (1981) and HR Hahlo & E Kahn The South African 
Legal System and its Background (1973) 550-553. 
43 J Dugard “The Place of Public International Law in South African Law” in C Visser (ed) Essays in 
Honour of Ellison Kahn (1989) 108 110. Works published by Van Bynkershoek that discussed this 
positivistic approach to international law included De Domino Maris (1702), De Foro Legatorum 
(1721) and Quaestiones Juris Publici (1737). 
44 J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 1 ed (1994) 37. 
45 Roman-Dutch writers such as Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Joannes Loenius, and Joannes van der 
Linden are amongst those scholars who followed a monist approach to applying international law 
directly into municipal law. See AJGM Sanders “The Applicability of Customary International Law in 
Municipal Law - South Africa’s Monist Tradition” (1977) 40 THRHR 147 148.    
46 J Dugard International Law-A South African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 43. 
47 Dugard “The Place of Public International Law” in Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 110.   




in Holland.48 It was practice to rely directly upon the rules of international law 
without any need to take further steps to incorporate them into the municipal law 
before applying them.49 The argument that international law and municipal law 
should be distinguished from one another as two different legal orders was only raised 
at the end of the nineteenth century.50 Dugard suggests that this argument did not 
originate from, nor did it significantly interest, the Roman-Dutch jurists.51 In this 
regard, Dugard argues that the Roman-Dutch jurists were loyal to the view that 
natural law formed the basis of international law and that this would have kept them 
from supporting the emerging argument that international law and municipal law were 
two separate legal orders.52 
Although seemingly far removed from the South African context today, it is 
against this backdrop that a discussion on international law within the South African 
legal system begins. It was the works of the Roman-Dutch scholars that travelled with 
the Dutch to the Cape that were subsequently transplanted into the South African 
municipal legal order. Consequently, the acceptance of Roman-Dutch law by the 
South African legal order began with the arrival of the Dutch in the Cape of Good 
Hope in 1652 under the auspices of the Dutch East India Company. The Dutch 
occupation lasted until 1795, and it was during this time that the law of Holland was 
enforced in the Cape.53 After Dutch rule, the first occupation by the British occurred 
and the Cape remained under British rule until 1910.54 Even after British occupation, 
the British Government chose to maintain Roman-Dutch law as the common law of 
the Cape and Roman-Dutch law was subsequently accepted in the Transvaal, the 
Orange Free State, and Natal.55  
In terms of their approach to international law, the method used by the Dutch 
found continued support on South African soil. Municipal law and international law 
were considered to form part of the same universal system. Consequently, during this 
time, South African courts applied international law directly within municipal law 
without requiring any legislative incorporation of international law into the municipal 
                                                
48 Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 1 ed 38. 




53 Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background 572. 
54 569. British occupation between 1795 and 1910 was briefly interrupted when the Cape was ruled by 
the Batavian Republic from February 1803 until January 1806.  
55 Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background 575-576. 




legal order.56 Case law dating back to 1881 provides evidence of this approach and 
demonstrates the importance attached to the role of international law in domestic 
matters by the South African judiciary. This is illustrated in one of the earliest cases 
of Ncumata v Matwa,57 a case concerning the capture of an alleged rebel’s property, 
which came before the Eastern Districts Court of the Cape of Good Hope in 1881 and 
1882. In this case, the court rejected an argument put forward by the plaintiff that was 
based on the provisions of placaaten.58 Instead, the judge directly applied principles 
of international law, as relied upon by the defendants,59 without requiring their 
legislative incorporation into municipal law.60   
In 1894, the monistic approach to the use of international law (as elaborated 
further in section 2 4) was again illustrated in the case of C.C. Maynard Et Alii v the 
Field Cornet of Pretoria.61 In the judgment, Kotz CJ cited Sir Henry Maine as 
follows: “[T]he [municipal] law must be interpreted in such a way as not to conflict 
with the principles of International Law ...”.62 This judgment was, however, couched 
with a warning that would resonate in South Africa over 50 years later, and stated 
further that: 
 
“It follows from the above, as put by Sir Henry Maine, ‘that the State which 
disclaims the authority of International Law places herself outside the circle of 
civilised nations.’ It is only by a strict adherence to these recognised principles that 
our young State can hope to acquire and maintain the respect of all civilised 
communities, and so preserve its own national independence.”63 
 
                                                
56 Dugard “The Place of Public International Law” in Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 112. 
57 1881-1882 2 EDC 272 279. 
58 Placaaten is a form of legislation. Certain placaaten for example, were received into the Cape from 
the States of Holland. See Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background 151. The 
particular placaaten relied upon in this case by the plaintiffs was the Placaat of the 10th of August 
1778, which abolished the confiscation of the property of criminals. In addition to this, the plaintiffs 
relied upon the Placaat of the 22nd of April 1779, which abolished old forms of punishment that 
included the confiscation of property of persons who had been involved in rebellion. 
59 Ncumata v Matwa 1881-1882 2 EDC 272 277. To expound upon the law governing the taking of 
property from an enemy during war, the defendants cited international law authorities. The judgment 
does not reference these sources in full. However, considering the information provided and the date of 
judgment, it is submitted that these included amongst others Grotius, TD Woolsey Introduction to the 
Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching, and in Historical Studies 5 ed (1879) and 
E Vattel The Law of Nations or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns Translated by J Chitty (1866). 
60 Ncumata v Matwa 1881-1882 2 EDC 272 279.  
61 1894 (1) Off Rep 214.   
62 223. 
63 223.  




This case dealt with the obligations resting on foreigners to undertake military 
service. In deciding the matter, Kotz CJ referred to the manner in which the issues at 
hand were dealt with in scholarly works on international law.64 In the same judgment, 
Jorissen J stated the following: 
 
“There is no doubt that the laws of this Republic must be viewed and interpreted, in 
case of ambiguity, with due regard to the higher law, which is accepted in all 
civilized countries as ideal without further proof. And even if we wished to do 
otherwise, sect. 3 of the Grondwet is imperative, for it says, ‘They desire themselves 
to be recognised and respected by the civilized world as a free and independent 
people.’ What prevails as right in the whole civilized world must also prevail in this 
country, and the laws of the country must be interpreted in conformity therewith.”65 
 
Jorissen J went on to state that general international law relevant to the matter was 
derived from two sources - the doctores juris and the writers, as well as the treaties 
signed between civilized nations. 66  This case clearly indicates that matters of 
municipal law were addressed by relying on scholarly works of international law as 
well as treaties signed between other nations, without any need to transform these 
principles and norms into municipal law. Recourse was also had to international law 
in relation to issues raised by the South African War.67 Dugard notes that municipal 
courts had to consider the rights of belligerents, the confiscation of property for war 
purposes, the seizure of enemy property, and the legality of the annexation of the 
Boer Republics within the context of international law.68 The courts adjudicated these 
cases by seeking guidance from the Roman-Dutch jurists such as Grotius, Van 
Bynkershoek and Vattel, as well as examining more contemporary literature by 
authors such as Wheaton, Halleck, and Lawrence in determining the applicable rules 
of international law.69 As in Roman-Dutch law, international law was consulted and 
directly applied as an integral part of municipal law. Through the courts’ consultation 
                                                
64 223, 226-228. These authorities included amongst others, the writings of E Vattel, the work of AW 
Heffter as well as the writings of JK Bluntschli, WE Hall and HW Halleck, who published works in the 
field of international law. 
65 C.C. Maynard Et Alii v the Field Cornet of Pretoria 1894 (1) Off Rep 232. 
66 232. Jorissen utilised the first source of law by consulting the opinion of Bluntschli and relied further 
on the writings of a Dutch lawyer who in turn quoted Vattel. In terms of the second source of 
international law, Jorissen considered the international treaties entered into by the Government and 
England. 
67 This war took place between 1899 and 1902. 
68 Dugard “The Place of Public International Law” in Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 112-113. 
69 J Dugard “The South African Judiciary and International Law in the Apartheid Era” (1998) 14 
SAJHR 110 112. 




and use of international legal sources, South African law was shaped in harmony with 
prevailing international law during colonial times. 
 
2 4 The Monism / Dualism Debate in South Africa 
The methods of incorporating international law into a domestic legal order centre 
around two different schools of thought concerning how and when international law 
becomes part of municipal law. The first school, known as the monist school, views 
the international legal order and municipal legal orders as part of a uniform, universal 
system of law.70 Within this system, municipal law has a subordinate position, while 
the courts apply rules of international law directly without these laws undergoing any 
transformation or adoption into municipal law. The second school of thought, more 
commonly known as the dualist school, views the international legal order as separate 
from municipal legal orders. 71  According to this theory, international law and 
municipal law differ in respect of their sources of law, their subjects of law, and in 
their subject matter.72 Consequently, if international law is to be applied in municipal 
law, this theory requires that the relevant rules of international law be transformed or 
adopted into municipal law in order to apply internally.73  
The monism-dualism divide originated at the beginning of the 19th century, 
eventually entering the legal academic debate in South Africa in 1971.74 The theory of 
dualism was strongly supported by Booysen. He took the position that customary 
international law was a separate legal system and customary international rules could 
only be applied in appropriate cases.75 In response, the theory of monism was 
                                                
70 T Maluwa “International Human Rights Norms and the South African Interim Constitution 1993” 
(1993) 51 SAYIL 14 28. 
71 R Schaffer “The Inter-Relationship between Public International Law and the Law of South Africa: 
An Overview” (1983) 32 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 227 278-279. 
72 Schaffer (1983) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279; Cassese International Law 214. 
73 Maluwa (1993) SAYIL 28; Dugard “The Place of Public International Law” in Essays in Honour of 
Ellison Kahn 114; Schaffer (1983) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 280. 
74 This debate began in 1971 when Professor John Dugard reviewed the first of a trio of cases involving 
the question of whether customary international law formed part of South African law. 
75 H Booysen “Is Gewoonteregtelike Volkereg Deel van Ons Reg?” (1975) 38 THRHR 315-322. 
Booysen submits that it is incorrect to state that customary international law is part of South African 
law to the extent that the “act of state” doctrine does not exclude its application, and on condition that 
customary international law does not conflict with legislation. He argues that even though Roman-
Dutch writers, such as Van Bynkershoek and Grotious, wrote about international law, this in no way 
means that modern international law formed part of Roman-Dutch law then or forms part of South 
African common law as it stands today. See also Dugard “The Place of Public International Law” in 
Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn. 




advocated by Dugard who maintained that customary international law had, save for a 
few exceptions, become part of the law of South Africa.76  
Even though the pre-Union courts adopted a favourable attitude towards the 
monist application of international law in the cases referred to above, the constitutions 
of 1910, 1961 and 1983 offered very little guidance as to how courts were to apply 
international law.77 For example, the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 
198378 made but scant reference in section 679 and section 9480 to the relationship 
between international law in the form of international treaties and agreements and the 
domestic legal order. It was only in 1971, in the case of South Atlantic Island 
Development Ltd v Buchan that the Cape Provincial Division expressly declared the 
status of customary international law in South Africa.81 While it was regarded as trite 
that international customary law formed part of South African municipal law,82 no 
mention of the status of customary international law was made in any of the pre-1993 
constitutions. 
As international law does not generally instruct States on how they should go 
about incorporating international law into their domestic legal orders, such 
incorporation depends upon the approach chosen by the State. Therefore, a judge has 
to give effect to specific international norms or instruments according to whether the 
State has chosen to follow a dualist or monist approach to the incorporation of 
international law into a municipal legal system. International treaties were treated 
differently to customary international law during the apartheid regime. Therefore, the 
discussion that follows will focus on the approach taken by the South African courts 
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78 Act 110 of 1983. 
79 Section 6 states the following: 
“The State President and his powers: 
(3) The State President shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have  power -  
to enter into and ratify international conventions, treaties and agreements”. 
80 Section 94 states the following: 
“All rights and obligations under conventions, treaties or agreements which were binding on 
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81 1971 1 SA 234 (C) (“South Atlantic”). See section 2 5 2 below. This case concerned an applicant’s 
request for an interdict against the respondent for allegedly violating the applicant’s fishing rights 
granted to him over certain territorial waters. 
82 Dugard (1998) SAJHR 112. 




during this period in respect of these two sources of international law. In addition, I 
will evaluate the approach followed by the courts concerning the application of 
international human rights law during the period of apartheid. These two 
methodological approaches will be compared to highlight the restricted use of 
international human rights law during this period.  
 
2 5 The Role of the Judiciary in the Application of International Law 
and International Human Rights Law during Apartheid 
2 5 1 A dualist approach to the incorporation of treaties into municipal law 
The United Kingdom, and other countries of the British Commonwealth, followed a 
dualist approach to the incorporation of international treaties into their domestic legal 
orders. Even though South Africa was a former Commonwealth country, very little 
judicial authority existed before 1965 to confirm its use of a dualist approach, or any 
other practice, to the incorporation of international treaties.83 In 1965, the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa made its first pronouncement on the 
relationship between municipal law and international conventions in Pan American 
World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co Ltd.84 In this case, 
the appellant raised a defence based on the conditions of a treaty to which South 
Africa was a party namely, the provisions of the Bilateral Air Transport Agreement of 
1947 between South Africa and the United States of America as well as the Universal 
Postal Convention of 1957. Steyn CJ upheld the view of counsel for the respondent 
and stated the following: 
 
“It is common cause, and trite law I think, that in this country the conclusion of a 
treaty, convention or agreement by the South African Government with any other 
Government is an executive and not a legislative act. As a general rule, the provisions 
of an international instrument so concluded, are not embodied in our municipal law 
except by legislative process. The Universal Postal Convention and the Bilateral Air 
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Transport Agreement are no exceptions. In the absence of any enactment giving their 
relevant provisions the force of law, they cannot affect the rights of the subject.”85 
  
Although this judgment did not reflect on the status of international human rights 
treaties in South African municipal law, it confirmed the use of a dualist approach 
towards international treaties generally. Accordingly, the executive was responsible 
for signing treaties, while the provisions of the treaty would only have domestic effect 
once legislatively enacted into municipal law.86 
The legislative process described above could take several forms. The treaty 
provisions could be included in the text of an Act of Parliament.87 In addition, the 
treaty could take the form of a schedule to an Act, or an enabling Act could allow the 
executive authority to give domestic effect to the treaty by proclamation in the 
Government Gazette.88   
  
2 5 2 International treaties and the protection of human rights in South Africa  
The method described above indicates that it was possible for treaty provisions to find 
application in the municipal legal order. Within the context of international human 
rights law, the Union of South Africa was an original member of the League of 
Nations and made positive contributions to the League in this regard.89 South Africa 
also ratified the United Nations Charter on 7 November 1945, and was an original 
member of the instrument.90 This involvement in the advancement of human rights 
under the auspices of South African leadership seemed to have set the scene for a 
significant and successful relationship between South Africa and the international 
community. In addition, South Africa was bound by the provisions of the UN Charter, 
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which called for the respect of human rights. This was most notably entrenched in 
articles 55(c)91 and 5692 of the UN Charter. However, the ill treatment of persons of 
Indian origin in South Africa was brought before the UN General Assembly 
(“UNGA”) in the following year.93 In the following years, South Africa’s racial 
policies resulted in the increase of complaints brought before the UNGA and 
remained on the UN’s agenda until 1994.94  
Dugard argues that South Africa exploited the weaknesses of the human rights 
clauses contained in the UN Charter, which enabled it to defend its discriminatory 
practices.95 In addition, he submits that, although South Africa was a party to the UN 
Charter, the Government had not taken any steps towards incorporating the provisions 
of the instrument into South African domestic law.96 Consequently, in accordance 
with South Africa’s dualist approach to international treaties, the provisions of the UN 
                                                
91 Article 55 of the UN Charter states the following: 
“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
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and development; 
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92 Article 56 of the UN Charter states the following: 
“All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.” 
93 See ‘Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa’ UNGA Res 44 (I) (8 December 1946). This 
was the first General Assembly resolution on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of 
South Africa. This issue frequently appeared on the agenda until the General Assembly eventually 
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Government of the Republic of South Africa’ UNGA Res 1761 (XVII) (6 November 1962). 
94 South Africa received support from various countries in its initial stages of defending apartheid 
before the General Assembly. The South African Government justified its internal policies by relying 
on article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and in particular, that this article took priority over the human rights 
provisions entrenched in the UN Charter. See Dugard International Law 1 ed 202. 
95 Dugard International Law 1 ed 201. Dugard argued that the human rights clauses contained in the 
UN Charter suffered from various defects. Firstly, he argued that the clauses were vague and it was 
therefore unclear which precise rights were subject to protection under the UN Charter, the right of 
non-discrimination being the exception. Secondly, the lack of enforcement mechanisms worsened 
matters as action was only taken in cases of severe human rights violations that threatened international 
peace and security according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thirdly, although it has been suggested 
that article 56 implies that at the very least, States have a negative obligation to act in a manner that 
does not undermine human rights, Dugard argued that it was not certain whether States incurred any 
legal obligation under the UN Charter at all. Lastly, Dugard submitted that the principle of non-
intervention, as expounded upon in article 2(7) of the UN Charter, conflicted with the UN Charter’s 
human rights clauses. According to Dugard, the above points weakened the legal status of the human 
rights clauses contained in the UN Charter, and South Africa was successfully able to exploit these 
weaknesses.  
96 J Dugard “The Role of International Law in Interpreting the Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 208 
208. 




Charter could not be directly invoked as part of South African municipal law in cases 
of human rights violations.   
At an international level, the South African Government expressed its growing 
disregard for international human rights norms by its abstention from voting on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights97 in 1948, and its subsequent refusal to be 
party to any other human rights instruments thereafter.98 
Consequently, it had become clear that the political regime in South Africa 
after 1948 envisaged a different fate for international human rights treaties that 
ultimately affected the protection of individual rights in South Africa. International 
human rights treaties could not play an effective role in protecting the rights and 
interests of individuals before South African courts during the period of apartheid. 
However, as will be elaborated upon in the following discussion, the courts did, on 
occasion, have the opportunity to invoke those human rights norms that formed part 
of customary international law, such as the principle of non-discrimination, as well as 
the common law presumption that a statute should not be interpreted to violate a rule 
of international law. 
 
2 5 3 A monist approach to the incorporation of customary international law into 
municipal law  
As stated above, the relationship between international law and South African 
municipal law was not addressed in any of the South African Constitutions prior to 
1993, nor was it defined in South African legislation during apartheid and the periods 
preceding it. Scholars have submitted that this relationship was largely governed by 
rules found in English common law, which South Africa inherited from the United 
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Kingdom.99 Dugard argues that courts readily sought guidance from English law, as 
opposed to Roman Dutch law, which included seeking guidance from English law on 
matters of public international law.100 English courts followed the “Blackstonian 
principle” in terms of which customary international law forms part of the law of the 
land.101 Case law from as early as 1735 provides evidence that English courts hold a 
long tradition of recognising, as well as taking judicial notice of, the law of nations.102 
Sanders argues that various factors played a role in influencing South African 
courts to act upon the basis of the “Blackstonian principle”.103 First, South Africa’s 
governmental structure was based on the English model, and also contained three 
branches of government.104 Second, South African courts not only closely resembled 
English courts, but also adopted the English principle of stare decisis.105 Although 
Sanders admits that South African courts never expressly alluded to the “Blackstonian 
principle”, Sanders’ survey of South African case law from 1882 up until 1975 
indicates that South African courts considered customary international law as having 
direct application in municipal law to the extent that courts could take judicial notice 
of it.106 
Before the 1993 Constitution entered into force in April 1994, South African 
courts discussed the status of customary international law within the South African 
                                                
99 Schaffer (1983) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 283. Sanders (1977) THRHR 150; 
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domestic legal order in a number of cases.107 As noted above, the courts took judicial 
notice of customary international law based on the assumption that customary 
international law formed part of South African municipal law. 108  Ex parte 
Schumann,109 a case heard before the Natal Provincial Division, is one such example 
in which Selke J states that: 
 
“I see no reason to suppose that these principles of international law are other than 
principles of general application throughout the civilised world ... and, in my opinion, 
they are principles which are recognised by the law of this country.” 110 
 
According to Maluwa, this decision expressed the view that customary international 
law formed part of South African law and has since been interpreted as adopting a 
monist approach towards customary international law.111 Similarly, in S v Ramotse,112 
a case heard before the Transvaal Provincial Division, Viljoen J readily accepted for 
the purposes of the judgment that customary international law formed part of South 
African municipal law.113 Furthermore, in Parkin v Government of the Republique 
Democratique du Congo,114 a case heard before the Witwatersrand Local Division, 
Myburgh J stated that: 
 
“The problem that arises in this application is whether this court is entitled, in law, to 
attach the money of a foreign sovereign State to found jurisdiction against such a 
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State. The answer to this problem is to be found in international law to the extent that 
our common law recognises such international law.”115 
 
Bridge interpreted this to mean that, “to an undefined extent customary international 
law was seen as forming part of South African common law.”116 Yet, Sanders used 
this statement to illustrate the point that certain qualifications existed that limited the 
application of the principle that international law forms part of South African law 
namely, “to the extent that the South African common law recognises such 
international law.”117 Following a similar approach, Dugard cited Parkin as a case 
that “diluted” the monist approach affirmed later in South Atlantic.118 
Many widely viewed South Atlantic as a pioneering judgment clearly 
expressing that customary international law formed part of South African municipal 
law, relying on English and American court practice to do so. In this decision, 
Diemont J stated that: 
 
“Although I am surprised that there is no decision in which a South African Court has 
expressly asserted that international law forms part of our law, I would be even more 
surprised if there were a decision asserting the contrary. It appears to have been 
accepted in both the English and the American courts that international law forms 
part of their own law... . And there are also one or two indications in decisions in our 
courts that judicial notice will be taken of international law... . In my view it is the 
duty of this court to ascertain and administer the appropriate rule of international law 
in this case.”119  
 
This case also highlights the view that international law was not a foreign system of 
law that had to be proven before the courts by way of an affidavit.120 
The judgments of Ramotse, Parkin, and South Atlantic do not expressly state 
whether the principles laid down therein are to be applied to international treaties or 
customary international law, or to both. However, Bridge argues that the rules stated 
therein apply to customary international law.121 This is based on the fact that Pan 
American World Airways expressly laid down specific principles that alluded to a 
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different methodological approach to be used in the incorporation of treaties into 
municipal law.122 In 1977, the Appellate Division stated the following in the case of 
Nduli v Minister of Justice:  
 
“While it is obvious that international law is to be regarded as part of our law, it has 
to be stressed that the fons et origo of this proposition must be found in Roman-Dutch 
law.”123 
 
Although the judgment is considered to be the leading precedent on the role of 
customary international law in the South African municipal legal order prior to the 
advent of the 1993 Constitution, it did attract criticism.124 The judgment was criticised 
as not fully clarifying the application of international customary law in the South 
African legal order, as it may be construed as supporting both a dualist and monist 
approach.125 Dugard’s criticism centres on the court’s decision to base the proposition 
that customary international is part of the law of the Republic, on Roman-Dutch law, 
as opposed to referring to previous case law that confirmed such incorporation.126 
Dugard argues that such a proposition affirms that customary international law forms 
part of municipal law without legislative, or any other, act of incorporation and 
therefore affirms the monist approach.127 However, he argues further that by stating 
that the fons et origo (translated as the “source”) of the proposition should be found in 
Roman-Dutch law, the dictum may also suggest that some act of adoption is required 
before customary international law is accepted as forming part of South African 
municipal law.128 The court accepted the argument of the counsel for the appellant 
namely, that according to the law of the Republic, rules of customary international 
law will only be regarded as being part of our law if they are universally recognised 
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or have received the assent of our country.129 However, Dugard argues that such 
requirements may be construed as supporting the view that the court affirmed a 
dualistic approach to the incorporation of customary international law into South 
African municipal law.130   
Dugard concludes that Rumpff CJ’s dictum should not be read as indicating 
that the source of international law is Roman-Dutch law.131 Rather, it should be 
understood to mean that the source of the proposition (or more simply, the rule 
favouring this principle of incorporation) should be found in Roman-Dutch law, as 
opposed to English law. 132  Dugard argues further that it was Rumpff CJ’s 
commitment to a “purist” approach that turned his focus to Huber, François (the 
Dutch jurist) as well as Hahlo and Kahn, instead of referring to the English case of 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria,133 or the South African 
precedent, namely South Atlantic.134 
The Nduli judgment created further uncertainty. The court’s acceptance of the 
argument that South African law only recognised those rules that had attained 
universal recognition or had received the country’s assent, further narrowed the 
application of international customary law in South African municipal law.135 Since 
the court did not indicate how such “assent” should be demonstrated, the words 
“country’s assent” as well as the test for “universal recognition” has been criticised as 
being too vague. 136  In sum, the Nduli judgment left the relationship between 
international customary law and municipal law more uncertain than appears to be the 
case at first glance.   
Despite these uncertainties, two other courts namely, the Transvaal Provincial 
Division and the Eastern Cape Division, subsequently confirmed the Appellate 
Division’s view in Nduli namely, that customary international law forms part of South 
African municipal law. The cases in question are Kaffraria Property Co (Pty) Ltd v 
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Government of the Republic of Zambia 137  and Inter-Science Research and 
Development Services (Pty) Ltd v Republica Popular de Mocambique.138 In Inter-
Science Research, the court stated the following: 
 
“International law is part of the law of South Africa, save in so far as it conflicts with 
South African legislation or common law. Our courts will take judicial cognizance of 
international law, and it is their duty in any particular case to ascertain and administer 
the appropriate rule of international law.”139 
 
In addition to confirming that international customary law forms part of South 
African law, the decision in Inter-Science Research was also important for its 
pronouncement on the meaning of “universal recognition”.140  Within this context, it 
is important to note that in an earlier decision by the Supreme Court of the Cape of 
Good Hope namely, Du Toit v Kruger, De Villiers CJ put forward a stringent test to 
determine whether a rule qualified as customary international law.141 According to 
this test, customary international law had to be “universally accepted”. 142  As 
discussed above, more than 70 years later, identical words were used in the Nduli 
decision, whereby Rumpff CJ stated that only those rules of customary international 
law that are either universally accepted, or have received the assent of the country, 
will be regarded as part of our law.143 However, in Inter-Science Research, Margo J 
considered this test as too strict and stated that the meaning of “universal recognition” 
was not an absolute one, irrespective of the ordinary meaning attached to 
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“universal”.144 Conradie J later confirmed this qualification in S v Petane.145 In 
Petane, the question placed before the Cape Provincial Division was whether Protocol 
I of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War146 had 
acquired customary international law status in South Africa.147 South Africa had 
ratified the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, but 
had not yet acceded to the abovementioned Protocol.148 In his consideration of this 
question, Conradie J cited the Appellate Division’s finding in Nduli whereby it 
affirmed that customary international law was directly operative in municipal law, on 
condition that it was not in conflict with any statutory or common law. 149 
Furthermore, the court reiterated the requirements discussed in Nduli namely, that 
only those international rules that have either been universally recognised or have 
received the assent of this country, would be applicable in South African municipal 
law.150 However, Conradie J qualified this dictum with the following: 
 
“It is not clear to me whether Rumpff CJ in giving the judgment meant to lay down 
any stricter requirements for the incorporation of international law usages into South 
African law than the requirements laid down by international law itself for the 
                                                
144 Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd v Republica Popular de Mocambique 
1980 (2) SA 111 (T) 125. To support this statement, Margo J cited literature on international law which 
stated that: 
“if a custom becomes established as a general rule of international law, it binds all States 
which have not opposed it, whether or not they themselves played an active part in its 
formation.” 
In addition, Margo J referred to article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, which states the following: 
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) … 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
…” 
See also Dugard “The Place of Public International Law” in Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 120. 
145 1988 3 SA 51 (C) (“Petane”). 
146 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 
December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3. 
147 More specifically, the accused was indicted on, amongst others, three counts of terrorism in terms of 
section 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. The accused refused to plead before the court and 
challenged the court’s jurisdiction to try him by arguing that in terms of Protocol 1 to the Geneva 
Conventions, the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. As a result of such status, the 
protecting power appointed to oversee prisoners of war was to be given notice of the accused’s 
impending prosecution of an alleged offence. As the trial could not proceed without such a notice, the 
necessity of the notice in this case was to be determined before evidence was led. The court thus 
needed to determine whether the terms of the Protocol were applicable to this case. 
148 S v Petane 1988 3 SA 51 (C) 56. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135. 
149 S v Petane 1988 3 SA 51 (C) 56. 
150 56.  




acceptance of usages by States. International law does not require universal 
acceptance for a usage of States to become a custom.”151 
 
Relying on the dicta of Margo J in Inter-Science Research, Conradie J agreed with the 
view that the term “universal”, as used in Nduli, was not intended to mean that the 
relevant rule was universally accepted, irrespective of the ordinary meaning of the 
term, “universal”. 152  In particular, the court qualified the abovementioned 
requirements laid down in Nduli by stating that custom would at least have to be 
widely accepted before it would be considered as being incorporated into South 
African municipal law.153 
The principle that customary international law formed part of the law of the 
land was subject to certain qualifications in the South African context. First, the 
legislative sovereignty of Parliament meant that if a conflict existed between 
customary international law and legislation, the legislation would prevail.154 Second, 
by following the judicial policies of stare decisis, courts kept to their own precedents 
irrespective of whether these were in conflict with customary international law.155 
Lastly, treating foreign policy matters as non-justiciable meant that the validity of 
certain acts such as acts of state, or certain executive acts carried out under the duty of 
“managing foreign affairs”, could not be challenged using customary international 
law.156  
 
2 5 4 Customary international law and the protection of human rights 
As discussed above, the South African courts adopted a monistic approach towards 
the incorporation of customary international law into the municipal legal system 
during the period of apartheid. However, during this period, the courts also 
demonstrated reluctance towards recognising certain international instruments as 
generating rules of customary international law.  
During the period of apartheid, the UNGA adopted numerous resolutions that 
condemned the practice of apartheid. It was therefore not surprising that South 
African courts took a cautious approach towards recognising such resolutions as 
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creating rules of customary international law.157 For example, the judgment delivered 
in Petane addressed whether the UDHR, as well as relevant UNGA resolutions, had 
attained the status of customary international law and would therefore be incorporated 
into the South African municipal legal order. In respect of UNGA resolutions, 
Conradie J stated that it was doubtful whether these resolutions could qualify as State 
practice.158 Furthermore, he stated that resolutions and declarations made by States 
could not be classified as State practice that gives rise to custom.159 Conradie J added 
that these State resolutions and declarations may constitute opinio juris and if, in 
addition, sufficient usus or usage has occurred, the relevant resolutions would create a 
rule of customary international law.160 However, he added that if there was no usus, 
customary international law had not been created. Furthermore, Conradie J indicated 
that a mere declaration made by a State could not produce a rule of customary 
international law.161 In terms of the UDHR, Conradie J stated that while the assertion 
was made that the provisions of the UDHR were rules of customary international law, 
such statements needed to be weighed against concrete acts made by a State.162 He 
stated further that it was only “material, concrete and/or specific acts of States which 
are relevant as usus.”163 Conradie J described usus as follows: 
 
“The substance of the practice required is that States have done, or abstained from 
doing, certain things in the international field: eg that they have exercised diplomatic 
protection in certain circumstances, or recognised the rights of other States to do so; 
that they have refrained from bringing or permitting legal proceedings against visiting 
diplomats; that they have claimed certain areas of submarine territory or recognised 
such right claimed by other States. State practice, as the material element in the 
formulation of custom, is, it is worth emphasizing, material: it is composed of acts by 
States with regard to a particular person, ship, defined area of territory, each of which 
amounts to the assertion or repudiation of a claim relating to a particular apple of 
discord.”164 
 
Therefore, Conradie J placed significant weight on the requirement of settled 
practice. According to Conradie J, the practice of condemning South Africa’s racial 
policies proved only that there was a general dislike for South Africa’s internal 
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policies.165 Moreover, the existence of a general dislike was insufficient to create a 
rule of customary international law.166  Furthermore, Conradie J argued that an 
instrument of recommendatory character was incapable of exhibiting a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation was involved.167 The court’s 
restrictive approach becomes particularly noticeable when considering that, 
approximately eight years earlier, a United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied upon the UDHR and a UNGA resolution to support the creation of a rule of 
customary international law.168 Although Dugard notes that the Court in Filartiga did 
not enquire thoroughly into the existence of state practice pertaining to torture, he 
criticises the judgment in Petane as raising too high a standard in terms of the 
requirement of usus. 169  To support this criticism, Dugard draws from the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, and in particular, the Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.170 In this 
regard, he states that the ICJ’s decision in this case suggests that a rule of customary 
international law may be established without much evidence of settled practice in 
cases where the State’s opinio juris is indicated clearly by their support for UNGA 
resolutions.171  
Later, in S v Rudman,172 a case heard before the Eastern Cape Division, 
Cooper J adopted a similar approach towards the UDHR when he commended 
international instruments such as the UDHR, the ICCPR, the European Convention 
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for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms173 and the American 
Convention on Human Rights174 as instruments inspired by laudable ideals, but 
nonetheless held that they “did not form part of customary international law”.175  
From this analysis it can be concluded that human rights norms that gained the 
status of customary international law and did not conflict with South African 
legislation, could have been recognised as part of South Africa’s municipal law. 
However, as discussed above, South Africa’s racial policies were so deeply 
entrenched in legislation that very little room remained for the protection of human 
rights by way of customary international law. 176  Furthermore, the courts were 
reluctant to recognise UNGA resolutions that protected human rights as generating 
rules of customary international law. In this regard, Dugard makes the important point 
that while South Africa may have advanced the view that UNGA resolutions did not 
qualify as law, as in Petane, in practice, these resolutions had serious implications for 
South Africa.177 In particular, the General Assembly called for action against South 
Africa through resolutions, which included the call that economic sanctions be 
imposed against the State.178 
 
2 5 5 The protection of human rights through the use of common law 
In 1989, the South African Law Commission made the following statement in a 
working paper that analysed the protection of group rights and the possible extension 
of the existing protection of individual rights: 
 
“There is full recognition of and respect for the rights of the individual as 
recognized in our common law. The courts see it as their task to protect 
these rights, and it is said that the courts form a bulwark between the 
individual and the executive.”179 
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Trengove argues that, despite the judiciary’s advanced knowledge and ability to apply 
the principles of common law, the courts’ inability to defend these principles can be 
attributed to the acceptance of parliamentary sovereignty and the absence of a Bill of 
Rights.180 The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty adopted in South Africa placed 
the judiciary in a very weak position in terms of interpreting and testing the validity of 
apartheid legislation. According to the doctrine, most courts were only empowered to 
give effect to the intention of the legislature.181 Consequently, if an Act of Parliament 
infringed a recognised human right, the court would first have to analyse the Act in 
question to determine the intention of the legislature. If, after examination, it was 
found that the legislature in fact intended to violate the human right involved, the 
court was obliged to give effect to the legislative intent and thus enforce the 
provisions of the Act. As a result, while the courts had very little opportunity to 
invoke human rights-friendly principles of the common law, they were also enforcing 
discriminatory laws that violated the provisions of the UN Charter to which South 
Africa was a party.182 Devenish notes that even if courts were willing to apply 
common law principles, the fact that apartheid was so deeply embedded in South 
African legislation, resulted in a very limited application of these principles.183  
However, common law presumptions existed that were used in the process of 
interpreting legislation. Hahlo and Kahn regard these presumptions of interpretation 
as a tertiary source of assistance in the interpretation of legislation, and defines them 
as: “assumptions of legislative intent in cases … where uncertainty prevails after 
invocation of the objective primary and secondary rules of construction.”184 These 
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presumptions have been referred to as common-law a priori guidelines and principles 
that are used by courts to interpret the law.185 
According to English law, when a statute is ambiguous, a municipal court may 
have regard to unincorporated treaty obligations when interpreting the statute. A 
similar approach existed within the context of South African common law, a 
presumption exists namely, that in the event of a statute being ambiguous or unclear, 
a statute would not be interpreted to violate a rule of international law.186 Devenish 
formulates the presumption in another way namely, that a statute will not be 
interpreted so as to violate a rule of international law or international obligations.187 
According to this presumption, Parliament did not intend to derogate from, or 
legislate in conflict with, the principles of international law when enacting a statute.188 
Therefore, South African courts should always have attempted to adopt an 
interpretation of a statute that would not conflict with their international treaty 
obligations.189 Accordingly, during the time of apartheid, judges could have sought 
guidance from international treaties that were signed and ratified, but not yet 
legislatively incorporated into municipal law, as well as those not yet signed, as 
interpretative aids.190  
The Supreme Court of Transvaal confirmed the recognition of this 
presumption as early as 1905 in the case of Harajee v Ismail.191 Furthermore, in 
Maluleke v Minister of Internal Affairs,192 a case brought before the Bophuthatswana 
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Supreme Court, Hiemstra CJ referred to and supported the approach in Pan American 
World Airways and added the following: 
 
“The rights of the subject are not affected by a treaty as such, nor does the subject 
derive any rights from it - still less an alien. If legislation is passed to give effect to a 
treaty, that will be the source of the citizen’s rights...When interpreting such 
legislation, the Courts are entitled to take treaties into account, but only as a guide on 
doubtful points … a treaty is no more than an aid to interpretation.”193 
 
Three years later in 1984, the Ciskei Supreme Court also confirmed the use of 
unincorporated treaty obligations in the interpretation of an ambiguous statute in 
Mabuda v Minister of Co-operation and Development.194 In 1988, in the case of 
Binga v Cabinet for South West Africa,195 which was heard before the Appellate 
Division, Van Heerden JA cited the decision made by Diplock LJ in the English Court 
of Appeal in the case of Salomon v Commissioner of Customs and Excise196 who 
followed a more restrictive approach to the use of international treaties in the 
interpretation of legislation. Diplock LJ stated that before an international convention 
may be consulted in the interpretation of legislation, there must be cogent evidence 
that the relevant statute was intended to give effect to the convention.197 He stated 
further that in English law, when interpreting legislation “one does not start with the a 
priori assumption that Parliament intended to fulfil its treaty obligations.”198   
A second, less restrictive approach to the use of unincorporated treaties in the 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute was adopted in R v Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs, Ex parte Bhajan Singh, a case brought before the English Court of Appeal.199 
In this case, Lord Denning MR held that an international convention should be taken 
into account “whenever interpreting a statute which affects the rights and liberties of 
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the individual.”200 Van Heerden JA preferred Diplock LJ’s “restrictive” approach 
compared to that of Lord Denning MR, and concluded that the presumption could not 
be applied since there was no evidence that the legislation concerned (the South-West 
Africa Constitution Act) was enacted with the intention of giving effect to an 
obligation of the relevant treaty. Therefore, according to Van Heerden JA, an 
international treaty obligation could only influence the interpretation of a statute in 
cases where the statute is ambiguous and if evidence exists that the legislature created 
the statute with the aim of giving effect to the obligations under a treaty.201 Although 
Van Heerden JA’s pronouncement on the presumption is obiter, Dugard has criticised 
this restrictive approach as not fully considering the necessary authorities.202 In this 
regard, Dugard argues that several English decisions existed in which the ECHR was 
invoked as a progressive guide to statutory interpretation.203 
As was pointed out above, although the UN Charter was ratified by South 
Africa, this instrument could not be applied directly in domestic disputes since it had 
not been legislatively incorporated into South African municipal law.204 However, in 
accordance with the arguments advanced above, there were other means of relying on 
the rights entrenched in the UN Charter. For instance, articles entrenching the 
principle of non-discrimination could potentially have been used as an aid in the 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. This strategy could have been 
pursued in accordance with the presumption that the legislature did not intend to 
violate international law.205 The case of S v Werner206 presented the first opportunity 
for a South African court to rule on South Africa’s obligations under the UN Charter. 
This case challenged the validity of a proclamation issued under the infamous Group 
Areas Act 36 of 1966 that provided for the racial zoning of urban areas into White, 
Coloured, Indian, and Black areas. The Group Areas Act itself did not demarcate 
these areas, but by way of a proclamation, the executive was authorised to make the 
various demarcations. As the proclamation did not expressly authorise the unequal or 
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discriminating treatment in the demarcation process, it was argued, amongst others, 
that the Appellate Division could have used the opportunity to interpret the Group 
Areas Act in line with South Africa’s obligations of non-discrimination under the UN 
Charter, specifically articles 55 and 56. Unfortunately, the court did not attach much 
weight to this argument. Instead, the court held that the Group Areas Act was not 
ambiguous and therefore permitted discrimination and injustice.  
Relying on the decision of the ICJ in 1971 in the case of Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution,207 Dugard argues that the human rights 
clauses contained in the UN Charter imposed certain legal obligations upon member 
States, even though South Africa had ratified the UN Charter, but not yet incorporated 
it into municipal law.208 As South Africa was party to the UN Charter, Dugard states 
that South Africa was bound by the human rights clauses contained therein at the 
international level. The human rights provisions contained in the UN Charter only 
broadly describe the obligations of member States. However, Dugard states that there 
was increasing support for recourse to the UDHR and conventions such as the ECHR, 
the AmCHR, and the ICCPR, to clarify the scope of the State’s obligations under the 
UN Charter. 209  In support of this argument, Dugard submits that this was an 
established method of statutory construction in both British and American courts 
when interpreting an ambiguous statute that influenced a human right. Consequently, 
Dugard argues that South African courts could have invoked the provisions of the UN 
Charter as elaborated on by the UDHR and other human rights conventions to which 
South Africa was not a party.210  
In S v Werner, neither the Appellate Division nor the trial court answered the 
question whether the judiciary could rely on unincorporated treaties when interpreting 
an ambiguous statute. Instead, the court concluded that the Group Areas Act was clear 
and unambiguous, and therefore clearly permitted racial discrimination. S v Werner 
has been cited as illustrative of the readiness of the South African courts to find a 
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statute, which adversely affects a human right, clear and unambiguous.211 The Act 
clearly made provision for a proclamation that would have a discriminatory effect on 
different racial groups. To this extent, an interpretation in accordance with the human 
rights provisions of the UN Charter and other relevant treaties would have challenged 
the validity of such a proclamation.212 
In S v Khanyile,213 the Natal Provincial Division found that the accused was 
entitled to be provided with legal representation. In this judgment, Didcott J relied on 
the provisions of treaties that were neither signed by South Africa nor incorporated 
into South Africa’s municipal law namely, the ICCPR and the ECHR. This approach 
was, however, rejected one year later in the abovementioned case of S v Rudman.214 
In this case, the appellant relied on the provisions of the UDHR, the ICCPR, the 
ECHR, and the AmCHR, stating that these instruments reflected a universal 
acceptance of the right to legal representation. Cooper J, however, held that as South 
Africa was not a party to the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR or the AmCHR, these 
instruments could not be relied upon in support of the appellant’s contention that a 
universal right to legal representation existed. 
In the context of the common law presumption, the term, ‘international law’ 
should be understood as referring only to customary international law, as Pan-
American World Airways established those principles concerning the incorporation of 
treaties into municipal law. 215 Dugard argues that many of the principles that govern 
the relationship between customary international law and international treaties, as 
well as the role of international law when interpreting ambiguous statutes in South 
African law, are identical to those used by the Anglo-American courts.216  Based on 
this premise, Dugard argues that a number of situations existed in which South 
African courts could have applied customary international law to protect human 
rights, as the American courts have done on occasion. 217  Firstly, customary 
international law could have been used where a gap existed in the common law. 
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According to Dugard, certain provisions of the UDHR had attained the status of 
customary international law.218 However, despite attaining such a status, apartheid 
judges had very little scope to employ customary international law as statutes took 
precedence over customary international law and the common law.219 Secondly, the 
common law principles that were not yet settled could have been reinforced by South 
Africa’s international obligations that existed under customary international law (and 
convention).220 Lastly, Dugard argues that, following the approach suggested by Lord 
Scarman in Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation,221 the Appellate 
Division was not completely bound by precedent and as a result, judges of the court 
could have considered South Africa’s international obligations when considering a 
possible departure from precedent.222 In the event of any conflict arising between a 
rule of international customary law and a rule of common law, the court was in the 
same position as when considering a conflict between two conflicting common-law 
principles.223  In Liebowitz v Schwartz,224 the Transvaal Provincial Division had to 
choose between a principle of international law225 and a common law principle226 and 
found that: 
 
“Plainly, one of two conflicting principles must yield … There can be no doubt in my 
mind that it is the second principle, which must give way. The first is founded on 
grave and weighty considerations of public policy, international law and comity.”227  
 
Even though the court could have obtained support from the Appellate Division to 
rule in favour of the municipal law rule, 228  its decision to apply customary 
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international law instead implied that the prevalence of a municipal law over a 
conflicting customary international law rule was not always certain.229  
In the discussions above, I have investigated the restricted role granted to 
international human rights law in the form of treaties and customary international law, 
and the possible reasons for this. However, in 1983, Dugard identified a number of 
additional elements that contributed towards the judiciary’s weak reliance on 
international human rights norms.230 In his opinion, the lack of amicus curiae had an 
important impact on the under reliance on human rights concepts in public interest 
litigation which challenged apartheid legislation. Dugard argues that amici curiae 
briefs would have constituted invaluable instruments that would allow both qualified 
and concerned parties to contribute to a decision. He also suggests that the activist 
approach found in Anglo-American courts could not have been expected in the South 
African courtrooms, as many South African judges were not sympathetic to the 
human rights arguments before them, displaying a similar attitude to the South 
African executive in these matters. Thus, as a consequence of the legal and judicial 
culture in South Africa at the time, the judiciary tended to defer to parliament and the 
executive, despite being presented with arguments based on international human 
rights law. To this extent, the judiciary illustrated a culture of deference and 
formalism in the interpretation of statutes and, although said to be independent, was 
criticised for being too executive-minded, especially in cases where political 
controversies were involved. In relation to this, it must also be noted that international 
law, and particularly international human rights law, was afforded a very limited role 
in the law curricula of South African Universities. As a consequence, international 
law, and particularly international human rights law, remained unfamiliar to many 
judges and lawyers, probably resulting in fewer arguments based upon international 
human rights being brought before the courts and accepted.  
 
2 6 Conclusion 
In summary, the historical evaluation of the court’s treatment of international law 
outlined in this chapter illustrates firstly, that across all spheres of life, Black South 
Africans, which constituted the majority of the South African population, were 
                                                
229 Dugard “The Place of Public International Law” in Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 121. 
230 Dugard “International Human Rights Norms” in Fiat Iustitia 221. 




subject to the discriminating effects of apartheid legislation and policies. As 
emphasised above, these Acts and policies also impacted negatively on the socio-
economic welfare of Black South Africans and affected, amongst others, the areas of 
health and health care, land possession, education, working conditions and social 
security.231  
Secondly, this historical account has provided evidence that the recognition of 
and reliance on international law by South African courts was not an unfamiliar 
exercise. In South Africa, customary international law formed part of the common 
law. However, in the event of international law conflicting with legislation or acts of 
state, the latter prevailed. Furthermore, treaties could have direct application in 
municipal law, provided that they were directly incorporated into municipal law. 
Thirdly, I showed that after the rise of apartheid, the use of these sources 
changed significantly when applied in the context of human rights. The law of 
apartheid changed the relationship between South Africa and the international 
community as South Africa isolated itself from the international human rights 
movement and the international community distanced itself in various ways from 
South Africa. South African citizens suffered as the responsibility of human rights 
protection was placed in the hands of an executive-minded judiciary who was 
reluctant to employ international human rights norms. Thus, through the analysis, I 
showed that distinct methodological approaches towards international human rights 
law and international law were created and developed during this time. Furthermore, I 
emphasised that, despite the growing international movement towards the protection 
of these human rights, opportunities to rely on international instruments were subject 
to stringent qualifications, restricting the assistance that these may have offered in 
instances of human rights violations. Furthermore, this assessment highlights that the 
development of international human rights law indicated a change in the nature of 
State responsibility towards individuals. On the one hand, South Africa relied 
vehemently upon the principles of State sovereignty and non-intervention,232 which 
                                                
231 See section 2 2 of this chapter. 
232 This was, to a certain extent, endorsed by the UN Charter and, despite its commitment to the 
promotion of human rights, the UN Charter continued to affirm the more traditional approach 
recognising only States, and not individuals, as subjects of international law. This was determined by 
article 2(7), which provided the following: 
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” 




supposedly prevented any external involvement in the abuse of individual rights and 
left all South Africans under the exclusive jurisdiction of their State. On the other 
hand, the international community signalled a shift away from an approach 
characterised by the avoidance of public interest, the pursuit of self-interest by States 
and legal relations based on reciprocity.233  
This historical evaluation forms a point of departure for the following chapters 
by underscoring the importance and necessity of affirming the status of international 
human rights law in the Constitution. It also provides insight into the attitudes 
prevalent during the apartheid era towards the international community and the use of 
international human rights law, which form an undeniable part of South Africa’s legal 
culture. Consequently, international human rights law remained an unfamiliar source 
of law in South African judicial reasoning during the apartheid era. The affects of this 
may, in part, account for a reluctance to fully embrace international human rights law 
in the substantive development of socio-economic rights, as will be explored in 
chapter 5. In the following chapter, I examine the significant changes brought about 
by the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions concerning the role of international law, 
particularly international human rights law, in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
                                                                                                                                      
This was further emphasised in article 2(1) of the UN Charter, which stated that the Organisation itself 
was based on “the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” The Union of South Africa, 
which at the time was governed by the United Party under the leadership of General Smuts, became a 
signatory to the UN Charter on 7 November 1945. 
233 Cassese International Law 396. 






International Human Rights Law and the 1993 and 1996 
South African Constitutions 
 
3 1 Introduction  
The fall of the apartheid legal order and the advent of the new constitutional 
dispensation in South Africa brought about a transition from parliamentary 
sovereignty to constitutional supremacy.1 The adoption of the 1993 and 1996 South 
African Constitutions, and their accompanying Bills of Rights, ushered in a new 
culture of human rights. More specifically, the 1993 and 1996 Bills of Rights included 
various socio-economic rights as justiciable rights. 2  A further feature of both 
Constitutions is the prominent role that they give to international law. In particular, 
both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions contain provisions that regulate the procedural 
requirements that must be met in order for South Africa to become party to any 
                                                
1 Section 4 of the 1993 Constitution states the following:  
“(1) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act 
inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary 
implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency.  
(2) This Constitution shall bind all legislative, executive and judicial organs of state at all 
levels of government.”  
Similarly, section 2 of the 1996 Constitution declares the supremacy of the 1996 Constitution and 
states the following: 
“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.” 
2 The 1993 and 1996 Constitutions incorporate both civil and political rights as well as economic, 
social, and cultural rights as justiciable rights. Section 38 of the 1996 Constitution (section 7(4)(a) of 
the 1993 Constitution) entitles anyone listed in the section to the right to approach a competent court 
with a claim that a right within the Bill of Rights has been violated or threatened. In terms of this 
section, the court may grant appropriate relief, which can include a declaration of rights. These 
provisions permit rights bearers to approach courts with claims based on civil and political rights and 
socio-economic rights, with the effect that these rights are justiciable rights before South African 
courts. 




international agreements.3 The 1993 and 1996 Constitutions also include provisions 
governing the status of customary international law in South Africa’s municipal law 
namely, section 231(4) and section 232 respectively.4 Furthermore, section 35(1) of 
the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution afford a 
significant role to international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.  
Following the historical overview presented in chapter 2, I analyse the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights in both the 1993 and 1996 Bill of Rights. In 
addition, I explore the drafting processes that preceded the adoption of the 1993 and 
1996 Constitutions and in particular, I investigate the role played by international 
human rights law during the drafting of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the 
1993 and 1996 Bills of Rights. Furthermore, I analyse the significant role of 
international human rights law in the determination of “universally accepted” 
fundamental rights to be included in the 1996 Constitution. Thereafter, I proceed to 
focus on the provisions contained in the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions that govern the 
manner in which international treaties and customary international law operate in 
municipal law. Lastly, I examine the constitutional provisions that mandate the 
courts’ consideration of international law as an interpretative tool in the interpretation 
of the Bill of Rights, and their relevance to socio-economic rights in South Africa. 
                                                
3 Section 231(2)-(3) and section 231 of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions respectively. The term 
“international agreement” is not defined in the 1993 or 1996 Constitutions of South Africa. However, 
Dugard maintains that the definition of an international agreement is equal to that of a “treaty” and is 
defined in accordance with article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 
331 (“VCLT”). Dugard International Law 4 ed 60-61. In support of this definition of an “international 
agreement”, Olivier states that South Africa considers the provisions of the VCLT as customary 
international law, despite not being a party to the Convention. See ME Olivier “International Human 
Rights Agreements in South African Law: Procedure, Policy and Practice (Part 2)” (2003) 3 TSAR 
490 493. The VCLT defines “treaty” in article 2(1)(a) as follows: 
“[A]n international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation; …”. 
4 These are not the only provisions within the 1993 Constitution that concern international law. Section 
82(1)(i) governs the negotiation and signing of treaties by the President. Section 116(2) concerns the 
duty placed upon the Human Rights Commission to report any proposed legislation to the relevant 
legislature if it is of the opinion that such proposed legislation conflicts with chapter 3 or with the 
norms of international human rights law. Furthermore, section 227(2) concerns international 
humanitarian law. Within the 1996 Constitution, section 233 regulates the use of international law in 
the interpretation of legislation. In addition to this, section 35(3)(l), section 37(4)(b)(i), and section 
37(8) include references to international law. Although these provisions address certain aspects of 
international law, they fall outside the scope of the present study.   




3 2 The Inclusion of Socio-Economic Rights in the South African 
Legal Order 
3 2 1 The 1993 and 1996 Constitutions 
In March 1993, various political parties of South Africa entered into a structured 
process of negotiations known as the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (“MPNP”).5 
The purpose of these negotiations was to reach agreement on, and ultimately adopt, a 
new Constitution for South Africa. 6  The Negotiating Council 7  was the body 
responsible for the negotiations and decision-making concerning, amongst others, the 
selection of fundamental rights that were to be included in the 1993 Constitution. 
However, these negotiations were fraught with disagreement and compromise 
between negotiating parties, which was largely attributed to the so called “minimalist-
optimalist debate”.8 According to Du Plessis and Corder, the “minimalists” comprised 
those political parties that were not convinced of the legitimacy of the MPNP and 
argued that the process was not adequately representative.9 Consequently, these 
political parties argued that the MPNP could only generate an interim constitutional 
text.10 To this extent, the “minimalists”11 advocated for the inclusion of only those 
rights that were absolutely necessary to facilitate the transition.12 
                                                
5 The MPNP was by no means the first attempt at negotiations of this nature. Political parties had 
previously attempted negotiations by way of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(“CODESA”) and the second Convention for a Democratic South Africa (“CODESA II”) that preceded 
the MPNP. CODESA itself was the product of a gradual interaction among political parties whose 
beginnings can be traced from as early as the 1980’s. Interaction and negotiations among political 
parties gained momentum especially after FW de Klerk’s election within the National Party and the 
subsequent national election in which the National Party was once again voted into power in South 
Africa. For a detailed account of significant political events leading up to the MPNP, see Du Plessis & 
Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 1-7.    
6 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 39.    
7 The Negotiating Council was a body within the MPNP and consisted of two delegates from each 
political party, one of which had to be a woman, as well as two advisors. This Council convened three 
to four days of the week and was responsible for creating those agreements that were to be placed 
before the plenary for ratification. The plenary was made up of 208 members and represented 26 
parties. While it was the highest decision-making body, the more complex political decisions were 
dealt with in the Negotiating Council. The Negotiating Council was assisted by seven Technical 
Committees who were responsible for preparing the documentation presented to the Negotiating 
Council for discussion. The Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues was responsible for the 
drafting of the 1993 Constitution while the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights was required 
to draft the 1993 Bill of Rights. Therefore, the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights was 
responsible for presenting the Negotiating Council with a proposed list of rights that were to be 
included in the Bill of Rights. 
8 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 40-46.  
9 40. 
10 40. 




So called “optimalists” consisted of those political parties who did not enjoy 
majority support in South Africa, and were vexed by the possible threat of being 
marginalised once other largely supported political parties came into power.13 Thus, 
the “optimalists” argued for a more comprehensive list of rights to be included in the 
new Constitution that would assist in protecting their interests after the elections.14 
The outcome of the “minimalist-optimalist” debate played a determinative role in the 
limited manner in which socio-economic rights were provided for in the 1993 
Constitution. This was particularly apparent by the inclusion of predominantly civil 
and political rights, and only a handful of socio-economic rights, in the 1993 Bill of 
Rights. For this reason, the set of fundamental rights that was to form the 1993 Bill of 
Rights was described as “neither fatally limited nor satisfactorily comprehensive”.15  
The socio-economic rights that were eventually incorporated into the 1993 
Constitution included the right of detained persons, including sentenced prisoners, to 
be detained in a manner that, amongst others, included “at least the provision of 
adequate nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state expense.” 16 
Furthermore, the 1993 Bill of Rights also entrenched rights related to economic 
activity,17 rights related to labour relations,18 property rights,19 environmental rights,20 
the rights of children to security, basic nutrition, basic health and social services,21 and 
rights related to education. 22  As noted, the selection of socio-economic rights 
incorporated in chapter three of the 1993 Constitution was rudimentary in relation to 
the many important socio-economic rights protected in international human rights 
instruments. 23  Such rights include the right to adequate housing, 24  the right to 
                                                                                                                                      
11 The African National Congress (“ANC”) was amongst those political parties that supported this 
view, together with the Governments of Transkei and Venda. 
12 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 40-41. 
13 41. 
14 41. The Inkatha Freedom Party, the Government of Ciskei, the Government of Bophuthatswana, and 
the South African Government, which comprised of members of the National Party, shared this point 
of view. 
15 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 41. 
16 Section 25(1)(b).  
17 Section 26. 
18 Section 27.  
19 Section 28. 
20 Section 29. 
21 Section 30(1)(c). 
22 Section 32. 
23 Such as those contained in the ICESCR. See S Liebenberg “The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications for South Africa” (1995) 11 SAJHR 359 
376. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 




adequate food,25 the right to social security,26 and the right to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.27 However, the rights that the 1993 Bill of 
Rights included formed the foundation upon which a more comprehensive edifice of 
socio-economic rights could be built in the 1996 Constitution.28 
International human rights law significantly influenced the drafting of the 
rights contained in chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution. Firstly, the drafters had been 
inspired by, and relied upon, international human rights instruments in the 
formulation of provisions entrenching human rights.29 These instruments included the 
UDHR, the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the ECHR. These sources were especially 
helpful in the drafting of more controversial provisions.30 Secondly, the Technical 
Committee considered draft proposals for a Bill of Rights submitted by political 
parties, interest groups, and organisations. Many of these proposals contained aspects 
that were inspired by international human rights law, and in this way, this source of 
law influenced the work of the Technical Committee.31 
The 1993 Constitution constituted a transitional constitutional text and 
prepared the way for the 1996 Constitution by creating the processes and mechanisms 
for the adoption of the latter. It was the task of the Constitutional Assembly, which 
consisted of the National Assembly and the Senate sitting in joint session, to draft and 
                                                                                                                                      
October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (“AfCHPR”) as well as the UDHR also contain socio-economic 
rights that were not included in the 1993 Constitution.    
24 Article 11 of the ICESCR recognises everyone’s right to “an adequate standard of living for himself 
and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.”  
Article 25 of the UDHR recognises everyone’s right to: 
“a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right 
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other 
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”  
25 Article 11 of the ICESCR and article 25 of the UDHR. 
26 Article 9 of the ICESCR recognises everyone’s right to “social security, including social insurance.” 
Article 22 of the UDHR provides for everyone’s right to social security, while article 25 provides for 
the right to security under specific circumstances. 
27 Article 12 of the ICESCR recognises everyone’s right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.” See article 25 of the UDHR above. Article 16 of the AfCHPR 
recognises every individual’s right “to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.”  
28 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 16. For the academic debates concerning the inclusion of socio-
economic rights in the 1993 Constitution, see N Haysom “Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy 
and Socio-Economic Rights” (1992) 8 SAJHR 451-463, E Mureinik “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: 
Economic Rights in the Constitution” (1992) 8 SAJHR 464-474 and DM Davis “The Case Against the 
Inclusion of Socio-economic Demands in a Bill of Rights except as Directive Principles” (1992) 8 
SAJHR 475-490. 
29 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 47. 
30  48. In these cases, the Technical Committee relied more heavily upon the wording of the 
international text. 
31 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 48. 




adopt the 1996 Constitution.32 Furthermore, the 1993 Constitution contained thirty-
four Constitutional Principles,33  to which the 1996 Constitution had to comply, 
subject to certification by the Constitutional Court.34 The importance of these thirty-
four Constitutional Principles to the process of creating the 1996 Constitution is not to 
be underestimated.35 The Constitutional Principles were the product of negotiations 
between political parties and have been characterised as a “political contract” that was 
necessary for the transition.36 Furthermore, these Principles provided a broad structure 
for the construction the 1996 Constitution, and were not to be diverted from or 
neglected.37 Du Plessis and Corder describe these Principles as reflecting the manifest 
distrust that permeated the opinions of particular political parties concerning the 
election of a government based on a majority vote.38 
 
3 2 2 Determining the “universal acceptance” of fundamental rights 
Constitutional Principle II was pivotal to the creation of the 1996 Bill of Rights as it 
assisted the drafters in determining which fundamental rights were to be included in 
the text. It stated that: 
 
                                                
32 The mandate placed on the Constitutional Assembly in this regard is located in section 68(2) of the 
1993 Constitution. This provision requires the Constitutional Assembly to draft and adopt the new 
constitutional text in accordance with chapter five of the 1993 Constitution. Section 71(1)(b) of the 
1993 Constitution also requires that the Constitutional Assembly be responsible for passing the new 
Constitution in accordance with chapter 5. For a description of the process whereby the 1996 
Constitution was drafted and adopted see J Sarkin “The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution 
from a Human-Rights Perspective” (1999) 47 The American Journal of Comparative Law 67-87.   
33 The 1993 Constitution Schedule Four.  
34 The 1993 Constitution section 71(1)(a). Section 71(2) of the 1993 Constitution stated that  
“[t]he new constitutional text passed by the Constitutional Assembly, or any provision thereof, 
shall not be of any force and effect unless the Constitutional Court has certified that all the 
provisions of such text comply with the Constitutional Principles referred to in subsection 
(1)(a).”  
This section states in particular that the constitutional text drafted by the Constitutional Assembly shall 
comply with the Constitutional Principles that are contained in Schedule Four. 
35 The importance of the thirty-four Constitutional Principles to the creation of a final Constitution was 
underscored by section 74(1)(a) of the 1993 Constitution. This provision states that the Constitutional 
Principles detailed in Schedule Four of the 1993 Constitution could not be subject to amendment or 
appeal. Similarly, section 74(1)(b) of the 1993 Constitution stated that the provisions of chapter 5 
relating to the Constitutional Principles, as well as the provision that mandated compliance between the 
new constitutional text and the Constitutional Principles, could not be subject to appeal or amendment. 
Du Plessis and Corder submit that if the Constitutional Principles were neglected, the Government may 
have risked losing political legitimacy, and conflict and economic deterioration may have ensued. 
These submissions further underscored the significance of the Constitutional Principles in the process 
of creating the 1996 Constitution. 
36 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 15. 
37 15. 
38 13. 




“Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil 
liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable 
provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having given due 
consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter three of this 
Constitution.”39  
 
Theme Committee Four of the Constitutional Assembly (“Theme Committee Four”) 
was tasked with drafting a proposed Bill of Rights for the 1996 Constitution.40 A 
Technical Committee advised Theme Committee Four and provided guidance and 
assistance in determining which rights adhered to the abovementioned criteria of 
“universal acceptance”.41 The Technical Committee examined the jurisprudence of 
South African courts as a possible source of guidance. It found that, within the 
context of customary international law, South African courts interpreted the phrase 
“universal” acceptance to mean the widespread or general acceptance of rules by 
States.42 Furthermore, South African courts did not require that every State consent to 
a specific rule of customary international law in order for it to achieve “universal” 
acceptance. 43  Following this, the Technical Committee advised that the same 
principles should apply to the “universal acceptance” of human rights.44 Therefore, 
the Technical Committee held that rights would be recognised as “universally” 
accepted if it could be established that these rights received widespread and general 
acceptance or recognition by States.45 Additionally, the Technical Committee advised 
                                                
39 Constitutional Principle II (emphasis added). 
40 The 1996 Constitution Theme Committee Four of the Constitutional Assembly. 
41  The Technical Committee assisted Theme Committee Four by preparing an Explanatory 
Memorandum. This Memorandum was based on the Theme Committee Report and dealt with certain 
aspects concerning particular rights. The Memorandum also detailed the process of researching, 
formulating, and selecting provisional draft formulations of fundamental human rights. The Technical 
Committee was also responsible for examining the submissions made by political parties and the public 
regarding the proposed Bill of Rights and made recommendations in this regard. This Technical 
Committee differed from the Technical Committee that assisted in the drafting of the 1993 Constitution 
and consisted of Prof. Halton Cheadle, Prof. John Dugard, Prof. Ignatius Rautenbach and Sandra 
Liebenberg. Professor John Dugard in particular specialised in the field of human rights and 
international law and contributed to the strong international law expertise on the Committee. 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 17. 
42 See chapter 2. Technical Committee (Theme Committee 4) The meaning of “universally accepted 
fundamental rights” in Constitutional Principle II, Schedule 4 to the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (1995) para 2 (document on file with author). The Technical Committee 
cited Inter-Science Research and Developments Services (Pty) Ltd v Republica Popular de 
Mozambique 1980 2 SA 111 (T) 125 and S v Petane 1988 3 SA 51 (C) 56-57 in support of its 
conclusion. 
43 Technical Committee (Theme Committee 4) The meaning of “universally accepted fundamental 
rights” para 2 (document on file with author). 
44 Para 3. 
45 Para 3. 




Theme Committee Four that it was not required that every State recognise and accept 
these fundamental rights in order for them to achieve “universal acceptance”.46 
According to the Technical Committee, international human rights treaties and 
UN declarations contain “universally accepted” fundamental rights.47 In terms of the 
former, the Technical Committee held that their claim to universal acceptance is 
based upon the number of States that have ratified these instruments.48 Moreover, the 
Technical Committee noted that the “universal acceptance” of fundamental rights 
contained in UN declarations is determined by the number of States that have voted in 
favour of such declarations.49  
In addition, the Technical Committee submitted that national bills of rights 
lack general acceptance and are therefore not “universally accepted” fundamental 
rights.50 They stated that these domestic instruments are often created within a very 
particular political and historical context that largely determines the selection of rights 
entrenched in the constitutional text. 51  However, the Technical Committee also 
recognised that certain national bills of rights had engaged with international human 
rights instruments in some form. This occurred when national bills of rights played an 
influential role in the formulation of provisions entrenched in international 
instruments.52 It also included those instances in which a national bill of rights was 
inspired, or shaped by, provisions found in international instruments.53 Consequently, 
                                                
46 Para 3. 
47 Para 4, 6-7. In its memorandum, the Technical Committee identified certain international and 
regional instruments and declarations as highly significant, and indicated the number of parties that had 
become members of these instruments at the time of writing. These included the following: the UN 
Charter (184 parties); the UDHR (In 1948, this resolution was approved by 48 of the 56 member States 
of the UN); the ICCPR (over 120 parties of which 36 were African States). Although the memorandum 
does not explain the meaning of “over 120 parties”, it is assumed that this refers to the amount of States 
that had signed and ratified these instruments at the time. In addition, the Technical Committee referred 
to the ICESCR (over 120 parties), the ECHR, the AmCHR as well as the AfCHPR. The Technical 
Committee also mentioned the following specialised human rights treaties: the CERD (over 137 
parties) and the CEDAW (over 130 parties). The Technical Committee also referred to the CAT (over 
80 parties) and the CRC (over 154 parties). The Technical Committee also took note of the importance 
of declarations adopted by international conferences to clarify the manner in which the international 
community viewed human rights obligations, such as the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights and 
Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993. 
48 Technical Committee (Theme Committee 4) The meaning of “universally accepted fundamental 
rights” para 4. 
49 Para 4. 
50 Para 8. 
51 Para 8. 
52 Para 8. The Technical Committee noted that the United States Bill of Rights was an example of this.  
53 Para 8. The Technical Committee referred to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s2, Part 
1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (entered 
into force 17 April 1982) as well as the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 as providing 
examples of this. 




the Technical Committee advised that Theme Committee Four of the Constitutional 
Assembly could refer to these national texts for assistance when formulating rights 
found in “universally accepted” instruments.54 However, if a right was entrenched in a 
national bill of rights, but not in a “universally accepted” international instrument, 
Theme Committee Four could not consider the right.55 According to the Technical 
Committee, this understanding of “universally accepted fundamental rights” was 
aligned with section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution to the extent that it accorded a 
higher status to international human rights norms than national comparative norms.56 
In addition, Theme Committee Four was advised to consider the way rights were 
interpreted by courts, investigative commissions, and committees established by 
particular international conventions.57  
To ensure compliance with the requirement embedded in Constitutional 
Principle II, the Technical Committee investigated the “universal acceptance” of 
every fundamental right that was considered for inclusion in the Bill of Rights.58 The 
Technical Committee did not exempt socio-economic rights from this process. For 
example, the Technical Committee investigated the universal acceptance of the 
fundamental right to housing or housing-related rights. It identified international 
human rights treaties, declarations, and resolutions that recognised and protected 
these rights,59 and established that these rights were also recognised in national 
                                                
54 Technical Committee (Theme Committee 4) The meaning of “universally accepted fundamental 
rights” para 8. 
55 Para 8. 
56 Para 8. 
57 Para 9. 
58 The importance of the requirement of “universal acceptance” of a fundamental right is further 
illustrated in the deliberations over section 26 of the 1993 Constitution. This section provided for the 
right to freely engage in economic activity. One of the criticisms directed towards retaining this right 
by most political parties was that it was not included in any international instruments, and foreign 
constitutions had not given it strong support. This argument partly fuelled the lack of support by 
political parties for the inclusion of this right in the 1996 Constitution, and it was not included in the 
Bill of Rights. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of 
Rights, volume one, Explanatory Memoranda, 9 October 1995 1-285 106 (document on file with 
author). 
59 These included the following: the UDHR (article 25); the ECHR (article 8(1); article 1; Protocol 1); 
the International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into 
force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (“Refugee Convention”) (article 21); the ESC (articles 16, 19(4); 
article 4, Additional Protocol); the ILO Convention C117: Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) 
Convention (Convention Concerning Basic Aims and Standards of Social Policy) (46th Conference 
Session Geneva 22 June 1962) (articles 2, 4(d) and 5(2)); the ICESCR (article 11); the CERD (article 
5(e)(iii)); the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(adopted 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976) 1015 UNTS 243 (“Convention on the 
Crime of Apartheid”) (article 11(b) and (d)); the CEDAW (article 14(2)(h)); the Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(adopted 17 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 1999) 28 ILM 156 (1989) (“Additional 




constitutions.60 Furthermore, it highlighted that, on occasion, international tribunals 
and national courts interpreted rights such as the right to life, the right to security of 
the person, and the right to dignity, to include the protection of housing-related 
rights.61 
The Technical Committee also regarded the right to education as a 
fundamental right for the purposes of Constitutional Principle II. 62  This 
recommendation was based on evidence collected from a range of international and 
regional human rights instruments that recognised and protected the right to 
education.63 The Technical Committee identified article 13 and article 14 of the 
ICESCR as the main provisions that influenced the drafting of rights related to 
                                                                                                                                      
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights”) (article 11); the CRC (article 27(3)); the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3 (“Migrant 
Workers Convention”) (article 43(1)(d)). In addition, the Technical Committee identified the following 
declarations and resolutions that recognised housing rights: the American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States 
(1948) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 
OEA/Ser L V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 17 (1992) (“American Declaration”) (articles 8, 11, 23); the ILO 
Recommendation R115: Workers’ Housing Recommendation (45th Conference Session Geneva 28 
June 1961) Principle 2; the UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development UNGA Res 2542 
(XXIV) (11 December 1969) Part II, article 10; the UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 
UNGA Res 3447 (XXX) (9 December 1975) (article 9); the Vancouver Declaration on Human 
Settlements, adopted at the UN Conference on Human Settlements, Vancouver, Canada, 31 May to 
June 1976; the UN Commission on Human Settlements Resolution 14/6 on “The Human Right to 
Adequate Housing” adopted on 5 May 1993; the UN Declaration on the Right to Development UNGA 
Res 41/128 (4 December 1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/128 (article 8(1); the Resolution on Shelter for the 
Homeless in the European Community, adopted by the European Parliament on 16 June 1987; the 
UNCHR (Sub-Commission),‘Promoting the Realization of the Right to Adequate Housing’ (26 August 
1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/SUB.2/1994/38; the UNCHR (Sub-Commission),‘Forced Evictions’ (26 
August 1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1994/39. Furthermore, the Technical Committee referred 
to a study that was being prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. This would focus specifically on the 
“right to adequate housing” that could proceed to the creation of an International Convention on 
Housing Rights. (“The Right to Adequate Housing”, second progress report, E/CN. Sub.2/1994/20). 
60 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of Rights 141-148. 
The Technical Committee listed examples of provisions from the constitutions of Belgium, Brazil, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Greece, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Seychelles, Spain, Suriname, and Switzerland. 
61 148. The Technical Committee referred to a decision delivered by the Indian Supreme Court namely, 
Tellis v Bombay Municipal Council [1987] LRC (Const) 351 (Ind.SC) at 368 per Chandrachud CJ. In 
terms of the right to life, Chandrachud CJ stated that “[a]n equally important facet of that right is the 
right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of 
livelihood …”. 
62 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of Rights 165. 
63 These instruments included: the UDHR (article 26); the ECHR (article 2, Protocol I); the UNESCO 
Convention against Discrimination in Education; the CEDAW (article 10); the AfCHPR (article 17); 
the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (article 13). The latter 
instrument was not yet in force at the time of the Technical Committee’s writing of the Explanatory 
Memorandum. Lastly, the Technical Committee referred to the CRC (articles 28 and 29).  




education in other international treaties and national constitutions. 64  Lastly, the 
Technical Committee examined the way rights relating to education were protected in 
national constitutions.65 The Technical Committee also addressed the right to have 
access to sufficient food and clean water, and found this right to be recognised in a 
range of international human rights instruments. 66  Furthermore, the Technical 
Committee referred to a variety of international human rights instruments67 and 
national constitutions68 that recognised and protected the right to health and access to 
medical treatment.69 In particular, it highlighted that the right to reproductive health 
care is afforded significant protection in CEDAW, while the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action70 creates obligations for States in this regard. Rights relating to 
access to social security, including social assistance were also found in international 
human rights instruments.71 The Technical Committee further identified that the right 
to benefit from various forms of social security and assistance is also protected in a 
                                                
64 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of Rights 165. 
65 This investigation analysed the entrenchment of rights relating to education in the constitutions of 
Germany, Canada, India, Portugal, Denmark, and Namibia. See Constitutional Assembly, 
Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of Rights 166. 
66 The UDHR (article 25); the ICESCR (article 11); the CEDAW (articles 12(2) and 14(2)(h)); the 
CRC (article 24(c); the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (article 12). 
The latter instrument was not yet in force at the time of the Technical Committee’s writing of the 
supplementary memorandum. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary 
Memorandum on Bills of Rights and Party Submissions (1995) 19 (document on file with author). 
67 The UDHR (article 25); the ICESCR (article 12); the CERD (article 5(e)(iv); the CEDAW (articles 
12 and 14(2)(b); the CRC (article 24); the ESC (articles 11 and 13); the AfCHPR (article 16); the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (article 10). The latter instrument 
was not yet in force at the time of the Technical Committee’s writing of the supplementary 
memoranda. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary Memorandum on 
Bills of Rights 17. 
68 These included the constitutions of Angola, and El Salvador, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Namibia, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee 
Supplementary Memorandum on Bills of Rights 18. 
69 The UDHR (article 25); the ICESCR (article 12); the CERD (article 5(e)(iv); the CEDAW (articles 
12 and 14(2)(b); the CRC (article 24); the ESC (articles 11 and 13); the AfCHPR (article 16) and the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (article 10). The latter instrument 
was not yet in force at the time of the Technical Committee’s writing of the supplementary 
memoranda. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary Memorandum on 
Bills of Rights 17. 
70 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women, 
Beijing, 15 September 1995. 
71 These included: the UDHR (article 22 and 25); the ICESCR (articles 9 and 11); the CERD (articles 
5(e)(i) and (iv); the CEDAW (articles 11(1)(e), 11(2)(b) and 14(2)(c)); the CRC (articles 26 and 27); 
the ESC (articles 12 and 13); the International Labour Organisation Convention no. 102 Concerning 
Minimum Standards of Social Security; the AfCHPR (article 18) and the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights (article 9). The latter instrument was not yet in force at the 
time of the Technical Committee’s writing of the supplementary memorandum. See Constitutional 
Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary Memorandum on Bills of Rights 19-20. 




variety of national constitutions.72 Following from the above, the approach adopted by 
the Technical Committee shows that international and regional standards played a 
determinative role in the Technical Committee’s advice on the selection of rights to 
be included in the proposed Bill of Rights. Furthermore, its comprehensive 
investigation into international and regional human rights treaties and declarations 
provides evidence that the rights protected in the proposed Bill of Rights were aligned 
with a comprehensive array of international and regional human rights norms and 
standards. 
During its investigations, the Technical Committee also clarified the status to 
be assigned to socio-economic rights in the draft Bill of Rights. In particular, it 
emphasised the difficulties of maintaining the distinction between first, second, and 
third generation rights.73 Furthermore, it highlighted that such distinctions challenged 
the approach established in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,74 
which stated that: 
 
“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, 
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 
must be born in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic 
and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”75 
 
Lastly, the Technical Committee emphasised that all universally accepted 
fundamental rights should be protected through an effective national remedy in 
instances of violation, noting that this approach would be in harmony with the 
approach adopted in international human rights law.76 The Technical Committee 
therefore argued that socio-economic rights were not to be treated as inferior to civil 
and political rights in the draft Bill of Rights. 
                                                
72  Provisions were found in the constitutions of Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional 
Committee Supplementary Memorandum on Bills of Rights 20-21. 
73 Technical Committee (Theme Committee 4) The meaning of “universally accepted fundamental 
rights” para 12. 
74 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights 
in Vienna on 25 June 1993. 
75 Para 5. 
76 See Technical Committee (Theme Committee 4) The meaning of “universally accepted fundamental 
rights” para 12.     




The Technical Committee presented the Constitutional Assembly with the 
recommendations discussed above. The Assembly largely accepted these 
recommendations concerning the range of rights to be included, and the integrated 
treatment of all rights in relation to enforcement proceedings. However, the 
Constitutional Court adopted a different interpretation of “universal acceptance” in Ex 
parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.77 It held that, although a strict 
literal interpretation should not be applied to the term “universal”, it nevertheless 
established a strict test.78 The Court held further that the drafters of Constitutional 
Principle II intended “that only those rights that have gained a wide measure of 
international acceptance as fundamental human rights must necessarily be included in 
the [1996 Bill of Rights].” 79  However, the Court held that beyond the 
abovementioned prescription, the Constitutional Assembly enjoyed discretion in 
determining other rights to be included in the Bill of Rights.80 To support this, the 
Court relied on the wording of Constitutional Principle II which states that the 
Constitutional Assembly must give “due consideration to inter alia the fundamental 
rights contained in Chapter 3 of this Constitution”. The Court held that the rights in 
the 1993 Constitution merely had to be considered, and not necessarily duplicated or 
matched. 81 In this regard, the Court stated that: 
 
“To the extent that the [1993 Constitution] afforded rights which went beyond the 
‘universally accepted’ norm, the [Constitutional Assembly] was entitled to reduce 
them to that measure. By like token, the [Constitutional Assembly] was entitled to 
formulate rights more generously than would be required by the ‘universally 
accepted’ norm, or even to establish new rights.” 82 
 
                                                
77 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) (“First Certification judgment”). The first draft of the Constitution was 
presented to the Constitutional Court for certification. Section 71(2) of the 1993 Constitution stated 
that: 
“[t]he new constitutional text passed by the Constitutional Assembly, or any provision thereof, 
shall not be of any force and effect unless the Constitutional Court has certified that all the 
provisions of such text comply with the Constitutional Principles referred to in subsection 
(1)(a).”  
However, the Court did not certify this text. The amended text of the Constitution was only certified in 
Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 2 SA 
97 (CC) (“Second Certification judgment”).  
78 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 51. 
79 Para 51. 
80 Para 51. 
81 Para 51. 
82 Para 52. 




Therefore the Court found that the requirement of universal acceptance did not 
prevent the Constitutional Assembly from also including provisions in the proposed 
Bill of Rights that were not “universally accepted”. This disposed of objections raised 
against the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the proposed Bill of Rights on the 
basis that these rights were not universally accepted fundamental rights. 83  In 
conclusion, the different interpretations held by the Technical Committee and the 
Constitutional Court concerning the interpretation of Constitutional Principle II and 
its core concept of “universally accepted” fundamental rights did not, in the end, 
detract from the significant impact which international law in fact had on the drafting 
of the Bill of Rights.  
 
3 2 3 The role of international human rights law in the formulation of socio-economic 
rights 
In addition to providing evidence of the “universal acceptance” of fundamental 
human rights, the abovementioned international and regional instruments, and the 
interpretations accorded to them by the relevant supervisory bodies, provided further 
guidance in the precise formulation of the relevant provisions. The Technical 
Committee advised that these sources were valuable to the work of Theme Committee 
Four for two reasons. Firstly, these could assist Theme Committee Four in 
determining how “universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and liberties” 
could be entrenched in a constitution.84 Secondly, these international conventions 
specified the nature of the protection that South Africa would be required to give to 
such rights when it ratified these instruments. 85  In this regard, the Technical 
Committee argued that the protection afforded by the Constitution should not fall 
short of the protection that would be expected in terms of the country’s international 
obligations.86 The following sections will discuss the manner in which international 
                                                
83 Para 76. These objections were raised against sections 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the proposed Bill of 
Rights that protect the right to access to housing, health care, sufficient food and water, social security, 
basic education and the socio-economic rights afforded to children respectively. 
84 Para 11. 
85 Para 11. 
86 Technical Committee (Theme Committee 4) The meaning of “universally accepted fundamental 
rights” para 11. See also Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary 
Memorandum on Bills of Rights 17. By 1993 South Africa had signed, but not yet ratified, a number of 
international human rights treaties namely, the CEDAW, the CAT, and the CRC.         




and regional human rights law influenced the formulation of provisions relating to 
socio-economic rights to be included in the Bill of Rights. 
 
3 2 3 1 The right to housing 
In its investigation of the scope and content of the right to adequate housing in 
international human rights law, the Technical Committee focused particularly on the 
formulation of article 11(1) of the ICESCR.87 The Technical Committee read this 
article together with article 2 of the ICESCR, which defines the nature and scope of 
States parties’ obligations under the ICESCR.88  The Technical Committee also 
examined General Comment 4, adopted by the CESCR,89 describing it as “the most 
authoritative and detailed elaboration of international standards regarding the right to 
housing.”90 In respect of General Comment 4, the Technical Committee examined the 
CESCR’s approach to the content of the right to housing, the nature of State 
obligations, and the legal measures to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the right to 
adequate housing.91 
During the drafting of section 2592 and section 2693 of the proposed Bill of 
Rights, the Technical Committee suggested that the concept of “adequate housing”, as 
found in article 11 of the ICESCR, be used in the proposed formulation of the right to 
housing.94 It argued that a similar formulation of the right to housing in the South 
African Constitution would be advantageous on two grounds.95 Firstly, it would assist 
                                                
87 South Africa signed the ICESCR in October 1994. Article 11(1) of the ICESCR states the following: 
“The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The State Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential 
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.” 
88 Article 2 of the ICESCR states the following: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.” 
89 UNCHR ‘General Comment 4’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (“General Comment 4”).  
90 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of Rights 149. 
91 149-151. 
92 This section dealt with rights related to housing and land. 
93 This section dealt with rights related to health, food, water and social security. 
94  Technical Committee IV Memorandum on Sections 25 and 26 of the Working Draft of the 
Constitution (14 February 1996) (document on file with author). 
95 Technical Committee IV Memorandum on Sections 25 and 26 2. 




in maintaining consistency between South Africa’s domestic policies and laws, and its 
international human rights obligations.96 In this regard, the Technical Committee 
emphasised that, as the legislature and executive were the main branches of 
government tasked with adopting policy and legislation that would give effect to the 
right, this consistency would be important.97 Secondly, a formulation similar to that of 
the ICESCR would assist the courts when interpreting the right, by directing the 
courts to a “legitimate international source” that would also accord with section 
39(1)(b) and (c) of the 1996 Constitution.98 Lastly, one of the main reasons for the 
Technical Committee’s adoption of the phrase “adequate housing”, over the term 
shelter, was that the phrase was consistent with the right found in international human 
rights instruments, and a body of international standards had developed around the 
right to “adequate housing”.99 This formulation was ultimately used, and appears in 
section 26 of the Bill of Rights of the 1996 Constitution. 
The Technical Committee also proposed that the phrase, “reasonable measures 
to achieve the progressive realisation of the right” be included in the formulation of 
the right to adequate housing, and be consistent with the formulation found in article 2 
of the ICESCR, the leading international treaty protecting economic, social and 
cultural rights.100 In addition, the phrase was adopted into the provisional text as it 
delineated the State’s responsibilities in relation to the fulfilment of these rights. In 
this regard, the Technical Committee reiterated paragraph 2 of General Comment 3 
namely, that the measures used by the Government to fulfil these obligations had to 
be “deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible”.101 In defining the 
meaning of the term “progressive” within the context of the progressive realisation of 
rights, the Panel of Experts102 drew particularly from article 2 of the ICESCR and the 
obligations resting upon the State parties in this regard.103 Amongst other remarks, the 
                                                
96 2. 
97 2. 
98 2.  
99 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary Memorandum on Bills of Rights 
17. 
100 Technical Committee IV Memorandum on Sections 25 and 26 2. 
101 3. UNCHR ‘General Comment 3’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc HRI/ 
GEN/1/Rev. 9 (“General Comment 3”). 
102 The Panel of Experts was distinct from the Technical Committee and were called upon to assist the 
Technical Committee in respect of very specific matters that required particular expertise. 
103 The term “progressive” is used in the formulation of section 25(3) and section 26(2) of the Working 
Draft of the proposed Bill of Rights. These sections deal specifically with housing and land rights as 
well as rights concerning health, food, water and social security. In light of this, a panel of 




Panel of Experts stated the following in terms of the meaning of “progressive” in 
international law:  
 
“[T]he term ‘progressive’ in international law captures the idea that the full 
realization of socio-economic rights will generally not be achieved in a short period 
of time, that economic realities are taken into account, and that the need for flexibility 
is taken into account, although the achievement of these rights have to be a matter of 
priority.”104 
 
In conclusion, international human rights law, particularly the ICESCR and the 
General Comments adopted by the CESCR, played a very influential role in the 
formulation of the right to adequate housing proposed by the Technical Committee. 
 
3 2 3 2 The right to health care, food, water and social security  
The Technical Committee investigated the international recognition of the right to 
health and access to medical treatment and found such recognition in numerous 
international instruments.105 Furthermore, the Technical Committee highlighted that 
these rights are protected in various ways in national constitutions.106 The Technical 
Committee also noted the special protection given to the right to reproductive health 
care in the CEDAW and its inclusion in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action.107 In addition, the Technical Committee highlighted the various international 
instruments that recognised the right to food or adequate nutrition and water.108 
Various factors influenced the Technical Committee’s formulation of the right related 
                                                                                                                                      
constitutional experts was required to provide information regarding the use of the term “progressive” 
in international human rights law. See Panel of Constitutional Experts The Meaning of “Progressive” 
(Sections 25 and 26) (6 February 1996) (document on file with author).   
104 6. 
105 These include article 25 of the UDHR, article 12 of the ICESCR, article 5(e)(iv) of the CERD, 
article 12 and 14(2)(b) of the CEDAW, article 24 of the CRC, article 11 and article 13 of the ESC, 
article 16 of the AfCHPR, and article 10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights. The latter instrument was not yet in force at the time of the Technical Committee’s 
writing of the supplementary memorandum. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee 
Supplementary Memorandum on Bill of Rights 19. 
106 These include the constitutions of Angola and El Salvador, Greece, Italy, Namibia, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and Turkey. See Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary 
Memorandum on Bill of Rights 18. 
107 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary Memorandum on Bill of Rights 
18. 
108 These included article 25 of the UDHR, article 11 of the ICESCR, article 12(2) and article 14(2)(h) 
of the CEDAW, article 24(c) of the CRC and article 12 of the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights. The latter instrument was not yet in force at the time of the Technical 
Committee’s writing of the supplementary memorandum. Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional 
Committee Supplementary Memorandum on Bill of Rights 19. 




to social security and social assistance. One such factor was the general tendency to 
interpret the concept of social security broadly, so that it accorded with international 
trends to develop comprehensive systems of social protection.109 These systems were 
created in response to factors such as the increased mobility of labour, and changing 
global work patterns such as the growth of the informal sector, home-based work, and 
temporary work.110 The Technical Committee held that the proposed formulation, 
which appears in an almost identical form in the 1996 Bill of Rights, was consistent 
with the general scope accorded to the right in the international human rights 
instruments previously listed.111As discussed above, the Panel of Experts also drew 
significantly from article 2 of the ICESCR to determine the meaning of “progressive” 
within the context of health rights, and the right to food, water, and social security. In 
particular, the Panel of Experts compared concepts used in the ICESCR such as 
“progressive”, “to the maximum of its available resources”, and “all appropriate 
means including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”, with terms used in 
the working draft.112 
   
3 2 3 3 The right to education 
In formulating the right to education, the Technical Committee focused particularly 
on articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR, and the obligations imposed on States parties by 
these provisions. The Technical Committee argued that these were not only the main 
provisions that expressly protected and recognised the rights to education in 
international human rights law, but that these also influenced other international 
treaties and national constitutions.113 In its evaluation of article 13 of the ICESCR, the 
Technical Committee analysed the particular obligations established in this provision 
namely, that States parties must agree to the aims of education as set out in the 
ICESCR, and are required to take progressive, positive steps towards the full 
realisation of the right of everyone to education. In addition, they are required to 
respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians, and refrain from interfering with the 
liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions. 
                                                
109 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Supplementary Memorandum on Bill of Rights 
21. 
110 21. 
111 22.  
112 Technical Committee IV Memorandum on Sections 25 and 26 5-6. 
113 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of Rights 165.  




Furthermore, the Technical Committee investigated the “core elements” of the right to 
education found in article 13 of the ICESCR.114 The Technical Committee also 
examined article 14 of the ICESCR, which places an obligation upon States that have 
not yet secured free and compulsory primary education, to develop a “detailed plan of 
action”.115 Therefore, ICESCR was used to highlight obligations placed upon States 
parties in relation to the right to education, and formed part of the drafting process 
involved in the formulation of rights relating to education in the proposed Bill of 
Rights. The product of such involvement is clearly visible in section 29 of the 1996 
Constitution, which entrenches rights relating to education. Drawing from articles 
13(3) and (4) of the ICESCR,116 and from article 20 of the Namibian Constitution, the 
Technical Committee proposed a formulation of section 29(1)(3) that appeared in 
almost exactly the same terms as the two abovementioned texts in the 1996 Bill of 
Rights.117  
In conclusion, the extent to which socio-economic rights are entrenched in the 
1996 Constitution extends beyond that of its predecessor. The discussion above 
highlights that international law played a significant role not only in the selection of 
socio-economic rights included in the 1996 Bill of Rights, but also influenced the 
formulation of the provisions discussed above by playing a direct role in the 
deliberations concerning the drafting of the rights. Many of these provisions were also 
formulated to give effect to the State’s international law obligations. In light of the 
above, these provisions are, to a certain degree, genetically connected to international 
and regional human rights treaties,118 and declarations. This should serve as a further 
                                                
114 168.  
115 167.  
116 Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Committee Sub-Committee Draft Bill of Rights 174. 
Article 13(3) of the ICESCR refers to the liberty of parents and legal guardians to send their children to 
the school of their choice that adheres to the State’s minimum educational standards but which also 
conforms with the moral and legal beliefs of parents and guardians. Furthermore, parents and legal 
guardians are not bound to those schools provided by the State. Article 13(4) of the ICESCR states that 
article 13 should not be understood as interfering with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish 
and direct educational institutions. These institutions must however still adhere to the State’s minimum 
educational requirements and conform to principle 1 of the article. 
117 Clause 2 of the provisional text stated that: 
“(2) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, private 
educational institutions that- 
  (a) do not discriminate on the basis of race 
  (b) are registered with the state; and 
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable state-aided 
educational institutions.”  
118 It must be noted that the Technical Committee made no reference to the AfCHPR in the formulation 
of the socio-economic rights contained in the draft Bill of Rights, despite the fact that the AfCHPR had 




impetus for South African courts to avail themselves of the meaning and content of 
the relevant provisions found in international and regional human rights law. 
The engagement with international and regional human rights standards, as 
described above, did not conclude South Africa’s interaction with international and 
regional human rights law. By the end of January 1993, the South African 
Government signed the CEDAW, the CRC, and the CAT.119 The signing of the 
CERD, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR in 1994, which occurred in conjunction with 
President Nelson Mandela’s address to the UNGA, followed this.120 These actions 
provided further evidence of South Africa’s commitment to the protection of human 
rights as a new constitutional democracy.121 The signing and, in some cases,122 the 
subsequent ratification of international human rights treaties, signalled an intention by 
South Africa to realign itself with the developments occurring within international 
human rights law and mend the negative reputation the country had gained within the 
international community, as discussed in chapter two.  
 
3 3 Constitutional Provisions Governing the Role of International 
Law in the South African Municipal Legal Order 
3 3 1 The role of international human rights law in the interpretation of the 1993 and 
1996 Bill of Rights 
In the process of drafting the 1993 Bill of Rights, the Technical Committee 
recommended to the negotiating Council that the Bill of Rights should provide that 
when interpreting its provisions, a court of law should “where appropriate, have 
regard to public international law applicable to the protection of rights entrenched in 
                                                                                                                                      
been adopted at the time of these negotiations, and was a prominent human rights instrument from 
Africa, which protected the right of every individual to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health, and the right of every individual to education. 
119 South Africa signed the CEDAW, the CRC and the CAT on 29 January 1993. 
120 Address by President Nelson Mandela of South Africa to the 49th session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on 3 October 1994. South Africa signed the CERD, the ICCPR and the ICESCR  
on 3 October 1994. 
121  In this regard, see T Ginsberg “Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and 
International Law” (2006) 38 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 707-760. 
122 For example, while South Africa signed the ICESCR in 1994, it only ratified this instrument on 12 
January 2015. 




the Chapter, …”.123 In response to the Committee’s recommendation, section 35(1) 
was included in the 1993 Constitution.124 Section 31(1) reads: 
 
“In interpreting the provisions of the Chapter a court shall promote the values which underlie 
an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, 
have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in 
this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.” 
 
Therefore, section 35(1) ensured that the various international human rights 
instruments, amongst them those that inspired the drafting of the fundamental rights 
in chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution, would not be neglected during the process of 
interpretation. Furthermore, international human rights law in the context of 
constitutional interpretation did not require prior approval by legislative or executive 
bodies. Thus, the judiciary was accorded a significant amount of discretion in drawing 
on international law in the interpretation of fundamental rights in contrast to the role 
given to judges in the pre-constitutional era as discussed in chapter two. Deemed a 
“jewel in the Constitution”, section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution also ensured, to a 
certain extent, that South Africa prioritised a commitment to international human 
rights law.125 To this extent, the word “shall” indicated, in a peremptory vein, that 
courts were required “where applicable” to “have regard to public international law 
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched” in the Bill of Rights. 126 
The phrase, “public international law applicable to the protection of the rights” 
referred to the protection of fundamental rights.127 Such fundamental rights are 
                                                
123 Technical Committee Tenth Progress Report (5 October 1993). 
124 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 121. Ford has 
(optimistically) stated that even in the absence of a provision in the Bill of Rights requiring such use of 
international law in the interpretative process, South African courts would still, out of necessity, have 
turned to international human rights law for guidance. See J Ford “International and Comparative 
Influence on the Rights Jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court” in M du Plessis & S Pete 
(eds) Constitutional Democracy in South Africa 1994-2004: Essays in Honour of the Howard College 
School of Law (2004) 33 35. See also Dugard (1994) SAJHR 211. 
125 Dugard (1995) SAJHR 241.  
126 Section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. 
127 Not all scholars of international law agree with catagorising international human rights law as a 
separate body of law from international law. Brownlie notes that while it may be convenient to identify 
a separate body of norms from international law known as “International Human Rights Law”, it is 
actually a source of confusion, since no such body of law really exists. Brownlie argues that in a 
procedural context, a human rights issue is dealt with by referring to the “specific and relevant 
applicable law”, such as the law of a particular State, the provisions of a human rights convention, or to 
principles of general international law that are relevant to the case. Brownlie suggests that as 
“International Human Rights Law” does not exist in practice, it is not a distinct body of law that can be 
applied. I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 6 ed (2003) 530. However, Botha argues 
that the South African 1993 Constitution actually provides for the creation of such a category, by 
referring to the mandate in section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution which, he argues, provides for the 
application of international human rights law in particular, and not international law generally. See 




commonly termed “human rights”, implying that in terms of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution, courts were to apply that body of public international law more 
generally termed, “international human rights law”.128 For purposes of constitutional 
interpretation, section 35(1) authorised the courts to rely on all sources of 
international law applicable to the protection of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights.129 The implication of this was that a claim to a right remained a domestic 
claim that would be dealt with on a domestic level. However, by virtue of section 
35(1), the “fleshing out of such a claim” occurred with the assistance of international 
human rights law.130   
The body of international human rights law available to the courts as an 
interpretative aid under section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution is made up of various 
components. Courts find the various sources of public international law set out in 
article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Courts are not 
restricted to regard only those international instruments to which South Africa is 
bound, but can pursue an enquiry beyond these for the purposes of interpretation. At 
the time of the adoption of the 1993 Constitution, the role of international treaties not 
yet signed, as well as customary international law, had not yet been clarified in the 
interpretive process. However, Dugard states that it was not the intention of the 
drafters to limit the applicable rules of international law in such a way. 131  In 
particular, he submits that limitations had not been placed on the meaning of the term, 
“public international law” as it appeared in section 35(1). Furthermore, Dugard argues 
that the Constitution confirmed its approach towards international human rights law in 
section 116(2), whereby the Human Rights Commission was instructed as follows: 
 
“[T]o measure any proposed legislation against the Bill of Rights or norms of 
international human rights law which form part of South African law or other 
                                                                                                                                      
Botha (1994) SA Publiekreg/Public Law 246. The implications of this argument is that section 39(1)(b) 
of the 1996 Constitution, which refers only to international law, also requires that courts consider 
international human rights law, as opposed to international law generally. 
128 Botha (1994) SA Publiekreg/ SA Public Law 246. Botha argues that the distinction between 
fundamental human rights and human rights is semantic, and settles for the general, internationally 
accepted term of human rights. However, as noted in chapter 1, the Constitutional Court has considered 
fields of international law other than international human rights law in its application of section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. 
129  Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 121; Dugard (1994) 
SAJHR 212. 
130 Botha (1994) SA Publiekreg/ SA Public Law 247. 
131 Dugard (1994) SAJHR 212; Dugard (1995) SAJHR 243. 




relevant norms of international law and report any conflict between such norms and 
the proposed legislation to the relevant legislature.” 
 
The implications of this argument were that even if South Africa was not a party to an 
international agreement, or had not yet signed or ratified a convention containing 
human rights law, such an agreement or convention could still be used as an 
interpretative aid.132 Furthermore, the application of customary international in South 
African municipal law was regulated in section 231(4) of the 1993 Constitution. 
However, by virtue of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, customary international 
law could also be invoked as an interpretative aid to assist in giving meaning and 
content to fundamental rights.   
The inclusion of section 35(1) in the Bill of Rights allowed courts to seek 
guidance from the wording of international treaties, and from the interpretations given 
to them by different adjudicative bodies, without having to prove that these principles 
were binding upon South Africa.133  The decisive factor in using these sources, 
however, remained whether or not the source of international law was applicable to 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.134 According to Du Plessis and Corder, the drafters of 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution intended for the section to be understood in a 
broad sense namely, that a large corpus of international human rights jurisprudence 
would be recognised as “applicable”, to “give maximum effect to the otherwise 
incomplete catalogue of rights entrenched in chapter 3”.135 The application of this 
section was, however, qualified. The phrasing of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution indicates that courts were only required to “have regard to” this source of 
law. Courts were therefore only required to take applicable public international law 
into account when interpreting the Bill of Rights, as opposed to being required to 
apply it. Botha and Olivier support the view that international interpretations of a 
provision will almost always be applicable.136 However, Olivier has attributed the 
qualification “where applicable” to the traditional caution shown towards the use of 
international law by courts and politicians.137 Olivier states that this qualification may 
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have been to safeguard local remedies from an overly extensive use of international 
law.138 
Section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution was replaced with section 39(1) in the 
1996 Constitution with only minor modifications.139  Section 39(1)(b) states: “When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum … must consider 
international law”. Section 39(1) differs from its predecessor as it not only refers to 
“courts of law”, but also broadens its application to include tribunals and forums.140 
Furthermore, section 39(1)(b) mandates these adjudicative bodies to “consider” 
international law, as opposed to the language of its predecessor, which obliged courts 
to “have regard to” public international law. In addition, the reference made in section 
35(1) to “public international law” was replaced in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution with the term “international law”. 
The most striking difference between section 35(1) and section 39(1)(b) is the 
removal of the words, “where applicable” from section 39(1)(b). Thus, the 
abovementioned adjudicative bodies are no longer limited to only regarding public 
international law when they deem it applicable to a case, as was the approach laid 
down in section 35(1). Rather, these bodies are now obliged to “consider international 
law” whether they deem it applicable or not. This modification precludes adjudicative 
bodies from making use of the “escape route” provided by section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution that potentially allowed courts to question the applicability of 
international law. In addition, the 1996 Constitution has maintained that both 
international law and foreign law can be used as interpretive aids when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.141  To this extent, the 1993 Constitution has preserved this 
distinction, namely that the relevant adjudicative bodies “must” consider international 
law, while they “may” consider foreign law.  
 
                                                
138 491. 
139 Section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides the following: 
“(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law.” 
140 Olivier (2003) TSAR 492. 
141 492. 




3 3 2 The signing, ratification and incorporation of international treaties  
The 1993 Constitution introduced significant changes to the law governing the status 
of international treaties, and the manner in which these were to be incorporated into 
municipal law. Section 82(1)(i) of the 1993 Constitution indicated that the President 
was competent to sign and negotiate international treaties, therefore reserving this 
function for the Executive.142 Together with this mandate, section 231(2)143 stated that 
Parliament could agree to the accession to, or the ratification of, international 
agreements.144 The 1993 Constitution therefore afforded Parliament a primary role in 
the accession, or ratification, of international treaties.145 According to section 231(3), 
where Parliament agrees to the ratification of, or accession to, an international 
agreement, such an agreement becomes binding, and forms part of domestic law, once 
two conditions are met. Firstly, an agreement becomes binding once Parliament 
expressly provides so, and secondly, such an international agreement has to be 
consistent with the Constitution. In respect of the former, Keightley argues that 
Parliament was no longer restricted to transforming international agreements into 
municipal law only by way of an Act of Parliament.146 While the 1993 Constitution 
did not define the other means by which treaties could be incorporated into municipal 
law, Keightley submits that a resolution, or an “endorsement”, from Parliament was 
                                                
142 Keightley notes that the President had taken a predominant role in the signing of international 
agreements after the 1993 Constitution came into force. This is in contrast to Dugard’s view that this 
function was usually that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Keightley derived evidence for this 
practice from the memorandum to all Ministers and Heads of Government, namely the “Procedures for 
the Conclusion of International Agreements”. See R Keightley “Public International Law and the Final 
Constitution” (1996) 12 SAJHR 405 409. 
143 Section 231 of the 1993 Constitution states that: 
“(1) All rights and obligations under international agreements which immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution were vested in or binding on the Republic within the 
meaning of the previous Constitution, shall be vested in or binding on the Republic under this 
Constitution, unless provided otherwise by an Act of Parliament. 
(2) Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, be competent to agree to the ratification of or 
accession to an international agreement negotiated and signed in terms of s 82(1)(i). 
(3) Where Parliament agrees to the ratification of or accession to an international agreement 
under subs (2), such international agreement shall be binding on the Republic and shall form 
part of the law of the Republic, provided Parliament expressly so provides and such 
agreement is not inconsistent with this Constitution. 
(4) The rules of customary international law binding on the Republic, shall, unless 
inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, form part of the law of the 
Republic.” 
144 Keightley submits that, within this context, Parliament’s agreement to such treaties had the effect of 
ratification, and that Parliament’s assent was required before the treaty had international effect. She 
argues that this approach was contrasted with the approach of the State before the adoption of the 1993 
Constitution. Keightley (1996) SAJHR 409. 
145 Keightley (1996) SAJHR 409. 
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considered as an acceptable form of transformation.147 Keightley argues further that 
this change had positive practical implications for the domestication of international 
treaty provisions.148  She argues that section 231(3) ensured that the domestication of 
treaty provisions would be achieved much quicker, and was particularly relevant to 
the various international human rights treaties that were already signed by the 
Government, and still in need of ratification at the time.149 The 1996 Constitution 
regulates the status of treaties in section 231.150 This provision confirms the dualist 
approach to the incorporation of international treaties into domestic law, followed in 
the 1993 Constitution. The Constitutional Court has elaborated on the nuanced 
process entrenched in section 231 of the 1996 Constitution in Glenister.151 In this 
case, the Court held that the negotiating and signing of international agreements by 
the national executive does not render such agreements binding upon the Republic.152 
In accordance with section 231(2), such an agreement only becomes binding once it 
has subsequently received approval by both houses of Parliament namely, the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, by way of resolution.153 
The only exception to this is found in section 231(3), concerning agreements that are 
“technical, administrative or executive in nature”.154 Furthermore, as confirmed by the 




150 Section 231 of the 1996 Constitution provides as follows: 
“(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the 
national   executive. 
(2) The international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces, unless it is an 
agreement referred to in subs (3). 
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national 
executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable 
time. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by 
Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament. 
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic 
when this Constitution took effect.” 
151 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). For a more detailed description of the facts of the case, see page 115. 
152 Para 180. 
153 Para 180. 
154 Section 231(3) provides that: 
“An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national 
executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the National 




Court in Glenister, the approval of an international treaty by Parliament in accordance 
with section 231(2) only binds the Republic to the international agreement under 
international law.155 Therefore, Parliamentary approval does not transform “the rights 
and obligations contained in international agreements into home-grown constitutional 
rights and obligations.”156 
However, the Court stated that international treaties that are ratified, and thus 
approved by Parliament but not yet incorporated into municipal law, still have value 
in the international sphere. Ngcobo CJ held that, in accordance with the VCLT, 
Parliamentary approval provides evidence that South Africa intends to bind itself to 
the relevant international agreement under international law.157 The Court held that 
such approval indicates that, at an international level, a State agrees to take the 
necessary steps to comply with the international agreement.158 This will occur either 
by way of legislatively incorporating the agreement into municipal law, or by aligning 
municipal laws with the provisions of the treaty to the extent that they lack 
compliance with the treaty provisions.159 
Furthermore, Ngcobo CJ stated that Parliament’s ratification of an 
international agreement is a positive assertion to the signatories of the agreement that 
Parliament will act in accordance with the ratified treaty, subject to the provisions of 
the Constitution.160 Therefore, South Africa is accountable to signatory States, and 
may be held responsible for failing to adhere to the international treaty. 161 
Furthermore, section 231(4) of the 1996 Constitution expressly provides for the 
incorporation of international agreements into municipal law. The Court in Glenister 
argued that, as section 231(4) provides specifically for the domestication of 
international agreements into municipal law, section 231(2) could not give “binding 
internal constitutional force to agreements merely because Parliament has approved 
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time.” 
155 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 181. 
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157 Para 91. This was expressed in the minority judgment of Ngcobo CJ. Reference is made to the 
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them.”162 In accordance with section 231(4), provisions that have received such 
approval must be enacted into municipal law by way of national legislation before 
they form part of municipal law. 163  Therefore, the process of incorporating 
international agreements into municipal law, as governed by section 231(4), does not 
confer constitutional status upon these rights and obligations, but transforms these 
into statutory rights and obligations.164 This provision therefore reintroduces the legal 
situation prior to the adoption of the 1993 Constitution in terms of which an Act of 
Parliament was required to domesticate an international agreement..165 
 When international agreements are incorporated into domestic law by way of 
national legislation, they, according to Ngcobo CJ, assume the same status as 
legislation.166  Furthermore, such legislation will only prevail over other national 
legislation if that intention is clearly expressed by Parliament.167 In the event of a 
conflict between an international agreement that has been legislatively incorporated 
into municipal law in terms of section 231(4), and ordinary legislation, the principles 
of statutory interpretation, and those governing superseding legislation, must be 
applied.168 In addition, Ngcobo CJ reaffirmed that those international agreements, 
which are duly incorporated into municipal law and have assumed the status of 
ordinary legislation, give rise to rights and obligations in municipal law. However, he 
stated that these rights and obligations would only exist to the extent provided for by 
the legislation that incorporated the agreement into municipal law.169 Lastly, Ngcobo 
CJ established that if an international agreement contains a self-executing provision, 
which is duly incorporated into municipal law in accordance with section 231(4), this 
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163 Section 231(4). The legislature incorporates international treaty provisions into municipal law in 
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provision would still assume the status of an ordinary statute, and would not 
constitute a constitutional obligation.170 
 
3 3 3 The status of customary international law 
Section 231(4) of the 1993 Constitution not only removed all uncertainties that 
previously concerned the court’s use of customary international law, as discussed in 
chapter 2, but also clarified the status of customary international law in the South 
African municipal legal order. Section 231(4) maintained the monist approach to the 
incorporation of customary international law into municipal law. Accordingly, no 
legislative transformation needed to take place before customary international law 
was regarded as binding upon domestic law. However, this was subject to the 
condition that customary international law was not found to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution, or an Act of Parliament.   
Section 232171 of the 1996 Constitution reaffirms the monist approach to the 
incorporation of customary international law into municipal law followed in the 1993 
Constitution. This approach is also subject to the qualification that any inconsistencies 
with the Constitution, or an Act of Parliament, will render the application of 
customary international void.    
 
3 4 The Relevance of International Human Rights Law to 
Constitutional Interpretation 
After the Second World War, non-state actors increasingly interacted with the State 
and today, the international and national landscape is characterised by such trans 
border interactions. The existence and influence exerted by actors such as 
transnational and multinational corporations, and inter-governmental organisations 
such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and 
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courts’ application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution.  
171 Section 232 states that: “Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.” 




the European Union, indicate that international law is no longer confined to regulating 
the relations between States. Globalisation, however, should not only be understood 
as portraying an ideal state of affairs. In this regard, Bryde criticises the notion of an 
idyllic global village stating that: 
 
“[W]e are not living in a global village but a global megapolis of the sort that we 
know from the third world: with a few upper class districts, heavily guarded but by no 
means secure, some middle class areas and a lot of slums and no-go areas.”172 
 
Bryde argues that, as a result of globalisation, there is an increased demand for 
international law that is capable of addressing concerns that can only be dealt with at 
an international level.173 He argues that the emergence of concerns such as climate 
control and environmental conservation, international terrorism, and particularly for 
the purpose of this study, human suffering related to poverty, can no longer be 
conceived of as a domestic concern confined within State borders. Similarly, Fraser 
argues that poverty in particular, has too often only been presented and addressed 
within “the Westphalian frame” namely, as internal to the modern territorial State.174 
To this extent, redress has been sought by way of invoking national constitutions and 
national law.175 Fraser argues that although this approach to redress is plausible, such 
a conceptualisation ignores the reality of “global poverty”.176 Furthermore, she argues 
that by “misframing” poverty in this manner, transnational actors and external sources 
responsible for contributing to the causes of poverty are excluded from 
accountability.177 In addition to this, Fraser argues that in these instances, adequate 
redress cannot be found at a national level.178 Lastly, Fraser argues that addressing 
global poverty as a national concern masks the necessity for mechanisms that can 
provide redress on a broader scale.179 Thus, there is not only a need for recognising, 
and reconceptualising, social problems associated with poverty as existing on scales 
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beyond that of the territorial state. There is also a need for these issues to be addressed 
by legal mechanisms that function beyond the national level. 
Efforts to address emerging concerns regarding the welfare and protection of 
the individual are particularly evident within the realm of international human rights 
law. The periods following the Second World War witnessed the creation of a 
proliferation of international instruments aimed specifically at recognising human 
beings as subjects of international law. Benhabib argues that, since the adoption of the 
UDHR, global civil society has entered into a period characterised by a “transition 
from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice”.180 In this regard, Benhabib 
explains that cosmopolitan norms are afforded to individuals, who are regarded as 
moral and legal persons in a world wide civil society.181 Furthermore, these norms 
oblige States to treat their citizens and residents in accordance with certain human 
rights standards.182 This resonates with Kant’s approach to global justice namely, that 
municipal law cannot be seen in abstract from the international or “cosmopolitan” 
community in which rights are situated.183 Thus, the individual has emerged as a 
subject of international law. 
This is illustrated in the language of the UDHR, which indicates that 
individuals are recognised as bearers of universal, fundamental human rights, 
applicable to all citizens of the world. In addition, it is expressed in international 
human rights instruments such the ICESCR, the ICCPR, the CEDAW, the CAT, and 
the CERD. Moreover, the Preamble to the UN Charter states that Member States are 
determined to:  
 
“[R]eaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom ...” 
 
A normative feature of human rights, also embodied in the international human rights 
instruments above, is their claim to universality through the concept of human 
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dignity.184 This concept serves to underscore that human rights are moral rights as 
well as legal rights. Although not clearly defined, and certainly open to differences in 
interpretation, Bielfeldt argues that the meaning of human dignity can be derived from 
human rights, while texts protecting human rights may also provide aspects of a 
definition.185 Human dignity is furthermore represented by principles of equality and 
freedom.186 Within this context, the principle of equality affirms that individuals are 
equal in their claims to self-determination.187 In regards to the principle of freedom, 
all human rights are argued to be “rights of freedom”, while the principle of freedom 
also affirms the freedom of individuals to claims of self-determination.188 
Domestic constitution drafters have also attempted to protect certain universal, 
fundamental human rights and values. The so-called “cross fertilization” between 
international law and national constitutions signals, and promotes, the concept of a 
universal recognition of these rights.189 For example, amongst the more recent 
democracies in Africa, constitutions have been designed to give recognition to 
universal values, amongst them freedom, equality and human dignity.190 Recognition 
of the universality of international human rights norms was clearly illustrated in the 
drafting of the 1996 South African Bill of Rights. In this case, drafters sought to 
include only those fundamental human rights that adhered to the requirement of 
“universal acceptance”. Consequently, this promotes the idea that shaping national 
constitutional provisions in accordance with these international and regional standards 
will strengthen the protection of these rights in the national sphere.   
International human rights law increasingly influences more than just the 
drafting of constitutional provisions. In this regard, there is an increasing trend 
amongst these emerging democracies to include within their constitutions, provisions 
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188 6. To this extent, Beilefeldt characterises social and economic rights as rights of freedom to the 
extent that their fulfillment assists in the upliftment of poor social conditions, thereby: “operat[ing] as 
tools to broaden the space for freedom.” 
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permitting the use of international law in constitutional interpretation. In this way, 
courts are cutting across the traditional monism-dualism approach, which 
characterises the manner in which international law is incorporated into municipal 
law, by seeking interpretive guidance from international human rights law. Various 
constitutions provide for the utilisation of international law specifically for the task of 
constitutional interpretation. Constitutions that have afforded international law such a 
role in the interpretation of their constitutional provisions include that of Angola,191 
Malawi,192 Romania,193 Namibia,194 South Africa,195 and Papua New Guinea.196 The 
                                                
191 Constitution of the Republic of Angola section 26 states the following: 
“(2) Constitutional and legal precepts relating to fundamental rights must be interpreted and 
incorporated in accordance with the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the African 
Charter on the Rights of Man and Peoples and international treaties on the subject ratified by 
the Republic of Angola. 
(3) In any consideration by the Angolan courts of disputes concerning fundamental rights, the 
international instruments referred to in the previous point shall be applied, even if not invoked 
by the parties concerned.” 
192 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi section 11(2) states the following:  
“In interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of law shall- 
promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society; take full account of the 
provisions of Chapter III and Chapter IV; and where applicable, have regard to current norms 
of public international law and comparable foreign case law.”  
193 Constitution of Romania article 20 states the following: 
“(1) Constitutional provisions concerning the citizens’ rights and liberties shall be interpreted 
and enforced in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the 
covenants and other treaties Romania is a party to.  
(2) Where any inconsistencies exist between the covenants and treaties on the fundamental 
human rights Romania is a party to, and the national laws, the international regulations shall 
take precedence, unless the Constitution or national laws comprise more favourable 
provisions.  
194 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia article 144 states the following:  
“Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of 
public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this 
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.” 
195 Constitution of South Africa section 39(1)(b) states the following: 
 “(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
  … 
  (b) must consider international law.” 
196 Constitution of Papua New Guinea section 39(3): 
“For the purposes of determining whether or not any law, matter or thing is reasonably 
justified in a democratic society that has a proper regard for the rights and dignity of mankind, 
a court may have regard to-  
(a) the provisions of this Constitution generally, and especially the National Goals 
and Directive Principles and the Basic Social Obligations; and  
(b) the Charter of the United Nations; and  
(c) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and any other declaration, 
recommendation or decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms; and  
(d) the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the Protocols thereto, and any other international conventions, 
agreements or declarations concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms; and  
(e) judgements, reports and opinions of the International Court of Justice, the 
European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and 




existence of these provisions indicate that constitutional drafters recognise the 
relevance of international law, and particularly international human rights law, to the 
interpretation of their constitutional provisions.   
As early as 1988, the growing trend of using international human rights law 
for the purposes of, amongst others, interpreting constitutional provisions, was 
evidenced and acknowledged by judges at a colloquium in Bangalore, India. The 
colloquium was dedicated solely to the “Domestic Application of International 
Human Rights Norms”, and was attended by judges predominantly from 
Commonwealth countries197 as well as from the United States of America. This 
colloquium underscored and summarised crucial aspects of utilising international 
human rights law for the purposes of constitutional interpretation in the so-called 
“Bangalore Principles”. 198  Through these Principles, the judges acknowledged 
international human rights instruments as important sources of guidance in cases 
addressing human rights and freedoms.199 Furthermore, the body of jurisprudence that 
has developed through the interpretation of human rights and freedoms, and the 
application thereof, is recognised as both practically relevant and valuable to judges 
and lawyers.200  The Principles declared that the judges relied increasingly upon 
unincorporated international treaties in instances where domestic law (constitutional 
law, statute or common law) suffered from uncertainty or was incomplete. 201 
Furthermore, the Principles indicated that this increased reliance upon unincorporated 
international treaties is affirmed and welcomed. This signalled respect for the 
universality of fundamental human rights, while emphasising the independent role of 
                                                                                                                                      
other international courts and tribunals dealing with human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; and  
(f) previous laws, practices and judicial decisions and opinions in the country; and  
(g) laws, practices and judicial decisions and opinions in other countries; PNG 
National Legislation and  
(h) the Final Report of the pre-Independence Constitutional Planning Committee 
dated 13 August 1974 and presented to the pre-Independence House of Assembly on 
16 August 1974, as affected by decisions of that House on the report and by 
decisions of the Constituent Assembly on the draft of this Constitution; and  
(i) declarations by the International Commission of Jurists and other similar 
organizations; and  
(j) any other material that the court considers relevant.  
197 Judges from Australia, India, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, the 
United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.  
198 The Bangalore Principles (1988) 14 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1196-1211. 
199 Bangalore Principles, Principle 2. 
200 Bangalore Principles, Principle 3. 
201 Bangalore Principles, Principle 4 acknowledges that in most countries whose legal systems are 
governed by common law, international conventions only become part of, and thus directly 
enforceable, in municipal law once these provisions are legislatively incorporated into municipal law. 




the judiciary.202 Bangalore Principle 7 acknowledged that courts were, in fact, well 
suited to refer to unincorporated international treaties and stated the following: 
 
“It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and well-established judicial 
functions for national courts to have regard to international obligations which a 
country undertakes - whether or not they have been incorporated into domestic law - 
for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions, 
legislation or common law.”203 
 
Although the Bangalore Principles affirmed the use of international law when 
interpreting national constitutions, legislation or the common law, such use was 
qualified. The Principles stated that local laws, traditions, circumstances, and needs 
must be taken into account. 204  Furthermore, the courts should not rely upon 
international law where national law was clear but inconsistent with the State’s 
international obligations.205 
Admittedly, the Bangalore Principles were developed from the opinions and 
judicial interpretive activities of only a small sub-set of judges from Commonwealth 
states (and one non-Commonwealth judge). However, their exchange underscores the 
necessity of judges to acknowledge that international law, particularly international 
human rights law, is increasingly relied upon to enrich constitutional interpretation 
beyond the traditional monism-dualism divide.  
Contemporary scholars have provided similar evidence indicating the 
increasing tendency among common law courts to rely on public international law, 
not yet incorporated into their municipal legal system, for the purposes of 
constitutional interpretation. Waters argues that the rise of international human rights 
treaties, and supra-national institutions, have drawn domestic courts into a tension 
between their obligations under a dualist system, and the universal normative 
aspirations of international human rights law. Through a phenomenon she describes 
as “creeping monism”, Waters argues that common law courts are gradually utilising 
a more flexible approach to the use of unincorporated human rights treaties in the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions.206 Thus, common law courts are no longer 
                                                
202 Bangalore Principles, Principle 5. 
203 Bangalore Principles, Principle 7. 
204 Bangalore Principles, Principle 6. 
205 Bangalore Principles, Principle 8. 
206 MA Waters “Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human 
Rights Treaties” (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 628-705 633. 




restricting themselves to the distinction of incorporated and unincorporated treaties, as 
required by dualism, but are adopting “monist-orientated interpretive incorporation 
techniques”. Waters argues further that such a reliance on unincorporated treaties 
does not fall into the traditional category of binding treaty law, nor can their use be 
classified as providing evidence of customary law. Instead, these interpretative 
techniques are being categorised in international law as operating in a “grey zone”, 
utilised for their persuasive value in international law, or as a means to incorporate 
soft law sources into municipal law. 207  Slaughter has described this interaction 
between national law and international law as a judicial interaction characteristic of 
“judicial globalization”.208 She describes this as a 
 
“diverse and messy process of judicial interaction across, above and below borders, 
exchanging ideas and cooperating in cases involving national as much as 
international law.”209 
 
According to Slaughter, at the core of each interaction described by judicial 
globalization, lies the recognition of “participation in a common global enterprise of 
judging, an awareness that provides a foundation for a global community of law.”210  
She adds that in this endeavour, judges, litigants, and lawyers alike, are realising that 
they form part of a wider world.211  
Alston exemplifies the value of international human rights law to the process 
of interpreting constitutional provisions in the following statement:      
 
“If the international human rights regime can succeed in acting as a force for 
convergence [in approaches across different domestic jurisdictions], in much the 
same way as other developments act in an increasingly globalised world economy, 
the prospects that the new bills of rights will not only survive but will flourish, should 
be greatly enhanced.”212 
 
This statement reflects the powerful way in which international human rights law can 
endorse and support the goals, values, and rights entrenched in a bill of rights.  
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South African courts have acknowledged the importance of section 35(1) of 
the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution as a means of 
positioning themselves within the broader dialogue of the international community. 
As indicated in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa,213 Sachs J held 
the following:  
 
“In deciding whether or not sending people to jail for not paying their debts is 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality we need 
to locate ourselves in the mainstream of international democratic practice.”214  
 
The international instruments that Sachs J relied on for assistance included the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 215  the AmCHR, 216  the 
ICCPR,217 and the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention,218 which the Court 
invoked through section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. Furthermore, in S v Williams, 
Langa J held the following: 
 
“While our ultimate definition of these concepts [contained in s 11(2) of the interim 
Constitution] must necessarily reflect our own experience and contemporary 
circumstances as the South African community, there is no disputing that valuable 
insights may be gained from the manner in which the concepts are dealt with in 
public international law as well as in foreign case law.”219  
 
The South African Constitution has been designed to attend to the domestic needs and 
values of South African citizens, and was created in response to South Africa’s 
unique past. For this reason, the document can be characterised as “inward-
looking”.220 However, the Constitution is also outward looking to the extent that it 
was designed to facilitate the transformation of a society that would be established 
upon new social and political goals.221 In this context, the Constitution must be 
recognised as a “living instrument”, which serves a society that is in a process of 
                                                
213 1995 4 SA 631 (CC). 
214 Para 51. 
215 Para 52. 
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219 S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) para 23. 
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change and reformation.222 International human rights law can be particularly relevant 
and informative in providing valuable guidance to the substance of these new rights 
and freedoms. Within the South African context, such a consideration of international 
human rights law should not be viewed as an element in a procedural checklist of 
interpretative strategies. Rather, the injunction in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution should be considered within the context of the Constitution as a whole 
and the overall goals that it seeks to achieve. In this regard, it is recalled that both the 
1993 and 1996 Constitutions were created with the purpose of establishing a new 
democratic order. The values, which form part of the bedrock of this new social order, 
are expressed in the Preamble,223 as well as section 1224 of the 1996 Constitution.225 
Furthermore, section 39(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution emphasises the values that 
should guide the interpretation of the Bill of Rights namely, that: 
                                                
222 Udombana (2005) African Human Rights Law Journal 56. The view that constitutions should be 
regarded as “living instruments” is strongly opposed by so-called originalists who deny the legitimacy 
of judicial comparative engagement and argue that the national legal order does not recognise 
international law (or foreign law) as a legitimate source of law suitable for the interpretation of a 
Constitution. This view is especially prevalent in debates concerning constitutional interpretation in the 
United States. See Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting), Atkins v 
Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002), Stanford v Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See also JEK 
Murkens “Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections” 
(2008) 41 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 32-50; N Dorsen “The Relevance of Foreign Legal 
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice Scalia and Justice Stephen 
Breyer” (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 519-541; K Schiemann “Response to 
The Judge as Comparatist” (2005-2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 281 295; BS Markesinis & J Fedtke 
Engaging with Foreign Law (2009) 192. 
223 The Preamble to the 1996 Constitution states the following: 
“We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the 
supreme law of the Republic so as to - 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights.” 
224 Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states the following:  
“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following 
values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.  
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.  
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular elections and a 
multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.” 
225 The wording of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution also underscores that these values are to 
underlie the entire interpretive exercise. Section 35(1) states the following: 
“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which 
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.” 
Furthermore, in S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) para 17, Chaskalson J stated the following: 
“[I]t cannot be too strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we wish it 
to mean. We must heed Lord Wilberforce’s reminder that even a constitution is a legal 
instrument, the language of which is to be respected. If the language used by the lawgiver is 
ignored in favour of a general resort to “values” the result is not interpretation but divination.” 





 “(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.” 
 
South Africa’s domestic courts are therefore tasked with constructing decisions that 
will reflect the values inherent in the Constitution. As a system that follows a dualist 
approach226 to the incorporation of treaties into the municipal system, the inclusion of 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution is truly unique to the South African legal 
order. Sections 39(1)(a) and 39(1)(b) place courts in an interesting position whereby 
they are, on the one hand, mandated to interpret the Bill of Rights in a manner that 
will promote domestic, democratic values, while regarding South Africa’s history and 
local context. On the other hand, courts are also required to consider public 
international law when delineating the content and meaning of these constitutional 
provisions.  
Ford states that by having such recourse to global standards and experiences, 
interpreters are able to determine what a society based on these values might 
require.227 The consideration of public international law is thus a tool to be used in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights that can assist in informing the values of our 
society. Drawing from international jurisprudence as a means of strengthening a 
domestic decision can serve an additional dual purpose. Firstly, a domestic court’s 
decision can gain a certain degree of legitimacy when a court’s authority is embedded 
in the support of international jurisprudence.228 Secondly, the international norms are 
even further fortified when relied upon by domestic courts. 229  Constitutional 
mechanisms like that of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution can serve as judicial 
conduits whereby courts can gain access to established international jurisprudence for 
guidance, perspective, inspiration, and even support for a certain approach. 230 
However, the consideration or use of international law in constitutional 
interpretation will not necessarily lead to an expansion of the meaning or scope of a 
                                                
226 The treatment of self-executing treaties, as dealt with in section 231(3) of the 1996 Constitution, is 
an exception to this. 
227 Ford “International and Comparative Influence” in Constitutional Democracy in South Africa 33.  
228 MA Burnham “Cultivating a Seedling Charter: South Africa’s Court Grows its Constitution” (1997) 
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particular domestic provision.231 The nature of the constitutional provision, as well as 
the nature of an international treaty, may circumscribe its relevance to the interpretive 
exercise.232 Furthermore, a court can derive assistance from an international norm as a 
persuasive force in the interpretation of a constitutional provision that is similar, or 
identical, to that of the international norm.233 In this regard, Neumann argues that, on 
a functional level, the international norm may provide courts with empirical evidence 
indicating the success or failure of a certain interpretation and the consequences 
thereof.234 Furthermore, through the consideration of international law, courts may be 
informed of how values are realised in other domestic jurisdictions and at an 
international level, thus challenging them in the way they have addressed the 
fulfilment of such values in their own jurisdictions.235 
South African courts may profit from a consideration of international human 
rights law, particularly within the context of interpreting socio-economic rights. 
Firstly, as a relatively new constitutional democracy, which protects socio-economic 
rights as justiciable rights, it may be argued that South Africa’s socio-economic 
rights’ jurisprudence may gain useful insight from more developed regional and 
international standards that engage further with the scope and content of socio-
economic rights. Secondly, as highlighted in the discussion above, certain socio-
economic rights entrenched in the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions were inspired by, or 
borrowed from, international human rights instruments. These instruments may also 
guide South African courts in their interpretative process. Lastly, a connection has 
been identified between the use of international law in the interpretation of socio-
economic rights, and the advancement of transformative constitutionalism236 in South 
African courts. The use of international law may provide insight into the meaning and 
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236 See also K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
The concept of transformative constitutionalism was defined by Klare as: 
“[A] long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed 
(not in isolation of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes 
an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes 
grounded in law.” 




scope of socio-economic rights in a manner that would assist South African courts, 
and other adjudicative bodies, in their call to transformative adjudication.237 In this 
regard, Liebenberg states that: 
 
“This process of considering international law standards promotes the kind of critical 
self-reflection which should underpin the development of a transformative 
jurisprudence on socio-economic rights.”238 
 
As discussed above, South African courts are mandated to consider international 
human rights law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. However, the abovementioned 
discussion provides further evidence that this source of law can make a meaningful 
contribution to the interpretive process. However, the use of international human 
rights law for the purposes of interpreting constitutional provisions is not without its 
critics. As the Constitution mandates South African courts to consider international 
law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, many of the criticisms directed at the use of 
international law within the context of constitutional interpretation are overcome. 
However, even within the South African context, the use of this source of law as an 
interpretive tool is not necessarily free from legitimacy concerns. For example, Ford 
submits that the manner in which courts consider international human rights law for 
the purposes of constitutional interpretation may challenge the democratic legitimacy 
of this source of law.239 This concern raises two distinct challenges. Firstly, judges 
must be transparent in justifying how they arrive at their conclusions when relying on 
international law.240 Secondly, judicial outcomes must be based upon value-oriented 
reasoning. This implies that courts must adapt the value-based principles from other 
systems into a local context, and thus aim at resolving local issues in a justified 
manner.241 Therefore, a key objective of the interpretive project should be to create an 
indigenous interpretation that is applicable to the domestic context.  
Furthermore, international law may be accused of suffering from ambiguity, 
and is thus argued to be irrelevant. Kirby J argues that such cases may indeed exist, 
however, many international law principles have been elaborated on and are therefore 
detailed. These include decisions handed down from the European Court of Human 
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Rights (“ECtHR”) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”).242 
More particularly, the General Comments issued by the HRC, as well as the CESCR, 
are designed specifically with the aim of assisting States parties with adhering to the 
obligations created under their respective Covenants. Furthermore, these General 
Comments help to clarify and develop the meaning of provisions contained in the 
relevant international instruments and are particularly rich in content. Therefore, the 
existence of ambiguity and vagueness of international human rights is diminishing as 
international adjudicative bodies interpret these rights. 
 Lastly, scholars such as McGinnis and Somin argue that the international law-
making processes used in formulating human rights norms are undemocratic, and 
therefore inferior to the more democratic processes offered within the municipal 
system of a democracy.243 The authors only apply this argument to so called “raw” 
international law that has not yet been ratified by a domestic, democratic process, or 
incorporated into a municipal system of law by way of legislation. The authors argue 
that a democracy is better placed to afford certain rights with the status of 
fundamental human rights. 244  Furthermore, the authors argue that the use of 
international human rights law as a tool in constructing an interpretation can result in 
displacing domestic law-making processes, as it would result in an outcome that 
would differ if domestic political decision-making were the only determining 
factor.245   
  Despite such criticisms, it must be recalled that, within the South African 
context, international human rights law is only one tool of interpretation used to 
achieve a value-orientated outcome and is not given a determinative role that dictates 
to courts the decisions they should take. However, the application of section 39(1) of 
the 1996 Constitution (and section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution) still challenges 
courts to provide consistent, transparent and qualitative reasoning when relying on 
international human rights law.  
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3 5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrated that international human rights law played an 
important and determinative role in the formulation of socio-economic rights 
contained in the 1993 and 1996 Bill of Rights. This prominent role underscores the 
significant weight that was attached to this source of law during the drafting process 
and highlights the belief held that international human rights law encapsulates a 
universal standard of protection of fundamental human rights. Moreover, this historic 
connection between international human rights law and the socio-economic rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights serves to strengthen the motivation for adjudicative 
bodies to consider international human rights law when interpreting socio-economic 
rights.  
Furthermore, I described those constitutional provisions in the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions that regulate the status of international treaties and customary 
international law within the South African legal system. In addition, I examined the 
provisions in the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions that oblige courts to consider 
international human rights law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In this 
discussion, I illustrated the differences between the abovementioned provisions, and 
highlighted the changes effected by these provisions to the approach followed by the 
courts before the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. Furthermore, I emphasised that 
the entrenchment of section 35(1) in the 1993 Constitution, and section 39(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution, is a clear vindication of the State’s decision to re-enter the 
community of nations, and remain receptive to this community’s evolving normative 
values. In this chapter, I also engaged with arguments that support as well as oppose 
the use of international law in the process of constitutional interpretation. The analysis 
of these arguments indicated that despite the inclusion of section 35(1) and section 
39(1)(b), South African courts are not exempt from providing clearly justified, 
consistent, and transparent decisions when considering international human rights law 
in the interpretation of the Bill of rights. This conclusion thus forms a point of 
departure for the following chapters 4 and 5, which will investigate the manner in 
which international human law has been invoked by South African courts in their 
endeavour to interpret rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 





 Chapter 4 
A Critical Evaluation of the South African Courts’ 
Application of Section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and 
Section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Since the 1993 Constitution came into force, South African courts have been afforded 
the opportunity to draw from the developing body of international law when giving 
meaning and content to the Bill of Rights. As discussed in chapter 3, section 35(1) of 
the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution oblige courts to 
consider international law and, in doing so, establish this source of law as an 
interpretive tool in the interpretation of fundamental rights. However, the 1993 and 
1996 Constitutions do not expressly provide a methodology that is able to guide 
courts in their endeavour to consider international law in this context. Thus, it is up to 
the courts to determine which sources should be considered, and the extent of their 
engagement with these, when applying section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution.  
In this chapter, I focus on the South African courts’ application of section 
35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. My aim is to firstly, examine the Constitutional 
Court’s development of a methodological approach to the application of the 
abovementioned provisions. To achieve this, I identify and analyse those cases in 
which the Constitutional Court has invoked section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution 
and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. In particular, my analyses focus on the 
decisions delivered in Makwanyane, Grootboom, AZAPO, and Glenister. 
Secondly, I analyse the South African courts’ application of section 35(1) of 
the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, with the aim of 
identifying misconceptions that have evolved in the courts’ application of these 
provisions and their consideration of international law sources. My analysis is not 




limited to social economic rights jurisprudence, but will canvass the courts’ use of 
international law in constitutional interpretation generally.1 
Lastly, I identify the possible causes of these misconceptions, and focus 
specifically on the impact of various factors such as legal education, the accessibility 
and availability of resources, the role of legal representation, amicus curiae, and the 
judges, on the courts’ consideration of international law. 
 
4 2 The Development of a Methodological Approach 
In this analysis, I have selected four judgments delivered by the Constitutional Court 
for their engagement with the role of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, or 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. These include the decisions delivered in 
Makwanyane, Grootboom, AZAPO, and lastly, Glenister. 2 The discussion below 
analyses the contribution made by each case to the development of a methodology 
that can assist courts in their application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, and guide them in their consideration of 
international law. 
 
4 2 1 S v Makwanyane 
In Makwanyane, the South African Constitutional Court was required to determine 
the constitutionality of the death penalty as a competent sentence for the crime of 
murder in light of various fundamental rights entrenched in the 1993 Constitution.3 In 
its determination, the Court considered the status of this form of punishment in 
international law. In this regard, the court stated the following: 
 
                                                
1 As elaborated on in the Introduction, reported decisions of the Constitutional Court and High Courts 
handed down between 1996 and 2014 were examined to identify the courts’ approach. These cases 
were selected on the basis of their reliance on section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, or section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, with the specific aim of identifying the manner in which the 
provisions were applied, and the extent to which international law was used as an interpretive tool. 
2 This analysis draws largely from a similar investigation undertaken by Du Plessis on the role of 
international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. See Du Plessis “Beyond Parochialism?” in 
Globalization and Private Law 145-162. 
3 These included the right of everyone to “equality before the law and to equal protection of the law”, 
entrenched in section 8, every person’s right to life entrenched in section 9, every person’s right to 
“respect for and protection of his or her dignity” protected in section 10 and lastly, the prohibition of 
“cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment”, protected in section 11(2) of the 1993 
Constitution. 




“In the context of section 35(1), public international law would include non-binding 
as well as binding law. They may both be used under the section as tools of 
interpretation. International agreements and customary international law accordingly 
provide a framework within which Chapter Three can be evaluated and understood, 
and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, 
such as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, 
and in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the International 
Labour Organisation may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of 
particular provisions of Chapter Three.”4 
 
The Court’s reference to binding and non-binding law was accompanied by a footnote 
wherein Chaskalson P relied upon Dugard’s assertion that section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution required that regard must be given to all the sources recognised by 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ namely:5  
 
“(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the consenting states;   
(b)  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law; 
(c)  the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations; and 
(d)  judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”6  
 
Consequently, in what has been termed the “framework dictum”,7 Chaskalson P 
introduced a methodological approach whereby international law is to be used as an 
interpretive framework within which the Bill of Rights is to be evaluated and 
understood. Furthermore, Chaskalson P established that a generous selection of 
international law sources may be relied upon in the context of section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution namely, binding and non-binding law.8 This statement deserves 
further consideration to establish the differences between binding law and non-
binding law, as the definition of non-binding law, and the sources that qualify as such, 
have received minimal attention in South African case law.  
                                                
4 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35 (footnotes omitted). 
5 Para 35 footnote 46. Article 38(1) of the ICJ provides a statement of the sources of international law 
that may be used by the ICJ. However, it has been accepted that this is the most comprehensive 
statement on the existing sources of international law in general. For a comprehensive discussion on 
the sources of international law as established in article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, see I Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law 7 ed (2008) 3-29. 
6 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35 footnote 46. In this footnote, Chaskalson P referred to 
a contribution made by John Dugard in Dawid van Wyk et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The 
New South African Legal Order (1994) 192-5. 
7 Du Plessis “Beyond Parochialism?” in Globalization and Private Law 149. 
8 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35. 




As elaborated in chapter 3, sections 231(1) - (3) of the 1993 Constitution, and 
section 231 of 1996 Constitution, regulate the status of international treaties within 
municipal law. According to this section, binding international law refers to 
international treaties to which South Africa has become a party, through the signing 
and ratification thereof. To this extent, South Africa is bound to the international 
treaty or convention under international law. Furthermore, section 231(4) of the 1993 
Constitution and section 232 of the 1996 Constitution provide that international 
customary law is binding upon South African municipal law, subject to being 
consistent with an Act of Parliament and the Constitution. Therefore, the 
abovementioned treaties and international customary law to which South Africa is 
bound, constitutes binding international law. 
Within the South African context, non-binding international law may include 
treaties to which the State cannot be a party, such as the ECHR, or the AmCHR. 
However, non-binding international law may also include the category of so-called 
“soft law”. Wallace and Martin-Ortega state that there is no accepted definition of soft 
law.9 However, they define the category of soft law as:  
 
“[N]on-legally binding international instruments … which contain[s] norms, 
principles, commitments or standards expected to be complied with by states, and 
increasingly non-state actors.”10  
 
Therefore, although not legally binding, non-compliance with soft law instruments 
can still have negative consequences for a State.11 According to their definition, this 
includes treaties that contain general obligations, which they term “legal soft law”. 12 
In addition, they define soft law as including voluntary resolutions, statements of 
intent, codes of conduct produced by international and regional organisations, and 
statements made by individuals.13 Wallace and Martin-Ortega submit that statements 
made by individuals would include, for example, international principles that have 
been articulated by groups of eminent international lawyers, which they describe as 
“non-legal soft law”. 14 In addition, they argue that soft law must exist in written 
                                                
9 R Wallace & O Martin-Ortega International Law 7 ed (2013) 30. 
10 30. 
11 F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 2 ed (2012) 30. Viljoen states that a State’s  
non-compliance with soft law may impact negatively on a State’s international relations for example. 
12 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 30. 
13 30. 
14 30. 




form.15  According to Cassese, soft law is characterised by the following three 
features. Firstly, soft law points towards emerging modern trends whereby 
international organisations and collective bodies have the task of promoting action 
taken on issues of general concern.16 Secondly, soft law addresses new concerns, 
which previously did not draw the attention of the international community.17 Lastly, 
soft law is created when States are unable to reach complete agreement on the 
standards and views contained in these instruments or documents to the extent that 
they are able to agree on legally binding obligations.18 As such, soft law is not legally 
binding, however, it manifests a certain measure of agreement in the form of 
guidelines, statements reflecting common positions, or policies.19 In accordance with 
the abovementioned features, a fundamental difference between a legally binding 
agreement and soft law is the intention with which each is created.20 Guzman and 
Meyer illustrate the definition of soft law in the following way: 
  
“In our view, … , soft law is best understood as a continuum, or spectrum, running 
between fully binding treaties and fully political positions. Viewed in this way, soft 
law is something that dims in importance as the commitments of states get weaker, 
eventually disappearing altogether.”21  
 
Arguably, an instrument or document catagorised as soft law may develop into legally 
binding international law or so-called “hard law”.22 For example, sufficient State 
practice and the requisite opinio iuris may result in soft law developing into 
customary international law at a later stage.23 In addition, provisions contained in a 
soft law instrument may later be included in a treaty.24 Viljoen makes the important 
argument that soft law instruments such as statements made by UN and regional 
quasi-judicial human rights treaty bodies, which include General Comments and 
Concluding Observations, may attain significant persuasive force through various 
factors such as their quality, dissemination, and subsequent use by the domestic 
                                                
15 30. 
16 Cassese International Law 196. 




21 A Guzman & T Meyer “International Soft Law” (2010) 2 Journal of Legal Analysis 171 173. 
22  Cassese International Law 196. 
23 197. 
24 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 30. 




court.25 This suggests that different weight should be attached to different soft law 
instruments. 
In S v Makwanyane, it is clear that Chaskalson P regarded Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the ICJ as a sufficient statement of the sources of international law to be 
considered in the Court’s application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution.26 
Importantly, it appears that Chaskalson P hereby regards international soft law as 
fitting comfortably within the definitions provided in Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the ICJ. Dugard supports Chaskalson P’s approach and in particular, his interpretation 
of the term “public international law” within the context of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution, which includes only those sources of international law accepted as 
traditionally falling within the scope of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ and 
treaties that South Africa has not yet signed.27 Moreover, Dugard argues that such an 
interpretation would grant the courts access to the entire field of international human 
rights law, as intended by the drafters of the Constitution.28  
However, Chaskalson’s P’s distinction between binding and non-binding 
international law has been subject to criticism in light of the sources established in 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. In particular, Botha and Olivier argue that 
Chaskalson P’s reference to “non-binding” international law in Makwanyane led to 
the assumption that he was taking a progressive approach towards the sources of 
international law by including sources that did not fit into the traditional sources 
                                                
25 Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa 31. 
26 Dugard confirms his support of Chaskalson P’s approach in an article published subsequent to the 
decision.  
27 J Dugard “International Law and the “Final” Constitution” (1995) 11 SAJHR 241 242. In this article 
Dugard confirms his understanding of “public international law” within the context of section 35(1) of 
the Constitution in the following passage: 
“In order to ensure that there is no backsliding in this regard and that courts do not confine 
their enquiries to those treaties to which South Africa is a party, it would be wise to include a 
subclause to s 35(1) which makes it clear that a broad approach is to be adopted to the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘public international law’. Such a clause might read: 
‘ “Public international law” in section 35(1) is to be interpreted to include all the 
sources of international law referred to in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. A court may have regard not only to treaties to which 
South Africa is a party but also to other treaties which may assist the court in 
ascertaining the relevant norm of international law.’” 
Furthermore, Dugard emphasised that section 116(2) of the 1993 Constitution in particular, was a clear 
indication that the drafters of the 1993 Constitution intended that the entire “field of international 
human rights law” was to be accessible within the context of section 35(1). Section 116(2) of the 1993 
Constitution states that the Human Rights Commission must ensure that national and provincial 
legislation must comply with “norms of international human rights law which form part of South 
African law or to other relevant norms of international law”.  
28 Dugard (1995) SAJHR 243. 




mentioned in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ namely, soft law.29  They 
furthermore question Chaskalson P’s reference to Dugard in the case, and his 
emphasis on only those traditional sources of international law stated in Article 38(1) 
of the Statute of the ICJ. Consequently, they question whether Chaskalson P’s 
reference to “non-binding” international law was not merely a reference to treaties to 
which South Africa is not a party, and to articles (c) and (d) of Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the ICJ. In particular, these provisions refer to general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations and judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists.30  
The Makwanyane judgment therefore sparked a discussion on the adequacy of 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ as a method of determining the status of all 
sources of international law. According to Olivier, Chaskalson P’s statement limited 
non-binding international law sources, within the context of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution, to only those “traditional” sources stated in Article 38(1) of the Statute 
of the ICJ.31 She argues further that Dugard’s interpretation excludes certain non-
binding international sources that do not fit in the traditional categories provided by 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.32 Oliver argues in particular that resolutions 
adopted by the UNGA, and specifically the UDHR, are such examples and, although 
very valuable, fall outside the scope of the traditional sources of international law.33 
Arguing otherwise, Maluwa suggests that Chaskalson P did in fact intend for the 
scope of international law to include both the “hard” law of customary rules, treaty 
provisions, and judicial decisions as well as the soft law contained in resolutions, 
declarations, and guidelines drawn up by international bodies and international law 
not binding on South Africa.34  
                                                
29 Botha & Olivier (2004) SAYIL 42 46.  
30 46. 
31 M Olivier “Interpretation of the Constitutional Provisions Relating to International Law” (2003) 6 
PER 26 30. 
32 30. 
33 30. Olivier has challenged the adequacy of the traditional sources of international law as stated in 
article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ as a method of determining the status of all international human 
rights law. See M Olivier “The Relevance of “Soft Law” as a Source of International Human Rights” 
(2002) 35 CILSA 289-307. Olivier has argued that the legal status of UNGA Resolutions can be 
adequately accommodated under the category of “soft law”, which is not legally binding and therefore 
cannot constitute a new source of international law, but still remains legally relevant. Alternatively, she 
has suggested that under exceptional circumstances, the possibility exists that the legal status of such 
resolutions may be determined within the context of customary international law. 
34 T Maluwa “The Incorporation of International Law and its Interpretational Role in Municipal Legal 
Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey” (1998) 23 SAYIL 45 59-60. 




Challenges to the adequacy of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ as a 
means of determining the status of the sources of international law has not, however, 
led to an exclusion of certain non-binding international law sources, such as the 
UDHR, in practice. This was seen for instance in Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of 
the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995.35 In this judgment, Sachs J affirmed 
Dugard’s view that section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution requires that regard be had 
to (a) treaties ratified by South Africa, (b) customary rules accepted by South African 
courts, (c) “international law contained in general treaties, custom, general principles 
of law, the writings of jurists, and the decisions of international and municipal 
courts”. Furthermore, Sachs J referred to Dugard and his reference to section 116(2) 
of the 1993 Constitution, whereby the Human Rights Commission must take into 
account “other relevant norms of international law” to support his contention.36 
Thereafter, Sachs J proceeded to consider a vast range of sources of international 
human rights law that included the traditional sources stated in Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the ICJ, references to the UDHR, and the General Comments of the HRC in 
respect of the ICCPR. 37  Sachs J therefore understood Dugard’s statements as 
                                                
35 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) (“Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature”). 
36 Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 footnote 9. 
37 Sachs J conducted a laudable analysis into principles of international law relating to the protection of 
minority rights, which aimed to determine whether international law required a different interpretation 
of section 32(c) of the Constitution as that proposed by the Court. Sachs J contextualised his 
investigation by citing the objectives listed in article 26(2) of the UDHR and article 13(1) of the 
ICCPR. Sachs J also traced the historical development of minority protection from its initial existence 
as a tolerance toward minorities, to the development of the protection of national groups and the 
eventual shift towards guaranteeing the rights of individuals. This included examining those 
developments made under the League of Nations and the United Nations, and included an investigation 
into the relevance of the ICCPR. Reference was made to Dr Capotorti, the Special Rapporteur of the 
United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and 
his work on the application of article 27 of the ICCPR as well as to authors that supported minority 
rights and debated the application of article 27. Sachs J also highlighted the creation of instruments that 
affected the rights of migrant workers and indigenous peoples for example, the ILO Convention C143: 
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (Convention Concerning Migrations in 
Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers) 
(60th Conference Session Geneva 24 June 1975) and the ILO Convention C169: Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention (Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries) 
(76th Conference Session Geneva 27 June 1989). Furthermore, Sachs J referred to the adoption of a 
General Comment by the UN HRC that focuses on the interpretation of section 27 of the ICCPR and 
identified six interrelated principles that operated in international law protecting minority rights. These 
included the right to existence, non-discrimination, equal rights, the right to develop autonomously 
within civil society, affirmative action, and positive support from the State. In his examination of these 
principles, Sachs J referred to international instruments including the UN Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 
1951) 78 UNTS 277 (“Convention on the Crime of Genocide”), the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ECHR, the 




endorsing a broad definition of the term “public international law”, which includes a 
wide selection of sources that still fall within the scope of Article 38(1) of the Statute 
of the ICJ.38 
As will be discussed further in chapter 5, the Constitutional Court’s decision 
in Grootboom illustrates another example in which the Constitutional Court clarified 
the role of non-binding law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In this case, 
Yacoob J relied upon General Comments of the CESCR in a decision that centred on 
the interpretation of the right to adequate housing as protected in the 1996 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s consideration of these General Comments, 
and its reliance on certain aspects of this source in the interpretation of the right to 
adequate housing, has clarified that non-binding international law includes the 
General Comments adopted by the CESCR in the interpretation of rights.39  
In summary, Makwanyane underscored the obligation to consider international 
human rights law in the process of evaluating and understanding the rights entrenched 
in the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, it established a generous approach to the use of 
sources of public international law as tools in the process of interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. However, as will be discussed in part 4 3 2 below, Chaskalson P appears to err 
in the following statement in which he claims: “We can derive assistance from public 
international law and foreign case law, but we are in no way bound to follow it.”40 
While this statement highlights the fact that courts’ need not follow the international 
law and foreign law sources consulted within the context of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution, Chaskalson P neglected to add that South African courts are obliged to 
follow international law binding upon the Republic in terms of section 231 of the 
                                                                                                                                      
CERD, the CEDAW, jurisprudence from the ECtHR namely, the Belgian Linguistics Case (1968) 1 
EHRR 252 as well as Kjeldsen, Busk, Madson and Pedersen v Denmark Series A, No 23, 7 Dec 1976. 
Furthermore, Sachs J referred to the Convention on the Crime of Apartheid, UNESCO, ‘Convention 
Against Discrimination in Education’ (14 December 1960) and the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (entered into force 1 February 1998). See Ex Parte Gauteng 
Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the 
Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) para 44-68. 
38 Although Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature provides evidence that a wide breadth of sources 
may be considered in the application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, the methodology 
applied by the Court in this case in its consideration of soft law has been criticised. These criticisms 
will be explored in chapter 5. See E de Wet “The ‘Friendly but Cautious’ Reception of International 
Law in the Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some Critical Remarks” (2004) 28 
Fordham International Law Journal 1529-1565. 
39 Du Plessis “International Law and the Evolution of (Domestic) Human-Rights Law” in New 
Perspectives 331.  
40 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 39. 




Constitution.41 In this regard, Du Plessis argues that Chaskalson P erroneously created 
the belief that international law and foreign law are equivalent in constitutional 
interpretation, a misconception that will be discussed more comprehensively below.42 
Despite these shortcomings, Makwanyane represents a significant statement on the 
relevance of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution (and, by implication, section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution)43 and has assisted in guiding courts in their 
application of this provision. 
 
4 2 2 Azanian Peoples Organisation v President of the Republic of South Africa 
The 1993 Constitution instructed Parliament to provide for the granting of amnesty 
under certain circumstances.44 In response to this, the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 45  was enacted, establishing the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. According to section 20(7) of the Act, once granted 
amnesty, a person would no longer be held criminally liable for the act, omission or 
offence in question. Furthermore, persons granted amnesty would not incur any civil 
liability towards victims who incurred damages as a result of human rights violations 
during apartheid.46 The applicants contested the constitutionality of section 20(7) of 
the Act, claiming that the section was inconsistent with section 22 of the 1993 
Constitution. 47  The applicants argued further that the State was obliged by 
international law to prosecute those responsible for gross human rights violations. 
                                                
41 Du Plessis “Beyond Parochialism” in Globalization and Private Law 150. 
42 150. 
43 The Makwanyane decision, by implication, also affects the consideration of international law in 
terms of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution since this provision is drafted in similar terms as 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. Furthermore, section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution serve the same purpose namely, to establish international law as an 
interpretative tool in the interpretation of fundamental rights. 
44 The 1993 Constitution states the following: 
“In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in 
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in 
the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall 
adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and 
before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, 
including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after 
the law has been passed.” 
45 This was also referred to in colloquial terms as the Truth and Reconciliation Act. 
46 Section 20(7) of the Act also provided that the State would also be exempt from any civil liability if 
such acts, omissions or offences were committed by a person during the course, and within the scope, 
of their employment by the State. Further provision was made for the discharging of other bodies, 
organisations, or persons from vicarious liability resulting from the acts or omissions.  
47 Section 22 of the 1993 Constitution protected the right of every person to have justiciable disputes 
settled in a court of law or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial forum. 




Accordingly, the applicants submitted that provisions authorising the granting of such 
amnesty resulted in a breach of international law. 48  In the majority judgment, 
Mahomed DP stated the following: 
 
“The issue which falls to be determined in this Court is whether s 20(7) of the Act is 
inconsistent with the Constitution. If it is, the enquiry as to whether or not 
international law prescribes a different duty is irrelevant to that determination. 
International law and the contents of international treaties to which South Africa 
might or might not be a party at any particular time are, in my view, relevant only in 
the interpretation of the Constitution itself, on the grounds that the lawmakers of the 
Constitution should not lightly be presumed to authorise any law which might 
constitute a breach of the obligations of the State in terms of international law. ”49  
 
Furthermore, Mahomed DP interpreted section 231(3) of the 1993 Constitution to 
mean that international treaties that have been acceded to, or ratified, by Parliament 
only become part of municipal law, and therefore enforceable before South African 
courts by private individuals, once they are legislatively enacted into municipal 
law,50and on condition that the agreement is consistent with the Constitution.51  
In addition, Mahomed DP found that section 231(1) of the 1993 Constitution 
indicated that an Act of Parliament can override any contrary rights or obligations 
under international agreements entered into before the commencement of the 1993 
Constitution.52 The judge also referred to section 231(4) of the 1993 Constitution, 
holding that this provision had a similar effect on customary international law.53 
Furthermore, Mahomed DP interpreted section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution as 
being completely consistent with the abovementioned views, emphasising that: “[t]he 
court is directed only to ‘have regard’ to public international law if it is applicable to 
                                                
48 AZAPO v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 671 (CC) para 25. The applicants 
relied on article 49 of the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, article 50 of the second Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
article 129 of the third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and article 
146 of the fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
These Conventions all provide that: “The high contracting Parties undertake to enact legislation 
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, 
any of the grave breaches …”. 
49 AZAPO v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 672 (CC) para 26 (emphasis added). 
50 Para 26. 
51 Para 27. 
52 Para 27. 
53 Para 27. Section 231(4) of the 1993 Constitution states the following: “The rules of customary 
international law binding on the Republic, shall, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament, form part of the law of the Republic.” 




the protection of the rights entrenched in the Chapter.”54 Applying this, the judge 
concluded that if section 20(7) of the Act was authorised by the Constitution, the rules 
contained in the Geneva Conventions were irrelevant to the case.55 In addition, 
Mahomed DP noted that the rules relied upon in the Geneva Conventions did not, in 
any event, assist the applicants as it was doubtful whether these rules were even 
applicable to the situation in South Africa during the time of apartheid.56 To justify 
this claim, the Court referred to a distinction made in international literature 
concerning perpetrators in State conflicts. In particular, there are perpetrators that 
participate in conflicts between States. 57  However, these perpetrators must be 
distinguished from the armed forces of a particular sovereign State, as well as other 
dissident armed forces operating under responsible command within that State, who 
carry out violent acts within that State.58 Mahomed DP stated that a contracting State 
was not obliged to prosecute the perpetrators of violent acts carried out under the 
latter circumstances.59 He cited article 6(5) of Protocol II of the Geneva Convention60 
as justification for this, and emphasised that the complexities involved in the 
reconstruction of a society after civil conflict within a State played a significant role 
in this approach.61 Mahomed DP was therefore not convinced that anything in section 
20(7) of the Act was in violation of the country’s obligations under international 
humanitarian law.62 In addition, the Court held that the postamble to the 1993 
Constitution “trumped” section 22 of the 1993 Constitution, while section 20(7) of the 
Act was found to be constitutional.  
This judgment negatively affected the interpretation of section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution. The manner in which this occurred becomes clearer when three 
important aspects concerning the application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution 
                                                
54 AZAPO v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 671 (CC) para 27. 
55 Para 28. 
56 Para 28-29. 
57 Para 30. This includes armed conflicts between liberation movements desiring self-determination 
against colonial and alien powers.  
58 Para 30. 
59 Para 30. 
60 Article 6(5) of Protocol II of the Geneva Convention states the following: 
“At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their 
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” 
61 AZAPO v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 671 (CC) para 31. 
62 Para 32. 




are identified.63 Firstly, section 35(1) obliges courts to have due regard to public 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Therefore, the application of 
section 35(1) is prescriptive and courts must adhere to this mandate when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights. The framework dictum developed in Makwanyane, and discussed 
in part 4 2 1 above, is relevant in this regard as it established that international 
agreements and customary international law “provide a framework within which 
[Chapter 3] can be evaluated and understood.”64 Secondly, when undertaking a 
consideration of international law, a number of sources may be considered. In this 
regard, Makwanyane established that a generous range of sources may be canvassed 
in the application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. Lastly, these sources need 
not be adopted or applied, as the mandate is to only consider them. Ideally, this final 
aspect should prompt a court to justify why it will, or will not, draw from the 
international law considered. 
As mentioned above, Mahomed DP held that an enquiry into whether or not a 
different duty exists in international law is irrelevant when determining whether 
section 20(7) of the Act is inconsistent with the Constitution.65 With this finding, the 
Court restricts the very first element discussed above namely, the application of 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and dismisses the mandate entrenched in this 
provision concerning its role in the interpretation of fundamental rights. Motala 
highlights further that the Court interpreted the term “shall”, in section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution, as referring to a discretion that it could exercise, as opposed to an 
obligation placed upon it to consider international law. As will be addressed below, 
the restrictive application of section 35(1) arguably led to the Court’s failure to regard 
relevant international law sources.   
With respect to the Courts’ interpretation of 231(1), Motala draws attention to 
section 231(1)66 of the 1993 Constitution, and submits that it contains a “claw back-
clause”67 that makes provision for Parliament to change obligations imposed upon 
                                                
63 See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution.  
64 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
65 Para 26. 
66 Section 231(1) of the 1993 Constitution states the following: 
“All rights and obligations under international agreements which immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution were vested in or binding on the Republic within the 
meaning of the previous Constitution, shall be vested in or binding on the Republic under this 
Constitution, unless provided otherwise by an Act of Parliament.” 
67 This terminology is also found in the AfCHPR. 




South Africa by international agreements. 68  Motala argues that Mahomed DP 
continued to apply the “claw-back clause” from section 231(1) to section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution.69 Thus, Motala argues that in this case, the phrase “to have regard” 
was interpreted by Mahomed DP to mean that the Court may consider public 
international law, but such considerations could be overridden by Parliament by way 
of ordinary legislation.70  
Du Plessis argues that Mahomed DP’s decision has led to the creation of an 
absurd situation in which section 231 of the 1993 Constitution must first be invoked 
to determine the international law binding upon South Africa. He argues that only 
once this is completed can section 35(1) be used to justify reliance on binding 
international law when interpreting provisions of the Bill of Rights.71 In this regard, 
Du Plessis argues that AZAPO renders provisions like section 35(1) 72  largely 
superfluous. Du Plessis defends the relevance of section 35(1) by stating that courts 
should, in any event, be aware of their responsibilities under section 231 of the 
Constitution. Furthermore, he argues that section 35(1) could not have had any other 
purpose than to oblige courts to at least have “due regard” to public international law 
that was not binding in terms of section 231 of the 1993 Constitution.73  
Adopting a different tack, Dugard argues that the judgment has a more 
probable meaning namely, when the constitutional validity of a statute is challenged 
that involves a rule of international law, the Court has a duty to ascertain the content 
of this rule and interpret the Constitution in a manner that accords with it.74 
Furthermore, Dugard argues that the Constitution will only prevail once this becomes 
impossible. He submits that such impossibility may be caused by inconsistencies 
between the international rule and the Constitution.75 Dugard argues that this is the 
likely meaning of Mahomed DP’s judgment, as firstly, it accords more with the 
                                                
68  Z Motala “The Constitutional Court’s Approach to International Law and its Method of 
Interpretation in the ‘Amnesty Decision’: Intellectual Honesty or Political Expediency?” (1996) 21 
SAYIL 29 34. 
69 34. 
70 34. 
71 Du Plessis “International Law and the Evolution of (Domestic) Human-Rights Law” in New 
Perspectives 330. 
72 As well as section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. 
73 Du Plessis “International Law and the Evolution of (Domestic) Human-Rights Law” in New 
Perspectives 330. This is also applicable to section 231, section 232 and section 233 of the 1996 
Constitution. 
74  J Dugard “Is the Truth and Reconciliation Process Compatible with International Law? An 
Unanswered Question” (1997) 13 SAJHR 258 266. 
75 266-267. 




intention of the drafters of the 1993 Constitution.76 Secondly, Dugard states that a 
proper interpretation of the Constitution cannot take place without considering 
international law.77 Lastly, Dugard submits that such an understanding of the decision 
accords with section 233 of the 1996 Constitution.78 Dugard’s arguments, however, 
do not appear to acknowledge that the judgment fails in respect of these three reasons 
and exhibits an incorrect understanding of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution.  
As argued, the AZAPO case is significant for its failure to acknowledge the 
obligation to consider international human rights law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. I argue that the Court should have acknowledged the obligation entrenched in 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and provided sufficient justification as to why 
the provision of amnesty should override international humanitarian law. Recognition 
must be given to the extensive policy reasons that were advanced in the judgment, 
which underscored the necessity of amnesty and its relevance in assisting with a 
peaceful transition to democracy. However, it is the Court’s attitude reflected in this 
judgment towards the role of section 35(1) of the 1993 that is under scrutiny. 
Arguably, the objectives achieved through this judgment were accomplished at the 
unnecessary cost of restricting section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. Du Plessis 
further criticises this finding, stating that it replaces the generous monistic approach in 
favour of international law as laid down in Makwanyane with a more restrictive 
dualism.79 In terms of the Court’s interpretative strategy used in AZAPO, Du Plessis 
states that AZAPO represents not only a withdrawal from international law, but also a 
reversal of Chaskalson P’s framework dictum in Makwanyane. Motala argues further 
that the approach followed in AZAPO was not only archaic, but also problematic in 
that States do not have unrestrained freedom to create legislation.80 He finds evidence 
in international law of a peremptory duty to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, as 
well as crimes against humanity. States are required to act in accordance with the 
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principles of international law, especially jus cogens, and may not justify their non-
compliance with international law norms by invoking their domestic law.81  
In addition to the above criticisms that focus on the restrictive interpretation of 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, Dugard criticises the AZAPO judgment for its 
failure to adequately examine whether international law imposes a duty on successor 
states to punish perpetrators of a prior regime for their commission of crimes under 
international law.82 In particular, Dugard argues that the Court should have at least 
engaged with the evidence that exists in both international treaties and customary 
international law in favour of such a duty. He states that various international 
treaties83 impose such a duty on successor regimes to punish perpetrators who were 
members of the preceding regime for violations that are recognised as crimes under 
international law.84 However, Dugard notes that of these treaties, only the 1949 
Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War were applicable to South Africa, as the 
country was not party to the others at the time that the relevant acts were committed.85 
The Geneva Conventions oblige States parties to punish the perpetrators for acts 
defined by the Geneva Conventions as “grave breaches”.86 These had not been 
legislatively incorporated into South African municipal law by Parliament at the time. 
Despite this, Dugard argues that these conventions were incorporated into municipal 
law “by the exercise of the prerogative power”.87 
Furthermore, Dugard argues that the Court failed to consider customary 
international law and in particular, the possible obligation to prosecute crimes against 
humanity. In this regard, Dugard argues that there is widespread acceptance that the 
practices of apartheid are recognised as a crime against humanity.88 To justify this 
statement, Dugard states that various international sources recognise many of the acts 
and practices committed under apartheid in South Africa as crimes against 
humanity.89 Furthermore, international sources have expressly recognised apartheid as 
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a crime against humanity.90 Additionally, he argues that international instruments, 
including General Assembly resolutions, and academic writers, confirm that States 
are obliged to try or extradite perpetrators that have allegedly committed crimes 
against humanity. Dugard notes that there is insufficient usus or settled practice 
amongst states to submit that there is an obligation under customary international law 
that requires a successor regime to prosecute perpetrators of a prior regime for crimes 
against humanity.91 However, he submits that jurists have argued strongly in favour of 
such an obligation, and the South African Court should have considered this argument 
more seriously.92 
Dugard also criticises the Court’s finding that article 1(4) of the Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions is not applicable. In this regard, he argues that 
the Court failed to consider that historically, this instrument was aimed at addressing 
apartheid in South Africa.93 Lastly, Dugard criticises the Court for neglecting to 
consider relevant jurisprudence from the AmCtHR and the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights (“IACommHR”) that concerns the investigation and 
prosecution of international human rights violations.94 Dugard’s arguments do not 
challenge the correctness of the order. Rather, he highlights the Court’s failure to 
engage with important international and regional law sources that could assist in 
determining whether there is an obligation to prosecute perpetrators for committing 
human rights violations that would challenge the decision to grant such perpetrators 
amnesty. 
 Once again, it must be recalled that the Court did raise important policy 
reasons for its decision to allow the granting of amnesty, but, is this sufficient to 
render an engagement with these international arguments unnecessary, and, as in this 
case, ignore relevant international law that states otherwise? The Court may have 
avoided this criticism through clarifying, in much stronger terms, its decision not to 
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apply relevant international and regional law, and to justify its decision to do so in 
respect of specific instruments or rules of international customary law. Therefore, the 
AZAPO judgment not only restricted the application of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution, but did not provide sufficient justification for its decision not to engage 
with, or have “due regard” for, relevant international and regional law. In this way, 
the judgment casts a shadow on the more generous approach established in 
Makwanyane. 
 
4 2 3 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
Yacoob J’s judgment in Grootboom presented renewed optimism in the context of 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and the framework dictum developed in 
Makwanyane.95 In order to acquaint itself with the concept of the minimum core, as 
will be discussed further in chapter 5, the Constitutional Court considered a General 
Comment issued by the CESCR. Du Plessis argues that in so doing the Court firstly, 
reinstated that which Makwanyane had declared namely, that the term ‘international 
law’ includes both binding and non-binding international law, and that both are to be 
used as tools of interpretation. Secondly, the Court permitted the reliance on relevant 
international law without requiring such law to be prescriptive.96 In its consideration 
of international law, the Court highlighted the significant weight it attached to 
international law in this case. The Court then referred to section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution, which mandates the Court, at the very least, to consider international 
law as a tool of interpretation. Yacoob J cited Chaskalson P’s reference for the use of 
international law in Makwanyane, but added to this stating that: 
 
“The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to be 
attached to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary. However, 
where the relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be 
directly applicable.”97 
 
This statement clarifies that the status of international law in the municipal legal order 
is not only governed by section 39(1)(b). International law can also be binding on the 
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Republic if it accords with the requirements set out in sections 231 and 232 of the 
1996 Constitution, as discussed in chapter 4. Thus, unlike Chaskalson P’s decision in 
Makwanyane, the statement above reaffirms the distinction between international law 
as an interpretive tool and as binding international law. 
 
4 2 4 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
In 2011, the Constitutional Court delivered a significant judgment in Glenister, 
wherein the majority judgment reaffirmed the differences between the distinctive 
functions of section 231 and section 39 of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, the 
Court elaborated on the significant interpretive value of international treaties that are 
binding upon the State in terms of section 231(1) and 231(2) of the 1996 Constitution, 
but not yet incorporated into domestic law. This judgment added significantly to the 
understanding of section 231, and assisted in “fleshing out” the framework dictum 
even further. It did so by developing the role of binding international treaties not yet 
incorporated into municipal law, in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
In this case, the applicant challenged the constitutional validity of national 
legislation that firstly, established the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
(“DPCI”),98 and secondly, disbanded the Directorate of Special Operations.99 The 
Court had to address two critical questions. Firstly, whether the obligation resting 
upon the State to create and maintain an independent body aimed at combating 
corruption and organised crime, had its basis in the Constitution.100 If so, the second 
question posed to the Court was whether the body established by the legislation was 
sufficiently independent.101  
In terms of the first question, the Court located the actual source of the State’s 
duty to combat corruption within the Constitution itself.102 In this regard, the Court 
held that the Constitution, considered as a whole, imposed a duty upon the State to 
“set up a concrete and effective mechanism to prevent and root out corruption and 
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cognate corruption practices.”103 In particular, the Court highlighted that section 7(2) 
of the 1996 Constitution provides that the State has a duty to “respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.” As corruption threatens democracy 
and corrodes the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, the Court found that section 
7(2) of the 1996 Constitution therefore obliged the State to establish efficient anti-
corruption mechanisms.104  
In terms of the second question to be determined, the applicant challenged the 
validity of the impugned legislation, arguing that the corruption-fighting unit that was 
established was insufficiently independent on both a structural and operational 
level.105 Consequently, the impugned legislation was challenged as being inconsistent 
with South Africa’s international obligations and therefore with the Constitution.106 
Although the legislation itself provides that the Directorate must have the necessary 
independence in order to perform its functions, “necessary independence” is not 
defined within the text. Consequently, the Court held that it must engage with 
international agreements that bind the Republic in an effort to delineate the content of 
“independence”.107 It is within this context that the Court relied upon Makwanyane’s 
framework dictum in support of considering both binding and non-binding 
instruments of international law. The Court stated further that: 
  
“[O]ur Constitution takes into its very heart obligations to which the Republic, 
through solemn resolution of Parliament, has acceded, and which are binding on the 
Republic in international law, and makes them the measure of the State’s conduct in 
fulfilling its obligations in relation to the Bill of Rights.”108  
 
Both the minority and majority judgments expounded upon the status of 
unincorporated treaties to which the State is bound under international law, but from 
which no rights or obligations arise in domestic law. In sum, the Court confirmed that 
the negotiating and signing of an international agreement by the national executive in 
terms of section 231(1) of the 1996 Constitution does not render such an agreement 
binding upon the State.109 Such an agreement only becomes binding upon the State 
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once it has received approval by both houses of Parliament, namely the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. This must be done by way of 
resolution as required by section 231(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 110  The only 
exception to this is provided for in section 231(3) concerning agreements of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature.111 Once the requisites of section 231(1) 
and 231(2) have been fulfilled, these international agreements only bind the State in 
the international sphere, between States parties, unless they are agreements that are 
governed by section 231(3) of the 1996 Constitution.112  
The majority judgment in Glenister established that although the specific 
agreements discussed above are only binding upon South Africa under international 
law, they are still able to exert influence on domestic constitutional provisions. In 
relation to the international agreements that bind South Africa in terms of section 
231(2),113 the Court stated that the obligation referred to in these agreements, namely 
the requirement to create an anti-corruption unit that has the necessary independence, 
are both “clear and unequivocal”. Therefore, in the international sphere, these 
obligations exist and bind the State. However, this duty is also found in the domestic 
sphere and is located within section 7(2) of the 1996 Constitution itself, which 
requires the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
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Rights.” The Court recognised that this duty to create an anti-corruption unit with the 
necessary independence, is a constitutional duty derived from section 7(2) of the 1996 
Constitution and not a duty derived from external sources.  
The Court held that section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution is only invoked 
to assist in answering “in-part” the question of which reasonable measures the State is 
required to take in order to protect and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.114 
However, the Court stated that the international conventions, agreements, and 
protocols all clearly indicate that South Africa is obliged to create an anti-corruption 
unit that holds the necessary independence.115 The Court declared that it is of great 
interpretive significance that South Africa has acceded to these instruments and bound 
itself to the obligations contained in them in the international sphere. In this context, 
these instruments can provide guidance in determining whether the State’s obligations 
in accordance with section 7(2) namely, to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights, have been fulfilled.116 Furthermore, the Court stated that 
the fact that these agreements are binding upon the South Africa in accordance with 
section 231(2) significantly influences the delineation of the State’s obligations in 
terms of protecting and fulfilling the rights in the Bill of Rights.117 
The consideration of international law in this context was not merely a 
superficial inventory of every international instrument that aims to combat corruption. 
Rather, the Court clearly emphasised the important interpretive weight that should be 
attached to agreements not yet incorporated into municipal law. Furthermore, it was 
already implicit that the State had a duty to establish an anti-corruption mechanism. It 
was also expressed that whatever measure the State implemented in fulfilment of its 
obligation, had to be reasonable and effective. Thus, the binding international 
obligations assisted, in part, in determining which reasonable measures the State may 
use.   
Furthermore, the Court emphasised that this use of international law was not 
to be construed as inserting international agreements into the Constitution, but rather 
“to be faithful to the Constitution itself, and to give meaning to the ambit of the duties 
it creates in accordance with its own clear interpretive injunctions.”118 In addition, the 
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Court emphasised that the content of the obligations created by section 7(2) of the 
1996 Constitution could have been determined without the use of international law.119 
However, the Court found that the mandate placed upon it by section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution creates a constitutional obligation to do so.120 To this extent, 
international law cannot be used as a mechanism to “manufacture constitutional 
obligations.”121 Rather, the Court held that:  
  
“It is to respect the careful way in which the Constitution itself creates concordance 
and unity between the Republic’s external obligations under international law, and 
their domestic impact.”122 
 
Through this statement, the Court confirms the obligatory nature of section 39(1)(b) 
of the 1996 Constitution, which constitutionally mandates the courts’ consideration of 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, the above 
evaluation provides evidence that the framework dictum, as established in 
Makwanyane, has provided courts with a structure within which they can apply 
international human rights law. The strong criticisms levelled at the Court for its 
restrictive treatment of the framework dictum in AZAPO, indicates that although the 
application of the dictum is not always consistent, it is still preferable and its use has 
become a yardstick with which to measure a court’s consideration of international law 
in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. For this reason, the interpretive framework 
established in Makwanyane can be regarded as a methodological approach to the use 
of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. The judgment delivered 
in Glenister added substantially to the framework dictum by reaffirming the 
obligatory nature of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and expounding upon 
the significant weight attached to international treaties to which South Africa is 
bound, but from which no rights and obligations can be derived in municipal law. To 
this extent, the Glenister judgment contributed to further delineating the interpretive 
role of “binding” international law.  
Although aspects of the framework dictum are still in need of jurisprudential 
development, such as the weight to be attached to non-binding law, the introduction 
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of the framework dictum and its subsequent developments, provide a methodological 
approach which South African courts can utilise and simultaneously strive to develop. 
This will ensure that the practice of considering international law in the interpretation 
of the Bill of Rights not only maintains a high standard of critical scrutiny and 
research, but also remains relevant to the Court’s task of giving meaning to the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
 
4 3 Methodological Misconceptions  
In the discussion above, I examined how the Court developed guidelines pertaining to 
its use of international sources of law as interpretative aids. In the following section, I 
highlight the methodological misconceptions namely, the ways in which South 
African courts have misunderstood the interpretative mandate, that characterise the 
courts’ application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution. In addition, I investigate the interaction between the 
abovementioned provisions and section 231 of the 1993 Constitution and section 231 
and 232 of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, I analyse the potential challenges that 
the courts’ may encounter in their consideration of international law in constitutional 
interpretation. 
     
4 3 1 The conflation of the distinction between international law and foreign law  
Both section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution refer to international law123 and foreign law as two different sources of 
law. In order to maintain this distinction, courts must recognise that their 
consideration of international law is mandatory124  when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, while their consideration of foreign law is discretionary.125 Under the 1993 
Constitution, courts have interpreted section 35(1) as requiring them to have regard to 
comparable foreign case law. This misconception is illustrated in the decision of the 
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Supreme Court in Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order.126 In this case, the court 
stated the following: 
 
“Although s 35(1) of the Constitution enjoins one to have regard to comparable 
foreign case law where applicable in interpreting the provisions of chap 3 of the 
Constitution, this should be done with circumspection because of the differing 
contexts within which foreign constitutions were drafted and operate in, and the 
danger of unnecessarily importing doctrines associated with those constitutions into 
an inappropriate South African setting.”127 
 
This case shows that section 35(1) was erroneously interpreted as requiring the court 
to regard comparable foreign case law.128 This misconception is further illustrated in 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security.129 In this 
case, Van Schalkwyk J addressed the use of international law and foreign law in the 
context of section 35(1) and stated the following: 
 
“While the Courts are enjoined, by the provisions of section 35(1) of the Constitution 
to have regard to public international law as well as comparable foreign case law in 
interpreting the provisions of Chapter 3, this must be done with circumspection. 
Different legal systems apply different principles and the rules are frequently so 
crafted to accommodate the idiosyncrasies which are inherent to each particular 
system.”130 
 
This case reveals that the court’s obligation to consider international law, and its 
discretion to regard comparable foreign case law, is conflated to the extent that the 
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court is obliged to consider both.131 In the remainder of the decision, the reader is 
confronted with many references to, amongst others, Canadian and American 
municipal law and jurisprudence, and case law from New Zealand and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Only one reference is made to public international law namely, Article 50 of 
the ECHR, while three references are made to decisions delivered by the ECtHR.132 
Botha critically observes that, given Van Schalkwyk J’s reading of section 35(1), such 
a focus on foreign case law in the rest of the judgment is unsurprising.133  
By equating the manner in which public international law and foreign law 
should be considered, adjudicative bodies misconstrue their responsibility to consider 
public international law. In addition, Botha suggests that such conflation allows courts 
to draw from the case law of familiar foreign jurisdictions as opposed to more 
unfamiliar international law. In this regard, Botha submits that judgments conflating 
international law and foreign law usually rely on one, or two, references to 
international decisions. He states further that these cases are often decisions delivered 
from one of the more regularly relied upon courts or tribunals, such as the ECtHR. 
Furthermore, he argues that these minimal references to international decisions are 
followed by an extensive citation of foreign case law.134 The case above illustrates this 
tendency, as references to foreign case law dominated this judgment. 
Writing in 1996, Botha notes that there is a strong tendency for courts to rely 
on Canadian law and the law of the United States of America.135  He argues that the 
heavier reliance on these laws is attributed to courts’ preferences for these more 
familiar sources.136 The argument proceeds along the lines that, as certain foreign 
jurisdictions are more familiar to South African judges, their inclusion in the 
interpretative process is often more prevalent than the more unfamiliar forms of 
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international law.137 The decision of Constitutional Court in S v Zuma138 illustrates 
this point. In this case, Kentridge AJ investigated various principles of constitutional 
interpretation and referred to dictum from the Privy Council, the courts of Canada, 
Botswana and the Supreme Court of Namibia.139 In order to determine the legitimacy 
of a provision that creates a “reverse onus”, Kentridge AJ considered case law from 
courts that were “undoubtedly Courts of open democratic societies”. These included 
the United States Supreme Court, the Canadian Supreme Court, the Privy Council and 
the ECtHR.140 In order to address the problem of reconciling presumptions of reverse 
onus of proof with the constitutional presumption of innocence, the Court referred to 
case law from the United States, Canada and the Privy Council. In addition, the Court 
referred to the United States Constitution and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in respect 
of their approach to the limitation of rights.141 Therefore, the decision in Zuma was 
dominated by a consideration of foreign case law, as international authority was cited 
only once.  
In addition, Olivier argues that court decisions illustrating an over-reliance on 
foreign law usually reflects a somewhat superficial use of international law in the 
interpretation of fundamental rights.142 In particular, Olivier argues that regard for 
international law, and specifically international human rights law, has taken the form 
of mere references, often without any further analysis or interpretation.143 This is 
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or construction of a statute that is given by the Privy Council in terms of the English counterpart is to 
be followed, subject to certain conditions. In the case of considering the jurisprudence from other 
British high courts or the high courts of Commonwealth countries, such decisions (and the construction 
of statutes emanating there from) were valuable for their persuasive force and could be considered, but 
were not binding on South African courts. Du Plessis notes further that the law of statutory 
interpretation in South Africa has in many ways echoed the English common law. This has resulted in 
the regular citation of English jurisprudence and case law to confirm or support the chosen canon of 
construction or method of interpretation. The citation of English law was therefore not an alien exercise 
in South African courts. LM Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 265-266. 
138 S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) (“Zuma”). 
139 651-653. 
140 653. As was discussed above, reference to the ECtHR as an open democratic society is indicative of 
a misunderstanding between foreign law and international law. 
141 653-656. 
142 Olivier (2003) TSAR 502. 
143 502. 




illustrated in the decision of the Constitutional Court in Case v Minister of Safety and 
Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security.144 In this case, mere statements 
were made of relevant provisions found in international instruments, and were 
designated to a footnote in the judgment. In analysing the right to receive information 
within the context of freedom of expression, Mokgoro J stated that: 
 
“Section 35 of the Constitution provides that this Court ‘shall, where applicable, have 
regard to public international law applicable to the protection of (chap 3 rights)’. It is 
significant that at least four international human rights instruments provide 
specifically for the right to receive information under the general head of the right to 
free expression.”145 
 
A footnote appearing in the above text refers to article 9(1) and (2) of the AfCHPR, 
article 10 of the ECHR, article 19(e) of the UDHR and article 19(e) of the ICCPR. 
Mokgoro J then proceeded to analyse case law from courts in Zimbabwe, India, the 
United States, and also included case law from the Ontario High Court of Justice. 
Olivier criticises such regard to international law as passing and superficial.146 She 
describes it as a merely formal, as opposed to a substantive, form of judicial reasoning 
in the relevant cases.147 Consequently, scant references to international law that are 
lacking in depth undermine the purpose of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, and severely restrict the contribution that 
international law can make to the interpretive process. 
In addition to the above examples, the following case illustrates another way 
in which the court’s obligation to consider public international law when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, and the discretion it is given to regard comparable foreign law, is 
conflated. In Moeketsi v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana,148 the Supreme Court of 
the Bophuthatswana Provincial Division misconstrued section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution is to mean that courts may have regard to both international law and 
foreign law. In particular, Friedman P stated that:  
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145 Para 29. 
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“I may also ‘have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the 
rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case 
law.’”149  
 
This case highlights the courts’ failure to recognise the obligation entrenched in 
section 35(1) to regard public international law. From the selected cases, it is clear 
that in various ways, section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution is misconstrued at times 
to conflate a court’s obligation to regard public international law and its discretion to 
have regard to comparable foreign case law.150 
Case law examined under the 1996 Constitution appears to produce far fewer 
examples illustrating the conflation of the courts’ constitutional obligation to consider 
international law and the permission granted to them to consider foreign law, in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. However, one such illustration is found in the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in Sanderson v Attorney - General, Eastern 
Cape151 wherein Kriegler J states that “both the interim and final Constitutions, 
moreover, indicate that comparative research is either mandatory or advisable.”152 In 
response to this statement, Du Plessis argues that while comparative research is 
advisable, the consideration of international law is always mandatory.153 Furthermore, 
Kriegler J’s use of the term “comparative research” assumes that international law 
bears the same meaning as foreign law. In this regard, Du Plessis states that Kriegler J 
equates international law and foreign law, thereby conflating these.154 Consequently, 
Du Plessis suggests that such an error may serve as one possible explanation for the 
court’s constant failure to engage with international law and their seeming partiality 
towards case law from foreign jurisdictions.155 
Moreover, the courts’ decisions demonstrate that international law and foreign 
law are not always clearly distinguished, which is illustrated in the case of S v 
Williams.156 In this case, the Constitutional Court was required to interpret section 
11(2) of the 1993 Constitution, which concerns the right to freedom and security of 
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the person. Langa J delved extensively into comparative sources,157  and clearly 
distinguished between international law and foreign law by treating these as two 
distinct sources of law. However, in the discussion subsequent to this, Langa J did not 
clearly distinguish between discussions concerning international law and foreign law. 
Consequently, the discussion represented a mix of both sources of law without 
clarifying that the court is obliged to consider international law, while it may have 
regard to foreign law.158   
  The discussion above illustrates the courts’ tendency to conflate international 
law and foreign law, to the detriment of international law. The courts have, in some 
cases, misconstrued the meaning of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution so as to conflate the manner in which international 
law and foreign law may be invoked. Conflation also occurs when courts refer to 
international law and foreign law as part of “comparative research”, thereby equating 
these two sources of law. In addition, conflation occurs in those instances where 
judicial officers neglect to clearly distinguish between discussions based on foreign 
law, and those based on international law. Lastly, to a much smaller extent, references 
to public international law have been erroneously categorised as municipal sources.159 
 
                                                
157 Emphasising the manner in which section 11(2) conformed with many international human rights 
instruments, Langa J made specific reference to article 5 of the UDHR which forbids: “torture … or 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.” Furthermore, Langa J referred to P Sieghart 
The International Law of Human Rights (1983), which emphasises that significantly similar versions of 
this right to freedom and security of person occur in a number of other international instruments and 
national constitutions adopted since 1949. Article 7 of the ICCPR, article 3 of the ECHR, and article 5 
of the AfCHPR were used to illustrate this point. Reference was also made to article 8 of the Namibian 
Constitution and to the interpretation given by the UN HRC. Langa J also referred to the work of P van 
Dijk and GJH van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights in which 
they discuss the interpretation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The definition of inhumane treatment under 
the European Commission on Human Rights was also considered. Reference was also made to the 
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America as well as to Article 12 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. 
158 Botha and Olivier have identified additional case law wherein the Constitutional Court does not 
distinguish between international law and foreign law as two different sources of law. These include 
Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) and Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North 1997 2 BCLR 
153 (CC). Botha & Olivier (2004) SAYIL 42. 
159 These instances include referring to the decisions of international tribunals as foreign law. Such an 
example is the inclusion of a decision delivered by the ECtHR in a section of the judgment that 
canvasses only foreign case law. This is erroneous as the ECtHR is a specialised, regional court that 
has been given the jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters arising from the ECHR. This court should be 
distinguished from municipal courts as it does not pronounce on municipal law or European law and 
therefore decisions delivered by this court cannot be referred to as “European” or “of Europe”. Instead, 
these decisions should be considered as forming part of those sources of law dealt with under public 
international law. This error might not necessarily appear to jeopardise the decision which a judge 
reaches and may thus not appear worth highlighting. However, it is still indicative of a 
misunderstanding regarding the differences between public international law and foreign law.  




4 3 2 The use of international law as an interpretive tool rather than as a source of 
directly binding obligations 
Section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution was expected to have a significant effect on 
South African law.160 Its use was evident in early jurisprudence and international law 
was used as an interpretative tool in cases such as Zuma, Makwanyane and Williams, 
as discussed above. 161 In contrast, section 231 of the 1993 Constitution has received 
scant attention from the courts. It is apparent that courts tend to show a preference 
towards the method of invoking public international law as an interpretive tool rather 
than referring to binding treaty obligations arising out of section 231. The court’s 
reluctance to engage with section 231 of the 1993 Constitution is also fuelled by an 
apparent conflation with the status of international law as an interpretative tool, and 
international law as binding upon the State. As mentioned above, this is specifically 
illustrated in decision of the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane:  
 
“In dealing with comparative law, we must bear in mind that we are required to 
construe the South African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the 
constitution of some foreign country, and that this is to be done with due regard to 
our legal system, our history and circumstances, and the structure and language of our 
own Constitution. We can derive assistance from public international law and foreign 
case law, but we are in no way bound to follow it.”162   
 
Chaskalson P’s use of the term “public international law” appears to refer to public 
international law generally, drawing no distinction between the differences found 
between this source of law in the context of section 35(1) and section 231 of the 1993 
Constitution. By maintaining that courts are in no way bound to follow public 
international law generally, but can only derive assistance from it, Chaskalson P fails 
to give recognition to section 231. Section 231 has an important effect on the 
adjudication of rights. In particular, courts are bound to treaties that the State has 
ratified under section 231 of the 1993 Constitution and section 231 of the 1996 
Constitution, as well as to customary international law in accordance with section 232 
of the 1996 Constitution.163   
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Cases handed down by South African courts after the 1996 Constitution came 
into force reveal that while South African courts are still, albeit decreasingly, 
invoking section 39(1)(b), courts are also visibly reluctant to engage with section 231 
of the Constitution. In Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal 
Centre Trust, as Amicus),164 for example, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated the 
following: 
 
“The Constitutional Court has held … that the State is, furthermore, obliged under 
international law to protect women against violent crime and against the gender 
discrimination inherent in violence against women. This obligation was imposed on 
the State by s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, read with the preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; article 4(d) of the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women and art 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women ...”.165 
 
While the international obligations on the State are acknowledged, the international 
instruments referred to above are confined to being relied upon as interpretative aids 
by way of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. South Africa has ratified the 
CEDAW,166 and this instrument should have been relied upon in terms of section 231 
of the 1996 Constitution. Similarly, in Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of 
Good Hope,167 the High Court invoked section 39(1)(b) and proceeded to highlight 
three international instruments that dealt with the use of certain narcotics. In this 
regard, Friedman JP indicated the following:  
 
“[H]aving regard to these instruments it is clear that cannabis is regarded 
internationally as a drug, the possession and use of which should be strictly regulated 
and controlled.”168  
 
By invoking section 39(1)(b), it is correct that due regard must be had to these 
international instruments,169 but South Africa’s international obligations arising from 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) and the UN Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances (1971), both of which South Africa is a party to, are not 
mentioned. These two instruments have only been relied upon as guides to 
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interpretation, irrespective of the fact that these instruments require parties to strictly 
regulate and control the possession of cannabis. Reliance on section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution promotes the Makwanyane framework dictum, as discussed above, 
but fails to recognise that South Africa’s obligations in terms of these instruments 
should inform the interpretation of a right as a self-standing argument.170 Reference to 
these instruments should not only provide a means of understanding the international 
position on cannabis, but should also have emphasised that the international 
agreement was an impetus for South Africa’s own domestic regulation and control. 
Similarly, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Bathgate171  evidence was 
submitted before the High Court indicating that South Africa was party to the UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
which gives rise to certain international obligations. In particular, this agreement 
required South Africa to enact measures that would provide for restraint, pending the 
confiscation of property suspected of having been obtained from the proceeds of 
crime.172 The provisions of the relevant legislation are said to reflect the South 
African Government’s respect for the international practice that has evolved in this 
regard, as well as its willingness to co-operate in the global objectives against 
particular conduct. The applicant’s legal representative relied upon section 39(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution and argued that one of the main sources of applicable 
international law is the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, an international agreement that South Africa ratified, and is 
therefore bound to. 173 Unfortunately, this instrument was not relied upon in terms of 
section 231 of the 1996 Constitution. Olivier has criticised this approach as 
                                                
170 Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 1998 8 BCLR 976 (C) 985. Cannabis is 
listed as a drug in two of the schedules to the Single Convention. The Single Convention obliges the 
parties to it to adopt any special measures of control which in their opinion are necessary, having 
regard to the particularly dangerous properties of a drug included in the schedule. Parties are also 
required to implement provisions aimed at limiting the possession and use of drugs, of which Cannabis 
is included, to medical and scientific purposes. The Convention also requires that each party adopt such 
measures as will ensure that, inter alia, possession of those drugs shall be a punishable offence. The 
UN Convention on Psychotropic substances also lists cannabis as a psychotropic substance and 
requires that parties to the Convention shall prohibit all use except for scientific and very limited 
medicinal purposes. Although South Africa is not a signatory to the UN Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, this Convention also lists cannabis as a 
psychotic substance and requires parties to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a 
criminal offence under its domestic law, the possession of psychotropic substances for personal 
consumption. 
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resembling the decision in Makwanyane to the extent that South Africa has ratified a 
treaty that is not brought to the forefront of the argument by only invoking section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution.174   
The respondent in this case also referred to section 39(1)(b), calling for a 
purposive and generous interpretation of the section in the Constitution with “due 
regard to applicable international law”.175 The respondent argued that: “[i]nasmuch as 
South Africa has obligations in terms of international law, they should not lightly be 
disregarded.”176 This submission appears to recognise that South Africa might be 
bound to certain international obligations in terms of section 231, yet the argument 
does not go beyond this point. While the respondent relied upon section 10 (human 
dignity), section 14 (the right to privacy), and section 25 (the right not to be deprived 
of private property) of the 1996 Constitution, no evidence was presented that could 
indicate which international obligations might exist in relation to these provisions.177   
Furthermore, during the enquiry based on section 36 of the 1996 Constitution, 
no connection was drawn between the purpose of the legislation and South Africa’s 
international obligations under the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic substances.178  These obligations required that legislative 
measures be created in South Africa’s municipal law so to give effect to South 
Africa’s international obligations that have arisen from section 231 of the 1996 
Constitution. In agreement with the evidence, Van Zyl J only stated that South Africa 
is obliged to follow and apply the international precedents, and that full and 
unequivocal cooperation is essential.179 This denies the true power of section 231 as 
the obligations to which Van Zyl J refers to are not expressly identified and no 
references to international precedents are made. 
The above jurisprudential analysis highlights that, while the State has signed 
and ratified a number of international instruments, the courts have often relied upon 
these by way of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution or 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution, as opposed to invoking section 231 of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions. 
The signing and ratification of treaties is a deliberate step by the State to bind itself, 
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on an international level, with other States parties to the treaty. Surely these treaties 
should be held in higher regard in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights than soft law, 
or for example treaties that have not yet been signed by the State. Despite the 
criticisms directed at the courts in the discussions above, the courts have nonetheless 
indicated a willingness to rely on public international law by way of invoking 
provisions such as section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution.  
 
4 4 Conclusion 
The investigation into the Constitutional Court’s application of section 35(1) of the 
1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution reveals that the Court 
has developed a methodological approach to the consideration of international law 
when interpreting fundamental rights. In this regard, the framework dictum 
established in Makwanyane provides a structure within which courts should operate 
when relying on international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
Furthermore, the decision in Grootboom endorses the distinction between 
international law as an interpretative tool and as international law binding upon South 
Africa. The decision also clarifies that different weight should be attached to different 
sources of international law. The academic criticisms raised by the Constitutional 
Court’s approach in AZAPO indicate that the framework dictum has made a valuable 
contribution to the methodology used by courts when considering international human 
rights law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, Glenister has 
developed the framework established in Makwanyane by elaborating on the 
interpretative role of international treaties binding upon South Africa under 
international law, but not yet incorporated into municipal law. To this extent, the 
framework dictum, and its subsequent developments, provide a methodological 
approach to the use of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
However, this approach remains embryonic, and needs to be further developed to 
enable courts to draw upon relevant sources of international law in a structured and 
relevant way that will ensure the effective use of the interpretative mandate enshrined 
in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. In particular, the Court’s methodology 
should be developed to include clear analytical steps that can be followed when 
court’s consider international law. It may be argued that the Court’s methodological 




approach may then run the risk of becoming a superficial procedural checklist, which 
courts adhere to for the sake of obliging the interpretative mandate. However, such an 
argument misses the value that a well-structured approach can add to the Court’s 
interpretative strategy. International law will no longer be an unfamiliar, unchartered 
source of law, and court’s will be better equipped to evaluate their decision-making 
against the framework of international law sources.   
Lastly, this chapter investigated the manner in which courts have invoked 
section 35(1) and section 39(1)(b) through an extensive evaluation of case law. This 
investigation shows that, within the context of section 35(1) and section 39(1)(b), 
public international law and foreign law are often conflated, which signals a less than 
optimal use of international law. Furthermore, this conflation has contributed to the 
neglect of public international law in the context of section 35(1), which has often 
manifested in the form of an over reliance on foreign law. In this way, courts neglect 
the force that international treaty obligations can exert. Possible factors may 
contribute towards the treatment of international law highlighted above. Writing in 
1996, Botha argues that academic training has neglected the field of public 
international law, which has largely been ascribed to the minimal role public 
international law and particularly international human rights law, played under the 
apartheid regime. As a logical consequence courts, lawyers and (most) judges initially 
faced an unfamiliar area of law that may have influenced their reluctance to rely on 
international law.180  
                                                
180 Botha (1996) SAYIL 179. An examination of the state of legal education at tertiary level also 
indicates that universities were not necessarily prepared for the new demand for public international 
law in the form of international human rights. Booysen investigated the subject of international law as 
a university course and succinctly described how international law was presented in South African 
universities in 1996. See H Booysen “International Law as a University Course” (1996) 17 SAYIL 147-
154. Booysen suggested that apart from the University of South Africa, South African Universities 
offered international law as a subject without any focus on international human rights. Furthermore, 
Booysen suggested that because only one or two papers were offered on this topic, it could be assumed 
that the basic concepts of international law would dominate the content of the courses. The result was 
that a subject such as international human rights law, which was regarded as a more recent addition to 
the field of international law, fell outside the scope of the classic content of international law. In 
conclusion, Booysen aptly remarked that: 
“[I]f all universities offer only the same course on the very basic aspects of the classic public 
international law of previous centuries, the country will lack the necessary expertise to play its 
proper role in the international sphere.” 
In terms of those persons already practising in the field, the important role of legal representation in 
advancing arguments based on public international law, as well as the judges presiding over these 
matters, cannot be underestimated. Heyns and Viljoen draw a distinction between law graduates before 
1994 and those after, stating that the former might be unaccustomed to rely on international law. The 
latter on the other hand, are equipped with not only a better understanding of the Bill of Rights, but 
would also have benefitted from exposure to international human rights law in their legal training. See 




The treatment of international law, and specifically international human rights 
law, in tertiary institutions, has changed dramatically over the last decade. Despite 
this, Heyns and Viljoen argue that most lawyers do not come into frequent contact 
with treaties in judicial proceedings, with the exception of those lawyers who 
specialise in constitutional litigation.181 Heyns and Viljoen suggest that this judicial 
resistance to the use of international law in judicial proceedings is not only due to the 
novelty of international law in the South African legal order, but is also caused by an 
insensitivity towards the value of international law.182 The inevitable implication is 
that students should, to a greater extent, be exposed to international instruments and 
how they are applied, as well as gain insight into developing legal arguments based on 
international law.  
In addition, the availability of, and access to, information on public 
international law can also play an important role in determining whether international 
treaties will be relied upon in constitutional interpretation.183 Furthermore, amicus 
curiae184 can deliver insight into important aspects of international law and introduce 
them to the court for consideration, as was illustrated in Grootboom.185 In this case, 
the amicus introduced arguments based on the CESCR’s General Comment 3 
pertaining to the minimum core obligation. Although South Africa initially signed and 
ratified only a handful of international human rights treaties when the 1993 
Constitution came into force, this number has increased substantially. One can 
question the extent to which judges and lawyers alike are aware of the status of these 
treaties in South Africa, and South Africa’s obligation in terms of them. As seen 
above, legal representatives and judges do, on occasion, acknowledge that South 
Africa is party to a treaty, and yet they proceed to invoke section 39(1) of the 1996 
                                                                                                                                      
C Heyns & F Viljoen “South Africa” in C Heyns & F Viljoen (eds) The Impact of the United Nations 
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183 The Oxford Reports on International Law provides one such example. This is an internet-based 
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application of international law in domestic courts as well as case law specific to international human 
rights law. See Oxford Reports on International Law <http://www.oxfordlawreports.com> (accessed on 
30 October 2014). 
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permission from the court to offer advice on certain aspects of the case in question. 
185 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 




Constitution to rely on this international instrument as an interpretative tool. This may 
indicate that the differences between section 35(1) and section 231 of the 1993 
Constitution, and section 39(1)(b) and section 231 of the 1996 Constitution, are not 
adequately understood. Consequently, while reliance on section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution promotes the framework 
dictum established in Makwanyane, courts prevent treaty obligations from having an 
influence on decision-making. Attending to the abovementioned factors may assist in 
alleviating the methodological misconceptions highlighted in this chapter and enhance 
the effectiveness of the courts’ application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution and their consideration of international law.  
Although embryonic and, on occasion, characterised by misconceptions, the 
Constitutional Court’s methodological approach should still be applied, as it remains 
valuable and relevant to the Court’s consideration of international law in the 
interpretation of fundamental rights. This discussion therefore lays the foundation for 
the following chapter, which will examine how the Constitutional Court has relied 
upon section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution, and in particular, will evaluate how the methodological approach 
discussed above has been applied within the context of socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions. 






International Human Rights Law in the Constitutional 
Court’s Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence 
 
5 1 Introduction  
The 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions give express recognition to a variety 
of socio-economic rights and protect these rights as justiciable claims.1 The language 
used in section 262 and section 273 of the 1996 Constitution has led the Constitutional 
Court to adopt a model of reasonableness review to evaluate the State’s fulfilment of 
the positive obligations imposed by these rights.4 Defining the State’s obligations in 
respect of socio-economic rights is a complex task, the outcome of which has the 
potential to respond to the daily realities of poverty and socio-economic inequality in 
South Africa. However, the meaning that courts attribute to socio-economic rights 
will largely determine the extent to which they will contribute towards addressing 
these problems.  
In light of the interpretative mandate entrenched in section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, I examine the relationship 
between the Constitutional Court’s adjudication of socio-economic rights and the 
obligation placed upon the Court to consider international law when interpreting the 
                                                
1  See section 3 2 in chapter 3. As discussed, the 1993 Constitution contained only a limited number of 
socio-economic rights compared to that contained in the 1996 Constitution.  
2 Section 26 of the 1996 Constitution states the following: 
 “(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to  achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions.”   
3 Section 27 of the 1996 Constitution states the following: 
 “(1) Everyone has the right to have access to - 
  (a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
  (b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependents, appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
 (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.”  
4 Reasonableness review is discussed in section 5 3 below. 




Bill of Rights. 5  This evaluation can provide valuable insight into the Court’s 
application of the methodological approach it has thus far developed concerning its 
consideration of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.6 It will 
indicate the consistency with which the Court applies section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, and the extent to which 
the Court considers the generous selection of sources permitted by the framework 
dictum. This evaluation would therefore make it possible to identify possible 
strengths and weaknesses of the Court’s approach to its interpretative mandate, within 
the context of socio-economic rights. In addition, this evaluation will assist in 
determining the relevance of international human rights law to the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights in South Africa, and provide a clearer indication of whether 
international human rights law is a neglected tool of interpretation or an irrelevant 
one, within this context. 
My main objectives are firstly, to determine whether the Court has applied 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, 
and the methodological approach developed in this regard, in the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights. Secondly, I aim to determine whether international and 
regional human rights law is relevant to the Court’s interpretation of socio-economic 
rights.  
In this chapter, I consider four aspects of the Constitutional Court’s 
consideration of international human rights law in its interpretation of socio-economic 
rights. Firstly, I examine, on a case-by-case basis, the Court’s application of section 
35(1) of the 1993 Constitution or section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and its 
utilisation of the methodological approach it developed in terms of these provisions, 
in its interpretation of socio-economic rights. Where the Court has done so, I examine 
the manner in which it considered international human rights law. In terms of South 
Africa’s eviction jurisprudence, I focus particularly on the Court’s consideration of 
international law in the development of the concepts of meaningful engagement and 
alternative accommodation. Secondly, I trace the Court’s adoption of the 
reasonableness model of review in its assessment of the positive duties imposed on 
the State by socio-economic rights. In this regard, I determine whether this model 
affords a meaningful role to international human rights law in the interpretation of 
                                                
5 See section 3 3 1 in chapter 3.  
6 See section 4 2 in chapter 4. 




socio-economic rights. I also focus on the Constitutional Court’s adoption of a model 
of review in respect of the negative duties placed upon the State by these rights.7 
Furthermore, I examine decisions in which the Court has not applied the 
reasonableness model of review, specifically the Court’s adjudication of the education 
rights entrenched in section 29(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution.8 
Thirdly, I consider relevant international and regional human rights standards 
that may have further contributed to the interpretation of the socio-economic rights in 
the cases discussed. This includes examining the relevance of the ICESCR, and the 
normative standards developed by the CESCR, to the Court’s interpretive process. It 
will also include relevant human rights instruments and jurisprudence developed in 
the African, European and Inter-American human rights systems.9 Finally, I analyse 
the variety of international and regional human rights standards considered by the 
Constitutional Court with a view to determining which of these standards are 
considered the most, which of these standards remain neglected, and possible reasons 
for this distinction.  
 
5 2 The Constitutional Court’s Reliance on International Human 
Rights Law in the Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights 
5 2 1 The Constitutional Court’s housing jurisprudence  
5 2 1 1 The role of international law in the adjudication of the positive duties imposed 
by the right to have access to adequate housing 
In October 2000, the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in Grootboom, wherein 
it interpreted the right to have access to adequate housing protected in section 26 of 
the 1996 Constitution and the right of children to shelter entrenched in section 
                                                
7  The negative duties placed upon the State by socio-economic rights are also subject to a 
reasonableness model of review, but in terms of the general limitations clause entrenched in section 36 
of the 1996 Constitution. See section 5 2 1 2 below. 
8 Section 29 of the 1996 Constitution states the following: 
 “(1) Everyone has the right- 
  (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; 
  …” . 
9 The relevance of these regional and international standards is determined according to their ability to 
provide substantive content to socio-economic rights, and their potential to assist the Constitutional 
Court in providing a clearer description of the obligations placed upon the State by these rights. 




28(1)(c) of the 1996 Constitution.10 The amici11 relied heavily upon international 
human rights law in their submissions to the Court and as a result, the case offered the 
Court one of its first opportunities to engage with the CESCR’s General Comments, 
and determine their relevance to socio-economic rights in South Africa. 
  In their submissions, the amici submitted that article 11(1) of the ICESCR,12 
which entrenches the right to adequate housing, and article 2(1)13 of the ICESCR, 
which describes the nature of the obligations imposed on States parties to the 
ICESCR, were significant to understanding the positive obligations imposed on the 
State by socio-economic rights in the 1996 Constitution.14 The amici submitted 
                                                
10 This discussion will only focus on the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the right to have 
access to adequate housing protected in section 26 of the 1996 Constitution. 
11 The Human Rights Commission and the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western 
Cape were admitted as amici curiae. The heads of argument submitted on behalf of the amici curiae 
can be found at ESCR-NET “Government of the Republic of South Africa & Ors v Grootboom & Ors 
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)” (date unknown) ESCR-NET <http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/401409> 
(accessed 29-10-2014). 
12 ICESCR article 11(1) provides the following: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential 
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.” 
13 ICESCR article 2(1) provides the following: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.” 
14 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 27. South Africa 
signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994. Cabinet only approved the ratification of the ICESCR during 
an ordinary meeting held in Pretoria on 10 October 2012 and announced in a statement the following 
day that the ratification of the ICESCR is to be tabled before Parliament. See Government 
Communication and Information System (“GCIS”) “Statement on Cabinet Meeting of 10 October 
2012” (11-10-2012) GCIS <http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-
releases/cabstatements/11Ict2012> (accessed 29-10-2014). In March 2013, Deputy Minister of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Mr Andries Nel, stated that the ICESCR was 
soon to be submitted to Parliament for ratification. See The Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development “Address by the Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Mr Andries 
Nel, MP, during a Human Rights Day Debate in the National Council of Provinces on 19 March 2013” 
(date unknown) <http://www.justice.gov.za/m_speeches/2013/20130319-dm-hmrdebate.html> 
(accessed 29-10-2014). At 31 October 2014, this parliamentary process was still pending and the 
ICESCR could not be enforced in South Africa, as it had not yet been ratified by Parliament in 
accordance with section 231(2) of the 1996 Constitution. In addition, the ICESCR had not yet been 
legislatively incorporated into South Africa’s municipal law in accordance with section 231(4) of the 
1996 Constitution. This, however, did not detract from the usefulness of its provisions within the 
context of the interpretative mandate contained in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. However, 
it must be noted that South Africa ratified the ICESCR on 12 January 2015 and the instrument will 
enter into force in South Africa on 12 April 2015. See UN ‘International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: South Africa: Ratification’ (12 January 2015) C.N.23.2015.TREATIES-
IV.3 (Depositary Notification). Civil society groups have strongly supported and promoted South 
Africa’s ratification of the ICESCR. Unfortunately, South Africa has not yet signed or ratified the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (“OP-ICESCR”). The ICESCR Ratification Campaign Driver Group 




further that the CESCR’s General Comment 3,15 in which the CESCR endorses the 
concept of minimum core obligations upon States parties, was relevant to the case and 
argued that the Court follow a similar approach in its interpretation of section 26.16 
Furthermore, the amici argued that section 26 of the 1996 Constitution placed 
minimum core obligations upon the State that entitled all respondents to shelter.17 
In response to these arguments, the Court invoked section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution and cited Chaskalson P’s dicta as it appeared in Makwanyane. 18 
However, Yacoob J added to this and stated the following:  
 
“[T]he relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to be 
attached to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary. However, 
where the relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be 
directly applicable.”19 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the judgment illustrates a valuable engagement with the 
role of international law in the interpretation of the Constitution, which strengthens 
the Court’s methodological approach to the consideration of international law.20 
However, the Court also made a valuable determination concerning the relevance of 
                                                                                                                                      
has strongly promoted South Africa’s ratification of the  OP-ICESCR. This campaign comprises of the 
Black Sash, the University of the Western Cape’s Community Law Centre (CLC), the Global Call to 
Action against Poverty South Africa (GCAPSA), National Welfare Forum (NWF), Peoples’ Health 
Movement South Africa, Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI), and Studies in 
Poverty and Inequality Institute (SPII).  
15 CESCR ‘General Comment 3’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (“General Comment 3”). 
16 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 29. General 
Comment 3 paragraph 10 states the following: 
“[T]he Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, 
at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State 
party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is 
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care or basic shelter and housing, 
or the most basic form of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under 
the Covenant …”. 
It must be noted that the CESCR’s General Comment 3 is also relevant for its elaboration on States 
parties’ obligation to “take steps … by all appropriate means including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures”, the concept of “progressive realization”, the CESCR’s approach towards 
retrogressive measures, the concept of “to the maximum of its available resources”, the obligation on 
States parties in instances of resource constraints and lastly, the obligation on States parties “to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical …” . 
17 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 18. This 
challenged the High Court order granted by Davis J whereby only the applicant children and their 
parents were “entitled to be provided with shelter by the appropriate organ or department of state”. See 
Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C) 293. 
18 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35. See section 4 2 1 in chapter 4. 
19 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 26.  
20 See section 4 2 3 in chapter 4. 




article 11(1) and article 2(1) of the ICESCR and the CESCR’s General Comment 3 to 
the interpretation of section 26 of the 1996 Constitution. Firstly, the Court attached 
weight to the textual differences between the provisions of the ICESCR and the 1996 
Constitution.21 In particular, Yacoob J stated that section 26 of the 1996 Constitution 
referred to the “right of access to adequate housing”, whereas article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR referred to the “right to housing”.22 The Court held further that differences 
existed between article 2(1) of the ICESCR and section 26(2) of the 1996 
Constitution. It stated that article 2(1) of the ICESCR referred to the obligation on 
States parties to take “appropriate steps”, which must include legislation,23 whereas 
the Court found that section 26(2) of the 1996 Constitution only obliged the State to 
“take reasonable legislative and other measures”.24 
Secondly, in its consideration of the concept of minimum core obligations, the 
Court stated that General Comment 3, paragraph 10 did not specifically identify the 
meaning of a minimum core.25 However, the Court was of the view that international 
law required that the minimum core obligation be determined by the needs of the 
most vulnerable group. 26  Furthermore, the Court stated that the needs and 
opportunities for the enjoyment of a right must first be identified before any minimum 
threshold can be determined in respect of the progressive realisation of the right.27 
The Court highlighted that the task of determining the minimum core is a complex 
one when insufficient information on the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of 
a relevant right is available.28 In this regard, the Court held that it did not have 
information at its disposal comparable to that garnered by the CESCR during its 
examination of States parties’ reports in terms of sections 16 and 17 of the ICESCR.29 
                                                
21 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 28. 
22 Para 28. 
23 Para 28. 
24 Para 28. At a later stage in the decision, Yacoob J also argued that the right of “access to adequate 
housing” as entrenched in the 1996 Constitution goes even further than the “right to adequate housing” 
as protected in the ICESCR. Concerning the former, Yacoob J held that housing “entails more than 
bricks and mortar” and stated further that housing 
“requires available land, appropriate services such as the provision of water and the removal 
of sewage and the financing of all of these, including the building of the house itself. For a 
person to have access to adequate housing all of these conditions must be met: there must be 
land, there must be services, there must be a dwelling. Access to land for the purpose of 
housing is therefore included in the right of access to adequate housing s 26.” 
25 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 30. 
26 Para 31. 
27 Para 32. 
28 Para 32. 
29 Para 32. 




The Court therefore concluded that, in the context of the current case, it did not have 
sufficient information to determine what would comprise the minimum core 
obligation of the right to have access to adequate housing.30 The Court also found 
that, within the context of this right, the determination of a minimum core posed 
difficult questions as needs differ from case to case and questions arise as to whether 
a minimum core should be defined generally or for specific groups of people.31  
The above reasoning underpinned the Court’s decision that the concept of 
minimum core obligations, as found in the CESCR’s General Comment 3, could not 
be applied to the case. However, Yacoob J did not completely reject the concept of a 
minimum core obligation. Rather, he stated that there might indeed be cases in which 
it is “possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core to 
determine whether the measures taken by the State are reasonable.”32 However, 
Yacoob J held that in the present case, too little information was presented before the 
Court to allow for its determination.33 This aspect of the judgment creates, at least, a 
window of opportunity by which the concept of the minimum core may be used in a 
reasonableness review analysis in the future. However, in this case the Court deemed 
it unnecessary to decide whether it was appropriate to determine the minimum core of 
a right.34  
As I elaborate below, the Court chose instead to establish its use of the 
reasonableness model of review when adjudicating upon the right to have access to 
adequate housing.35 According to this model of review, the Court limits its inquiry to 
whether the measures undertaken by the State are reasonable.36 In this case, the Court 
applied the reasonableness model of review to the nation-wide housing programme 
adopted by the State and examined, in particular, whether a housing programme that 
                                                
30 Para 32. 
31 Para 33.  
32 Para 33. 
33 Para 33. 
34 Para 33. 
35 In the Grootboom judgment, the Constitutional Court laid down specific criteria that could assist in 
determining whether the State’s action was indeed reasonable. See Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 39-44. Briefly, the Constitutional Court held that a 
reasonable Government programme must be capable of facilitating the realisation of a right, and it must 
be comprehensive, coherent, and co-ordinated. Furthermore, appropriate financial and human resources 
must be made available for the programme and the programme must be balanced, flexible, and provide 
for short-, medium- and long term needs. A reasonable Government programme should also be 
reasonably conceived and implemented and make short-term provision for those with urgent needs and 
living in desperate circumstances. These criteria will be discussed further in this study in section 5 3 
below.  
36 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41. 




did not cater for those in desperate need was reasonable in the circumstances.37 The 
Court found that the nation-wide housing programme had to contain temporary 
measures to cater for those in desperate need and, as the programme did not provide 
such relief, it fell short of those obligations placed upon the State in terms of section 
26(2) of the 1996 Constitution.38 
Although the Court did not invoke the CESCR’s concept of the minimum 
core, it was assisted by the CESCR’s concept of “progressive realisation”, which was 
elaborated on in its General Comment 3.39 However, the Court did not entirely adopt 
the same meaning of “progressive realisation” as that used by the CESCR.40  
Grootboom is an important addition to the Constitutional Court’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence as it underscores the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights entrenched in the 1996 Constitution.41 Furthermore, the judgment establishes 
criteria that guide the application of the reasonableness model of review in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights.  
However, the judgment does not engage with the substantive content of the 
right to access to adequate housing entrenched in section 26(1) of the 1996 
Constitution. Such an engagement may have been particularly useful in clarifying the 
Court’s understanding of “people in desperate need” by identifying those conditions 
that must exist in order to classify an individual as such.42 Furthermore, by engaging 
with the content of the right to have access to adequate housing, the Court may have 
been able to assist the State in understanding its obligations, which pertain to 
satisfying “short term” and “immediate” needs. Yacoob J does refer to housing as 
“more than bricks and mortar” and comprising land, services and a dwelling.43 To this 
limited extent, Yacoob J engages with some criteria relevant to the right to have 
access to adequate housing. Ultimately, however, it remained for the State to 
determine what comprises immediate and short term needs.  
In this regard, an engagement with international human rights standards that 
further elaborate on the scope and content of the right to adequate housing may have 
                                                
37 Para 63. 
38 Para 65-66.  
39 General Comment 3, paragraph 9. Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 
SA 46 (CC) para 45. 
40 See D Bilchitz “Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and its Importance” 
(2002) 119 SALJ 484 494. 
41 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 20. 
42 Para 52. 
43 Para 35. 




contributed towards developing the substantive content of section 26 of the 1996 
Constitution and assisted the Court in identifying basic housing needs. In accordance 
with section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, the Court could have considered the 
CESCR’s General Comment 4.44 As discussed in chapter 4, the CESCR’s General 
Comments are not formally legally binding upon States parties to the ICESCR, and 
within the South African context, amount to soft law. Nevertheless, the CESCR’s 
General Comments amount to highly persuasive authority in the interpretation of 
States parties’ obligations under the ICESCR.45 The CESCR states that its General 
Comments are designed specifically to assist States parties “in fulfilling their 
obligations under the Covenant.”46 In addition, Conway describes these as “normative 
elucidations” that began to explain the content of the rights protected in the ICESCR 
and are now tools of evaluation that form a concrete basis for evaluating State 
compliance with the ICESCR.47  
However, it should be noted that the CESCR’s General Comments are not 
case or country specific, and are not made within the context of a contentious dispute 
amongst States parties. Accordingly, these are not adjudicative decisions designed to 
provide relief in complex and challenging factual circumstances. Therefore, it may be 
argued that the CESCR’s General Comments are merely abstract normative standards 
                                                
44 CESCR ‘General Comment 4’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (“General Comment 4”).  
45 See M Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (2009) 29. States 
bound to the ICESCR have also interpreted the provisions of the ICESCR and, consequently, a myriad 
of interpretations concerning the provisions of the ICESCR exist. However, Craven argues that the 
CESCR is best suited for developing a common understanding regarding the meaning of the ICESCR. 
See Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 4. The CESCR is one 
of several UN Treaty Bodies that adopt General Comments. Others who do so include the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, the HRC, the Committee Against Torture, the Committee on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, and the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination adopt General Recommendations. 
Although the terms “General Comment” and “General Recommendation” have been used 
interchangeably in practice, Conway highlights that important differences may exist between the two 
instruments in certain cases. See B Conway “Normative Instruments in International Human Rights 
Law: Locating the General Comment” (2008) Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working 
Paper No 17 1-38. For a historical discussion of the UN treaty bodies’ adoption of General Comments, 
see Conway (2008) Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No 17 5-9.  
46 ECOSOC, ‘Report on the forty sixth and forty seventh sessions’ (2-20 May 2011 and 14 November-
2 December 2011) E/2012/22-E/C.12/2011/3 15. 
47 Conway (2008) Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No 17 11. Similarly, 
Ssenyonjo argues that the General Comments function as instruments of “normative development” and 
highlights that the General Comments adopted by the CESCR have not received any formal objections 
from States, therefore indicating their wide acceptance by States parties to the ICESCR. Ssenyonjo 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 29. 




that may be difficult to apply to a specific set of facts within an adjudicative context. 
Nevertheless, the CESCR’s General Comments are deemed authoritative in their own 
right and can provide substantive, normative guidance on the content of relevant 
rights. General Comment 4 was adopted by the CESCR to provide clarity on article 
11(1) of the ICESCR, a provision that entrenches the right to adequate housing. In 
particular, General Comment 4 applies the standard of “adequacy” to housing rights, 
which requires that certain elements must be present in order for housing to be 
“adequate” namely, legal security of tenure, availability of services, materials, 
facilities and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location and 
cultural adequacy. The General Comment elaborates on certain aspects pertaining to 
adequate housing that Yacoob J also refers to in his description of the right to have 
access to adequate housing. In particular, he states that “housing entails more than 
bricks and mortar”48 and “requires available land, appropriate services such as the 
provision of water and the removal of sewage and the financing of all of these, 
including the building of the house itself”.49 Thus, the General Comment could have 
been used to support a more substantive engagement with these aspects and afford 
added legitimacy to them, as well as to other dimensions of the right elaborated on in 
the General Comment when interpreting section 26 of the 1996 Constitution.  
While section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution permits the consideration of 
the CESCR’s General Comment 4, other aspects relating to the relevance of this 
source may further justify the Court’s reference to it in the interpretation of section 26 
of the 1996 Constitution. In particular, the CESCR undertook extensive investigations 
during the drafting of its General Comment 4 and relied on other international 
developments and instruments relevant at the time. 50  Furthermore, regional 
                                                
48 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 35. 
49 Para 35. 
50 General Comment 4 is the product of much investigation and consultation. Not only did the CESCR 
and its predecessors examine seventy five reports concerned with the right to adequate housing since 
1979, but a day of General Discussion was also dedicated to this right at the CESCR’s third and fourth 
sessions. See General Comment 4, paragraph 2. At the CESCR’s discretion, one day of a session may 
be designated to the discussion of either a specific right or an aspect of the ICESCR. Such discussions 
are aimed at deepening the CESCR’s understanding of specific matters. Furthermore, it provides an 
opportunity for other interested parties to contribute to the CESCR’s efforts on the subject as well as 
assist in establishing a foundation upon which to develop a General Comment. See ECOSOC, ‘Report 
on the forty-sixth and forty-seventh sessions’ (2012) (E/2012/22-E/C.12/2011/3) para 56. These Days 
of General Discussion have contributed significantly to the formulation of General Comments. Within 
the context of General Comment 4, the CESCR also considered information derived from the 
International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (1987), while the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 
2000 was also consulted. In addition to this, reports and documentation adopted by the Commission on 




adjudicative bodies have relied upon the CESCR’s General Comment 4, signalling 
recognition of its relevance in the adjudication of socio-economic rights.51 
The concept of “adequate” housing or an “adequate” standard of living, which 
includes housing, is referred to in the UDHR and the CEDAW.52 South Africa had 
already ratified the latter at the time of the Grootboom judgment and was therefore 
bound to this instrument.53 This should have provided further impetus to at least 
engage with the standard of “adequacy” found in section 26(1) of the 1996 
Constitution, as the CEDAW demands a similar standard in respect to housing. 
The Habitat Agenda II may also have been relevant to the Court’s 
interpretation of section 26 of the 1996 Constitution as it elaborates on the concept of 
“adequate housing”.54 South Africa indicated its commitment to Habitat II before the 
                                                                                                                                      
Human Rights, as well as the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, were examined. See General Comment 4, paragraph 2.  
51 For example, in FEANSTA v France, the European Committee on Social Rights (“ECSR”) lauded 
the ICESCR as a “key source of interpretation” and highlighted the importance of the CESCR’s 
General Comment 4 to article 11(1) of the ICESCR. See FEANSTA v France Complaint No. 39/2006 
(Decision on the Merits, 4 February 2006) para 66-67. See also Satrose Ayuma & 11 others v 
Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme & 2 others, Petition 65 of 
2010 High Court at Nairobi (Nairobi Law Court) [2011] eKLR 9. In this case, the High Court of 
Nairobi adjudicated upon the private property rights of owners and the competing interests of 
petitioners that may be rendered homeless if evicted. In its adjudication of these rights, the High Court 
referred to the South African Constitutional Court judgment delivered in Makwanyane and the 
framework dictum established therein. The High Court then proceeded to refer to the CESCR’s 
General Comment 4 and listed the numerous elements that form the criteria for “adequate housing”. 
52 Article 25(1) of the UDHR states the following: 
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”  
Furthermore, article 14(h) of CEDAW states the following: 
“To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity 
and water supply, transport and communications.” 
53 South Africa signed the CEDAW on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 15 December 1995. 
54 Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), Istanbul, 3-14 June 
1996 A/CONF. 165/14. 171 countries adopted the report at the United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlements (Habitat II). As indicated in paragraph 1 of the Habitat Agenda, countries participating in 
the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) committed themselves to the 
objectives, principles, and recommendations contained in the Habitat Agenda. The purpose of this 
conference was to address two important global themes namely, “Adequate shelter for all” and 
“Sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world”. Furthermore, paragraph 25 of 
the Habitat Agenda indicates that participating States adopted “the goals and principles of adequate 
shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world.” Paragraph 39 
of the report states the following: 
“We reaffirm our commitment to the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate 
housing, as provided for in international instruments … we recognize our obligation by 
Governments to enable people to obtain shelter and to protect and improve dwellings and 
neighbourhoods. We commit ourselves to the goal of improving living and working 
conditions on an equitable and sustainable basis, so that everyone will have adequate shelter 
that is healthy, safe, secure, accessible and affordable and that includes basic services, 




Grootboom judgment, and expresses this commitment in the Urban Development 
Framework.55 Furthermore, Habitat Agenda II states that it  
 
“is a global call to action at all levels. It offers, within a framework of goals 
and principles and commitments, a positive vision of sustainable human 
settlements.” 56 
 
In addition, States participating in Habitat Agenda II declare that they “subscribe to 
the principles and goals set out below to guide us in our actions.”57 As will be 
recalled, 58  Wallace and Martin-Ortega define soft law as “non-legally binding 
international instruments” that comprise of “norms, principles, commitments or 
standards expected to be complied with by states”.59 The language and spirit of 
Habitat Agenda II indicates that this source of law falls within this description and is 
further characterised by those elements highlighted in part 4 2 1 of chapter 4 
describing soft law, which may be considered as a source of interpretation for the 
purposes of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution.  
In addition to these sources, the Court may have consulted relevant reports of 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, appointed by the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.60 The 
                                                                                                                                      
facilities and amenities, and will enjoy freedom from discrimination in housing and legal 
security of tenure.” 
55 National Department of Housing Urban Development Framework (1997) 1. 
56 Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), Istanbul, 3-14 June 
1996 A/CONF. 165/14 para 20. 
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58 See section 4 2 1. 
59 Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 30. 
60 Mr Rajindar Sachar was appointed as Special Rapporteur on promoting the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing in August 1992 by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. This decision was endorsed by the Commission on Human Rights in 1993. 
See UNCHR ‘Promoting the Realization of the Right to Adequate Housing’ (4 March 1993) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Dec/1993/103. This is not the only Special Rapporteur to address housing. In April 2000, the 
Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing 
as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living. The Commission was replaced by the 
Human Rights Council in June 1996, which has supported and extended this mandate. Special 
Rapporteurs on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on 
the right to non-discrimination in this context, appointed by the Human Rights Council, have included 
Mr Miloon Kothari, appointed from 2000 to 2008, and Ms Raquel Rolnik, appointed from 2008-2014. 
As of June 2014, Ms Leilani Farha holds this position. The Special Procedures of the Human Rights 
Council consist of independent human rights experts appointed by the Human Rights Council, and 
supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, to report on 
human rights issues in a specific country or in accordance with a specific theme. The Special 
Procedures are either individuals, known as “Special Rapporteurs” or “Independent Experts”, or consist 
of a working group. The Special Procedures report to the Human Rights Council on an annual basis. 
Many of the mandates also report to the General Assembly. Their tasks include, amongst others, 
undertaking country visits, drawing attention to alleged violations or abuses by sending 




Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights describes the Special Procedures 
as “the most directly accessible mechanism of the international human rights 
machinery”, which “interact regularly with human rights defenders and actual and 
potential victims of human rights violations.”61 These reports fit well within Cassese’s 
definition of soft law, which he defines as not legally binding, but manifesting a 
certain measure of agreement in the form of guidelines, statements reflecting common 
positions, or policies.62 One focus of the Special Rapporteur’s first progress report 
was to clarify States parties’ obligations in relation to the right to adequate housing.63 
This report largely endorses and confirms States parties’ obligations entrenched in the 
ICESCR and elaborated on in the CESCR’s General Comments 3 and 4. The report 
would therefore have served as a useful guide to understanding the nature and scope 
of the right to adequate housing under the ICESCR.64 
The South African Housing Code,65 adopted by the National Department of 
Housing, and applicable at the time of the judgment, uses the ICESCR’s definition of 
“adequate housing” to explain “adequate” within the context of section 26(1) of the 
1996 Constitution. McLean argues that in Grootboom, Yacoob J interpreted section 
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undertaking specific thematic studies and advising relevant parties in respect of technical cooperation. 
61 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations Special 
Procedures: Facts and Figures 2013 (2014) 1. 
62 Cassese International Law 196 
63 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on: The Realization of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” (1993) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/15. 
64 The report examines article 2(1) of the ICESCR and discusses the implications of the phrases 
“undertakes to take steps … by all appropriate means”, “to the maximum of its available resources”, 
and “to achieve progressively”. The report also discusses the concept of the minimum core, as adopted 
by the CESCR in General Comment 3 and elaborates on States parties’ “layers of obligations”, which 
include the duty to recognise, respect, protect and fulfil, within the context of adequate housing. The 
report also covers aspects such as the obligations of the international community and reiterates the core 
entitlement of housing rights contained in paragraph 8 of the CESCR’s General Comment 4 namely, 
legal security of tenure, availabilty of services, materials, and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, 
accessibility, location, and cultural adequacy. The report also considers various domestic legislation 
pertaining to housing rights, shortcomings of the legal approach to housing entitlements, the 
justiciability of housing rights and housing rights’ jurisprudence within both the domestic, regional and 
international context. Lastly, the report also looks at actions and omissions that constitute housing 
violations,  and the role of NGO’s in the development of housing rights legislation and housing rights 
based indicators. The Special Rapporteur submitted two reports subsequent to this that further clarify 
the nature and scope of the right to adequate housing, see UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on: The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/20 and UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on: The 
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing’ (1995) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/12. 
65 National Department of Housing National Housing Code (2000) parts 1 and 7. The National 
Housing Code (2000) was substantially revised in 2009, under the auspices of the Department of 
Human Settlements, which replaced the Department of Housing. 




26(1) of the 1996 Constitution more restrictively than that of the Housing 
Department, resulting in the creation of a constitutional standard that is lower than 
State policy.66 She argues that while the Court may do so, this interpretation firstly, 
indicates that the Court has inadequately assessed the South African Housing Code 
and secondly, indicates the Court’s reluctance to address the substantive content of 
section 26(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 67  Thus, McLean criticises the Court’s 
restrictive reading of sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the 1996 Constitution in Grootboom 
as avoiding an interpretation that adopts a more “practical and progressive” approach 
to State obligations that finds support in national legislation and international law.68 
Kapindu criticises the judgment further and submits that the differences between the 
provision of the ICESCR and section 26 of the 1996 Constitution are not very 
significant, thus implying that undue weight was attached to the difference in wording 
between article 11(1) of the ICESCR and section 26 of the Constitution.69  
However, the Court applied and developed the framework dictum established 
in Makwanyane in an exemplary manner and its consideration of international human 
rights law in the form of soft law should be lauded. As discussed in chapter 4, the 
Court’s reference to the CESCR’s General Comments reaffirms the principles 
established in Makwanyane namely, that both binding and non-binding international 
law are tools to be used in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.70 Moreover, Yacoob 
J reaffirmed the important role played by international human rights law, specifically 
the ICESCR, in the drafting of the provisions protecting socio-economic rights. 
Furthermore, section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution does not oblige courts to apply 
relevant international human rights law in the interpretive process, but only consider 
it. Therefore, the rejection of the minimum core in this case cannot be seen as an 
unsuccessful application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. However, this 
judgment challenges the relevance of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution in cases where the Constitutional Court does 
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not consider relevant international human rights law that may meaningfully contribute 
to the development of a more substantive jurisprudence.71  
 
5 2 1 2 The role of international law in the adjudication of the negative duties 
imposed by the right to have access to adequate housing 
In Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz,72 the Constitutional Court was required to 
decide on appeal whether certain provisions of the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944 
were inconsistent with the negative duties imposed by the right to have access to 
adequate housing entrenched in section 26(1) of the 1996 Constitution. In particular, 
section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrate’s Court Act regulated the process of recovering 
debts in the Magistrate’s Court. If a debtor failed to pay a judgment debt, or failed to 
adhere to a court order that required the payment of money in instalments, the Act 
provided that the judgment or order was enforceable by way of execution against the 
debtor’s moveable property. If the debtor’s movable property was insufficient to 
satisfy the judgment debt or order, or if the court so ordered, the clerk of the court was 
obliged to issue a warrant of execution against the debtor’s immovable property 
without judicial oversight.73 In this case, these provisions permitted the sale of 
execution of the homes of individuals who failed to pay judgment debts.74 In addition, 
while section 67 of the Magistrates Court Act lists those movables that are exempt 
from execution, the appellants argued that the provision was unconstitutional to the 
extent that the list did not include the home of a debtor, which is constitutionally 
protected.75 Individuals were therefore placed in a very vulnerable position that could 
result in the loss of the security of tenure in their homes.76  
In its judgment, the Court confirmed the appellants’ claim that the case 
concerned the negative duties imposed by the right to have access to adequate housing 
                                                
71 The Grootboom judgment was delivered on 4 October 2000. While South Africa ratified the  
AfCHPR on 9 July 1996, this instrument did not expressly contain the right to housing. It was only in 
October 2001, that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACommHPR”) 
recognised the right to housing as implicitly entrenched in the right to property, family protection and 
the right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental health. See SERAC v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 
(ACHPR 2001) para 60. Therefore, the AfCHPR is not relevant in this particular discussion as a 
standard that may assist in the normative development of section 26 of the 1996 Constitution. 
72 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) (“Jaftha”). 
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debts. 
75 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 18. 
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protected in section 26 of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, it stated that within the 
context of the right to have access to adequate housing, at least “any measure which 
permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing limits the 
rights protected in s 26(1).”77 The Court added that such a limitation would however, 
be subject to a higher standard of scrutiny by means of section 36 78  of the 
Constitution. 79 In its decision, the Court invoked section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution to assist it with the concept of adequate housing, and sought guidance 
from article 11(1) of the ICESCR. In addition, the Court examined the CESCR’s 
General Comment 4 and highlighted that the CESCR requires that the right to housing 
should not be interpreted restrictively, but rather as “the right to live somewhere in 
security, peace and dignity.”80 The Court viewed the CESCR’s interpretation as 
reflecting the same approach found in Grootboom namely, that human dignity and 
socio-economic rights are inherently linked to each other.81  
The Court also relied strongly on the significant position given to the standard 
of “adequacy” within the context of the right to adequate housing in the CESCR’s 
General Comment 4 and highlighted certain aspects of the CESCR’s approach in this 
regard.82 Firstly, the concept of “adequacy” comprises important elements relevant to 
the right to adequate housing, one of which is security of tenure.83 Secondly, security 
of tenure comprises many forms and is not only limited to ownership.84 Lastly, 
everyone should hold a degree of security of tenure that provides legal protection 
against forced eviction, harassment and other threats. 85  Moreover, the Court 
emphasised that an approach that focuses on the importance of security of tenure is 
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important within the context of South Africa’s history of forced removals and racist, 
arbitrary evictions.86  
The Court’s willingness to engage with the ICESCR as well as with the 
CESCR’s General Comment in this manner is commendable. The decision in Jaftha 
indicates that the Court affirms, and is willing to apply, the CESCR’s approach 
towards security of tenure to reinforce its understanding of the negative duties 
imposed by section 26(1) of the 1996 Constitution.87 Furthermore, by affirming the 
CESCR’s approach as being particularly relevant in the wake of South Africa’s past, 
the Court makes a valuable point that would endorse a more frequent use of 
international standards in South African jurisprudence. In this regard, the CESCR’s 
concept of “adequacy” elaborated on in General Comment 4 provides protection to 
many aspects of the right to adequate housing that could be utilised to reinforce our 
understanding of section 26 “in the light of our particular history of forced removals 
and racist evictions in South Africa.”88 
In Gundwana v Steko Development,89 the Constitutional Court was requested 
to adjudicate a similar matter. In this case, the Court held that a High Court registrar 
was not competent to declare a mortgaged property, that is a person’s home, specially 
executable in the course of ordering a default judgment under Rule 31(5)(b) of the 
Uniform Rules of the High Court.90 As confirmed in Jaftha, the Court reaffirmed that 
section 26 of the 1996 Constitution does not prohibit a sale in execution of a home 
per se, unless there has been an abuse of court procedure or an execution order is 
enforced in bad faith.91 However, the Court emphasised that an agreement to a 
mortgage bond does not consist of forfeiting an individual’s protection under section 
26(1) and 26(3) of the 1996 Constitution and that the procedural and proportionality 
principles established in Jaftha still apply to mortgagors who willingly place their 
homes as security for a loan.92 In particular, the Court emphasised that judicial 
oversight was required in execution orders concerning a person’s home. The Court 
added that in such an evaluation, the Court must take due regard of the facts of each 
case and the potential impact of such an execution on debtors who are poor and 
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subject to the risk of losing their homes. 93  This would include undertaking a 
proportionality analysis between the means used in the execution process and other 
comparable means to exact payment.94  
Unlike Jaftha, the Court did not apply section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution in the determination of this case. As indicated above, the CESCR’s 
General Comment 4 may have assisted in strengthening the importance of an 
individual’s security of tenure within the context of adequate housing as it did in 
Jaftha, and therefore assist in supporting the need for judicial oversight in instances 
described above.  
In both Jaftha and Gundwana, the Court may also have considered decisions 
delivered by the AfCommHPR that provide relevant support for, as well as reinforce, 
a State’s negative duty in respect of the right of access to housing.95 For example, in 
SERAC v Nigeria,96 the AfCommHPR engaged with the concept of minimum core 
obligations and held that, within the context of the right to shelter, such an obligation 
obliges the Nigerian Government “not to destroy the houses of its citizens and not to 
obstruct efforts by individuals or communities to rebuild lost homes.” 97  The 
AfCommHPR also held that the Nigerian Government’s duty to respect housing rights 
obliges the Government, as well as its agents and organs, to:  
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“[A]bstain from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal 
measure violating the integrity of the individual or infringing upon his or her freedom 
to use those material or other resources available to them in a way they find most 
appropriate to satisfy individual, family, household or community housing needs.”98  
 
Furthermore, the AfCommHPR held that, in terms of the duty resting upon the State: 
 
“Its obligations to protect oblige it to prevent the violation of any individual’s right to 
housing by any other individual or non-state actors like landlords, property 
developers, and land owners, and where such infringements occur, it should act to 
preclude further deprivations as well as guaranteeing access to legal remedies.”99 
 
Thus, the AfCommHPR highlighted the negative duty resting upon States parties to 
respect and protect the relevant socio-economic rights. 100  This concept of the 
minimum core differs from that applied by the CESCR and elaborated upon in the 
CESCR’s General Comment 3, which only refers to States parties’ positive 
obligations to prioritise the delivery of minimum essential levels of basic services in 
respect of the right to adequate housing. Furthermore, in Media Rights Agenda and 
Others v Nigeria,101 the AfCommHPR held that “[t]he right to property necessarily 
includes a right to have access to property of one’s own and the right not for one’s 
property to be removed.”102 These decisions could have provided additional support 
for the Court’s decision to uphold the State’s negative duty to respect the right to have 
access to adequate housing. As South Africa has signed and ratified the AfCHPR, 
reference to these decisions may have been more preferable than those made to the 
CESCR’s General Comment 4. However, the CESCR’s General Comment 4 
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freedom, taking into account all relevant factors …”. 




resonates more with section 26 of the 1996 Constitution, as it elaborates specifically 
on the concept of adequacy within the context of the right to adequate housing. 
Lastly, the Court may have sought guidance from the report of Mr Rajindar Sachar, 
the Special Rapporteur promoting the realisation of the right to adequate housing.103 
In his report, he elaborated on States parties’ obligations in terms of the right to 
housing protected in the ICESCR, which includes a duty to respect the right. 
 
5 2 1 3 The Constitutional Court’s eviction jurisprudence 
As discussed in chapter 2, the South African Government adopted many laws and 
policies before and during the period of apartheid, authorising the unequal and 
discriminatory distribution of housing and land in accordance with race classification. 
The forced removal of Black South Africans were a common occurrence during the 
apartheid era, while the State exerted tremendous effort in controlling the movement 
of Black South Africans to ensure their segregation from White areas. Under the new 
democratic dispensation, South Africa has constitutionalised housing rights and 
removed past discriminatory practices, policies and laws. However, apartheid has left 
an undeniable legacy of housing and land problems that the State must address today. 
This is particularly evident in the massive housing and land shortages in South Africa, 
which continue to leave many Black South Africans living in townships or informal 
settlements that are often characterised by deplorable conditions and a lack of security 
of tenure. 
The State has adopted legislation to give effect to the constitutionally 
protected right to have access to adequate housing, which provides both substantive 
and procedural safeguards within the context of evictions. The Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”) provides 
one such example, which prohibits unlawful evictions and regulates the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers. Courts are therefore tasked with interpreting such enactments in 
light of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has developed a substantial 
jurisprudence relating to evictions in South Africa in which it has developed the 
concepts of meaningful engagement and the provision of alternative accommodation 
in its adjudication of section 26 of the 1996 Constitution. In the following discussion, 
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I will examine the Court’s development of these concepts and determine whether 
international and regional standards, norms and jurisprudence have assisted the Court 
in this regard.104 
 
5 2 1 3 (a) The role of international law in the development of the concept of 
meaningful engagement 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 105  the Constitutional Court 
elaborated on the procedural safeguards provided for in PIE and detailed those 
considerations that a court must take into account when determining whether it is just 
and equitable to grant an eviction order. In particular, the Court stated that the extent 
to which serious negotiations had taken place between unlawful occupiers and 
landowners would constitute a relevant factor that must be taken into account.106 
Furthermore, the Court established that, in future cases that concern occupiers, courts   
 
“should be reluctant to accept that it would be just and equitable to order their 
eviction if it is not satisfied that all reasonable steps had been taken to get an agreed, 
mediated solution.”107  
 
In this case, Sachs J referred particularly to the United Nations Housing Rights 
Programme Report, which emphasised the significance and importance of housing, 
and its consequent recognition by the international community as a basic and 
fundamental right.108 This was used to highlight the transformatory nature of section 
                                                
104 This discussion focuses particularly on the concepts of meaningful engagement and the provision of 
alternative accommodation within the context of the Constitutional Court’s eviction jurisprudence as 
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105 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) (“PE Municipality”). 
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26(3) of the 1996 Constitution and its acknowledgment of the fact that “a home is 
more than just a shelter from the elements.”109 However, the Constitutional Court did 
not consider any international or regional human rights law to support the use of 
negotiations between the unlawful occupiers and the landowner in the case of this 
eviction. 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg110 was a landmark judgment in which the 
concept of meaningful engagement was firmly placed within South African eviction 
jurisprudence. In Olivia Road, the appellants applied for leave to appeal against a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, which authorised the City of Johannesburg 
(the “City”) to evict occupiers residing in so-called “bad” buildings. The City based 
these eviction orders on section 12(4)(b) of the National Building Regulations and 
Building Structures Act 103 of 1977 (“NBRSA”), which was enacted to grant the City 
statutory powers to evict occupiers of certain buildings in order to prevent unsafe 
living conditions that fall within its jurisdiction. Subsequent to hearing the application 
for leave to appeal, the Court delivered an interim order in which it ordered the City 
and the occupiers to enter into meaningful engagement. In addition to this, the City 
and the occupiers were ordered to report back to the Court on the results of their 
engagement, which would be taken into consideration when preparing the 
judgment.111  
In this case, the Court established that municipalities are constitutionally 
obliged to engage meaningfully with people who may potentially become homeless as 
a result of the eviction proceedings instituted at the municipality’s insistence.112 
Furthermore, the Court held that in order to comply with section 26(3) of the 1996 
Constitution, a court must take into account whether a municipality has engaged 
meaningfully, or at least made reasonable efforts towards such an engagement with 
the occupiers it wishes to evict, before an eviction order is granted that would leave 
occupiers homeless.113 The absence of such engagement, or an unreasonable response 
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from the municipality, should be viewed as a “weighty consideration” against the 
granting of an eviction order at the instance of the municipality.114  
The Constitutional Court’s decision in Olivia Road has substantively informed 
the procedure of meaningful engagement as it also elaborates on specific elements 
that should characterise the engagement process. In particular, engagement must be 
meaningful115 and there is an expectation, at least within the context of Olivia Road 
that the municipality will engage meaningfully with the occupiers both individually 
and collectively.116 The Court held that meaningful engagement must be a two-way 
process, aimed at discussing the circumstances in a meaningful way to achieve certain 
objectives, which do not comprise an exhaustive list.117 Furthermore, a municipality 
must make reasonable efforts to engage with occupiers, and it is only when such 
reasonable attempts fail, that a municipality may proceed without entering into 
meaningful engagement. 118  The Court added that sensitive, careful individuals 
representing a municipality must manage the engagement process, especially when 
occupiers are vulnerable, poor or illiterate, to ensure that engagement will be 
meaningful. 119 In addition, municipalities must respond within the context of 
meaningful engagement to those who may be rendered homeless by such an eviction, 
in a reasonable way.120 Furthermore, the Court stated that the larger the groups that 
may be rendered homeless subject to eviction at the instance of the municipality, the 
greater the need for “structured, consistent and careful management.”121 The Court 
noted that ad hoc engagement is only appropriate in a small municipality and is not 
appropriate in cases such as Olivia Road.122 The Court also held that both parties must 
act reasonably and in good faith, while those occupiers that may be subject to eviction 
should not nullify the engagement process by requesting unreasonable, non-
negotiable demands.123 The Court emphasised that civil society organisations should 
preferably facilitate the engagement process and that secrecy is counter-productive.124 
Lastly, the Court held that a complete and accurate account of the engagement 
                                                
114 Para 21. 
115 Para 5. 
116 Para 13. 
117 Para 14. 
118 Para 15. 
119 Para 15. 
120 Para 18. 
121 Para 19. 
122 Para 19. 
123 Para 20. 
124 Para 30 and para 21. 




process, which includes at least the reasonable efforts of the municipality to enter into 
the engagement process, is essential in any eviction proceeding conducted at the 
instance of the municipality.125 While the Court has significantly broadened its 
understanding of the engagement process within the context of evictions in South 
Africa, it did not consider any international law in its development of the 
abovementioned principles.  
In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes126 
the Constitutional Court grappled with the implications of the N2 Gateway Project, a 
project that formed part of the Breaking New Ground policy aimed at eradicating 
informal housing across South Africa. The Joe Slovo settlement was to be upgraded 
under this policy to provide formal housing in the Joe Slovo area and involved the 
relocation of its residents to Delft to live in temporary residential units. All the 
members of the Court delivered judgment and agreed that the eviction and relocation 
of the applicants was just and equitable in this case. Consequently, the eviction order 
was unanimously agreed upon, while additional requirements were imposed in the 
order.127  
Ngcobo J was the only member of the Court to refer to international human 
rights law in his decision. In this regard, he relied upon the CESCR’s General 
Comment 7 128  to highlight that international human rights law does in fact 
acknowledge that evictions may be necessary for the purposes of development.129 
Furthermore, Ngcobo J noted that General Comment 7 states that individuals subject 
to eviction should not be rendered homeless and that duties rest on the State in cases 
                                                
125 Para 21. 
126 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) (“Joe Slovo”). 
127 Para 400. The Court’s order imposed additional requirements that included the requirement that 
70% of the new homes built on the site of the settlement be allocated to certain residents. Therefore, 
specific appellants were entitled to a right of return. Furthermore, the Court’s order required an 
ongoing process of meaningful engagement, subject to judicial supervision, between the residents and 
the respondents concerning the relocation process. The Court’s order also required that the authorities 
provide detailed specifications regarding the temporary accommodation that was to be provided in 
Delft. 
128 General Comment 7, paragraph 13 states the following: 
“State parties shall ensure, prior to carrying out any evictions, and particularly those involving 
large groups, that all feasible alternatives are explored in consultation with the affected 
persons, with a view to avoiding, or at least minimizing, the need to use force…”. 
General Comment 7, paragraph 15 states the following: 
“The Committee considers that the procedural protections which should be applied in relation 
to forced evictions include: (a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected 
…”. 
129 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
232. 




where such individuals cannot support themselves.130 In his examination of the duty 
that rests upon the Government in instances of relocating individuals, Ngcobo J again 
relied upon General Comment 7 of the CESCR. In particular, Ngcobo J focused on 
the procedural requirements described in the General Comment that must be met in 
the event of evictions. These include entering into “genuine consultation” with the 
individuals who will be affected by the eviction, the provision of adequate and 
reasonable notice before the eviction, and the provision of information to affected 
individuals indicating the purpose of the eviction. Furthermore, Ngcobo J held that 
the General Comment requires the presence of Government officials or their 
representatives at the instance of evictions concerning groups of people, the proper 
identification of those executing the eviction, and the request that evictions do not 
take place during bad weather or at night without the consent of the people affected 
by the eviction.131  
In addition, Ngcobo J underscored the relevance of General Comment 7 and in 
particular, its request for “genuine consultation” in circumstances of eviction. In this 
regard, he stated that the General Comment provides useful guidance in cases where 
the State is responsible for the relocation of people, as it assists in determining the 
obligations that rest upon the State.132 Furthermore, Ngcobo J held that the demand 
for “genuine consultation” in General Comment 7 is consistent with the findings of 
South African courts requiring parties to engage with each other before evictions take 
place, as well as with the jurisprudence developed around PIE.133 Lastly, Ngcobo J 
stated that in cases of relocations such as in the present case, General Comment 7 
must be followed.134 
                                                
130 Para 232. General Comment 7, paragraph 7 states that 
“(e)victions may be carried out in connection with … development and infrastructure projects 
… land acquisition measures associated with urban renewal, housing renovation, [and] city 
beautification programmes …”.  
However, Ngcobo J also relied upon General Comment 7, paragraph 16 and restated it in the following 
way: 
“[T]he [government] must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available 
resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive 
land, as the case may be, is available.”  
Ngcobo J replaced “State party” with “government” in his citation of paragraph 16 of General 
Comment 7. However, the author submits that this is only an error and does not imply that the General 
Comments are binding upon South African municipal law. 
131 Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 236. See General 
Comment 7, paragraph 15. 
132 Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 237. 
133 Para 237. 
134 Para 237. 




Ngcobo J’s judgment also highlighted important aspects that assisted in 
substantively informing the engagement process. In this regard, Ngcobo J stated that 
engagement is a key requirement in the implementation of a programme.135 In 
particular, he held that meaningful engagement must take place between both the 
Government and the residents and furthermore, that there is a duty on the Government 
to engage meaningfully with residents both individually and collectively.136 Ngcobo J 
also confirmed the principle established in Olivia Road concerning evictions based on 
health and safety concerns. In this regard, he stated that while there is no closed list of 
objectives that engagement should aim to achieve, those identified in Olivia Road are 
equally applicable where the Government seeks to relocate people living in desperate 
conditions in accordance with a programme aimed at providing decent housing.137 
Furthermore, Ngcobo J stated that the needs of each household must be 
considered in order to assess the nature and extent of disruption caused by relocation 
as well as how such a disruption might be ameliorated.138 In addition, he held that 
affected residents must be informed in advance of the location they will be sent to as 
well as the date of such relocation.139 Ngcobo J also held that when implementing a 
programme to upgrade an informal settlement, engagement has the primary objective 
of providing affected residents with details of the programme, its purpose, and how it 
will be implemented.140 Ngcobo J emphasised that the process of engagement does 
not require that the parties reach agreement on every issue.141 Rather, engagement 
requires that both parties engage each other in good faith and reasonableness, with the 
willingness to listen to, and understand, the other side. Furthermore, Ngcobo J held 
that meaningful engagement should aim to “find a mutually acceptable solution to the 
difficult issues confronting the government and the residents in the quest to provide 
                                                
135 Para 238. 
136 Para 238. This was also established in Olivia Road. 
137 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
240-241. 
138 Para 241. 
139 Para 241. 
140 Para 242. In particular, Ngcobo J stated that the following must be addressed and provided to the 
affected residents: the purpose of the programme, the purpose of the relocation, arrangements for 
temporary residential units where in-situ development is not possible, how and when relocations will 
take place, the amount of notice to be given before relocation actually takes place, the consequences of 
relocation, including the extent to which the lives of the residents will be disrupted, whether 
Government will help in alleviating any dire consequences, the criteria for determining who of the 
residents will be resettled in the area that has been developed and where those residents, who cannot be 
accommodated in the developed area, will be provided with permanent housing. 
141 Para 244. 




adequate housing.”142 Lastly, he stated that relocation must be individualised to 
ensure that it is conducted fairly, and in accordance with the Constitution. For this 
reason, Ngcobo J states that meaningful engagement is crucial.143 
Ngcobo J’s dictum exhibits a strong reliance on General Comment 7, which 
must be commended. It is unfortunate that this is the only reference to international 
law in light of the comprehensive references to international and regional human 
rights law made in the submissions of the amici curiae before the Court.144 In fact, 
almost all the international and regional human rights instruments and regional human 
rights jurisprudence discussed in this study were presented to the Court by the amici, 
but reference was only made to General Comment 7 in the judgment.145   
                                                
142 Para 244. 
143 Para 261. 
144 See “Submissions of the Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions (COHRE)” available at ESCR-NET “Residents of the Joe Slovo Community, 
Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and others 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC)” (date unknown) ESCR-NET 
<http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/1529385> (accessed 30-10-2014). In terms of housing under 
international law, the amici referred to the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based 
Evictions and Displacement (UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a 
Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living’ (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/18 annex 1), as 
well as to article 11(1) of the ICESCR, the CESCR’s General Comment 4 and General Comment 7, 
FEANTSA v France Complaint No. 39/2006 (Decision on the Merits, 4 February 2006), European 
Roma Rights Centre (“ERRC”) v Greece Complaint No. 15/2003 (Decision on the Merits, 8 December 
2004); ERRC v Bulgaria Complaint No. 31/2005 (Decision on the Merits, 30 November 2006), ERRC 
v Italy Complaint No. 27/2004 (Decision on the Merits, 7 December 2005) and to SERAC v Nigeria 
(2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). The amici also referred to two resolutions adopted by the UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights namely, UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 
‘Tenth Anniversary of the Adoption of the Declaration on the Right to Development’ (25 November 
1996) UN Doc E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1996/22 and UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Forced Evictions’ (20 
August 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/SUB/RES/1998/9. Lastly, the amici referred to a statement made by 
UN Special Rapporteur, Miloon Kathari “UN Expert on Adequate Housing Concludes Visit to South 
Africa” Press Release, Geneva 7 May 2007. In terms of meaningful engagement under international 
law, the amici referred to the UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Forced Evictions’ (22 August 1997) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1997/6, the CESCR’s General Comment 7, and to the UN Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement (UNCHR ‘Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living’ 
(2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/18 annex 1). In addition, the amici referred to Conners v UK 2005 40 EHRR 
9, McCann v The United Kingdom Application NO. 19009/04 (13 May 2008), FEANTSA v France 
Complaint No 39/2006 (Decision on the Merits, 4 February 2006) and to SERAC v Nigeria (2001) 
AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
145 It is also unfortunate to note that despite the strong reliance on the CESCR’s General Comment 7, 
the engagement process undertaken by the parties only occurred at the remedial stage of the decision 
and has been critisised as inadequate and flawed for merely facilitating the parties’ involvement in 
implementing the eviction. See S Liebenberg “Engaging the Paradoxes of the Universal and Particular 
in Human Rights Adjudication: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Meaningful Engagement” (2012) 12 
African Human Rights Journal 1 22-23. This aspect stands in contrast to the General Comment quoted 
by Ngcobo J namely, General Comment 7, paragraph 13 which emphasises that prior to evicting 
individuals, State parties shall ensure “that all feasible alternatives are explored in consultation with the 
affected persons …”.  




In Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement of South Africa v Premier of the 
Province of KwaZulu- Natal,146 the Court held that section 16 of the KwaZulu-Natal 
Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 was inconsistent 
with section 26(2) of the 1996 Constitution as it removed the discretion of owners and 
municipalities to institute eviction proceedings and exposed unlawful occupants to 
arbitrary eviction proceedings.147 Furthermore, the Act in effect, permitted evictions 
without reasonable engagement and in cases where eviction was not the last resort.148 
In this judgment, Moseneke J elaborated on important aspects of meaningful 
engagement and stated the following: 
 
“Proper engagement would include taking into proper consideration the wishes of the 
people who are to be evicted; whether the areas where they live may be upgraded in 
situ; and whether there will be alternative accommodation. The engagement would 
also include the manner of eviction and the timeframes for the eviction.”149  
 
In this case, the Court did not rely on international law while crafting its 
understanding of meaningful engagement.  
In Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 150  the Court had to 
determine the lawfulness of the removal of people from, and the subsequent 
demolition of, their homes consequent to a decision that their place of residence 
constituted a disaster area in terms of the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 
(“DMA”). In this case, the Court referred briefly to meaningful engagement in its 
order and in particular, ordered the Municipality to engage meaningfully with the 
applicants concerning the identification of the land for the purposes of relocating the 
                                                
146 Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement of South Africa v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 
2010 2 BCLR 99 (CC) (“Abahlali”). 
147 Para 111 and 112. Section 16(1) and (2) of the Act states the following: 
“(1) An owner or person in charge of land or a building, which at the commencement of this   
Act is already occupied by unlawful occupiers must, within the period determined by the 
responsible Member of the Executive Council by notice in the Gazette, in a manner provided 
for in section 4 or 5 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act, institute proceedings for the eviction of the unlawful occupiers concerned.  
(2) In the event that the owner or person in charge of land or a building fails to comply with 
the notice issued by the responsible Member of the Executive Council in terms of subsection 
(1), a municipality within whose area of jurisdiction the land or building falls, must invoke the 
provisions of section 6 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act.” 
148 Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement of South Africa v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 
2010 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 113. However, this on its own does not render section 16 of the Act 
invalid. 
149 Para 114. 
150 2012 2 SA 598 (CC).  




applicants.151 No reference was made to the concept of meaningful engagement in the 
substantive judicial reasoning, and the Court had failed to consider any international 
human rights law in support of its order for meaningful engagement. 
Lastly, in Schubert Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality152 the residents approached the Court for an order granting 
the reoccupation of their homes after their removal during a situation of urgency. The 
Court held that although court supervision and engagement orders are usually 
required in cases of eviction orders and in particular, the provision of temporary 
accommodation pending a final eviction order, the exercise of meaningful 
engagement could also be extended to apply to situations beyond evictions. In 
particular, the process of meaningful engagement should be applied to situations 
concerning the restoration of occupation of property, as section 38 of the 1996 
Constitution is broad enough to accommodate such an order.153  
Furthermore, the Court stated that constitutional provisions requiring 
substantive involvement and engagement, and the jurisprudence illustrating this, 
reveal the “interrelation between different rights and interests”.154 In addition, these 
show that engagement between parties can resolve disputes involving competing 
interests and rights.155 The Court also emphasised the importance of recognising that 
the engagement process should not be characterised by preconceptions about the 
dignity and worth of its participants.156 In this regard, the Court stressed that this 
applied in particular to those who are constitutionally obliged to provide access to 
adequate housing under the Constitution.157 Furthermore, the Court stated that the 
applicants’ inherent right to dignity, as well as their legal entitlement to return to their 
homes absent a court order for eviction, entitles them to be treated equally in the 
engagement process.158 
Finally, the Court affirmed that a proper order of engagement should not 
proceed from a “top down” premise whereby the City determines “when, for how 
                                                
151 Para 53. 
152 2013 1 SA 323 (CC) (“Schubert Park”). 
153 Section 38 of the Constitution states that anyone listed in the section “has the right to approach a 
competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and that the 
court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.” 
154 Schubert Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 SA 323 
(CC) para 44. 
155 Para 44. 
156 Para 46.  
157 Para 47. 
158 Para 49. 




long, and ultimately whether at all, the applicants may return” to their homes.159 
Rather, an engagement part of a court order issued in terms of section 38 of the 
Constitution should provide for meaningful engagement with the applicants at every 
stage of the reoccupation process.160 As indicated in many of the cases analysed 
above, the Court did not refer to any international law in its elaboration of the concept 
of meaningful engagement. 
 
5 2 1 3 (b) Evaluation 
The analysis above indicates that the Constitutional Court has developed the 
procedural requirement of meaningful engagement through its adjudication of section 
26 of the 1996 Constitution. However, it has not applied section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution consistently, nor relied strongly on international or regional human rights 
law in its development of the concept. As illustrated above, Joe Slovo is the only 
Constitutional Court decision that refers to international human rights law in its 
development of the concept of meaningful engagement, despite the obligation placed 
upon courts to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.161 
Both international and regional human rights instruments recognise the 
concept of meaningful engagement.162 In addition, the CESCR’s General Comment 
                                                
159 Para 50. 
160 Para 51. 
161 It is important to note that, as discussed above, the Court did refer to international law in PE 
Municipality. However, this was not within the context of developing the scope and ambit of the 
concept of meaningful engagement.  
162 References to meaningful engagement or participation are found in the following instruments: 
article 14(2)(a) of CEDAW states that:  
“States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate 
in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right: 
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning at 
all levels.” 
Article 12(1) and (2) of the CRC state the following: 
“(1) States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the 
right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child 
being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
(2) For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in 
any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law.” 
In addition, article (9)(1)(c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa states the following: 
“(1) States parties shall take specific positive action to promote participative governance and 
the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries through affirmative 
action, enabling national legislation and other measures to ensure that: 
… 




4163 and General Comment 7164 refer to the concept, while both the UN Commission 
on Human Rights and the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights have adopted resolutions that contain provisions that expressly require 
consultation or participation. 165  Furthermore, the AfCommHPR has stated that 
individuals must be given meaningful opportunities to be heard and to participate in 
decisions affecting the development of their communities.166  
                                                                                                                                      
(c) women are equal partners with men at all levels of development and implementation of 
state policies and development programmes.” 
Furthermore, article 9(2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa states that: “States parties shall ensure increased and effective 
representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making.” See the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (adopted on 11 July 
2003, entered into force on 25 November 2005) (“African Women’s Protocol”). South Africa has 
signed and ratified all three of the above mentioned instruments and is therefore bound by them. South 
Africa signed the CRC on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 16 June 1995, while the State signed the 
CEDAW on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 15 December 1995. In addition, South Africa signed the 
African Women’s Protocol on 16 March 2004 and ratified it on 17 December 2004.  
Lastly, article 79(v) of the Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 24 October 2011) 
(“Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”) states 
that the right to housing imposes an obligation upon States parties to:  
“Ensure that where planning and development processes include evictions all those likely to be affected 
should be actively consulted”. In addition, article 79(w)(e) states that the eviction process should 
include the  
“holding of public hearing(s) that provide(s) affected persons and their advocates with 
opportunities to challenge the eviction decision and/or to present alternative proposals and to 
articulate their demands and development priorities.”. 
163 General Comment 4, paragraph 8(a) states the following: 
“States parties should consequently take immediate measures aimed at conferring legal 
security of tenure upon those persons and households currently lacking such protection, in 
genuine consultation with affected persons and groups …”. 
 General Comment 4, paragraph 12 states the following:  
“Both for reasons of relevance and effectiveness, as well as in order to ensure respect for other 
human rights, such a [national housing] strategy should reflect extensive genuine consultation 
with, and participation by, all those affected, including the homeless, the inadequately housed 
and their representatives …”. 
164 General Comment 7, paragraph 13 states the following: 
“State parties shall ensure, prior to carrying out any evictions, and particularly those involving 
large groups, that all feasible alternatives are explored in consultation with the affected 
persons, with a view to avoiding, or at least minimizing, the need to use force …”. 
General Comment 7, paragraph 15 states the following: 
“The Committee considers that the procedural protections which should be applied in relation 
to forced evictions include: (a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected 
…”. 
165 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Women and the Right to Adequate Housing and to Land and 
Property’ (27 August 1997) UN Doc E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1997/19, paragraph 14 and UNCHR, ‘Forced 
Evictions’ (10 March 1993) UN Doc E/CN.4/Res/1993/77, paragraph 3 and lastly, UNCHR, 
‘Prohibition of Forced Evictions’ (16 April 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2004/28 paragraph 3. These 
resolutions constitute non-binding soft law within the South African context. 
166 SERAC v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) para 53: 
“Government compliance with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter must 
also include … providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to 
participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.” 




Considering the extent to which the Court has developed principles pertaining 
to meaningful engagement, it is arguable that the Court’s principles extend beyond 
those referred to in international and regional human rights standards. This is 
particularly evident in the Court’s decision in Olivia Road. However, it is submitted 
that South African jurisprudence is aligned with many of the basic norms found in 
these international and regional standards, so that the latter remain valuable and 
relevant as a means to enforce and affirm the Court’s reasoning, as indicated by 
Ngcobo J in Joe Slovo. Furthermore, the Court’s explicit reference to the CESCR’s 
General Comments would demonstrate consistency with the CESCR’s approach and 
may be a basis for informing future development under the ICESCR once South 
Africa has ratified the instrument. 
In addition, the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based 
Evictions and Displacement 167  may have been of valuable assistance in the 
adjudication of development-based evictions. In effect, this circumstance triggered the 
eviction application in Joe Slovo. The Court chose to neglect this source of 
international law despite the amici’s efforts to direct the Court’s attention to this 
instrument in its submissions. In particular, this instrument emphasises specific ways 
in which States may initiate and facilitate the engagement process prior to eviction in 
instances of development-based evictions. For example, the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines require that any individual likely to be affected by urban or rural planning 
and development processes should be involved in these processes.168 The instrument 
also requires the giving of appropriate notice, the granting of a reasonable time-period 
to allow for public discussion and the effective dissemination of relevant information 
in advance.169 Furthermore, affected persons must be granted opportunities to receive 
legal, technical, or other advice concerning their rights and options.170 In addition, 
public hearings must be held whereby affected parties and their advocates can 
challenge the decision to evict, propose an alternative, and express their demands and 
                                                
167 UNCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/18 annex 1 (“Basic Principles and 
Guidelines”). Paragraph 10 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines states the purpose of this instrument 
namely, that these guidelines aim to guide States on the necessary measures and procedures to be 
followed to ensure that development-based evictions do not violate international human rights 
standards and result in “forced evictions”. 
168 Para 37 and 38. The instrument emphasises the right of women, indigenous peoples and persons 
with disabilities, as well as those working on behalf of affected individuals, to “relevant information, 
full consultation and participation” during the entire process. 
169 Para 37. 
170 Para 37. 




development priorities. 171  Furthermore, the Basic Principles and Guidelines 
emphasise the need to present disputes concerning alternatives before an independent 
body that has constitutional authority, for mediation, arbitration, or adjudication in the 
event that an agreement cannot be reached.172  
The Basic Principles and Guidelines also emphasise that opportunities for 
dialogue and consultation must be effectively extended to “the full spectrum of 
affected persons” during planning processes.173 In particular, the instrument highlights 
the need to include women, vulnerable and marginalised groups through the provision 
of special measures and procedures, when necessary.174 Even if a decision is made to 
evict occupiers, the Basic Principles and Guidelines emphasise the need to grant 
women equal opportunity to participate in planning processes and require that 
sufficient information be given to affected persons in terms of State projects, planning 
and implementation processes concerning the resettlement, the purported use of the 
eviction dwelling and its proposed beneficiaries.175 The entire resettlement process 
should ensure the full participation of affected persons, groups and communities and 
consideration must be given to alternative plans proposed by them.176 Lastly, the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines emphasise that States must guarantee the “right of 
affected persons, groups and communities to full and prior informed consent 
regarding relocation …”.177 Therefore, the Basic Principles and Guidelines provide 
the relevant steps to guide the engagement process and ensure the inclusion of all 
relevant parties, paying particular attention to the inclusion of vulnerable groups, in 
cases of development-based evictions. The instrument also establishes a much higher 
standard of engagement in instances of development-based evictions by requiring that 
all parties affected by eviction grant consent to relocation.  
Furthermore, a report drafted in 2004 by Miloon Kothari, the then Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard 
of living, stresses the particular vulnerability of women subject to eviction and 
                                                
171 Para 37 and para 38. 
172 Para 38. 
173 Para 39. 
174 Para 39. 
175 Para 56(h). Particular emphasis is placed on the inclusion of indigenous peoples, minorities, the 
landless, women and children. 
176 Para 56(i). 
177 Para 56(e). 




homelessness.178 Within the context of evictions, he emphasises that to exercise their 
rights, women must be equipped with knowledge and information.179 He adds that this 
may not only require that women be represented in meetings, but that even separate 
meetings be held with women, facilitated by women, with the aim of soliciting 
women’s views particularly in respect of “sensitive issues such as toilets, sanitation, 
water and the house plan”.180 This source could have led the Court to highlight the 
particular vulnerability of women in the context of evictions, and the need for specific 
measures to ensure their participation in engagement processes. In addition, the report 
provides a rich source of information pertaining to the protection against forced 
evictions at an international, regional level, and national level, and contains a detailed 
analysis of the impact of forced evictions on various vulnerable groups. It also 
discusses the initiatives undertaken by various actors at various levels, including the 
work of treaty monitoring bodies. This report may assist the Court in identifying 
relevant standards, or provide an understanding of the impact of forced evictions that 
may assist it in developing its own standards of due process.  
Lastly, Ms Raquel Rolink, the former Special Rapporteur on adequate 
housing, adopted a report focusing specifically on the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing within the context of post-disaster settings.181 In her report, she 
recommends that within the context of disasters, “[a]ll affected persons and groups 
should have access to information and be able to participate meaningfully in the 
planning and implementation of the various stages of the disaster response”.182 
Furthermore, she recommends that such persons participate specifically in the 
 
“identification and determination of tenure rights; the choice over, planning and 
implementation of transitional shelter and permanent housing programmes, and of 
durable solutions (return, local integration, resettlement); and in decisions over land 
use and planning restrictions.”183  
 
                                                
178 UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living’ (2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/48. 
179 Para 47. 
180 Para 47. 
181 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living’ (2001) A/66/270. 
182 22. 
183 23. 




Lastly, she recommends that women’s participation be ensured. 184  These 
recommendations may have assisted the Court in its development of the concept of 
meaningful engagement within the context of disaster situations as found in Pheko 
and Shubert Park. 
 
5 2 1 3 (c) The role of international law in the development of the concept of 
alternative accommodation 
In the analysis below, I examine the Constitutional Court’s development of the State’s 
obligation to provide temporary, alternative accommodation or land to those who 
have been, or may be, rendered homeless as a result of eviction. Furthermore, I 
evaluate the Court’s application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, and the 
extent to which international law was considered in this jurisprudence. Lastly, I 
determine whether existing international and regional human rights norms and 
standards may have assisted the Court in this regard. 
In PE Municipality, the Constitutional Court elaborated on the State’s duty to 
provide suitable, alternative accommodation in instances where unlawful occupiers 
resided on privately owned land and were subject to eviction proceedings at the 
instance of an organ of State namely, a municipality.185 As noted above,186 Sachs J 
developed the legislative framework found in section 6 of PIE187 that sets out the 
                                                
184 23. 
185 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 1. The applicants 
consisted of 68 individuals of which 23 were children. 
186 See the discussion on PE Municipality within the context of meaningful engagement in section 5 2 1 
3 (a) above. 
187 Section 6 of PIE states the following: 
“(1) An organ of State may institute proceedings for the eviction of an unlawful occupier from 
land which falls within its area of jurisdiction, except where the unlawful occupier is a 
mortgagor and the land in question is sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a mortgage, and 
the court may grant such an order if it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the 
relevant circumstances, and if -  
(a) the consent of that organ of State is required for the erection of a building or 
structure on that land or for the occupation of the land, and the unlawful occupier is 
occupying a building or structure on that land without such consent having been 
obtained; or 
      (b) it is in the public interest to grant such an order.  
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘public interest’ includes the interest of the health and 
safety of those occupying the land and the public in general. 
(3) In deciding whether it is just and equitable to grant an order for eviction, the court must 
have regard to -  
(a) the circumstances under which the unlawful occupier occupied the land and 
erected the building or structure; 
(b) the period the unlawful occupier and his or her family have resided on the land in 
question; and 




procedural safeguards that must be undertaken in the instance of evictions. A central 
feature of this procedure is the discretion awarded to courts to grant an eviction order 
if it deems it just and equitable to do so, taking into account all the relevant 
circumstances.188 In accordance with section 6(3)(c) of PIE, this includes, but is not 
limited to, the availability of suitable, alternative accommodation or land. The Court 
held that while regard must be had for the availability of suitable, alternative 
accommodation, this factor is not an “inflexible requirement”.189 Furthermore, this 
factor does not place an unqualified constitutional duty upon local governments to 
ensure that alternative accommodation or land is always made available in all 
circumstances in which homes are demolished.190 However, Sachs J stated that courts 
should be reluctant to grant eviction orders in cases where occupiers are relatively 
settled, unless courts are satisfied that reasonable alternatives are available, even if 
only as interim measures before occupiers are granted access to formal housing.191 
Furthermore, the Court emphasised that the availability of suitable, alternative 
accommodation will differ within municipalities, and will be influenced by the 
amount of individuals facing eviction. In this regard, the Court pointed out that the 
“actual situation” of the individuals facing eviction must be taken into account when 
locating suitable, alternative accommodation and highlighted further that the State’s 
measures must respond to the needs of the most desperate.192 In this case, the Court 
did not engage with any international or regional human rights standards in its 
elaboration of the concept of suitable, alternative accommodation entrenched in 
PIE.193  
In President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
(Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae), 194  the respondent, hereafter “Modderklip 
Boerdery”, was the owner of private property and was unable to execute an eviction 
                                                                                                                                      
(c) the availability to the unlawful occupier of suitable alternative accommodation or 
land.” 
188 Section 6(1) of PIE. 
189 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 28. 
190 Para 28. 
191 Para 28. 
192 Para 29. 
193 While the concept of alternative accommodation is found in PIE, and not expressly stated in the 
1996 Constitution, it is recalled that PIE was enacted to give effect to section 26 of the 1996 
Constitution and to “guide the courts in determining the approach to eviction now required by s 26(3) 
of the Constitution.” See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 
24. The Court therefore interprets PIE in light of the purposes of section 26(3) of the 1996 Constitution 
and the concept of alternative accommodation therefore forms an important substantive development of 
this right. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 14 and 19.  
194 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) (“Modderklip”). 




order granted to him, in terms of section 4 of PIE, against an impoverished 
community that had unlawfully settled upon his land.195 The Court had to determine 
the State’s duty towards Modderklip Boerdery in this regard. In the Constitutional 
Court, Langa ACJ (as he then was) chose firstly, to rely on section 1(c) of the 1996 
Constitution, which states that the Republic of South Africa is founded upon, amongst 
others, the value of supremacy and the rule of law. In terms of this section, the Court 
stated that an obligation rests upon the State to provide the necessary mechanisms 
whereby citizens can resolve disputes.196 Furthermore, the Court relied upon section 
34 of the 1996 Constitution, which protects the right of everyone to have their 
disputes decided in a fair, public hearing before a court, or where appropriate, before 
an independent and impartial tribunal.197 The Court found the State’s inaction to be 
unreasonable in light of the extent of the settlement on the property and the particular 
circumstances in which the occupiers found themselves.198 Furthermore, the Court 
stated that the State’s failure to provide an appropriate mechanism that would give 
effect to the eviction order granted by the Johannesburg High Court, had breached 
Modderklip Boerdery’s right to an effective remedy, as required by the rule of law 
and section 34 of the 1996 Constitution.199 Consequently, the Court ordered that 
Modderklip Boerdery be compensated for the unlawful occupation of its property.200   
Although the Court avoided resolving this case within the context of the 
owner’s property rights and the unlawful occupiers’ right to have access to adequate 
housing, the Court still found that the State was obliged to assure the unlawful 
occupiers of continuous accommodation until suitable alternatives were found.201 The 
judgment is significant in that it, in effect, placed a positive obligation upon the State 
and reaffirmed the principle established in Grootboom that the State must develop and 
implement a programme that “must include reasonable measures … to provide relief 
                                                
195 At the time of judgment, the settlement consisted of approximately 40 000 unlawful occupants and 
although the settlement comprised of streets, erven, and shops, the community drew water from only 
one tap, while no other services existed except pit toilets. For a full description of the merits, see 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 281-285. 
196 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
39. 
197 Para 39. Section 34 of the 1996 Constitution states the following: 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum.”  
198 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
48. 
199 Para 51 and 68. 
200 Para 68. 
201 Para 68. 




for people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in 
intolerable conditions or crisis situations.”202 Thus, the provision of immediate relief 
to the unlawful occupiers in this case must be lauded. However, the Constitutional 
Court did not engage with international and regional human rights law in its decision 
and in particular, in its statement on the State’s obligation to provide suitable, 
alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers in this case.  
In Joe Slovo, the Constitutional Court granted an eviction order that obliged 
residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement to vacate the settlement. However, the 
eviction order was subject to, amongst others, the condition that 70% of the new 
houses built at the Joe Slovo site would be allocated to residents of the Joe Slovo 
informal settlement that currently resided there or who moved away once the N2 
Gateway Housing Project was launched.203 The order to vacate was also conditional 
upon the applicants being relocated to temporary residential units that met the 
required standards of quality established in the order.204 While this case was discussed 
above in relation to meaningful engagement,205 this case is also relevant for its strong 
affirmation of the principle that the provision of suitable, alternative accommodation 
is an essential requirement when determining whether the evictions of large 
communities by the State are just and equitable.206 In particular, Yacoob J emphasised 
that section 6(3)(1) of PIE is vital when evaluating whether it is just and equitable to 
grant an eviction order. 207  In addition, Ngcobo J affirmed the Government’s 
obligation to provide landless people with access to adequate housing and emphasised 
that, for as long as this duty exists, the landless may not be evicted until alternative 
land is found.208 O’ Regan J also confirmed this principle by stating that an eviction 
                                                
202 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 99. Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 285. 
203 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 5. 
204 Para 5. The temporary residential unit had to be made available to each household that was 
relocated. Each temporary residential accommodation unit that already existed had to comply with the 
specifications set out in the order, while newly constructed units had to be of equivalent or superior 
quality. Each temporary residential unit had to be at least 24 m2 in extent, be serviced with tarred roads, 
be individually numbered for purposes of identification, and have walls constructed with a substance 
called Nutec. Furthermore, the units were to have a galvanised iron roof, be supplied with electricity 
through a prepaid electricity meter, be situated within reasonable proximity of a communal ablution 
facility, make reasonable provision (which may be communal) for toilet facilities with water-borne 
sewerage, and make reasonable provision (which may be communal) for fresh water. 
205 See the discussion on Joe Slovo, and in particular Ngcobo J’s judgment concerning meaningful 
engagement, in section 5 2 1 3 (a) of this chapter. 
206 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 310-311. 
207 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
105(c). 
208 Para 214 and 217. 




order that does not provide for alternative accommodation is far less likely to be just 
and equitable than one that makes careful provision for such alternative 
accommodation.209 O’ Regan J added that the Court order clarified that an occupier 
may not be required to vacate the settlement unless the respondents had made 
temporary accommodation available to them.210   
Only one reference was made to international human rights law in support of 
this principle. In particular, Ngcobo J relied upon the CESCR’s General Comment 7, 
to illustrate that international law recognises that development may require evictions, 
but that such evictions should not render people homeless.211 The General Comment 
was also relied upon to emphasise that when individuals affected by eviction are 
unable to provide for themselves,  
 
“the [government] must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its 
available resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or 
access to productive land, as the case may be, is available.”212  
 
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd,213 the Court considered whether the City is obliged to 
provide temporary, alternative accommodation in cases of evictions at the instance of 
private landowners and the extent of such an obligation, if one exists. Furthermore, 
the Court had to determine the reasonableness of the City’s current housing policy 
which, in the context of emergency housing, distinguished between occupiers 
relocated at the instance of the City and occupiers evicted by private land owners. The 
City relocated the former to temporary accommodation provided by the City, while 
the latter were not offered any temporary, alternative accommodation. The Court held 
that the City’s housing policy was unconstitutional and unreasonable to the extent that 
it excluded those occupiers evicted by private property owners from consideration for 
                                                
209 Para 313. 
210 Para 318. 
211 232. Ngcobo J refers specifically to General Comment 7, paragrapgh 7, which states that: 
“Evictions may be carried out in connection with … development and infrastructure projects 
… land acquisition measures associated with urban renewal, housing renovation, [and] city 
beautification programmes …”. 
212 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
232. Paragraph 16 of General Comment 7 states that in cases where those individuals affected by 
evictions are not able to provide for themselves, the State has a duty to: 
“[T]ake all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available resources, to ensure that 
adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive land, as the case may be, is 
available.”  
213 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) (“Blue Moonlight”). 




temporary accommodation.214 The Court affirmed that the State was obliged to 
provide temporary accommodation to those occupiers that had been rendered 
homeless by way of eviction, whether the eviction was instituted by the State or by 
private owners.215 Furthermore, the Court held that while the private property owner 
could not be expected to provide housing for free for an indefinite period, the property 
rights of the owners must be interpreted in light of the requirement that evictions must 
be just and equitable.216 The Court stated that an eviction would meet this requirement 
if the City provided temporary accommodation.217 In this regard, the Court held that 
this obligation includes the duty to provide temporary accommodation as near as 
possible to where the unlawfully occupied property was located.218 These two aspects 
of the order are commendable as the Court grants an order that caters, to a certain 
extent, for the specific needs of this particular group of vulnerable people, and results 
in “spatial justice” by reducing the adverse consequences of relocating individuals in 
instances of evictions.219 However, the Court did not consider any international 
human rights law in its decision. 
In Pheko,220 the Court held that the municipality’s engagement with the DMA, 
which led to the eviction of the residents of the informal settlement and the 
demolition of their homes without a court order, constituted action that fell outside the 
authority conferred upon it by the DMA. Consequently, the Court found that the 
municipality’s action was contrary to section 26(3) of the 1996 Constitution.221 The 
availability of alternative land was an important factor in the Court’s determination of 
whether the removal of residents from their homes was lawful. As part of the relief 
awarded to the applicants, the Court reaffirmed the municipality’s obligation to 
provide the applicants with suitable, temporary accommodation.222 Although the 
                                                
214 Para 95. According to the City’s housing policy, occupiers evicted and relocated from “bad 
buildings” at the City’s instance are provided with temporary accommodation, whereas occupiers 
evicted at the instance of private property owners are dealt with as an emergency situation as defined in 
Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code. Therefore, the latter are not considered under the City’s 
temporary housing programme for temporary accommodation. 
215 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 
SA 104 (CC) para 96. 
216 Para 97. 
217 Para 97. 
218 Para 104. 
219 M Strauss & S Liebenberg “Contested Spaces: Housing Rights and Evictions Law in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa” (2014) 13 Planning Theory 428 436. 
220 This case is also discussed within the context of meaningful engagement. See section 5 2 1 3 (a) of 
this chapter. 
221 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 45. 
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municipality was not able to obtain the land identified by the applicants and contained 
in recommendations, the Court found that this did not absolve the municipality from 
its obligation “to identify and designate land for housing development for the 
applicants.” 223  In terms of the applicant’s relocation, the Court ordered the 
municipality to furthermore identify land in the immediate vicinity of the applicant’s 
place of residence before the removal.224 Lastly, the Court ordered that the amenities 
provided to the applicants and people resettled by the municipality were to be “no less 
than the amenities and basic services provided to them as a result of the relocation in 
March 2011.”225 No international human rights law was considered in this judgment. 
In Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries Pty (Ltd),226 
the occupiers appealed against a High Court order that permitted the eviction of the 
occupiers from private land, irrespective of whether or not the municipality had 
complied with the court’s order to provide the occupiers with access to land at the 
time of the eviction.227 The applicants challenged the order on the ground that it was 
not just and equitable within the meaning of section 4(6) of PIE. In this case, Yacoob 
J referred to the Constitutional Court’s decision in Blue Moonlight in which it held 
that an owner’s right to property might be restricted when considering whether an 
eviction would be just and equitable within the context of PIE.228 Yacoob J applied a 
contextual approach to this case by inquiring into the landowner’s plans for the land 
in the foreseeable future as well the likelihood of the City responding quickly to the 
applicant’s need for alternative accommodation.229 The Court held that if the City 
provided alternative accommodation to the occupiers within a reasonable time, it 
would not be just or equitable for the occupiers to be left homeless for the intervening 
period before the City assisted them.230 In this regard, the Court referred to Blue 
Moonlight and its decision that there should be a link between the date upon which 
the occupiers are evicted and the date upon which the City is obliged to provide 
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alternative accommodation to the occupiers.231 The Court stated that, in this case, it 
would be just and equitable to require the City to provide access to alternative 
accommodation one month before the date of eviction.232 The Constitutional Court 
did not consider any international or regional human rights law in this case. 
In Occupiers of Mooiplaats v Golden Thread Ltd,233 the applicants, who had 
unlawfully occupied privately owned land, challenged an eviction order granted by 
the High Court as being inconsistent with the requirements of justice and equity 
within the meaning of section 4(6) of PIE.234 In this case, the Constitutional Court 
relied upon its decision in Blue Moonlight and reaffirmed that the City has both the 
power and the duty to make reasonable provision for emergency housing from its own 
resources.235 Furthermore, the Court distinguished between the circumstances of 
unlawful occupiers who have occupied land for a number of years and those who 
have occupied the land unlawfully for less than six months. This distinction is made 
in PIE and results in a difference concerning the relevant factors that must be 
considered in a court’s justice and equity enquiry. 236 The Court held that while the 
latter distinction was important, it was not decisive to the justice and equity 
enquiry.237 Furthermore, the Court held that in cases where occupiers have unlawfully 
occupied land for less than six months, courts are obliged to consider all the relevant 
circumstances in accordance with section 4(6) of PIE and should therefore determine 
what these relevant circumstances are.238  
The Court confirmed that in certain cases, such as the present, the question 
whether the City is able to reasonably provide alternative land or housing is critically 
important.239 The decision also confirmed the High Court judgment to the effect that 
                                                
231 Para 13. See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 99 and 100. In Blue Moonlight, the Court ordered that alternative 
accommodation be provided 14 days before the eviction takes place. 
232 Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries Pty (Ltd) 2012 4 BCLR 382 (CC) 
para 14 and 16. 
233 2012 2 SA 337 (CC) (“Mooiplaats”). 
234 Para 3. 
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“If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for less than six months at the time 
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237 Occupiers of Mooiplaats v Golden Thread Ltd 2012 2 SA 337 (CC) para 16. 
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if a court is aware that the City owns vacant land which may be made available to the 
occupiers as alternative land, a court cannot find an eviction order to be just and 
equitable without investigating this factor. 240  The Court emphasised that, as 
established in Blue Moonlight, an owner’s right to property is restricted in cases 
involving the justice and equity enquiry mandated by PIE.241 In the context of this 
case, the fact that the landowner had not put the land into any use, and that no 
evidence was available indicating that the land was intended for use in the foreseeable 
future, was significant.242 Thus, the landowner would suffer little prejudice in the 
event of the court order permitting the unlawful occupiers to occupy the land for a 
longer period until alternative land was made available by the local authority.243  
This case confirms that the availability of alternative accommodation remains 
an important factor for a court to consider in the justice and equity enquiry mandated 
in section 4 of PIE, even in instances where unlawful occupiers have occupied land 
for less than six months. However, again, no international or regional human rights 
law was considered in this case. 
 
5 2 1 3 (d) Evaluation 
The analysis above indicates that while the Constitutional Court has established a 
number of principles in relation to the State’s provision of alternative accommodation 
or land within the context of evictions, it has only made one reference to international 
human rights law in its formulation of these, namely in its decision in Joe Slovo. 
International human rights law recognises the provision of alternative accommodation 
within the context of evictions.244 Reference to these may have strengthened the 
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244 The UN Commission on Human Rights has, for example, adopted a resolution that addresses 
alternative accommodation. See UNCHR ‘Prohibition of Forced Evictions’ (16 April 2004) UN Doc 
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Court’s emphasis on the importance of this factor in a court’s justice and equity 
enquiry within the context of PIE. Furthermore, the recognition of the concept of 
alternative accommodation found in international law may have provided further 
justification for the Court’s finding in Modderklip that the State must provide 
unlawful occupiers with continuous accommodation until suitable alternatives are 
found. This may have bolstered the Court’s decision, particularly as it was not based 
on the owner’s property rights, or the occupier’s right to have access to adequate 
housing. Furthermore, an engagement with international standards in the Court’s 
development of the abovementioned principles may have strengthened the latter in 
those cases where these overlap with international standards, and adding further 
support to the Court’s findings and orders. 
In addition, international standards may have alerted the Court to different 
dimensions of the concept of alternative accommodation. In particular, the Court does 
not engage the substantive aspects of “temporary, alternative accommodation” and the 
positive obligations resting upon the City in this regard.245 In this respect, the 
CESCR’s General Comment 7 may be useful to the extent that it refers to the 
provision of “adequate” alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive 
land.246 The CESCR thus imposes a standard of “adequacy” on the alternative 
accommodation that must be provided by the State. In PE Municipality, the Court 
                                                                                                                                      
persons and communities that have been forcibly evicted, following mutually satisfactory 
negotiations with the affected persons or groups …”. 
Lastly, article 79(ff) of the Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights states that States parties must  
“Ensure sufficient alternative accomodation, or restitution when feasible, immediately upon 
the eviction.” 
245  However, it must be noted that the Constitutional Court has, for example, given detailed 
specifications concerning the nature and quality of temporary residential units to be provided to 
residents upon their relocation, as part of its order in Joe Slovo.   
246 Paragraph 16 of General Comment 7 states the following: 
“Evictions should not result in individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the 
violation of other human rights. Where those affected are unable to provide for themselves, 
the State party must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available resources, 
to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive land, as the 
case may be, is available.” 
A similar standard of “adequacy” is also found in article 79(gg) of the Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states that States parties must: 
“Ensure the right to resettlement, which includes the right to alternative land of better or equal 
quality and housing that must satisfy the following criteria of adequacy: accessibility, 
affordability, habitability, security of tenure, cultural adequacy, suitability of location, and 
access to essential services such as health and education. This includes the obligation to 
ensure that resettled persons, groups and communities are not placed in conflict with their host 
communities”. 




refers to a “reasonable alternative”,247 while PIE refers to a “suitable alternative”. 
However, the standard of “adequacy” has been explored by the CESCR in General 
Comment 4 and may provide guidance in developing the scope and content of 
reasonable or suitable, alternative accommodation. Lastly, the CESCR has also 
referred to standards of adequacy in respect of alternative accommodation in its 
Concluding Observations.248 These are context specific, and of a more contentious 
nature than the CESCR’s General Comments. These however, remain a non-binding 
source of international law for South Africa and are thus catagorised as soft law. In 
addition, the Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights states that States parties must ensure “sufficient alternative 
accommodation, or restitution when feasible, immediately upon eviction.”249 This 
instrument requires that a minimum standard be met in this regard, which may have 
alerted the Court to different components that may comprise sufficient alternative 
accommodation.250 
                                                
247 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 28. 
248 See, for example, the CESCR’s Concluding Observations in respect of the Dominican Republic. In 
this regard, the CESCR expressed its concern regarding the nature and magnitude of forced evictions 
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garbage removal. Similarly, persons who are housed in conditions which threaten their life 
and health should, to the maximum of available resources, be adequately rehoused.”   
See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Dominican Republic’ (7 December 1994) UN 
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examining State parties’ reports, which aim to assist States parties in their implementation of the 
ICESCR. Sepúlveda argues that the CESCR has increasingly undertaken a more adversarial and 
inquisitive approach in its examination of States parties’ reports. In particular, she argues that the 
CESCR has more recently assessed a State party’s actual compliance with the CESCR and is not 
merely making “suggestions and recommendations”. This is reflected in the language used in more 
recent Concluding Observations, which, Sepúlveda argues, further clarifies the normative content of 
the ICESCR and strengthens the CESCR’s interpretation of the content of a provision. Furthermore, the 
CESCR’s Concluding Observations, and its interpretation of the content of the ICESCR contained 
therein, are widely accepted by States parties. Moreover, the CESCR’s Concluding Observations are 
also relevant considering that the CESCR is influenced by the contributions made by NGO’s when 
considering State parties’ reports. See M Sepúlveda The Nature of the Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) 37-40. 
249 The Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
article 79(ff). 
250 Article 79(ff) states that: 
“[R]egardless of the circumstances and without discrimination, competent authorities shall 
ensure that evicted perons or groups, especially those who are unable to provide for 
themselves, have safe and secure access to: 
1. essential food, potable water and sanitation; 
2. basic shelter and housing; 
3. appropriate clothing; 




Within the context of development-based evictions, which occurred in the case 
of Joe Slovo, the Basic Principles and Guidelines may also have been a valuable 
source to consider. This instrument applies a standard of “adequacy” to alternative 
land or housing and in this regard, the criteria that must be met includes accessibility, 
affordability, habitability, security of tenure, cultural adequacy, suitability of location, 
and access to essential services such as health and education.251 Furthermore, the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines may provide further assistance in that they confirm 
that the alternative housing provided to those who are subject to eviction should be 
located as close as possible to the original residence and source of livelihood.252 In 
addition, the instrument emphasises that the provision of just compensation, sufficient 
alternative accommodation or restitution when feasible, must take place immediately 
after the eviction and requires that the resettlement measures be completed before 
eviction takes place.253 It must also be noted that the undertaking of resettlement 
measures in accordance with the Basic Principles and Guidelines go beyond the 
provision of only land or sites.254 They also require the undertaking of measures that 
ensure that individuals, especially those that are unable to provide for themselves and 
are subject to eviction, have safe and secure access to minimum, substantive relief. 
This includes the provision of essential food, potable water and sanitation, basic 
                                                                                                                                      
4. essential medical services; 
5. livelihood sources; 
6. fodder for livestock and access to common property resources previously depended 
upon; and 
7. education for children and childcare facilities”. 
251 UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living’ (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/18 annex 1 para 16. The Basic Principles and 
Guidelines afford more detail to these elements in paragraph 55 and state that identified relocation sites 
must fulfill the criteria for adequate housing and include:  
“(a) security of tenure; (b) services, materials, facilities and infrastructure such as potable 
water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of 
food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services, and to natural and 
common resources, where appropriate; (c) affordable housing; (d) habitable housing providing 
inhabitants with adequate space, protection from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats 
to health, structural hazards and disease vectors, and ensuring the physical safety of 
occupants; (e) accessibility for disadvantaged groups; (f) access to employment options, 
health-care services, schools, childcare centers and other social facilities, whether in urban or 
rural areas; and (g) culturally appropriate housing. In order to ensure security of the home, 
adequate housing should also include the following essential elements: privacy and security; 
participation in decision-making; freedom from violence; and access to remedies for any 
violations suffered.” 
252 Para 43. 
253 Para 44 and para 52. 
254 Para 44. The Basic Principles and Guidelines state that:  
“All resettlement measures, such as construction of homes, provision of water, electricity, 
sanitation, schools, access roads and allocation of land and sites, must be consistent with the 
present guidelines and internationally recognized human rights principles …”. 




shelter and housing, appropriate clothing, essential medical services, livelihood 
sources, fodder for livestock, access to common property resources upon which 
individuals were formally dependent, and education for children as well as child care 
facilities. 255  States must ensure that extended families or communities are not 
separated from one another and that the equal participation of women in the 
distribution of basic services and supplies occurs.256 
Furthermore, the Basic Principles and Guidelines require the provision of 
medical care and access to psychological and social services. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the health and medical needs of women and children, the provision of on-
going medical treatment and the prevention of contagious and infectious diseases such 
as HIV/Aids.257 As can be seen, these standards elaborate on resettlement measures 
that are more specific than those developed by the Constitutional Court within the 
context of development-based evictions and may have assisted the Court in further 
developing the scope and content of alternative housing and resettlement measures in 
Joe Slovo. Reference to these standards may also add legitimacy and support to court 
orders that contain specific measures that have not necessarily been determined 
through the engagement process, but by the Court. 
Jurisprudence from the ECSR258 may also have assisted in the development of 
the scope and content of the State’s provision of alternative accommodation within 
the context of evictions and further informed the engagement process by delineating 
the State’s positive obligation in this regard. For example, in ERRC v Greece,259 the 
ERRC relied upon article 16 of the ESC260 as well as its Preamble,261 and claimed that 
                                                
255 Para 52. 
256 Para 52 and 53. 
257 Para 54. 
258 The ECSR is responsible for monitoring State compliance with the provisions of the European 
Social Charter, as well as with the 1988 Additional Protocol and the Revised European Social Charter.  
259 Complaint No. 15/2003 (Decision on the Merits, 8 December 2004). 
260 The European Social Charter (opened for signature 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 
1965) CETS NO. 35  (“ESC”). The ESC was signed by 13 members of the Council of Europe in Turin. 
See O De Schutter “The European Social Charter” in C Krause & M Scheinin (eds) International 
Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2012) 463-480. 
Article 16 of the ESC states the following: 
“With a view to ensuring the necessary conditions for the full development of the family, 
which is a fundamental unit of society, the Contracting Parties undertake to promote the 
economic, legal and social protection of family life by such means as social and family 
benefits, fiscal arrangements, provision of family housing, benefits for the newly married, and 
other appropriate means.” 
261 The Preamble to the ESC states the following: 
“… 




certain legislation had a discriminatory effect on the Roma in regards to housing.262 In 
its decision, the ECSR held that in order to satisfy article 16, States must promote the 
provision of an adequate supply of housing for families, take the needs of families 
into account in housing policies and ensure that existing housing be of an adequate 
standard.263 This must include essential services such as heating and electricity.264 
Furthermore, the ECSR defined the term “adequate housing”, holding that it was not 
confined to a dwelling of an adequate standard and with essential amenities, but also 
that a dwelling must be of a suitable size considering the composition of the family in 
residence.265 The obligation to promote and provide housing was also held to extend 
to security from unlawful eviction.266 In addition, the ECSR noted that principles of 
equality and non-discrimination form an integral part of article 16.267 
In ERRC v Italy268 an allegation was made by the ERRC on behalf of the 
Roma that their rights to housing entrenched in article 31 of the Revised Social 
Charter had been violated.269 It was alleged that there was a shortage of camping sites 
as well as inadequate living conditions within camping sites. Furthermore, the Roma 
were subjected to forced evictions and lacked access to any other form of 
accommodation outside of camping sites. 270  In addition, it was alleged that 
segregationist policies and practices had resulted in racial discrimination that violated 
section 31 on its own or alternatively, section 31 read together with Article E271 of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Considering that the enjoyment of social rights should be secured without discrimination on 
grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin 
…”. 
262 Ministerial Decision No A5/696/25.4.83 Official Gazette 243/B/11/5/83 “Sanitary Provision for the 
Organized Relocation of Itinerant Persons (Nomadic Travellers)” and the Joint Ministerial Decision No 
23 641/3.7.2003 Official Gazette 973/B/15-07-2003 Amendment of the A5/696/25.4.83 “Sanitary 
Provision for the Organized Settlement of Itinerant Persons”. 
263 ERRC v Greece Complaint no. 15/2003 (Decision on the Merits, 8 December 2004) para 24. 
264 Para 24. 
265 Para 24. 
266 Para 24. 
267 Para 26. 
268 Complaint no 27/2004 (Decision on the Merits, 7 December 2005). 
269 Article 31 states the following: 
“With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake to 
take measures designed: 
  1 to promote access to housing of an adequate standard; 
  2 to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination; 
3 to make the price of housing accessible to those without adequate resources.” 
270 ERRC v Italy Complaint no 27/2004 (Decision on the Merits, 7 December 2005) para 5. 
271 Article E of the Revised Social Charter states the following: 
“The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status.” 




Revised Social Charter.272 In terms of the alleged inefficiency and inadequacy of the 
camping sites, the ECSR held that access to adequate housing as guaranteed by article 
31(1) of the Revised Social Charter means a dwelling that is structurally secure, and 
safe in terms of sanitation and health.273 The ECSR also stated that adequate housing 
should possess all basic amenities, such as water, heating, waste disposal, sanitation 
facilities, electricity, not result in overcrowding, and ensure legally protected security 
of tenure.274 Furthermore, the ECSR held that the temporary supply of shelter could 
not be considered as adequate and individuals should be provided with housing within 
a reasonable period.275 Furthermore, in terms of forced evictions and other sanctions, 
the ECSR stated that States parties were required to ensure that alternative 
accommodation is made available in instances of forced evictions and other 
sanctions.276 In addition, the ECSR held that in terms of the right to adequate housing, 
Italy had violated the ESC as a result of its failure to take into account the specific 
circumstances of the Roma or to take measures that were specifically aimed at 
improving the housing conditions of the Roma, which included possibly providing 
effective access to social housing.277   
These decisions may have assisted the Constitutional Court in determining the 
scope and content of the right to have access to adequate housing as they engage with 
the content of “adequate” housing on a case-by-case basis and identify positive 
obligations that the State should fulfil. In addition, these cases highlight certain 
criteria that must be met before both temporary alternative accommodation and longer 
term housing programmes meet the standard of “adequate” housing. The criteria set 
by the ECSR are broad enough to allow the State to fulfil these in a manner it deems 
fit and with regard to specific national circumstances and needs. In essence, the 
jurisprudence of the ECSR is valuable as it illustrates the willingness of the ECSR to 
set criteria pertaining to the substantive dimensions of the right to housing, while 
respecting the discretion of States parties in selecting the precise means of fulfilling 
these.278 
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278 Para 44 and para 55. 




Jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights279 and in 
particular, the concept of the “life project”, 280  may also have assisted the 
Constitutional Court in developing the substantive scope and content of alternative 
accommodation. For example, in Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay281 the 
IACtHR reaffirmed its understanding of article 4(1)282 namely that:  
 
“Essentially, this right includes not only the right of every human being not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life, but also the right that conditions that impede or 
obstruct access to a decent existence should not be generated.”283  
 
Furthermore, the IACtHR stated that within the context of the right to life, the 
State has an obligation to generate minimum living conditions that are compatible 
with human dignity. In addition, the IACtHR held that the State “has the duty to take 
positive, concrete measures geared toward fulfilment of the right to a decent life”. The 
                                                
279 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) came into being in 1979 and is responsible 
for applying and interpreting the AmCHR. See the Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev. 1 at 133 (1992). The IACtHR has both an adjudicatory and 
advisory function. The IACtHR’s adjudicative, or contentious, jurisdiction is established by way of 
article 61, article 62 and article 63 of the AmCHR, while article 64 of the AmCHR governs the 
IACtHR’s advisory function. As of December 2013, the States parties to the AmCHR that have 
recognised the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR include: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
280 The IACtHR recognises basic rights such as the right to health, adequate housing, sanitation, food, 
and education under the right to life and in particular, the right to a “life project”. The concept of the 
“life project” is rooted in the right to life, entrenched in article 4 of the AmCHR and the right to 
personal integrity, which is entrenched in article 5 of the AmCHR. The IACtHR first gave recognition 
to the concept of the “life project” in the Loayza Tamayo Case. See Loayza Tamayo Case,  
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser C) No 42 (27 November 1998). Thereafter, the concept 
was relied upon within the context of the right to life and special measures protecting children under 
articles 14 and 19 of the AmCHR. This was illustrated in cases such as Case of the “Street Children” 
(Villagran Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R (Ser C) No 63 (19 November 
1999) in which the IACtHR emphasised that the right to life includes having access to those conditions 
that are necessary for a dignified existence. The concept was also relied upon in Juridical Condition 
and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R (Ser. A) No 17 (28 
August 2002), as well as in the Case of Children’s Rehabilitation v Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R (Ser C) No 112 (2 September 2004). In the case of Yakye-Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, 
Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R (Ser C) No 125 (17 June 2005), the court explicitly extended the concept 
of the right to life beyond custodial situations, and held that the failure by the State to take appropriate 
and positive measures to address those conditions necessary for a community to live a dignified life, 
constituted a violation under article 4 of the AmCHR. See T Melish “The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging 
Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 372 388-391. 
281 Yakye-Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R (Ser C) No 125 (17 
June 2005) (“Yakye Axa case”). The Yakye Axe are an indigenous community that form part of the 
Southern Lengua Enxet people. 
282 Article 4(1) of the AmCHR states the following: 
“Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, 
in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”  
283 Yakye-Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R (Ser C) No 125 (17 
June 2005) para 161. 




IACtHR emphasised that alleged victims that are vulnerable or at risk, became a 
higher priority for States.284 The IACtHR found that Paraguay violated article 4(1) 
together with article 1(1) of the AmCHR for failing to take measures to address 
conditions that affected the possibility of living a decent life.285 The decision of the 
IACtHR is particularly valuable for the interim measures that were granted. In this 
regard the IACtHR ordered the State to supply immediately, on a regular basis and for 
as long as the community was landless, sufficient drinking water for consumption and 
personal hygiene. In addition, the State was ordered to provide regular medical care, 
and appropriate medicine (including medicine and adequate treatment for the 
deworming of all community members), so as to protect the health of the community, 
particularly that of children, the elderly, and pregnant women. 286  Furthermore, 
sufficient food in quantity, variety and quality was to be provided to the extent that it 
would meet the minimum conditions of living a decent life.287 The State also had to 
supply latrines, or any other form of appropriate toilets, that would ensure the 
community’s effective and healthy management of biological waste. Lastly, the State 
was ordered to provide sufficient bilingual material.288 
This jurisprudence may be relevant as it provides evidence of an adjudicatory 
body that is willing to place positive obligations on the State to provide far-ranging 
immediate relief to those in desperate need. As illustrated, these obligations extended 
beyond the provision of only alternative or temporary accommodation, as an interim 
measure, while the affected individuals waited for access to land. Secondly, the case 
indicates that in its provision of interim relief, the IACtHR is willing to address the 
specific socio-economic needs of a destitute community in order to live a dignified 
life as it awaits access to its property. The Yakye Axa case is also valuable to the 
extent that it highlights the special gravity of the circumstances involving children 
                                                
284 Para 162. The IACtHR considered the State’s actions in light of the international protection afforded 
to indigenous communities. In addition, it considered article 4 of the AmCHR in combination with the 
general duty to respect rights entrenched in article 1(1) of the AmCHR. Furthermore, the IACtHR 
considered the duty of progressive development entrenched in article 26 of the AmCHR, as well as 
article 10 (right to health), article 11 (right to a healthy environment), article 12 (right to food), article 
13 (right to education), and article 14 (right to the benefits of culture) of the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights. The IACtHR also considered the provisions of ILO 
Convention No. 169. 
285 Yakye-Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R (Ser C) No 125 (17 
June 2005) para 176. 
286 Para 122. 
287 Para 122. 
288 Para 122. 




and the elderly.289 In this regard, the IACtHR indicates that the State has additional 
obligations regarding the right to life of children and the elderly and special measures 
must be taken in this regard.290 
 
5 2 1 3 (e) Conclusion 
The analysis above illustrates that there are a range of international and regional 
standards that contain strong substantive dimensions that can support and further 
enhance the Constitutional Court’s development of the concept of alternative 
accommodation. In addition, international and regional standards also recognise and 
protect the opportunity for participatory engagement within the context of evictions, 
which can provide valuable guidance to the Court in its development of the concept of 
meaningful engagement. Many of these standards were referred to the Court in 
amicus curiae briefs, particularly in Joe Slovo and the Court’s failure to engage with 
these standards strongly suggests that the obligation entrenched in section 39(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution is resorted to sporadically, and without a systematic 
methodology for considering relevant international law sources.  
 
5 2 2 Health care  
In Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal291 the appellant was denied 
life-prolonging renal dialysis by a State-funded hospital after failing to meet the 
prescribed admission criteria that determined the hospital’s use of dialysis 
resources.292 Before the Constitutional Court, the appellant requested that the hospital 
be ordered to provide him with renal dialysis at the State’s expense based on his 
constitutionally protected right to life293 and the right not to be refused emergency 
medical treatment.294 
                                                
289 Para 172-175. 
290 Para 172 and 175. The IACtHR stated that it has additional obligations to foster the measures of 
protection entrenched in article 19 of the AmCHR. 
291 1998 1 SA 765 (CC).  
292 Upon dismissal of his application before the High Court, the applicant obtained leave to appeal to 
the Constitutional Court. For a detailed description of the facts of this case see C Scott & P Alston 
“Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s 
Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 233-234. 
293 Section 11 of the 1996 Constitution states that: “Everyone has the right to life”. 
294 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 7. Section 27(3) of the 
1996 Constitution states that: “[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment”.  




 In his decision, Chaskalson P acknowledged that sections 26 and 27 of the 
1996 Constitution impose obligations on the State, but held that these obligations 
depend on the availability of resources and that insufficient resources limit these 
corresponding rights.295 Chaskalson P concluded that an unqualified obligation to 
fulfil these needs would not be possible in the present case due to a lack of resources 
and that this provided the context within which section 27(3) of the 1996 Constitution 
was to be understood.296  
Furthermore, the Court addressed counsel’s arguments that section 27(3) of 
the 1996 Constitution should be construed consistently with the right to life protected 
in section 11 of the 1996 Constitution, so that individuals unable to pay for life-saving 
treatment are entitled to receive such treatment at a State hospital free of charge.297 In 
this regard, Chaskalson P considered jurisprudence from the Indian Supreme Court, in 
which positive obligations were imposed on the State to address the basic needs of the 
society through the right to life.298 The Court emphasised that, unlike the Indian 
Constitution, the South African Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that expressly 
imposes specific positive obligations on the State through its various provisions.299 
Furthermore, South African courts have a duty to apply the obligations entrenched in 
the Constitution and not draw inferences that would be inconsistent with these 
obligations.300  
The Court proceeded to dismiss counsel’s argument as being inappropriately 
based upon the right to life as the 1996 Constitution expressly provides for the right to 
have access to health care services in section 27.301 In its interpretation of section 
                                                
295 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 11. 
296 Para 11. 
297 Para 14. 
298 Para 15. 
299 Para 15. 
300 Para 15. At this juncture, it is not clear whether Counsel presented the Court with foreign law 
namely, jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of India, or whether the Court itself chose to rely upon 
it. However, international human rights law could just as easily have been used to exemplify an 
interpretation of the right to life that imposes positive obligations with socio-economic dimensions. For 
example, the HRC’s General Comment 6. See UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment 6’ in 
‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I). It may have been more 
relevant to justify its reluctance to rely upon the right to life in this case in light of the HRC’s General 
Comment 6, considering that it is an interpretation of an international treaty that South Africa has 
signed and ratified. Furthermore, the HRC’s General Comments are regarded as authoritive 
interpretations of the ICCPR. In this regard see M Pieterse “Cases and Comments: A Different Shade 
of Red: Socio-Economic Dimensions of the Right to Life in South Africa” (1999) 15 SAJHR 372-385. 
301 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 19. The Court’s 
approach to the applicability of the right to life in this case has been critised. Ngwena and Cook argue 




27(3), the Court explained that affording this provision with a broader scope would 
have negative consequences. Firstly, the State would have more difficulty in fulfilling 
its primary obligations under section 27(1) and (2) of the 1996 Constitution to 
“provide health care services to ‘everyone’ within its available resources.”302 In 
addition, the Court stated that such an interpretation would lead to prioritisation of 
treatment for terminal illnesses over other medical care, thereby reducing the State’s 
available resources for medical care such as preventative health care and the medical 
treatment of illnesses or bodily infirmities that are not life threatening.303  
Furthermore, the Court held that “emergency medical treatment” possibly 
includes the ongoing treatment of chronic illnesses so as to prolong life.304 However, 
it found that this was not the ordinary meaning of the phrase and if section 27(3) of 
the 1996 Constitution was to include such a broad construction, this should have been 
expressed more clearly, and in more positive terms.305 In addition, the Court confined 
the application of section 27(3) of the 1996 Constitution to emergency situations, such 
as sudden catastrophes or unexpected trauma, which necessitates immediate medical 
treatment.306 As section 27(3) of the 1996 Constitution is couched in negative terms, 
the Court interpreted this right as imposing a negative duty only on the State, stating 
that “[w]hat [section 27(3)] requires is that remedial treatment that is necessary and 
available be given immediately to avert that harm.”307 This limited assessment of the 
                                                                                                                                      
that by following this approach, the Court labeled the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights as 
“atomistic elements” and not as interconnected provisions. Furthermore, these authors argue that the 
Court followed a legalistic approach to the interpretation of section 27(3) of the 1996 Constitution, as 
opposed to a purposive or contextual approach, in the interpretation of rights. See C Ngwena & R Cook 
“Rights concerning Health” in D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
(2005) 107 136. See also Pieterse (1999) SAJHR 372-385 in which Pieterse argues that the right to life 
entrenched in section 11 of the 1996 Constitution can be used to strengthen the protection of the socio-
economic rights contained in the 1996 Constitution as well as widen their scope and ambit. If the 
Constitutional Court followed such an approach, international human rights law may have assisted in 
providing various interpretations of the right to life that indicate a positive duty to address certain 
socio-economic conditions, such as that found in the HRC’s General Comment 6, paragraph 5. Scott & 
Alston (2000) SAJHR 245. Drawing from the work of Judith Jarvis Thompson, Moellendorf supports 
the Court’s finding, and concludes that it is only when the right to life expressly includes the right to 
life sustaining medical care, that it should be interpreted to mean more than just imposing a duty of 
non-interference upon the State. D Moellendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the 
Future of Socio-Economic Rights Claims” (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 328. 
302 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 19. 
303 Para 19. 
304 Para 13. 
305 Para 13. 
306 Para 20. Sachs J did add to this meaning in his concurring judgment by stating that section 27(3) of 
the 1996 Constitution reassures the public of the availability of accident and emergency departments to 
assist with unforeseeable catastrophes. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 
765 (CC) para 51. 
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scope of section 27(3) of the 1996 Constitution has been criticised.308 As the applicant 
suffered from a chronic, incurable condition, the Court found that section 27(3) of the 
1996 Constitution was not applicable and held instead that sections 27(1) and (2) of 
the 1996 Constitution were more appropriate to consider.309  
Lastly, in its consideration of section 27(1) and section 27(2) of the 1996 
Constitution, the Court held that due to the scarcity of resources in this situation, the 
State had not violated its obligations under section 27. This approach, however, has 
been challenged as implying that the availability of resources would both define and 
limit the right entrenched in section 27(1)(a), which in effect also results in a failure 
to engage with the content and scope of section 27 of the 1996 Constitution.310  
Liebenberg argues that the Court’s analysis of the right in Soobramoney does 
not conform to the two-stage enquiry associated with the limitation clause entrenched 
in section 36311 of the 1996 Constitution. Under this section, the two-stage analysis 
consists of firstly, identifying the content and scope of a right and determining 
whether any violation of such right has taken place. The second stage provides the 
State with an opportunity to justify why such law or conduct constitutes a reasonable 
limitation. Liebenberg argues that Soobramoney therefore illustrates a conflation of 
these two stages, resulting in an unbalanced analysis that directs more attention to the 
States’ justification for the limitation imposed namely, budget constraints, while 
neglecting any sufficient enquiry into the values and purposes of section 27(1)(a).312 
Furthermore, by avoiding a substantive engagement with the content of the 
right, the Court also obstructs the application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution, as a broader analysis and more substantive engagement with its content 
does not takes place. The neglect of such an enquiry is evident in the decision of 
Soobramoney. While it has been argued that the outcome of the case is correct, the 
judicial reasoning employed by the Court in arriving at its decision has been 
criticised. In particular, Ngwena and Cook submit that the Court did not make use of 
available international human rights instruments and jurisprudence to give content to 
the right to health or the right of access to health care.313 Kapindu goes so far as to 
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310 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 139. 
311 See footnote 78 of this chapter.  
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argue that the Court’s failure to consider international law in this decision should 
render it as one made per incuriam and that the ratio decidendi of this decision has 
resulted in a weakening of its precedential value.314  
While it is not suggested that international human rights law would have led 
the Court to a different outcome, references to relevant international law on the right 
to health may have assisted the Court in developing the normative content of the right 
of access to health care services in section 27(1)(a). In particular, these sources may 
have provided some guidance into key elements of the right that the Court could have 
elaborated on further. At the time of the judgment, various instruments protected the 
right to health.315 Although these instruments do not elaborate on the normative 
content of the right to health, they do indicate certain aspects of the right that have 
been prioritised. In addition, the Declaration of Alma-Ata defines the main 
characteristics of primary health care. 316  This may have assisted the Court in 
identifying some of the States’ primary obligations in respect of section 27(1)(a). This 
would have strengthened the Court’s decision by providing a more reasoned 
justification explaining why the appellant’s condition did not fall within the scope of 
section 27(1)(a). Lastly, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights emphasise that economic, social and cultural rights impose 
                                                                                                                                      
Furthermore, the authors highlighted the obligations placed on courts in terms of section 39(1)(b) and 
section 233 of the 1996 Constitution. 
314 Kapindu From Global to Local 40. 
315 At the time of the judgment, the following international human rights instruments protected the right 
to health: article 25(1) and (2) of the UDHR, article 12(1) of the ICESCR, article 16 of the AfCHPR, 
article 10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, article 24(1) of the 
CRC, article 5(e) of the CERD, article 12(1) and 12(2) of the CEDAW, and lastly, paragraph 9 of the 
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR ‘Substantive 
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (2000) UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 (“Maastricht Guidelines”)). The Maastricht Guidelines were 
compiled by more than thirty experts with the purpose of elaborating on the Limburg Principles and in 
particular, on the nature and scope of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. The Maastricht 
Guidelines also focus on appropriate responses and remedies. This meeting took place in Maastricht, 
the Netherlands, from 22-26 January 1997 under the auspices of the International Commission of 
Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty 
of Law of Maastricht University. This is not a legally binding instrument but is an important source of 
guidance in respect of States’ parties obligations under the ICESCR.   
316 WHO, Alma-Ata Declaration: Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care (6-12 
September 1978) WHO Health for All Series No. 1 1978, paragraph VI-VII. Paragraph VII(3) states 
that primary health care 
“includes at least: education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of 
preventing and controlling them, promotion of food supply and proper nutrition; an adequate 
supply of safe water and basic sanitation; maternal and child health care, including family 
planning; immunization against the major infectious diseases; prevention and control of 
locally endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and 
provision of essential drugs.” 




obligations on States to respect, protect and fulfil these rights. This instrument may 
have assisted the Court in identifying the positive and negative duties enshrined in the 
right to have access to health care services in the 1996 Constitution. This would have 
highlighted the various normative dimensions of the right and indicated that the right 
is not only defined by financial constraints. 
In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign,317 the Constitutional 
Court considered whether the Government’s limited distribution of Nevirapine318 to a 
limited number of research sites only, violated section 28(1)(c),319 as well as section 
27(1)(a) read with section 27(2),320 of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, the Court 
had to decide whether the abovementioned rights obliged the Government to create 
and implement an “effective, comprehensive, and progressive programme” focusing 
on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV throughout the country.321 
In this case, the amici advanced a number of key arguments based upon international 
human rights law.322 Relying on the concept of the minimum core developed in the 
CESCR’s General Comment 3, paragraph 10, the amici contended that section 27(1) 
of the 1996 Constitution established an individual right that contained a minimum 
core to which every person was entitled.323 In support of this argument, the amici 
argued that the language of the Constitution supported this contention. Furthermore, 
the amici interpreted section 26 and section 27 as placing two obligations upon the 
State. Firstly, self-standing rights could be identified in sections 26(1) and 27(1) of 
the Constitution to which everyone is entitled and which the State must “respect, 
                                                
317 (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) (“TAC”). 
318 Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug that significantly reduces the likelihood of mother-to-child 
transmissions of HIV at birth. 
319 Section 28(1) states that:   
 “Every child has the right - 
    … 
to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.” 
320 Section 27 states that:  
  “(1) Everyone has the right to have access to - 
  (a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
  … 
      (2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available  
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.” 
321 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 5.  
322 The amici curiae consisted of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the 
Community Law Center (CLC). The heads of argument submitted on behalf of the amici curiae can be 
found at ESCR-NET “Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC)” 
(date unknown) ESCR-NET <http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/403050> (accessed 30 October 2014). 
323 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 26. This differed 
from the amici arguments in Grootboom, to the extent that they argued that section 26(1), together with  
section 26(2) of the 1996 Constitution, contained a minimum core obligation. 




protect, promote and fulfil” in accordance with section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
Secondly, section 26(2) and section 27(2) create an obligation upon the State that is 
limited to achieving these rights progressively, by way of “reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within available resources”.324 This implied that the content of the 
right differed from the content of the obligation.325  
The Court relied on a statement initially made in Soobramoney, and later 
reiterated in Grootboom, in which it held that section 26(1) and 26(2) are “related and 
must be read together”.326 Drawing from these cases, the Court reasoned that in 
respect of the right to have access to housing, health care, food, water and social 
security for those who are unable to sustain themselves and their dependants, there 
was no obligation upon the State to go beyond its available resources or to realise 
these rights immediately. 
The Court proceeded to address the relevance of the provisions of the ICESCR 
and in this regard, referred to the Grootboom judgment.327 The Court relied on 
Yacoob J’s dicta in Grootboom and its treatment of the concept of the minimum core 
as being possibly relevant to the determination of reasonableness in section 26(2), but 
not as a self-standing right in terms of section 26(1) of the 1996 Constitution.328 The 
Court held that all that could be possible and expected of the State was “that it act 
reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights identified in sections 26 
and 27 on a progressive basis.”329 The Court added that it was institutionally ill 
equipped to make the necessary enquiries needed to determine the minimum core 
standards requested by the amici. Furthermore, the Court held that it was ill equipped 
to make decisions concerning the most effective manner of spending public 
revenues.330  
Ultimately, the Court found that the Government’s policy denied mothers and 
their new born children from acquiring Nevirapine at public hospitals and clinics that 
fell outside research and training sites. To this extent, the Court held that the 
Government’s policy was inconsistent with the State’s obligations under section 27(2) 
                                                
324 Para 29. The amici compared the structure of section 26 and section 27 of the 1996 Constitution 
with sections 9(2), 24(b), 25(5), and 25(8) of the 1996 Constitution that illustrated that rights and 
corresponding duties were not stated separately. 
325 Para 29. 
326 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34.  
327 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) Para 33-34. 
328 Para 34. 
329 Para 35. 
330 Para 37. 




read together with section 27(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution.331 In addition, the Court 
held that, by implication, it would also have been unreasonable for the State to delay 
making a decision on the use of Nevirapine outside the confines of research and 
training sites.332  
The Court declared that the Government was obliged to devise and implement 
a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise the rights of pregnant women 
and their new born children to have access to health care services, and that these must 
contain reasonable measures pertaining to counselling and testing.333 Furthermore, the 
Court granted mandatory orders pertaining to the availability and use of Nevirapine, 
when medically indicated, at public hospitals and clinics that fell outside the research 
and training sites.334 In addition, the Court made an order concerning the training of 
counsellors at public hospitals and clinics outside of the research and training sites as 
well as an order extending testing and counselling facilities throughout the public 
health sector to advance the use of Nevirapine.335 The Court did consider international 
human rights law in this case. However, this was limited to a consideration of the 
CESCR’s General Comment 3, which deals exclusively with the obligations of States 
parties to the ICESCR.  
The Court has been criticised for its failure to define or elaborate on the scope 
and content of section 27 of the 1996 Constitution (as well as its failure to elaborate 
on the scope and content of section 28).336 Bilchitz, for example, argues that the Court 
does not explain what the right to health-care actually entails.337 He maintains that 
any enquiry into the reasonableness of the measures adopted by the State necessitates 
that the content of the right be determined so as to conclude that everyone is entitled 
to receive Nevirapine by way of section 27(1)(a).338 In this regard, references to 
international law may have proved useful to the Court. Furthermore, Bilchitz criticises 
the Court for its focus on the State’s negative obligations, as opposed to focusing on 
                                                
331 Para 80. 
332 Para 81. 
333 Para 135 (2)(a) and (b). 
334 Para 135(3)(a). 
335 Para 135(c) and (d). Government was permitted to adapt its policy in the event that equal or better 
methods of the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV became available. This was subject 
to the condition that the policy remained consistent with the 1996 Constitution. 
336 Kapindu From the Global to the Local 41.  
337 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights 156-157. 
338 156-157. 




the positive obligations that rest upon the State.339 Kapindu argues that section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution required that the Court at least consider General 
Comment 14340 in the process of elaborating on the scope of section 27 of the 1996 
Constitution.341  
  General Comment 14 focuses specifically on article 12342 of the ICESCR and 
elaborates very broadly on the highest attainable standard of health. The General 
Comment lists those elements that the CESCR believes to be “core obligations”. 
These include: the provision of health facilities, goods and services in a non-
discriminatory manner; access to minimum essential food and ensuring freedom from 
hunger for everyone; ensuring access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation and an 
adequate supply of safe and potable water; the provision of essential drugs (as 
identified under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs); and ensuring the 
equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services.343 Furthermore, it 
requires the adoption and implementation of a national public health strategy and plan 
of action that would address the health concerns of the entire population.344 The 
General Comment also lists obligations regarded as “of comparable priority” that 
include the obligation to ensure reproductive, maternal and child health care, the 
provision of immunisation against major infectious diseases, and taking measures that 
will prevent, treat and control certain diseases.345 These obligations include providing 
education and access to information concerning major health problems as well as the 
                                                
339 158. 
340 CESCR, ‘General Comment 14’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (“General Comment 14”). 
341 Kapindu From the Global to the Local 41.  
342 Article 12 of the ICESCR states the following:	  
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
 enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child; 
  (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness.” 
343 General Comment 14, paragraph 43(a)-(e). 
344 Para 43(f). 
345 Para 44(a)-(c). 




provision of training for health personnel on aspects such as health and human 
rights.346 
  Langford and King note that the CESCR’s General Comments can be 
ambitious and state that CESCR’s General Comment 14 in particular is burdened with 
detail that may cause States to be overwhelmed at the request to satisfy all that is 
required.347 Furthermore, apart from the hefty list of obligations created in paragraph 
44 titled “core obligations”, the additional list of “obligations of comparable priority” 
makes it unclear as to how these obligations should be prioritised against the “core 
obligations”, as reference is made to the non-derogability of “core obligations”.348 
Furthermore, General Comment 14 states that the adoption of retrogressive measures 
that conflict with the “core obligations” amounts to a violation of the right to 
health.349 This may imply that a hierarchy exists between the two sets of obligations 
outlined in paragraphs 43 and 44. Furthermore, the “core obligations” entrenched in 
General Comment 14 require States parties to ensure access to other elements such as 
minimum essential food, basic shelter, housing, sanitation and the adequate supply of 
safe and potable water.350 In this regard, Pieterse argues that it may not be suitable to 
adopt the CESCR’s General Comment 14 when interpreting section 27(1)(a) of the 
1996 Constitution. Pieterse states that the broader right to health is protected by a 
variety of constitutional provisions which include section 27(1)(a), section 12(2), 
section 24(a), section 26, section 27(1)(b) and (c), section 27(3) and section 28(1)(c). 
Therefore, he submits that the adoption of a minimum core approach that contains a 
core that touches the broader underlying determinants of the right to health may 
unduly extend the ambit of section 27(1)(a).351 
However, I am not suggesting that the Constitutional Court adopt the 
CESCR’s General Comment 14 wholesale. Rather, I submit that aspects of the 
General Comment may assist in identifying the content and scope of the right to have 
access to health care, and in this way, may have supported the judicial reasoning of 
                                                
346 Para 44(e). 
347 M Langford & JA King “Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Past, Present and 
Future” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008) 477 481.  
348 General Comment 14, paragraph 47. 
349 Para 48. 
350 Para 43(b) and (c). 
351 M Pieterse “Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care 
Services” (2006) 22 SAJHR 473 491. 




the Court in TAC.352 Furthermore, as will be elaborated on below, certain aspects of 
the General Comment do contribute to its relevance as an interpretative tool. Firstly, 
the drafters of General Comment 14 have recognised the relevance of other 
international instruments namely, the Alma-Ata Declaration353 and used it to assist 
them in identifying these “core obligations”.354 Thus, the “core obligations” were not 
created in isolation from other international human rights developments. Secondly, 
the General Comment is based upon several years of experience that the CESCR has 
gained in its examination of various States parties’ reports.355 This goes a long way in 
maintaining the relevance of the CESCR’s General Comment 14 as a means of 
assisting in defining the scope and content of the right to have access to health care in 
South Africa.   
Furthermore, the IACtHR356 and the AfCommHPR357 have relied upon the 
CESCR’s General Comment 14 in their jurisprudence. General Comment 14 has also 
been used in national jurisdictions, as illustrated in the Kenyan case of PAO and Two 
                                                
352 Certain core obligations contained in both paragraphs 43 and 44 are of relevance to TAC. The 
obligations relevant to the case include those in paragraph 43(a), namely: “To ensure the right of access 
to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for marginalised 
groups”. In addition, the obligations in paragraph 43(d) are relevant namely, “To provide essential 
drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs”. This is of 
particular relevance considering that Nevirapine was on the WHO Model List of Essential Drugs in 
April 2002. Other relevant obligations include those in paragraph 43(e) namely, “To ensure equitable 
distribution of all health facilities, goods and services.” Furthermore, the obligations in paragraph 43(f) 
are relevant, namely:  
“To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of 
epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of the whole population; the 
strategy and plan of action shall be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a 
participatory and transparent process; they shall include methods, such as the right to health 
indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which 
the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular 
attention to all vulnerable or marginalized groups.” 
The obligations “of comparable priority” are also relevant to TAC, namely: (a) “To ensure 
reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post natal) and child health care”; and (c) “To take 
measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases”. The applicants could have 
relied upon these obligations to substantiate their request that the State satisfy certain obligations. 
Furthermore, the Court could have considered these obligations in support of their judgment by way of 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. 
353 WHO, Alma-Ata Declaration: Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care (6-12 
September 1978) WHO Health for All Series No. 1 1978.  
354 See General Comment 14, paragraph 43. 
355 Para 6.  
356 See Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.HR (Ser C) No 25 (17 
June 2005). 
357 In Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Another v Sudan (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009), the 
AfCommHPR relied upon the CESCR’s General Comment 14 in which the CESCR stated that the 
right to health “extends not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying 
determinants of health ...”. 




Others v Attorney General.358 This adds further weight to the relevance of General 
Comment 14 as a source of interpretative guidance. In conclusion, international 
standards on the right to health may assist the Court in constructing a stronger 
normative framework for section 27 of the 1996 Constitution. 
  
5 2 3 Social security 
In Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development359 certain provisions of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 were 
challenged as being inconsistent with section 27(1)(c)360 of the 1996 Constitution as 
they resulted in the exclusion of social assistance on the basis that the applicants were 
permanent residents, and not South African citizens.361 The Court held that the 
exclusion of permanent residents infringed upon section 27 of the 1996 
Constitution,362 and also constituted unfair discrimination in terms of section 9(3) of 
the 1996 Constitution. Although the Court’s decision favours the applicants, its 
judicial reasoning is disappointing in terms of its obligation created under section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution to at least consider international law when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. In the Court’s consideration of the purpose of 
providing access to social security to those in need, the Court noted the argument 
made by Mr Madonsela, the Director-General of the Department of Social 
Development. In highlighting the aims of the challenged legislation, he stated the 
following: 
 
                                                
358 [2012] eKLR. Under Article 2 of the Kenyan Constitution, the court is bound to have regard to 
international treaties. In this case, the court considered General Comment 14 with article 12(1) and (2) 
of the ICESCR, CEDAW, and article 24(1) of the CRC to determine the State’s positive obligations in 
respect of the right to health. This consideration contributed to the finding that legislation that renders 
the cost of essential drugs unaffordable to citizens is in violation of the State’s constitutional 
obligations. PAO and Two Others v Attorney General [2012] eKLR para 66. 
359 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). 
360 Section 27(1)(c) states that:   
 “(1) Everyone has the right to have access to- 
  … 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.” (Emphasis added). 
361 For an analysis of the decision, see Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 158-161. 
362 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 
505 (CC) para 85. 




“[T]he legislation is part of the government’s strategy to combat poverty…[and] that 
the legislation is directed at realizing the relevant objectives of the Constitution and 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme, and giving effect to South Africa’s 
international obligations.”363   
 
This is unfortunately the only reference made to international law throughout the 
entire decision. It was not clear which international obligations the Director-General 
was referring to, nor was any reference made to other relevant international human 
rights instruments that may have offered interpretative guidance.  
The Court could have engaged with international treaties that afford protection 
to social security rights, and which have been signed and ratified by South Africa, for 
interpretative guidance. Relevant treaties include the CRC, which affords protection 
to the social security rights of children.364 This convention has also been interpreted to 
provide for a range of social security rights such as the right to health care necessary 
for survival and to a standard of living that satisfies the need for food, clothing, 
shelter and education.365 The CERD, ratified by South Africa in 1998, also contains 
provisions concerning the protection of social security rights.366 Although South 
Africa has not yet ratified the ICESCR, article 9 of the ICESCR may also have been 
relevant as an interpretative source, as this provision recognises the right of everyone 
to social security, including social insurance. At the time of hearing this case, the 
CESCR had not yet issued General Comment 19 in which the CESCR focuses on 
elaborating on the right to have social security.367 Until then, it had been submitted 
that the right to social security could be derived from articles 9 and 11(1) of the 
ICESCR. The latter provision recognises “[t]he right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family.” Van Rensburg and Lamarche argue that 
                                                
363 Para 51. 
364 Article 6(2) of the CRC states the following: “States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent 
possible the survival and development of the child.” 
Article 23 provides that every child has the right to benefit from social security, which shall include 
social insurance while the State must take all reasonable measures to achieve the full realisation of this 
right in terms of national law. South Africa signed the CRC on 29 January 1993 and ratified the 
instrument on 16 June 1995. 
365 L Jansen van Rensberg & M Olivier “International Standards” in MP Olivier, N Smit, ER Kalula 
and GCZ Mhone (eds) Introduction to Social Security  (2004) 163 166.  
366 Article 2(1)(c) and (d) as well as article 5(e). South Africa signed the CERD on 3 October 1994 and 
ratified the instrument on 10 December 1998. 
367 CESCR ‘General Comment 19’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc HRI/ 
GEN/1/Rev. 9 (Vol. I) (“General Comment 19”). 




article 10(1) and (2) of the ICESCR could also have been interpreted to refer to social 
security and assistance in certain cases.368 
Thus, references to international human rights instruments would have 
enriched and supported the Court’s reasoning. While section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution obliges the Court to only consider international human rights in the 
interpretation of rights, the Court is not precluded from drawing from the available 
international human rights standards in developing the substantive, normative content 
of the right to social security entrenched in section 27 of the 1996 Constitution. 
Furthermore, references to those international treaties to which South Africa is a party 
may have added further support to the Court’s reasoning and indicated the 
harmonious relationship between the Court’s jurisprudence and South Africa’s 
international treaty obligations.  
 
5 2 4 Water  
In Mazibuko, the Constitutional Court was presented with the first opportunity to 
interpret the right to have access to sufficient water, entrenched in section 27(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution.369 The case concerned firstly, the City’s Free Basic Water 
Policy and in particular, the City’s decision to supply six kilolitres of free water per 
month to every account holder. 370  Secondly, the Court had to determine the 
                                                
368 Jansen van Rensberg & Lamarche “The Right to Social Security and Assistance” in Socio-economic 
Rights 214. Article 10(1) states the following: 
“The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is 
responsible for the care and education of dependant children.”  
Article 10(2) states the following: 
“Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after 
childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave with adequate 
social security benefits.” 
369 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC). The applicants sought leave to appeal in part 
the order made by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Respondents did not oppose the application, but 
in the event that it was granted, they applied conditionally for leave to cross appeal. See the High Court 
judgment in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus 
curiae) 2008 4 All SA 471 (W) and the Supreme Court judgment in City of Johannesburg v Mazibuko 
2009 3 SA 592 (SCA). Section 27(1)(b) states the following: 
 1. “Everyone has the right to have access to 
  (a) … 
  (b) sufficient food and water; 
  (c) … ”. 
370 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 6. In accordance with section 9 of the 
Water services Act 108 of 1997, the Minister has published Regulation 3, which defines the minimum 
standard for basic water supply as “a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day 
or 6 kilolitres per household per month.” 




lawfulness of the City’s installation of pre-paid water meters in Phiri.371 On appeal 
before the Constitutional Court, the applicants raised four arguments contesting the 
constitutionality of the City’s Free Basic Water Policy,372 which the Court dealt with 
individually.  
The applicants submitted that the Court should determine a quantified amount 
of water as “sufficient water” within the meaning of section 27 of the 1996 
Constitution and that this amount was 50 litres per person per day.373 This request 
required that the Court consider the proper relationship between section 27(1)(b) and 
section 27(2) of the 1996 Constitution.374 In order to respond to this and determine the 
reasonableness of the City’s Free Basic Water Policy, the Court expounded on its role 
in the interpretation of socio-economic rights and in particular, the right to have 
access to sufficient water. In this regard, O’ Regan J found that section 27(1)(b) and 
section 27(2) of the 1996 Constitution did not require the State to provide everyone 
with sufficient water immediately upon demand. Rather, the Court held that the State 
is only required “to take reasonable legislative and other measures progressively to 
realise the achievement of the right of access to sufficient water, within available 
resources.”375  
                                                
371 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 6. The area of Phiri, Soweto, was chosen 
as the first area in which the new water system would be implemented. The area of Soweto was 
characterised by massive water losses, partly through leakages and, as many residents did not pay for 
water consumption, great financial losses were incurred. The respondents argued that Soweto had 
suffered far greater water losses than surrounding areas that were also supplied with water on a deemed 
consumption basis. The new policy replaced the previous system of deemed consumption flat rate 
charges, with a system that consisted of three levels of water provision. The residents of Phiri were 
afforded the choice between yard standpipes that supplied 6 kilolitres of water per month for free (level 
2) and a pre-paid water meter (level 3). 
372 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 44. 
373 Section 9 of the Water Services Act allows the Minister from time to time to prescribe “compulsory 
national standards” relating, among others, to the provision of water services and the “effective and 
sustainable use of water resources for water services”. The Minister has published a set of regulations 
in this regard and regulation 3 provides that:  
    “The minimum standard for basic water supply services is: 
(a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use; 
and 
(b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 
kilolitres per household per month  
(i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute; 
(ii) within 200 metres of a household; and 
(iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a 
supply for more than seven full days in any year.” 
This regulation defines the content of a “basic water supply” as contemplated in the Act. 
374 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 44. 
375 Para 50 and 57.  




The Court proceeded to interpret the applicant’s arguments as requiring it to 
determine a minimum core in terms of the right to have access to sufficient water, 
which the State must provide.376 In order to address this, the Court focused on the 
concept of the minimum core and in particular, referred to the CESCR’s General 
Comment 3, paragraph 10.377 In addition, the Court referred to Grootboom and TAC, 
highlighting their rejection of the argument that socio-economic rights entrenched in 
the 1996 Constitution contains a minimum core that courts must determine.378 The 
Court stated that for the same reasons, the applicant’s argument must fail and that 
these reasons are essentially two-fold.379 Firstly, the Court held that the right to have 
access to sufficient water does not place a positive obligation on the State to provide 
sufficient water immediately upon demand, as indicated by the concept of 
“progressive realisation” in section 27(2) of the 1996 Constitution.380 The Court also 
stated that to fix a quantified amount might be rigid, counter-productive and prevent a 
contextual analysis of the case.381  
Secondly, the Court emphasised that courts are institutionally and 
democratically ill suited to determine what constitutes “sufficient water” and the steps 
that should be taken by the State to achieve the progressive realisation of the right.382 
In addition, the Court noted that the positive obligations placed upon the State by 
section 27(2) of the 1996 Constitution require the State “to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right”.383 The Court stated that this obligation is applicable to most 
of the social rights protected in the Constitution and is also consistent with 
international law.384 In this regard, the Court referred to article 2(1) of the ICESCR as 
“a source of the conception of the progressive realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights” as well as to the CESCR’s General Comment 3, which also elaborates 
on the term “progressive realisation”.385 Lastly, the Court held that the duty of 
progressive realisation requires the State to continually revise and review policy to 
                                                
376 Para 52. Later, the Court stated that the applicant’s argument went beyond requesting a minimum 
core. See paragraph 56. 
377 Para 52. As will be discussed below, the Court’s first reference to international law occurs in the 
preliminary issues discussed in the case and is made within the context of the concept of “progressive 
realisation”. 
378 Para 53-54. 
379 Para 57. 
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381 Para 61. 
382 Para 61-62. 
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385 Para 40, footnote 31. 




ensure that the rights are achieved in a progressive manner.386 Thus, the Court found 
that the argument presented by the applicants namely, that the Court must set the 
content of the right entrenched in section 27(1)(b) to 50 litres per person per day, 
must fail.387  
The applicants also argued that the allocation of six kilolitres of water per 
household per month was unreasonable as per household allocation discriminated 
against larger households.388 In this regard, the Court agreed with the City’s claims 
that it would be too difficult to establish the amount of people living on a stand at any 
given time.389 The Court added that the continual movement of people throughout the 
City would place an enormous administrative burden upon the City to determine the 
amount of people on a stand at sufficiently regular intervals in order to provide a daily 
allowance for each person.390 Thus, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and 
found the City’s policy of allocating water per stand per month to be reasonable.391  
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the installation of prepaid water-meters 
by the State in households in Phiri breached the State’s negative duty to respect the 
right to access sufficient water.392 In this regard, the Court held that a new system of 
water supply that provides six kilolitres of free water every month, followed by the 
payment of a subsidised tariff for water supply thereafter, does not result in an 
infringement of the State’s negative duty to respect the right to have access to 
sufficient water.393 The Court held that this was the first time a free water allowance 
was provided to the residents as opposed to the previous system, which entailed the 
payment of a flat rate per month and which made no provision for a free water 
allowance.394 In sum, the Court held that neither the Free Basic Water Policy nor the 
introduction of pre-paid meters in Phiri constituted a breach of section 27 of the 1996 
Constitution.395 The following discussion will consider each of the Court’s findings 
and determine whether international human rights law may have contributed towards 
the Court’s decision. 
                                                
386 Para 67. 
387 Para 68. 
388 Para 84. 
389 Para 84. 
390 Para 84. 
391 Para 84. 
392 Para 135. 
393 Para 136. 
394 Para 136. 
395 Para 169. 





(a) The Court’s engagement with the content of the right to have access to adequate 
water 
The Court’s response to the amici’s argument indicates a misrepresentation of the 
applicant’s argument in the following ways. Firstly, the applicants’ argument has been 
misinterpreted by the Court as a request that a minimum core be determined in respect 
of the right to have access to sufficient water. The applicants had in fact argued that 
the Court should determine the content of section 27(1)(b) by quantifying an amount 
of water “sufficient for a dignified life”.396 Furthermore, the applicants requested the 
Court to declare that the content comprises 50 litres per person per day, and argued 
that the Court should determine whether the State had acted reasonably in its 
achievement of the progressive realisation of the right to have access to sufficient 
water.397 Based upon this misinterpretation, the Court responded by reverting to the 
rejection of the arguments that favoured the adoption of a minimum core in 
Grootboom and TAC. Had the Court recognised that the applicant’s request required 
an assessment of the content of the right to have access to water by way of the 
reasonableness standard, it may have engaged the content of the right more 
substantively.  
Wesson argues that the Court was not requested to declare a minimum 
essential level that had to be provided by the State, but rather that the Court was 
requested to “specify the content of the right in its entirety”.398 He states that the 
Court was correct in refusing to determine an exact content of the right to have access 
to sufficient water, and submits that it is doubtful whether the judiciary is the most 
appropriate institution to define a “sufficient” amount of water.399 However, he 
stresses that the content of socio-economic rights nevertheless raises justiciable 
issues.400   
Liebenberg argues that the Mazibuko decision illustrates the avoidance of a 
particular responsibility placed on courts to interpret normative standards that support 
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socio-economic rights.401 Furthermore, she argues that the judgment reflects the flaws 
of reasonableness review as the Court determined the case through the application of 
reasonableness in accordance with section 27(2) of the Constitution, as opposed to 
engaging with the right of access to sufficient water entrenched in section 27(1)(b).402 
The Court’s decision to avoid engaging with the content of section 27(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution consequently also narrows its opportunity to consider substantive 
dimensions of this right that are elaborated on in international human rights law. 
International human rights law may have been able to assist the Court with 
identifying aspects related to the right to have access to sufficient water that may be 
subject to adjudication. In particular, the CESCR has adopted General Comment 15, 
which elaborates on the CESCR’s interpretation of the right to water protected in the 
ICESCR and has given normative content to this right.403 The General Comment 
states that: “The elements of the right to water must be adequate for human dignity, 
life and health”.404 Furthermore, the CESCR acknowledges that such adequacy “may 
vary according to different conditions”, however, it states that certain factors apply in 
all cases namely, availability,405 quality406 and accessibility.407 Wesson highlights the 
valuable role to be played by the CESCR’s General Comment 15 and states that 
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courts should review both legislative and executive decisions concerning socio-
economic rights in light of the principles established in therein.408  
 
(b) The Court’s interpretation of progressive realisation 
The Court’s first reference to international law occurs in its consideration of 
progressive realisation in the preliminary issues, and particularly in its discussion of 
the nature of States’ obligations concerning social and economic rights.409 However, 
the Court does not engage with the full definition provided by the CESCR in General 
Comment 15 namely, that States parties “have a constant and continuing duty under 
the Covenant to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full 
realization of the right to water.”410 Furthermore, General Comment 15 states that 
while rights entrenched in the ICESCR must be realised progressively, the steps taken 
to realise the right should be “deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible 
towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.”411  Therefore, the 
Court’s assessment of the City’s Free Basic Water Policy may have been assisted by 
this definition of progressive realisation in determining the reasonableness of the 
State’s measures. Lastly, General Comment 15 prohibits States from taking 
deliberately retrogressive measures and places on State parties the burden of proving 
that the most careful consideration of all alternatives had taken place and that such 
measures are duly justified. A consideration of this prohibition may have urged the 
Court to request a higher standard of justification from the State in its decision to 
employ its water policy. 
Furthermore, the Court may have been assisted by the jurisprudence of 
regional human rights courts that have found that the steps taken by a State in its 
realisation of rights are insufficient. This is seen for example in the jurisprudence of 
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the ECSR. In International Association Autism-Europe v France, 412  the ECSR 
developed a test in which it scrutinises the progress made in respect of the realisation 
of rights entrenched in the ESC. In this regard, the ECSR stated that: 
 
“The Committee recalls, as stated in its decision relative to Complaint No.1/1998 
(International Commission of Jurist v. Portugal, § 32), that the implementation of the 
Charter requires the State Parties to take not merely legal action but also practical 
action to give full effect to the rights recognised in the Charter. When the 
achievement of one of the rights in question is exceptionally complex and particularly 
expensive to resolve, a State Party must take measures that allows it to achieve the 
objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and to 
an extent consistent with the maximum use of available resources. States Parties must 
be particularly mindful of the impact that their choices will have for groups with 
heightened vulnerabilities as well as for others persons affected including, especially, 
their families on whom falls the heaviest burden in the event of institutional 
shortcomings.”413 
 
This “sufficiency” test has been applied in subsequent jurisprudence within the 
context of housing rights. For example in ERRC v Bulgaria, the ECSR stated that the 
effective enjoyment of certain fundamental rights requires that the State undertake 
positive intervention.414 In this regard, the ECSR stated that “the state must take the 
legal and practical measures which are necessary and adequate to the goal of the 
effective protection of the right in question.”415 The ECSR acknowledged that States 
enjoy a margin of appreciation in terms of which they may choose the manner in 
which they ensure compliance with the Charter. However, the ECSR referred to the 
test developed in Autism-Europe v France, stating that the measures that have been 
taken must nonetheless comply with the three criteria namely, a reasonable 
timeframe, measurable progress, and financing consistent with the maximum use of 
available resources.416  
The AfCommHPR has also engaged with the concept of progressive 
realisation in its decision in SERAC.417 In this case, the AfCommHPR held that the 
duty to “fulfil all rights” was interpreted to mean “more of a positive expectation on 
the part of the State to move its machinery towards the actual realisation of the rights” 
and should include “the direct provision of basic needs such as food or resources that 
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can be used for food (direct food aid or social security).” 418 Furthermore, in Purohit 
and Moore v The Gambia419 the AfCommHPR stated that: 
 
“[The AfCommHPR] would like to read into article 16 the obligation on the part of 
the state party to the African Charter to take concrete and targeted steps, while taking 
full advantage of its available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully 
realised in all its aspects without discrimination of any kind.”420 
 
Thus, the AfCommHPR indicates that the progressive realisation of rights entrenched 
in the AfCHPR requires the taking of concrete, targeted steps towards such 
realisation.  
 
(c) The reasonableness of six kilolitres of water per household per month 
In its determination of the reasonableness of six kilolitres of water per household per 
day, the Court limited its consideration to the difficulties of establishing the amount 
of people on each stand. In doing so, it neglected to acknowledge that many 
households consist of, or are headed by, vulnerable groups. These include women or 
child headed households, the elderly, or the disabled for example, which may have 
different needs or which may be unable to afford more water once the six kilolitres 
have been used. South Africa is party to international human rights treaties that 
require the State to ensure access to water for particularly vulnerable groups.421 Thus, 
the Court should have investigated the State’s responsibilities in this regard and the 
necessity of identifying these groups, so as to ensure that they were not discriminated 
against merely for the sake of an enormous administrative burden.  
 
(d) The installation of pre-paid water meters 
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The installation of pre-paid water meters affects individuals’ direct access to water. 
The negative duty to respect the right to have access to water has been addressed in 
international human rights law. In particular, the CESCR’s General Comment 15 
places specific emphasis on the availability of water as a factor necessary for the 
adequate supply of water and underscores the requirement of continuous availability 
of a water supply for personal and domestic use.422 Furthermore, the CESCR’s 
General Comment 15 states that the obligation to respect requires that States parties 
do not directly or indirectly interfere with the enjoyment of the right to water. This 
includes refraining from “engaging in any practice or activity that denies or limits 
equal access to adequate water…”423 In addition to this, the Draft Guidelines for the 
Realization of the Right to Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation states that all levels 
of government should refrain:  
 
“[F]rom interfering with the enjoyment of the right to water and sanitation or any 
other human rights, unless such interference is permitted by law and includes 
appropriate procedural protection. No one whose access to water and sanitation may 
be legally curtailed after the appropriate procedures have been followed should be 
deprived of the minimum essential amount of water or of minimum access to basic 
sanitation services…”424 
 
In addition, the Draft Guidelines state that before a person’s access to water and 
sanitation services are reduced because of non-payment, the State should ensure that 
the person’s ability to pay is taken into account.425 These instruments challenge the 
State’s policy by requiring that access to sufficient water not be interfered with 
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lightly, despite the provision of a free water allowance. Consideration of these 
instruments may have assisted the Court in its judicial reasoning of the negative duty 
to respect the right to have access to water. 
The discussion above illustrates that international and regional human rights 
standards have engaged with many aspects that the Court adjudicated upon in this 
case. Many of these standards challenge the Court’s reasoning, and to this extent, an 
engagement with them would have indicated that the Court was at least evaluating its 
interpretative strategy against international norms and standards. The Court’s refusal 
to engage with these sources, especially within the context of giving scope and 
content to the right to have access to water, illustrates that the Constitutional Court 
has not come any closer in determining a role for international human rights law in its 
application of reasonableness review in a manner that can impact upon the substantive 
interpretation of socio-economic rights. 
 
5 2 5 Electricity and sanitation 
Evidence for the support of the provision of electricity as an independent, substantive 
right does exist at an international and regional level. In particular, the CESCR’s 
General Comment 4, which elaborates on the right to adequate housing as protected in 
article 11(1) of the ICESCR, states that adequate housing includes “the availability of 
services, materials, facilities and infrastructure.”426 This has been interpreted by the 
CESCR to include “sustainable access to…energy for cooking, heating and lighting, 
sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage 
and emergency services…’.427 CEDAW also provides for the supply of electricity,428 
while the AfCommHPR has held that the Government’s failure “to provide basic 
services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage of medicine as 
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alleged in Communication 100/93” constituted a violation of article 16 of the 
AfCHPR.429  
The right to electricity is not expressly entrenched in the 1996 Constitution. 
However, the applicants in the case of Joseph v City of Johannesburg430 raised 
arguments supporting the recognition of the right to electricity as an implied right. 
The applicants argued that section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 (“PAJA”) applied, and submitted that the termination of electricity supply 
had materially and adversely affected their right. The applicants relied primarily upon 
the right to adequate housing entrenched in section 26(1) of the 1996 Constitution and 
argued that the termination of the electricity supply amounted to a retrogressive 
measure which infringed the negative duty placed upon the State to respect the right 
to have access to adequate housing.431 The applicants argued that, for the purposes of 
PAJA, this infringement affected the right to have access to adequate housing in a 
material and adverse manner.432  
The Court however, did not find it necessary to decide upon this argument.433 
Nor did it wish to determine the claim based on the right to human dignity entrenched 
in section 10 of the Constitution and the contractual right to electricity in terms of the 
contract of lease between the applicants and the landlord. Instead, Skweyiya J located 
the local Government’s obligation to provide basic municipal services, which 
included the supply of electricity, in the Constitution as well as in South African 
legislation.434 Furthermore, the Court held that the applicants held a corresponding 
public law right to receive these municipal services and were entitled to receive 
these.435 In sum, the Court declared the termination of electricity supply to be 
unlawful, and ordered the respondents to reconnect the electricity supply. 
The Court did not refer to any international human rights law in arriving at its 
decision to afford the right to electricity. However, from the discussion above, the 
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right to electricity has been recognised in a number of international and regional 
human rights contexts and could have added significant support to the Court’s 
judgment. As the right to electricity is not expressly provided for in the South African 
Constitution, the recognition of such a right is in harmony with international and 
regional developments and references to these could have added further legitimacy to 
the Court’s decision. 
In Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 436  the applicants 
sought the provision of temporary, basic sanitation services as well as lighting by the 
municipality, pending a decision on whether the settlement they reside in would be 
upgraded into a formal settlement. In particular, the community requested that each 
household be provided with one “ventilated improved pit latrine” or “VIP” latrine 
with immediate effect. Alternatively, the applicants requested that one VIP latrine per 
two households be provided, as opposed to one chemical toilet per ten families 
offered to them to replace their existing pit latrines.437 Furthermore, the applicants 
insisted on high-mast lighting. Amongst other provisions, the applicants relied on 
section 26 of the 1996 Constitution and argued that the right of access to adequate 
housing must be interpreted to include basic sanitation and electricity. The applicants 
argued further that section 26 of the 1996 Constitution contained a minimum content 
in this regard.  
In its consideration of this provision, the Constitutional Court held that it was 
not necessary to decide upon the interpretation of section 26 of the 1996 Constitution, 
as chapters 12438 and 13439 of the National Housing Code were adopted to give effect 
to the rights and that these do not purport to establish minimum standards.440 In this 
regard, the Court affirmed its previous subsidiarity doctrine to the effect that when 
legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, that legislation itself 
should be relied upon or challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution. 441 
Therefore, the Court held that the applicants could not rely directly on section 26 of 
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the 1996 Constitution. In addition, the Court stated that as the applicants had not 
sought to challenge either chapter of the National Housing Code, it would not make a 
finding for the applicant’s claim.442  
However, the Gauteng Provincial Government’s delay in deciding whether or 
not the settlement would be upgraded in terms of Chapter 13 of the National Housing 
Code was declared by the Court as being unjustified and unacceptable.443 The Court 
emphasised that the Provincial Government should make the decisions it is 
constitutionally responsible for, and that a delay of this length does not comply with 
the requirement of reasonableness found within section 26(2) of the 1996 Constitution 
or within section 237 of the Constitution.444 
Bilchitz criticises the Court in this case in that it avoided the task of 
interpreting and affording content to the rights that were at stake. 445 The Court 
applied the principle of subsidiarity, which requires in this case that applicants should 
apply for relief in terms of relevant legislation, and not directly on the Constitution.446 
However, had the Court endeavoured to interpret section 26 of the 1996 Constitution, 
international and regional human rights law may have assisted in developing a more 
substantive interpretation that could have provided support in recognising a right to 
electricity, and a right to sanitation. International instruments such as CEDAW 
recognise the right to sanitation, 447  while the CEDAW Committee’s General 
Recommendation 27 states the following: 
 
“States parties should provide affordable water, electricity and other utilities to older 
women. Policies to increase access to safe water and adequate sanitation should 
ensure that related technologies are designed so that they are accessible and do not 
require undue physical strength.”448 
                                                
442 Para 48. 
443 Para 55. 
444 Para 55. 
445 D Bilchitz “Is the Constitutional Court Wasting Away the Rights of the Poor? Nokotyana v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality” (2010) 127 SALJ 591 594. 
446 595. 
447 CEDAW article 14(2) states that: 
 “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate 
in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right: 
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, 
sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.” 
South Africa has signed and ratified this instrument and therefore has an important role to play in 
delineating the State’s obligations. 
448 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘General Recommendation 
No. 27’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9(Vol. II) para 49. 





In addition, the CESCR’s General Comment 15 affirms that access to 
adequate sanitation is fundamental to human dignity, privacy and is a principle 
mechanism for protecting the quality of water and drinking supplies. 449  These 
instruments therefore affirm the recognition of the right to sanitation at an 
international level, which could have provided support for the recognition of this right 
within the South African context.  
Furthermore, the Draft Guidelines may have provided assistance in 
developing the content of the right to sanitation. The Draft Guidelines confirm that 
“[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate and safe sanitation that is 
conducive to the protection of public health and the environment.”450 These Draft 
Guidelines also emphasise that the right to sanitation includes service that is 
physically accessible within, or in the immediate vicinity of, amongst others, the 
household.451 In addition, the Draft Guidelines state that States should give particular 
attention to the needs of those who are vulnerable or who traditionally face 
difficulties, and that water and sanitation facilities should be designed to take into 
account the needs of women and children.452 
Although the abovementioned elements contained in the Draft Guidelines may 
not specifically justify the provision of VIP latrines, as requested by the applicants in 
Nokotyana, they do constitute elements of the right to sanitation that are recognised in 
international law. A consideration of these sources may have assisted the Court in 
developing a more substantive judicial reasoning, in which the Court is able to more 
fully justify its decision within the context of these considerations. 
 
5 2 6 Education 
The right to education is protected in section 29453 of the 1996 Constitution. Section 
29(1)(a) is phrased in a manner that is distinguishable from the socio-economic rights 
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protected in section 26 and section 27, and is also distinct from the right protected in 
section 29(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution.454 The internal qualifications found within 
these sections do not form part of this particular socio-economic right. 455 
Furthermore, the right to a “basic education, including adult basic education” 
described in section 29(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution is immediately realisable.456 
However, this right may be subject to limitation in accordance with section 36 of the 
Constitution.457   
Only a handful of cases have contributed to developing the scope and content 
of the right to education. 458  In Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature, the 
Constitutional Court was requested to determine the constitutionality of the Gauteng 
                                                                                                                                      
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make 
progressively available and accessible.” 
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their 
choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In 
order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must 
consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking 
into account- 
  (a) equity; 
  (b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to address the results of past racially discriminating laws and practices. 
(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent 
educational institutions that- 
  (a) do not discriminate on the basis of race; 
  (b) are registered with the state; and  
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public 
educational institutions. 
(4) Sub-section (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational institutions.” 
454  For the advantages and challenges such an unqualified right presents to litigants, see C 
McConnachie & C McConnachie “Concretising the Right to a Basic Education” (2012) 129 SALJ 554 
577. 
455 These include the terms “progressive realisation”, “within available resources” and the need for 
“reasonable legislative and other measures”. 
456 This was recently confirmed in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 
2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC). 
457 Para 37. This approach was also recently affirmed in Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 SA 
40 (GNP) para 21.  
458 It must be noted that cases have addressed the rights contained in section 32(c) of the 1993 
Constitution as well as section 29(2) of the 1996 Constitution. These included Matukane v Laerskool 
Potgietersrus 1996 3 SA 223 (T) in which a state aided, dual-medium school was charged with 
denying children admittance into English medium classes because of their race. Laerskool Middelburg 
v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Departement van Onderwys 2003 4 SA 160 (T) concerned an 
application for the setting aside of a decision made by the Head of Department, Mpumalanga 
Department of Education, and its functionaries to convert a single-medium Afrikaans primary school 
into a dual-medium primary school. Minister of Education, Western Cape v Governing Body, Mikro 
Primary School 2006 1 SA 1 (SCA) also addressed a dispute concerning the language policy of a 
public, single-medium, Afrikaans speaking school in light of their refusal to admit English learners and 
convert to a dual medium school upon the request of the Western Cape Education Department. This 
also included Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 
SA 415 (CC). The courts did not consider international human rights law, as mandated by section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, in these cases. 




School Education Bill 1995.459 In order to solve the dispute, it was imperative that the 
Court determined whether section 32(c)460 of the 1993 Constitution placed a positive 
obligation on the State “to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based 
on a common culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no 
discrimination on the grounds of race.”  
The Court found that section 32(c) of the 1993 Constitution did not place such 
a positive obligation on the State and did not grant everyone the right to demand that 
the State establish such educational institutions.461 Instead, the Court stated that 
section 32(c) of the 1993 Constitution was a defensive right that allowed everyone to 
establish such institutions while providing protection from the State.462 However, in 
support of this contention, Sachs J made a laudable analysis of principles of 
international law relating to the protection of minority rights that was aimed at 
determining whether international law supported the Court’s interpretation.463 Based 
on his investigation of the status of minority protection under international law, Sachs 
                                                
459 Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC). At the time of the 
hearing, the Bill had been passed and enacted as the School Education Act 6 of 1995. However, the 
disputed sections had not yet become operational and the Act was referred to by the Court as the “Bill”. 
The dispute concerned the constitutionality of section 19(1) that prohibited the use of language 
competency testing for the purposes of admitting learners into schools. Furthermore, the applicants also 
challenged section 21(2). This provision required that the religious policy of public schools be 
developed according to a specific framework. Section 21(3) was also challenged, which allowed the 
Member of the Executive Council, after consultation with the governing body, to reformulate the 
religious policy of a public school. Lastly, the constitutional validity of section 22(3) was challenged. 
This section prohibited the compulsory attendance by learners of religious practices and education 
classes. 
460 Section 32 of the 1993 Constitution states that: 
“Every person shall have the right - 
    (a) to basic education and to equal access to educational institutions; 
(b) to instruction in the language of his or her choice where this is reasonably 
practicable; and 
(c) to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common 
culture, language or religion provided that there shall be no discrimination on the 
ground of race.” 
461 Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) para 7. 
462 Para 7-9. This case is argued to be one of the only cases, prior to Juma Musjid, to contribute to 
identifying the scope of section 32(a) of the 1993 Constitution. In this case, Mohamed J stated that:  
“Section 32(a) creates a positive right that basic education be provided for every person and 
not merely a negative right that such a person should not be obstructed in pursuing his or her 
basic education. Section 32(b), recognising the diversity of languages in our country, again 
creates a positive right for every person to instruction in the language of his or her choice, 
where this is reasonably practicable, not merely a negative right to prevent any obstruction if 
such person seeks instruction in the language of his or her choice. Section 32(c), by contrast, 
guarantees a freedom - a freedom to establish educational institutions based on a common 
culture, language, or religion. It is that freedom which is protected by s 32(c).”  
463 Para 44. See footnote 37 on pages 104-105 for the comprehensive list of international and regional 
sources Sachs’J relied upon in this case. 




J concluded that very little international human rights law could support a general 
claim to State resources for the purpose of promoting cultural, linguistic and religious 
diversity.464 Furthermore, he found that none existed to support a legal claim to the 
establishment of a separate State-funded school.465 Sachs J also affirmed Mohamed 
J’s interpretation of section 32(c) of the 1993 Constitution and found it to be 
reinforced by many international instruments.466 
Sachs J’s analysis of international human rights and the status of minority 
protection under international law have been criticised. De Wet argues that Sachs 
submission that the Framework Convention is the most recent and advanced 
instrument concerning international minority rights indicates a “lack of awareness” of 
other important developments that had taken place within the context of minority 
rights in Europe. 467  Furthermore, she submits that Sachs J should have also 
considered the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 2002.468 In addition, De Wet argues that the Court neglected to 
take into consideration the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the CSCE 
Conference on the Human Dimension of 1990.469 To this extent, De Wet argues that if 
European regional instruments are to be relied upon by the Court, it should be done in 
a consistent and comprehensive manner.470 Sach J's analysis is also criticised for 
neglecting to consider the AfCHPR, which South Africa had already signed and 
ratified at the time of the decision.471 In particular, De Wet argues that section 17(3), 
which protects the right to education in the AfCHPR, should have been considered.472 
However, De Wet does admit that it is unlikely that this provision would have 
provided for a positive claim against the State.473  
                                                
464 Para 83. 
465 Para 83. 
466 Para 92. 
467 De Wet (2004) Fordham International Law Journal 1529 1542. 
468 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (opened for signature 5 November 1992, 
entered into force 1 March 1998) CETS No. 148. 
469 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE 29 
ILM 1305 (1990). However, it must be noted that the Framework Convention that Sachs J referred to 
does take into account the commitments made in the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of 1990. 








De Wet submits that this judgment illustrates that a special status is afforded 
to European human rights instruments in South Africa jurisprudence.474 Furthermore, 
she argues that this case illustrates that a de facto hierarchy has been created whereby 
non-binding international instruments have been relied upon at the expense of binding 
international and regional human rights instruments.475 To this extent, De Wet argues 
that non-binding international and regional human rights instruments should be 
considered as secondary to those international and regional instruments to which 
South Africa is a party, such as the AfCHPR.476 
However, in addition to surveying European regional instruments, Sachs J also 
undertook a comprehensive survey of available UN instruments and publications. 
Moreover, South Africa was a member of the CEDAW at the time of this decision, 
the provisions of which were included in Sachs J’s analysis. Therefore, Sachs J’s 
consideration of international law contains references to both binding and non-
binding international law instruments. Furthermore, considering the date upon which 
this judgment was delivered, South Africa was not party to any of the instruments at 
the time that could provide evidence of an international obligation that supported 
Sachs J’s decision, except for the CEDAW and South Africa’s membership to the 
League of Nations. Although it was unfortunate to exclude at least an inquiry into the 
AfCHPR’s potential to assist the decision, a strong reliance on non-binding 
international and regional sources was inevitable. Ultimately, this judgment is 
laudable for its consideration of international law sources. The decision underscores 
the relevance of the framework dictum established in Makwanyane and the 
significance of the generous breadth of international and regional human rights 
sources that may be considered by the Court, particularly at a period when South 
Africa had both signed and ratified only a handful of human rights instruments. 
  In Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO477 the 
applicants challenged a high court decision authorising the eviction of a public school 
from private property belonging to a trust. The Constitutional Court was called upon 
to balance the learners’ rights to basic education against the right to property as 
enshrined in sections 29(1)(a) and section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution respectively. 




477 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC). 




Nkabinde J referred to both international478 and regional479 instruments that afford 
recognition and protection to the right to education.480 Furthermore, Nkabinde J drew 
particular attention to General Comment 13, paragraph 1 of the CESCR, in which the 
CESCR stresses the significance and aims of the right to basic education.481 
The Court found that the MEC had failed to discharge her positive 
constitutional obligations to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the learners’ right to 
basic education and had fallen below the standard required by the obligations 
established in the relevant statutory provisions.482 The Court also found that while the 
Trust did not give up its right to ownership in relation to its property, the trustees did 
in fact have a negative constitutional obligation not to impair the right to basic 
education of the learners.483 The content of the MEC’s and trustee’s obligations were 
determined in accordance with the statute and the Constitution. Furthermore, the 
judgment is important as it establishes basic education as an immediate right,484 and 
affirms the negative duties of non-interference with the right.  
However, international law played no role in underscoring the positive 
obligations placed upon the State to provide public schools and ensure that a 
                                                
478 The Court referred to article 26 of the UDHR as well as to article 13(1) and article 14 of the 
ICESCR for their unqualified recognition of the right to education. The Court also referred to articles 
28(1)(a) and (b) of the CRC and to General Comment 3 on the national implementation of the ICCPR 
in which the HRC places specific obligations upon States parties in terms of the ICCPR. See UNCHR 
‘General Comment 3’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 9 (Vo. 
I) at 4.     
479 The Court referred particularly to article 17 of the AfCHPR that protects every individual’s right to 
education. Furthermore, the Court referred to the positive obligations resting upon States parties in 
terms of article 1 of the AfCHPR namely, to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the 
rights contained in the AfCHPR. The Court also referred to articles 11(2) and (3) of the African 
Children’s Charter that respectively state the purposes and objectives of a child’s education as well the 
positive obligation upon States parties to take specific measures aimed at achieving the full realisation 
of the right, in particular to provide free and compulsory basic education. 
480 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC) para 40-
41. 
481 General Comment 13, paragraph 1 states the following: 
“Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realising other 
human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which 
economically and socially marginalised adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty 
and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities. Education has a vital role in 
empowering women, safeguarding children from exploitation and hazardous labour and 
sexual exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environment, and 
controlling population growth. Increasingly, education is recognised as one of the best 
financial investments States can make. But the importance of education is not just practical: a 
well educated, enlightened and active mind, able to wander freely and widely, is one of the 
joys and rewards of human existence.” 
482 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC) para 51-
52. Statutory obligations were located in the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 .  
483 Para 60-62. 
484 Para 37. 




sufficient number of places were made available to learners in affected areas. This 
obligation is entrenched in the CRC to which South Africa is already a party,485 while 
General Comment 13 may also have provided further support in this regard.486  
Furthermore, Nkabinde J elaborated on the negative duty placed upon third 
parties to refrain from interference with the right to education. Regional human rights 
law could have been used to support such a finding.487 For example, in Institute for 
Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice 
Initiative on behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v Government of 
Kenya,488 the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
found that a violation had occurred in respect to the right to education protected in 
article 11(3) of the Children’s Charter. In particular, Nubian children had received 
less access to educational facilities compared to other communities, fewer schools had 
been provided to them and they had received a disproportionately lower share of 
available resources.489 This decision could have assisted the Court in supporting its 
finding that third parties are to refrain from interfering with the right to education. 
One of the main aims of the above investigation was to analyse the manner in 
which the Constitutional Court engages with international human rights law in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights. The purpose of this analysis was to determine 
how the Court relies upon international and regional human rights law as well as to 
determine which international and regional human rights standards are relied upon. 
The discussion below critically evaluates the jurisprudence reviewed above. 
 
                                                
485 Article 1(a) of the CRC requires States to make primary education available to every child while 
article 1(b) requires States to make secondary education available and accessible to every child. 
486 General Comment 13, paragraph 6(a) states that the requirement of “availability” obliges States to 
provide functioning educational institutions and programmes that must be available in sufficient 
quantity. 
487 General Comment 13, paragraph 47 states that: “The obligation to protect requires States parties to 
take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to education.” 
As already discussed above, a State’s negative responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens from 
damaging acts of third parties as part of its minimum core obligations was also highlighted in a 
decision of the AfCommHPR namely, SERAC v Nigeria para 57. 
488 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice Initiative 
on behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v Government of Kenya no 002/com/002/2009. 
489 Para 65.  




5 3 An Evaluation of the Constitutional Court’s Reliance on 
International Human Rights Law in its Adjudication of Socio-
Economic Rights 
Section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution states that “when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must consider international law.” While the mandate 
to consider international law is clear, no direction is given as to the meaning of 
“consider” and the extent to which such a consideration should take place.490 From 
the cases canvassed in this study, the consideration of international human rights law 
in the interpretation of socio-economic rights has taken place in various forms and to 
various degrees. As stated in chapter 1, international law is a vast and complex field 
that requires both the skill and knowledge to engage with it successfully. Within the 
context of socio-economic rights, the Court’s task is further complicated by the 
Constitutional Court’s adoption of a reasonableness model of review, used to 
adjudicate claims based upon the positive obligations arising from socio-economic 
rights entrenched in the Constitution.491 Soobramoney displays the initial emergence 
of a standard of rationality review in socio-economic rights jurisprudence. 492 
However, the Constitutional Court’s subsequent decision in Grootboom was the first 
significant contribution towards the development of the reasonableness model of 
review in South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence. As discussed in section 
5 2, in Grootboom, the Court refrained from adopting the CESCR’s concept of 
minimum core obligations in its interpretation of section 26 of the 1996 
Constitution.493 The Court chose instead to apply a model of reasonableness review 
whereby the Court investigated into whether the measures taken by the State, in their 
endeavour to realise the right to have access to adequate housing, were reasonable. 
Thus, the Court applied a reasonableness test to the relevant Government policies 
adopted to give effect to these rights.494 In Grootboom, the Court indicated that its 
enquiry into the reasonableness of State actions would not be aimed at whether more 
                                                
490 See chapter 4. 
491 The standard of reasonableness is expressly stated in these provisions. In particular, section 26(2) 
and section 27(2) of the 1996 Constitution state that: “The State must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.” 
492 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
493 In its General Comment 3, the CESCR elaborated on the nature of States parties’ obligations as 
entrenched in article 2(1) of the ICESCR, in which the concept of minimum core obligations was 
established.  
494 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 33. 




appropriate alternatives, or more “correct” measures, could have been taken by the 
State.495 Instead, the focus of the investigation was to determine whether the measures 
taken by the State were reasonable.496 This approach therefore affords the legislative 
and executive branches of Government a margin of appreciation whereby they may 
decide how to fulfil their obligations in terms of the right. 
  The Grootboom judgment also establishes certain criteria by which courts can 
assess the reasonableness of Government programmes.497 In this regard, the Court 
stated that a reasonable Government programme must be a co-ordinated, 
comprehensive programme determined by all three spheres of Government in 
consultation with each other.498 A reasonable programme will be one that ensures that 
the appropriate financial and human resources are available.499 Furthermore, the 
measures taken by the State must establish a coherent housing programme directed 
towards the progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing within 
the State’s available means.500 The programme must be balanced and flexible, and 
must make appropriate provision for any housing crises as well as for short, medium 
and long-term needs.501 In addition, reasonable policies are those policies that are 
reasonable in both their conception and their implementation.502 Finally, a reasonable 
Government programme is one that makes short-term provision for those whose needs 
are urgent and are living in intolerable conditions.503 The Grootboom judgment also 
underscores the significant value of human dignity in determining the reasonableness 
of State measures and establishes that Government engagement with affected parties 
and civil society must also be taken into account.504 In TAC,505 the Court added that 
measures must be transparent and their contents must be made known effectively to 
the public.506 Lastly, the language used in section 26 and section 27 of the 1996 
Constitution has further qualified an assessment of reasonableness review. These 
                                                
495 Para 41. 
496 Para 41. 
497 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 152-153.  
498 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 40. 
499 Para 39. 
500 Para 41. 
501 Para 43. 
502 Para 42. 
503 Para 44. 
504 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 153. This criteria is derived from references made to the 
Court’s expectation that community engagement would have taken place between the municipality and 
the affected community once occupation of the land had occurred. See Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 87. 
505 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC).  
506 Para 123. 




provisions subject reasonable and other measures to “progressive realisation”, “within 
available resources” of the State.  
This approach to adjudicating the positive obligations resting upon States 
within the context of socio-economic rights has received academic support, and is 
perceived to be a means to realise the transformative potential latent in the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights.507 In this regard, Steinberg states that a 
reasonableness approach facilitates the type of judicial minimalism that results in an 
incremental evolution of the constitutional standards that may bring about lasting 
social reform.508 However, the Constitutional Court has been criticised for adopting a 
deferential approach to the adjudication of socio-economic rights. Brand argues that 
judicial deference has affected the Court’s adjudication of socio-economic rights in 
various ways. Brand submits that it has been used to justify the Court’s refusal to 
engage with claims on the basis of their complexity and the Court’s technical 
incapacity, as seen in TAC and in Mazibuko.509 Moreover, the Court has also followed 
a deferential approach when it has engaged with a claim, but applied a reasonableness 
test formulated in procedural or structural terms that avoids a substantive engagement 
with the matter.510  
The Court’s particular reluctance to engage with the scope and content of 
socio-economic rights has frustrated the application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution and the consideration of international law as an interpretative tool. As 
illustrated in Mazibuko, international law is not provided with an opportunity to 
engage substantively with the scope and content of the right, and is devoid of its 
purpose as an interpretative tool. However, the Court’s approach has not paralysed the 
application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution completely.  
In this regard, the case analysis in section 5 2 of this study has revealed that 
the Constitutional Court has firstly, on occasion, relied upon international human 
rights law to emphasise the importance and international recognition of a right. To 
this extent, the Court usually invoked a list of international and regional human rights 
instruments that recognise a specific right, in a rather superficial manner. This 
                                                
507 C Steinberg “Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-Economic 
Rights Jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264 264. 
508 269 and 272. 
509 D Brand “Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa” in S 
Liebenberg & G Quinot (eds) Law and Poverty: Perspectives from South Africa and Beyond (2012) 
172 177. 
510 177. 




consideration of international law did not play a central role in influencing the Court’s 
interpretation of the actual content of the right, as illustrated in Juma Musjid.511 
Similarly, in PE Municipality,512 soft law was relied upon to affirm the many 
attributes of “adequate housing”. However, it did not play a role in elaborating on the 
content of the right, or on the procedural safeguards that are associated with evictions 
that have been developed at an international or regional level. Although appearing 
superficial, such consideration plays an important role as these instruments highlight 
the manner in which the right is protected at an international level and the reasons 
why it receives international recognition. Furthermore, locating the right at an 
international level reinforces the importance of the right and the relevance of its 
recognition.    
Secondly, the Court has undertaken an evaluative consideration of 
international and regional human rights law. This is characterised by a deeper 
engagement with, and evaluation of, international and regional human rights 
standards that do not necessarily result in their adoption. However, the engagement 
does evaluate the relevance of the international standards to the South African 
context, and the Court has, on occasion, provided a justification concerning the 
rejection or acceptance of the international approach. This is illustrated in 
Grootboom,513 and, to a lesser extent, TAC.514  
Lastly, the case law indicated that, on occasion, the Court also endeavored to 
align its approach with international human rights standards or adopt a concept 
established at an international level in certain cases. This goes beyond mere 
consideration of international human rights law. This was seen for example, in 
Grootboom,515 where the Constitutional Court accepted the CESCR’s understanding 
of “progressive realization” as found in the CESCR’s General Comment 3, to be in 
harmony and bear the same meaning as in the South African context.516 Furthermore, 
the Court has relied strongly on international standards in this way when elaborating 
on the negative duty to respect the right to have access to adequate housing, as seen in 
                                                
511 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC).  
512 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
513 2001 1 SA 46 (CC).   
514 (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
515 2001 1 SA 46 (CC).   
516 However, it must be noted that the Court did not correctly understand the concept of progressive 
realisation. Bilchitz argues that the Court’s understanding was predicated upon an acceptance of the 
minimum core obligation. Bilchitz D “Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and 
its Importance” (2002) 119 SALJ 484-501. 




Jaftha.517 The Constitutional Court relied strongly upon the concept of “adequacy” 
and in particular, the inclusion of security of tenure as an element of “adequacy” in 
the CESCR’s General Comment 4. In this case, the Court applied this in its decision 
to reinforce the scope of section 26 of the 1996 Constitution in this regard. 
Furthermore, in Joe Slovo 518  the Constitutional Court established that General 
Comment 7 must be followed in cases of relocation. In addition, in Ex Parte Gauteng 
Provincial Legislature,519 the Court engaged with international human rights law and 
followed the approach concerning the protection of minorities as found in 
international human rights law. 
However, the South African jurisprudence discussed in section 5 2 also 
indicates that the Constitutional Court did not apply section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution in most of the cases pertaining to evictions. In particular, the Court made 
minimal reference to international and regional standards in its development of the 
concepts of meaningful engagement and alternative accommodation. This trend is 
illustrated in Olivia Road, PE Municipality, Modderklip, Gundwana, Pheko, Abahlali, 
Occupiers of Skurweplaas, Blue Moonlight, Schubert Park and Joe Slovo.  
Furthermore, the case law discussed in this study indicates that the CESCR’s 
General Comments, are by far the most cited sources of international human rights 
law.520 This may be attributed to a number of factors. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
ICESCR as well as the General Comments adopted by the CESCR played a very 
influential role in drafting the provisions that entrenched certain socio-economic 
rights. Thus, the Court may be more inclined to draw from these sources when 
interpreting these provisions. Furthermore, the CESCR’s General Comments are 
significantly more detailed and comprehensive when compared with the resolutions 
adopted by the AfCommHPR. In addition to this, the ICESCR has been in force since 
1966, and the CESCR has adopted General Comments in respect of the rights 
contained in the ICESCR since 1991.521 Thus, information on the ICESCR, as well as 
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518 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). 
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520 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), Jaftha v Schoeman; 
Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC), Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 
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the CESCR’s General Comments, has been disseminated over a longer period than 
communications and resolutions adopted by the AFCommHPR. Therefore, the 
Court’s familiarity with the ICESCR and the CESCR’s General Comments may have 
an impact on how often they have been considered.  
Furthermore, the case analyses above indicate that the AfCHPR and the 
jurisprudence of the AfCommHPR were cited significantly less.522 Unfortunately, the 
Constitutional Court has not relied as heavily on the AfCommHPR’s jurisprudence on 
socio-economic rights as would have been expected.523 Several reasons have been 
offered as an explanation for this, which focus largely on the effectiveness of the 
AfCommHPR. Mbazira argues that during the first years of its operation, many 
factors contributed to the ineffectiveness and weakness of the AfCommHPR. Mbazira 
defines this as the “redundancy” period, in which the AfCommHPR seemed neither 
capable, nor willing, to interpret the rights protected in the AfCHPR in their broadest 
possible meaning.524 Furthermore, doubts existed concerning the impartiality and 
independence of the AfCommHPR’s members, which stemmed from employees in 
the public service of a country, such as attorney generals, ambassadors, or cabinet 
ministers, holding posts as commissioners.525 This not only affected the independence 
of the AfCommHPR, but also created opportunity for commissioners to resist 
reprimanding their own governments.526 Article 59(1) of the AfCHPR states that  
 
“[a]ll measures taken within the provisions of ch III shall remain confidential until 
such time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise 
decide.”  
 
This degree of confidentiality had raised concerns regarding the accountability of the 
proceedings and Mbazira argues that this lack of accountability and public criticism 
may explain why, at least initially, the decisions of the AfCommHPR were regarded 
as slipshod.527 The effects of insufficient resources (usually in the form of insufficient 
                                                                                                                                      
the right to the highest attainable standard of health was adopted in 2000. The AfCHPR only entered 
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523 See section 4 4 in chapter 4. 
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funding from the OAU, and later, from the AU), were also visible in the 
AfCommHPR’s inadequate research and the frequency of badly formulated 
opinions.528 There are however, indications that the effectiveness of the AfCommHPR 
is improving. In 1994, the principle of confidentiality was no longer used in terms of 
the AfCommHPR’s decisions, activity reports and resolutions, thus increasing the 
transparency and trust in the work of the AfCommHPR.529  
In light of the case analyses above, references to the ECHR and the ECtHR 
were minimal.530 The ESCR was referred to by the amici in their heads of argument 
presented to the Court in Joe Slovo.531 The Constitutional Court however, did not 
address the reference and it did not appear in the Court’s judgment. Furthermore, no 
references were made to the Inter-American human rights system in the cases 
discussed above.  
 
5 4 Future Developments: The Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the African 
Women’s Protocol, and their Relevance to South African Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence  
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has recently come into force.532 As discussed above, South Africa has 
signed and ratified the ICESCR. However, the State has not yet signed, nor made any 
indication of an explicit intention to ratify the OP-ICESCR. This international 
instrument establishes three complaints procedures namely, an individual complaints 
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procedure, an inter-State communications procedure 533  and lastly, an inquiry 
procedure whereby the CESCR is able to inquire into urgent and serious violations.534 
The individual complaints procedure allows individuals or groups of individuals to 
submit a communication of complaint to the CESCR in the event of an alleged 
violation of their socio-economic rights protected under the ICESCR.535 To this 
extent, CESCR is authorised to adjudicate claims based on State parties obligations in 
terms of the ICESCR and will assess a State’s compliance with the rights protected in 
the ICESCR in accordance with the standard of reasonableness.536 Article (8)4 of the 
OP-ICESCR states the following: 
 
“When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall 
consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with 
Part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the State 
Party may adopt a range of possible measures for the implementation of the rights set 
forth in the Covenant.” (Emphasis mine).  
 
Porter submits that while article 8(4) of the OP-ICESCR permits the CESCR to 
adjudicate social claims, this reasonableness standard will not permit the CESCR to 
force policy choices upon respondent States in its assessment of State compliance 
with the obligations entrenched in the ICESCR, but will respect the availability, as 
well as the State’s preference, for other means of compliance.537 The concept of 
minimum core obligations, as elaborated on in the CESCR’s General Comment 3, is 
not explicitly referred to in the OP-ICESCR and it is not yet clear how these two 
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complaints mechanism. This complaints mechanism is equivalent to the complaints mechanism that 
exists under the ICCPR. Article 6 and 7 of the OP-ICESCR govern the procedure followed by the 
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standards will be reconciled by the CESCR in the context of considering individual 
communications of complaint under the OP-ICESCR.  
In an analytical paper adopted by the CESCR, the CESCR provided reasons in 
support of adopting a complaints procedure.538 Firstly, the CESCR notes that a 
complaints procedure will bring “concrete and tangible issues into relief”.539 This is in 
contrast to the abstract manner in which discussions concerning State party reports 
take place.540 Secondly, the information that would be presented to it in the evaluation 
of a complaint would provide a framework of inquiry that is absent in the 
consideration of State party reports.541 This would allow the CESCR to deal with 
complex issues concerning the provisions of the ICESCR.542 Thirdly, the CESCR 
submits that the potential to be brought before an international forum should 
encourage governments to provide effective domestic remedies in respect of social 
and economic rights.543 Furthermore, the CESCR states that when claimants present 
their claims at an international level, they may be encouraged to formulate their 
claims “in more precise terms and in relation to the specific provisions of the 
Covenant”.544 The CESCR also submits that the threat of a negative finding by an 
international forum may impact upon governments at a political level, thus providing 
economic and social rights with an important feature that it lacks at present.545 Lastly, 
the CESCR states that a complaints procedure will provide a “tangible result”, which 
may also invite interest in the ICESCR generally as well as in the specific issues 
surrounding it.546 The CESCR’s adjudication of an individual communication has the 
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potential to evolve substantively through reference to international and regional 
standards and relevant aspects of the local context of the State.  
Furthermore, the International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 547  suggests that as the CESCR will be able to receive and consider 
communications on a case-by-case basis, the CESCR will be able provide a more 
nuanced interpretation of the provisions of the ICESCR than it would by way of a 
General Comment.548 South Africa has currently ratified the ICESCR and has not yet 
become party to the OP-ICESCR. However, the jurisprudence can be considered by 
South African courts in accordance with section 39(1)(b) of the South African 
Constitution and may have the potential to inform and provide assistance in the 
Court’s application of the reasonableness model of review and the role of the 
minimum core obligation.549  
In addition to this, it is important to highlight the African Women’s Protocol 
and its potential to inform South Africa’s reasonableness model of review. Article 
10(3) of the Protocol states that: 
 
“States parties shall take the necessary measures to reduce military 
expenditure significantly in favour of spending on social development in 
general, and the promotion of women in particular.”550 
 
Thus, the African Women’s Protocol requires States parties to take steps to allocate 
financial resources towards social development generally, and the promotion of 
women in particular. Viljoen states that article 10(3) should be understood as 
providing the AfCommHPR, or the African Human Rights Court, with a basis for 
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reviewing States’ parties’ budgetary allocations.551 However, Viljoen adds that this 
article does not provide these Charter-based institutions with an opportunity to force 
their views concerning how their budgets should be allocated. Rather, it permits the 
reviewing of those allocations already made, specifically, those allocations made 
within a period of two or more years.552 Therefore, this “hierarchy of budgetary 
priorities”553 creates an important mechanism of review, which allows these Charter-
based institutions to evaluate how States’ parties have financially prioritised “social 
development generally, and the promotion of women in particular.”554 Article 10(3) of 
the African Women’s Protocol can potentially inform the Constitutional Court’s 
reasonableness assessment in a far-reaching way. In particular, it would allow the 
Court to review the States’ budgetary spending, and evaluate how social development 
generally, and the promotion of women in particular, are being prioritised and 
furthered. The inclusion of this element into the Court’s reasonableness model of 
review would assist the Court in potentially holding the State accountable for its 
budgetary spending, which may require a higher standard of justification by the State 
for its budgetary decisions and a greater transparency in respect of the State’s 
prioritisation of social development. Such a standard of accountability may thus also 
affect the way the State allocates resources towards social development in the future. 
Lastly, the use of article 10(3) to inform the Court’s reasonableness assessment would 
assist in aligning the Court’s reasonableness standard of review with the State’s 
international obligations entrenched in the African Women’s Protocol. 
 
5 5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I commenced with an analysis of the Constitutional Court’s 
engagement with international human rights law in accordance with section 39(1)(b) 
of the 1996 Constitution in the adjudication of socio-economic rights. This has 
revealed that the Constitutional Court has considered international and regional 
human rights standards to various degrees. However, section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution has been applied inconsistently, suggesting that the Court has in some 
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cases neglected the mandate entrenched in section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution and 
has consequently missed opportunities to gain valuable insight from international and 
regional human rights standards.  
Secondly, the analysis aimed to determine which international and regional 
human rights instruments and standards the Court relies upon when adjudicating upon 
socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitution. The case analysis has indicated 
that the Constitutional Court does not always consider the breadth of sources 
permitted in accordance with Chaskalson’s framework dictum, established in 
Makwanyane. Rather, the Court has often only considered a limited range of sources. 
In this regard, section 5 3 demonstrated that the General Comments adopted by the 
CESCR are predominantly relied upon by the Court in instances where international 
human rights law is considered. The jurisprudence developed by the AfCommHPR is 
considered to a much lesser extent, while jurisprudence from the ECtHR and ECSR is 
minimal, as are references to sources emanating from the UN, such as reports adopted 
by Special Rapporteurs or resolutions adopted by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights system is not 
considered at all in cases discussed above. 
Lastly, I analysed the impact of the reasonableness model of review on the 
Court’s consideration of international human rights law in the adjudication of socio-
economic rights. This revealed that the Court’s application of the reasonableness 
model of review has influenced the extent to which the Constitutional Court engages 
with the scope and content of socio-economic rights. In this regard, the Court does not 
engage substantively with the scope and content of the rights and consequently, it has 
narrowed the scope for international law to influence the normative development of 
the relevant rights. This in turn has also reduced the scope for international and 
regional human rights standards to play a meaningful role in the evaluation of South 
Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence and in the substantive development of 
socio-economic rights. However, the analysis reveals that a variety of international 
and regional human rights standards exist that can support and enrich the Court’s 
reasoning as well as assist in developing the scope and content of socio-economic 
rights entrenched in the 1996 Constitution without necessarily applying a minimum 
core standard.  
 While there are Constitutional Court decisions that can be lauded for their 
consideration of international human rights law, the Court has not been consistent in 




its application of the interpretative mandate entrenched in section 39(1)(b). Not only 
does this diminish the obligation entrenched in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution, but the process of considering international law when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights is never fully developed into an established methodology.  
As discussed in chapter 4, the Constitutional Court has confirmed the 
obligatory nature of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution in Glenister. In this 
judgment the Court also stated that section 39(1)(b) is invoked to assist in answering 
“in-part”, which reasonable measures our Constitution requires the State to take in 
order to protect and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.555 Thus, the Court has 
confirmed the important role of international and regional human rights standards 
when assessing the reasonableness of State measures to give effect to constitutional 
rights and it is regrettable that the potential of the approach laid down in Glenister has 
not been realised in the realm of the Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence. 
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6 1 The Primary Findings of this Dissertation 
6 1 1 The methodological approaches of colonial and apartheid courts to international 
human rights law  
In chapter 2, I illustrated that the State introduced legislation and policies 
discriminating against the Black majority in South Africa on the basis of race prior to 
the apartheid era.1 However, under the rule of the National Party, elected into power 
in 1948, a system of institutionalised racism gained momentum, which accelerated the 
enactment of discriminatory laws and policies that firmly established the apartheid 
legal order. Furthermore, I indicated that these laws and policies enforced the 
classification and segregation of the South African population into racial groups. 
According to these laws, Black South Africans had an inferior social, economic, and 
political status. In addition, I concluded that through racially discriminatory 
legislation, Black South Africans endured socio-economic deprivation during 
apartheid. Furthermore, I concluded that Black South Africans had very limited 
opportunities to obtain redress for these violations. During colonial times, and later 
during the apartheid era, the State did not recognise socio-economic rights as 
justiciable or enforceable rights, therefore, there were no constitutionally protected 
standards that could be used to challenge the abovementioned infringements. 
Furthermore, the judiciary interpreted racially discriminatory legislation in a 
formalistic manner, which frequently upheld the validity of such statutes. In this 
regard, I illustrated that the judiciary was limited to examining the intention of the 
legislature, leaving discriminatory policies and legislation substantively 
unchallenged.2 Consequently, the court’s interpretative strategy severely restricted 
any possibility of relying on the common law values of freedom and equality, or 
internationally recognised human rights, which may have provided grounds to 
challenge racially discriminating legislation. This evaluation thus created an 
important historical context that highlighted the legacy of socio-economic deprivation 
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of Black South Africans as a result of apartheid. It is clear that this inequality had to 
be addressed in the new democratic South Africa. 
As indicated in chapter 2, I observed that a relationship existed between 
international law generally and South African municipal law, as early as the mid-
1600’s.3 The South African legal system instituted international law as a direct result 
of the Dutch occupation of the Cape, which brought with it the works of Roman-
Dutch scholars who dealt with municipal law and international law as part of the same 
universal legal order.4 Thus, these scholars blended municipal and international law 
when addressing municipal matters. During colonial times, South African courts 
relied upon international treaties, as well as these scholarly works on international 
law, to address matters concerning South African municipal law. They did so without 
requiring any legislative incorporation of international law into the municipal legal 
order.  
In chapter 2, I also observed that during the period of apartheid, South African 
courts adopted a particular methodological approach to international law generally, in 
the form of treaties and international customary law. With regard to international 
treaties, courts accepted that these international instruments were adopted into 
municipal law by way of a dualist approach. In addition, courts accepted that 
international customary law formed part of municipal law in accordance with a 
monist approach. Through this evaluation, I concluded that South African courts were 
familiar with the practice of invoking international law in their decision-making 
process. However, international human rights law did not feature prominently in the 
courts’ decision-making processes. Through this chapter, I found that various factors 
contributed towards the courts’ restricted use of international human rights law in 
adjudication during apartheid. 
Although South Africa became a party to the UN Charter in 1945, the South 
African Government refused to become party to any human rights treaties thereafter. 
This severely restricted the application of international human rights law in the 
municipal legal order. Furthermore, the incorporation of customary international law 
into municipal law was subject to a number of qualifications that restricted the 
application of customary international law in the South African municipal legal order. 
In addition, South Africa’s racial policies were so deeply entrenched in legislation 
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that very little room remained for the protection of human rights by way of customary 
international law. 5  Although the UDHR contains provisions that prohibit 
discrimination and protect socio-economic rights,6 the court in S v Petane7 deemed 
the UDHR as only declaratory in nature, and consequently not a reflection of 
customary international law.8 Furthermore, the prevailing doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty restricted the courts’ review of discriminatory legislation. In particular, 
courts could only give effect to the intention of the legislature, even if this meant 
infringing on human rights that had gained prominence at an international level. 
Therefore, the courts had very little scope to employ the principles of common law 
that may well have protected human rights.  
Nevertheless, I illustrated how the courts did have some room to manoeuvre in 
respect of the common law presumption that was applicable to the court’s process of 
interpreting legislation. In particular, the presumption stated that when a statute was 
ambiguous or unclear, courts should not interpret the statute in a manner that violated 
a rule of international law. According to this presumption, Parliament did not intend 
to derogate from, or legislate in conflict with, the principles of international law when 
enacting a statute. Therefore, during the apartheid era, South African courts could 
have sought guidance from international treaties not yet incorporated into municipal 
law, and treaties not yet signed. This presumption, however, was qualified to the 
extent that it was only applicable in cases where a statute was ambiguous and where 
such a statute was enacted with the intention of giving effect to the obligations under 
a specific treaty. In light of the above, I concluded that, while South African courts 
adopted a specific methodological approach to the application of international treaties 
and international customary law, the courts did not follow this approach in respect of 
international human rights treaties or international customary law reflecting human 
rights standards.  
The results of the abovementioned evaluation provide insight into the legal 
culture that existed in South Africa before the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. The 
evaluation highlights that, as international human rights law was not recognised as a 
relevant source of law in adjudication during the apartheid era, judges did not develop 
the necessary skill or knowledge required to engage with it. In fact, international 
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human rights law was a neglected, unfamiliar source of law in South Africa until the 
adoption of the 1993 Constitution. This undoubtedly influenced the future 
engagement with international human rights law in the interpretation of socio-
economic rights. Furthermore, this historical account shows that if international 
human rights law was going to play a relevant role in South Africa in the future, the 
State would have to take deliberate steps to firstly, include it as a relevant source in 
municipal law, and secondly, rejoin the international community. Therefore, this 
evaluation of the history of international law in South Africa set the scene for the 
significant changes ushered in by the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
6 1 2 International human rights law and the 1993 and 1996 South African 
Constitutions 
In chapter 3, I highlighted firstly, the changes that were brought about by the adoption 
of the 1993 Constitution and the transition from parliamentary sovereignty to 
constitutional supremacy. In particular, the inclusion of justiciable and enforceable 
rights in the 1993 Bill of Rights established a new culture of human rights in South 
Africa. Although socio-economic rights formed part of the 1993 Constitution, the 
decision to include these was preceded by much debate. In addition, discussions 
concerning the selection of fundamental rights to be included in the constitutional text 
were fraught with disagreement, which played a determinative role in the limited 
selection of socio-economic rights included in the 1993 Constitution.9  
In this chapter, I highlighted further that the drafters of the 1993 Constitution 
relied upon international human rights instruments and draft proposals submitted by 
various political parties, interest groups, and organisations. International human rights 
law inspired many provisions contained in these draft proposals in various respects, 
and thereby indirectly influenced the work of the Technical Committee, which 
provided the background research and drafting proposals for the various provisions.10 
In relation to the drafting of the 1996 Bill of Rights, I showed that 
Constitutional Principle II played a pivotal role in the determination of rights to be 
entrenched in the constitutional text. This principle required that all rights, including 
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socio-economic rights, had to adhere to the criteria of “universal acceptance”.11 I 
demonstrated how the Technical Committee examined every right that was 
considered for inclusion in the 1996 Bill of Rights in accordance with the criteria of 
“universal acceptance”. The Technical Committee undertook a comprehensive 
investigation into international and regional human rights instruments, comparative 
jurisprudence, and jurisprudence from international courts and tribunals, to confirm 
the universal acceptance of socio-economic rights considered for inclusion in the 
1996 Bill of Rights. Consequently, I indicated that these international and regional 
standards played a determinative role in the Technical Committee’s selection of rights 
to be included in the 1996 Bill of Rights. Furthermore, I highlighted that the 
Technical Committee’s comprehensive investigation into international and regional 
human rights treaties and declarations confirmed international human rights law as a 
legitimate and vital source in this undertaking. This reliance on international 
standards helped ensure that the rights protected in the 1996 Bill of Rights were 
aligned with international and regional human rights law.  
In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,12 the Constitutional Court 
found that the meaning of “universal acceptance” differed from that given by the 
Technical Committee. However, the Constitutional Court held that this definition of 
“universal acceptance” did not prevent the inclusion of provisions in the Draft Bill of 
Rights that were not “universally accepted”. This proved to be particularly important 
in the face of arguments challenging the universal acceptance of socio-economic 
rights during the certification process. 
Furthermore, I illustrated how international and regional human rights law 
influenced the Technical Committee’s formulation of those provisions that entrenched 
the right to housing, social security, and the right to education.13 Many of these 
provisions were formulated to give effect to South Africa’s international legal 
obligations, or were guided by international and regional human rights law. I 
therefore argued that since many of the provisions in the 1996 Bill of Rights are 
genetically connected to international and regional human rights treaties and 
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declarations, courts should refer to these instruments when interpreting the meaning 
and content of the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
Moreover, I focused on the changes brought about by the adoption of the 1993 
and 1996 Constitutions in respect of the relationship between municipal law and 
international law. In terms of the 1993 Constitution, I highlighted that the inclusion of 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution ensured that international law, which included 
those international human rights instruments that inspired the drafting of provisions in 
the 1993 Bill of Rights, would not be neglected during the interpretation process. It 
also reflected, to a certain extent, the fact that South Africa prioritised a commitment 
to international human rights law. However, it is important to highlight that this 
obligation only required adjudicative bodies to consider this source of law in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
I further analysed the status of international treaties in the municipal legal 
order which section 231 of the 1993 Constitution governs. In this regard, I observed 
that this provision provided for a nuanced process of incorporation that affirmed the 
dualist approach relied upon before the new constitutional dispensation. Furthermore, 
I addressed the adoption of customary international law in municipal law, governed 
by section 231(4) of the 1993 Constitution. This provision maintained the monist 
approach previously utilised, but removed the uncertainties that plagued the adoption 
of customary international law in the municipal legal order before 1993. Against the 
historical background discussed in chapter 2, an analysis of the abovementioned 
provisions served to clarify the various ways in which South African municipal law 
could interact with international law under the 1993 Constitution. Not only did this 
evaluation delineate the differences between these provisions, but highlighted section 
35(1) of the 1993 Constitution as a powerful means of ensuring the courts’ interaction 
with international law in the interpretation of the 1993 Bill of Rights. 
In chapter 3, I also focused on the manner in which the 1996 Constitution 
governed the interaction between municipal law and international law. In particular, 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution was replaced by section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution with minor changes. Furthermore, section 231 of the 1996 Constitution 
governs the status of international treaties and continues to confirm the dualist 
approach to incorporating treaties into domestic law. The Constitutional Court 




elaborated greatly on this in Glenister 14  by describing the specific status of 
international treaties in municipal law during every step of the nuanced process set 
out in section 231 of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, section 232 of the 1996 
Constitution has maintained a monistic approach to the incorporation of customary 
international law in municipal law. This is also subject to the qualification that 
customary international law is not inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament. Thus, I emphasised the differences between the provisions regulating 
international treaties and customary international law in the 1996 Constitution and the 
prominent role that was, once again, accorded to international human rights law as an 
interpretative tool.  
I proceeded to analyse the relevance of international human rights law, and 
international mechanisms, to the problem of poverty. In this regard, there is support 
for the view that international law and international mechanisms provide an important 
means of appropriately addressing problems, such as human suffering and poverty, 
that occur on a global scale.15 In this respect, I argued that international human rights 
law in particular, aims to address concerns regarding the welfare and protection of 
individuals. Furthermore, international human rights instruments recognise 
individuals as bearers of universal, fundamental human rights, applicable to all human 
beings, and ground their claim to universality in the concept of human dignity.  
In addition, I provided evidence that international law is increasingly 
acknowledged as a relevant source of law in the interpretation of fundamental rights. 
Many domestic constitutions contain provisions that protect fundamental human 
rights and values. In this regard, I illustrated that in many of these instances, these 
constitutions contain provisions that permit the use of international human rights law 
in constitutional interpretation.16 Furthermore, the Bangalore Principles17 constitutes 
an important instrument that affirms and acknowledges crucial aspects concerning the 
use of international human rights law in constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the 
emergence of the concept of “creeping monism” reflects the increased tendency 
among common law courts to rely on unincorporated treaties when interpreting 
constitutional provisions. Slaughter’s concept of “judicial globalisation” offers one 
explanation for the courts’ engagement with international human rights law as an 
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interpretative tool in constitutional interpretation.18 She argues that by engaging in 
judicial globalisation, actors recognise their participation in a “common global 
enterprise”.19 Drawing from this argument, I concluded that a court’s engagement 
with international human rights law in constitutional interpretation signals 
acknowledgement of its participation in a broader, international community that 
promotes the protection of universal, fundamental human rights.  
I noted that the South African courts have acknowledged the importance of 
international human rights law as a means of entering into a broader dialogue with the 
international community.20 In this regard, the courts have alluded to the valuable 
insights that may be gained from international human rights law. In addition, courts 
have underscored the importance of locating themselves in mainstream democratic 
practice. Based on this need for international and democratic legitimacy, I identified 
the benefits that may be derived from international human rights law in constitutional 
interpretation. When we view the South African Constitution as a “living instrument”, 
which serves a society undergoing change and reformation, international human rights 
law may be particularly relevant in providing valuable guidance as to the nature and 
scope of fundamental rights. Moreover, a domestic court can obtain a certain degree 
of legitimacy when international law embeds its decision. Within the context of 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, courts can use this source of law as a source 
of inspiration, perspective, and as a means to strengthen support for a decision. 
However, I argued that a consideration of international human rights law must take 
place within the context of the values inherent in the Constitution. In this regard, I 
indicated that there is support for the view that recourse to global standards may allow 
courts to determine what a society, based on such values, may require, thereby 
informing the interpretation of the values entrenched in a Constitution.  
Through chapter 3, I reinforce the argument that international law is 
recognised in both literature and within South African case law, as a valuable source 
of law that can contribute to the interpretation of the 1996 Bill of Rights. Drawing 
from these arguments, I submitted that international human rights law may assist 
courts in developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights in South Africa. 
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6 1 3 A critical evaluation of the South African Court’s jurisprudence concerning the 
use of international law in constitutional interpretation 
In chapter 4, I sought to determine whether the Constitutional Court developed any 
methodological guidelines to assist it in fulfilling its mandate to consider international 
law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. I demonstrated that in Makwanyane,21 
Chaskalson P introduced a methodological approach to the consideration of 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.22 In his decision, Chaskalson P 
regarded article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ as a sufficient statement of the 
international sources of law for the purposes of section 35(1) of the 1993 
Constitution. 23  In addition, he established that both binding and non-binding 
international law may be relied upon. In this regard, non-binding treaties include 
treaties that South Africa cannot be a party to, such as the ECHR and the AmCHR, as 
well as soft law.24  
However, the Constitutional Court changed its approach in the subsequent 
decision delivered AZAPO.25 In particular, I argued that the AZAPO judgment is 
significant for its failure to acknowledge the obligation placed upon courts to consider 
international human rights law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. In addition, the 
Court should have justified more fully why relevant international humanitarian law 
was not considered in the circumstances. Instead, it merely declared that an enquiry 
into international law is irrelevant when determining whether section 20(7) of the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act is inconsistent with the 
Constitution.26 The strong criticisms levelled at the Court for its restrictive treatment 
of the framework dictum in the AZAPO judgment indicates that, although the 
application of the framework dictum, as set out in Makwanyane, is not always 
consistent, it is nevertheless preferable to neglecting the interpretative mandate. The 
framework dictum has therefore become a yardstick with which to measure a court’s 
consideration of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
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Despite the restricted role granted to section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution in 
AZAPO, the Constitutional Court in Grootboom affirmed the pronouncements made 
in Makwanyane and supplemented these. In this case, I indicated that the Court’s 
engagement with the CESCR’s General Comments had a three-fold effect on the 
Court’s methodological approach to international law within the context of 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. Firstly, it reaffirmed that international law included 
both binding and non-binding international law and that both could be used as 
interpretative tools in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Secondly, the Court 
engaged with relevant international law without requiring such law to be prescriptive. 
Lastly, the judgment emphasised the distinction between international law as an 
interpretative tool to be used within the context of section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution, and international law binding upon the Republic in terms of section 231 
and 232 of the 1996 Constitution. 
Furthermore, I argued that the Constitutional Court’s decision in Glenister 
added to what was already established in the abovementioned decision. In this case, 
the Constitutional Court clearly identified the status of international law agreements at 
every step of the nuanced process entrenched in section 231 of the 1996 Constitution. 
In particular, the Court emphasised that international treaties binding upon the State in 
terms of section 231(1) and (2) were binding upon the State in the international 
sphere, unless they were agreements governed by section 231(3) of the 1996 
Constitution. The judgment explained that while such treaties were not yet 
incorporated into municipal law, they remained of significant interpretative value. 
This established another guideline that could form part of the framework dictum. In 
addition, the Court held that these unincorporated treaties could assist in determining 
whether the State’s obligations in accordance with section 7(2) of the Constitution 
have been fulfilled. Lastly, the judgment confirmed the obligatory nature of section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. 
The evaluation undertaken in chapter 4 demonstrated that the framework 
dictum, and its subsequent development in Grootboom and Glenister, provides 
methodological guidelines pertaining to the consideration of international law. South 
African courts can utilise this framework and simultaneously strive to develop it. The 
use of a carefully crafted method will ensure that the practice of considering 
international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights not only maintains a high 
standard of critical scrutiny and research, but also remains relevant to the Court’s task 




of giving meaning to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. This discussion formed the 
foundation of chapter 5, wherein I examined the Court’s application of the framework 
dictum within the context of socio-economic rights. 
Furthermore, I showed that the South African court’s use of section 35(1) of 
the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution has not been 
without its challenges. As I illustrated in chapter 4, international law and foreign law 
are two different sources of law that contribute to the interpretation of rights under 
different terms. In particular, courts are obliged to consider international law, while 
courts may consider foreign law. In this chapter, I demonstrated that various decisions 
delivered by South African courts revealed a tendency to conflate the obligation to 
consider international law and the permission to consider foreign law when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. In addition, these cases revealed that an over-reliance 
on foreign law has occurred, while the courts have made minimal references to 
international law. Neglecting to consider international law either entirely, or by way 
of superficial and minimal reference, deprives courts of the benefits of relying on 
international standards and interpretations. I explained that the apparent neglect of 
international law, illustrated in chapter 4, may in part, be attributed to the first 
mentioned tendency. Therefore, the fact that courts, on occasion, equated the manner 
in which international law and foreign law should be considered, has resulted in 
adjudicative bodies misconstruing their responsibility to consider international law. 
Furthermore, such conflation also allows courts to draw from the case law of more 
familiar foreign jurisdictions as opposed to less familiar international law.  
In chapter 4, I identified possible factors that promote this predisposition to 
draw more frequently from foreign law as opposed to international law in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. For example, there is support for the argument that 
academic training has neglected the field of public international law. This has largely 
been ascribed to the minimal role international law, and particularly international 
human rights law, played under the apartheid regime. As a logical consequence 
courts, lawyers, and (most) judges initially faced an unfamiliar area of law that may 
have influenced their reluctance to rely on international law.27 The treatment of 
international law, and specifically international human rights law, in tertiary 
institutions, has changed dramatically over the last decade. Despite this, Heyns and 
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Viljoen argue that most lawyers do not come into frequent contact with treaties in 
judicial proceedings with the exception of those lawyers who specialise in 
constitutional litigation.28 They suggest that this judicial resistance of the use of 
international law in judicial proceedings is not only caused by the novelty of 
international law in the South African legal order, but also insensitivity towards the 
value of international law.29 To remedy these deficiencies, students should be exposed 
more frequently to international instruments, how they are applied, as well as receive 
more in-depth training on developing legal arguments based on international law.  
The amount of assistance made available to judges in researching international 
law may also play a significant role in whether a judge will rely on international law. 
The availability of, and access to, information regarding international law can also 
play an important role in determining whether international human rights law will be 
relied upon in judicial decisions. Furthermore, amici curiae have played an important 
part in drawing the court’s attention to relevant international human rights law. 
In addition, it was argued that, on occasion, South African Courts tend to 
invoke international law as an interpretative tool rather than referring to binding treaty 
obligations arising from section 231. Thus, while the State has signed and ratified a 
number of international instruments, the courts tend to rely on these instruments by 
way of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution. Moreover, the courts have, on occasion, exhibited an apparent 
conflation with the status of international law as an interpretative tool and 
international law that gives rise to binding obligations within the Republic in terms of 
section 231 of the Constitution. This may be attributed, once again, to unfamiliarity 
with international law. Although South Africa initially signed and ratified only a 
handful of international human rights treaties with the coming into force of the 1993 
Constitution, this number has increased substantially. As I demonstrated, there are 
illustrations of legal representatives as well as judges who have acknowledged that 
South Africa is a party to a treaty, and yet they proceed to invoke section 39(1)(b) to 
rely on this international instrument as an interpretative tool. This may indicate that 
the differences between section 35(1) and section 231 of the 1993 Constitution, and 
section 39(1)(b) and section 231 of the 1996 Constitution, are not adequately 
understood. Attending to the abovementioned factors may alleviate the occurrence of 
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conflation between the status of international law as an interpretative tool and 
international law that gives rise to binding obligations within the Republic in terms of 
section 231 of the Constitution. Addressing these factors may also curb an over-
reliance on foreign law and the negation of public international law which courts are 
bound to follow in terms of section 231. 
By highlighting the abovementioned methodological misconceptions, I 
demonstrated that the application of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution and 
section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, as well as the process of considering 
international human rights law in constitutional interpretation has, understandably, not 
yet been perfected by South African courts. This implies that the consideration of 
relevant human rights standards may be jeopardised by the challenges I raised, 
thereby impeding a more optimal application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution in the interpretation of the rights in the Bill of Rights. It is imperative 
that the courts address the challenges that currently permeate the process of 
considering international human rights law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights to 
ensure that relevant international human rights norms and standards are taken into 
account in a consistent and effective manner. 
 
6 1 4 International human rights law in the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of 
South African Courts  
The Constitutional Court has, on occasion, applied section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution and engaged with international human rights law when interpreting 
socio-economic rights. However, this has not been a consistent and predictable 
practice. In this regard, I provided evidence that the Court, in some cases, neglected 
the mandate entrenched in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and 
consequently, missed opportunities to gain valuable insight from international and 
regional human rights standards.30 However, the analysis of the Constitutional Court’s 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence revealed that in those instances where the 
Constitutional Court considered international and regional human rights standards, 
this occurred in various degrees. In particular, I demonstrated that international 
human rights law has been considered in three different ways. Firstly, the 
Constitutional Court has, on occasion, considered international human rights law in a 
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superficial manner as a tool to reinforce the international recognition or importance of 
the right. Secondly, the Constitutional Court has, at times, undertaken an evaluative 
consideration of international human rights, engaging with international human rights 
law in its judicial reasoning, without necessarily adopting the relevant international 
standards. Lastly, the Court has, on rare occasions, adopted the standards or concepts 
found in international human rights law.  
This analysis makes a significant contribution to the study of socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence in South Africa as it establishes that, within the context of socio-
economic rights, the Constitutional Court has undertaken the consideration of 
international law in various forms and degrees, each serving a particular function.  
Furthermore, I illustrated that the Constitutional Court’s application of the 
reasonableness model of review has influenced the extent to which it engages 
substantively with the scope and content of socio-economic rights. Firstly, that the 
Court has severely limited the application of the CESCR’s concept of minimum core 
obligations in its application of the reasonableness standard of review. Secondly, 
through its application of the reasonableness standard of review, the Court has not 
engaged substantively with the scope and content of socio-economic rights. 
Consequently, I argued that the Court has narrowed the scope for international law 
influences. Thus, opportunities to engage substantively with international and regional 
human rights standards for the purposes of developing the nature and scope of socio-
economic rights are restricted.  
I also argued that there are important international and regional human rights 
standards that exist, apart from the CESCR’s concept of the minimum core. In this 
regard, I argued that these sources can support and enrich the Court’s reasoning as 
well as assist in developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the South African Constitution, without necessarily requiring the 
adoption of a minimum core standard. This was clarified in the analysis of the right to 
access to adequate housing, the right to education, the right to social security as well 
as the right to water, electricity and sanitation. Moreover, I showed that South African 
eviction jurisprudence has, to a certain extent, developed beyond international and 
regional standards. However, to this extent I argued that this does not diminish the 
value of international and regional standards that confirm the principles established by 
the Court and add additional legitimacy to the Court’s findings. 




Lastly, I argued that the Constitutional Court does not always consider the 
breadth of sources permitted by Chaskalson P’s framework dictum as established in 
Makwanyane. Rather, the Constitutional Court often only considered a limited range 
of sources. In this regard, I illustrated that the Constitutional Court relied 
predominantly on the CESCR’s General Comments in instances where international 
human rights law has been considered. Furthermore, I indicated that the jurisprudence 
developed by the AfCommHPR is considered to a much lesser extent in South 
African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, than jurisprudence from the ECtHR, 
while references to the ECSR are minimal. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
human rights system is not found in South Africa’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence.  
 
6 2 Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
In conclusion, I do not consider international human rights law to be the panacea to 
the challenges facing socio-economic rights interpretation in South Africa. In 
addition, I do not propose that a consideration of international human rights law 
provides the only means by which the substantive development of the nature and 
scope of socio-economic rights can take place. In fact, every suggested source of 
international human rights law relied upon in chapter 5 may be legitimately 
challenged on the grounds that the interpretation of a Bill of Rights is a complex task, 
requiring regard for the values and purposes underpinning the constitutional text, 
relevant national history and context, as well as political theory and philosophy. 
Furthermore, arguments can be levelled at the appropriateness of international and 
regional sources, which challenge their relevance to the South African context. These 
may include, for example, arguments emphasising that these sources are created 
outside of the South African context and are the product of decision-making processes 
in which South Africa played no part.  
The primary argument advanced is that the consideration of international 
human rights law should form one significant part of the Court’s interpretative 
strategy and be recognised as a means of testing, comparing, and evaluating South 
African jurisprudence against international norms and standards. Furthermore, the 
Court’s consideration of international and regional human rights standards can play a 
significant role in both promoting substantive judicial reasoning, and in justifying and 




strengthening the Court’s decisions. In addition, an evaluative consideration of 
international and regional human rights standards in judicial decision-making 
enhances the transparency and accountability of judicial reasoning. However, I argue 
further that in order to form a significant part of the Court’s interpretative strategy, the 
Court must engage and further develop its methodological approach to the 
consideration of international sources of law. This will provide courts with more 
concrete and structured guidance that can assist them in navigating, and considering, 
these sources in an effective and relevant manner. 
Furthermore, the Court’s involvement in this process of “judicial 
globalization” gives recognition to the fact that South Africa is embedded in a 
broader, international community that recognises and protects fundamental human 
rights. As expressed in the Preamble to the UDHR, “a common understanding of 
these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance” for the achievement of the 
“promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.31 Thus, the Court’s engagement with international human rights law in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights is a means of aligning South African municipal law 
with these international and regional standards of protection.  
In light of the above, I recommend firstly, that the judiciary observe the 
mandate entrenched in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and remain attentive 
to the purposes that this provision was meant to serve. It remains important to 
recollect that section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution was not merely inserted into the 
1993 Bill of Rights as a means to assist in the development of the meaning and scope 
of fundamental rights during the transition to the “final text”. Rather, drafters of the 
1996 Bill of Rights were prompted to include this interpretative mandate in the final 
constitutional text to ensure it remains a permanent feature in the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights. While drafting the provision that dealt with the interpretation of the 
1996 Bill of Rights, the Technical Committee reflected on the purposes of section 35 
of the 1993 Constitution as a whole, and stated that: 
 
“Section 35 is unique in human rights law. It seeks to redress the agony of our past 
and to commit our law and its institutions to a future in which discrimination and 
repression have no place.”32 
 
                                                
31 Preamble to the UDHR. 
32 Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee Four Draft Bill of Rights 280. 




Therefore, section 35 of the 1993 Constitution and section 39 of the 1996 
Constitution, as a whole, have important roles to play in ensuring that the 
interpretation of South Africa’s Bill of Rights follows a transformative course away 
from the narrow, value-neutral interpretative methods that characterised the past. 
From this perspective, the consideration of international law is included in the 
interpretation clause as a tool to guide and assist in the development of a 
transformative interpretation of the Bill of Rights by requiring courts to regard 
“values that are generally accepted as fundamental features of an open and democratic 
society.”33  
Additionally, I recommend that South African courts be more consistent in 
their application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and should provide 
reasoned justifications for their decision not to follow a relevant international law 
standard.  
Secondly, I recommend that courts continue to develop a clear and transparent 
methodology for considering international law in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights that builds on Makwanyane’s framework dictum. As stated above, this 
development will promote the Court’s consistent application of section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution, and help ensure that courts consider the full breadth of relevant 
international sources. 
 Thirdly, I recommend that South African courts must respect the distinction 
created in section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. In particular, courts must 
distinguish between the obligation placed upon them to consider international law in 
the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and the permission afforded them to consider 
foreign law. Maintaining this distinction will decrease the tendency to conflate the 
manner in which these two sources are considered, and promote a more consistent 
approach to the application of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution.  
Fourthly, I recommend that courts develop a substantive model of 
reasonableness review to expand the scope for international human rights law to have 
a meaningful impact on the interpretation of the relevant socio-economic rights. I 
argue that it is only within the application of a substantive model of review that courts 
will have an opportunity to engage substantively with the scope and content of the 
right and thus be able to engage with relevant international human rights standards. 
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While debates concerning the application and relevance of the CESCR’s concept of 
the minimum core are important, I recommend that courts engage in a greater breadth 
of international law sources and seek guidance beyond the minimum core concept for 
the purposes of developing the scope and content of socio-economic rights.  
Fifthly, although the Constitutional Court’s evictions jurisprudence has 
developed principles beyond international and regional human rights standards, the 
Court should nevertheless acknowledge how these principles converge with those 
created at the international and regional level. This would highlight the harmonious 
development between South Africa’s eviction jurisprudence and international human 
rights law as well as strengthen and underscore the legitimacy of Court decisions.  
 
6 3 The Future of International Human Rights Law in the 
Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
Socio-economic rights have been described as vital to the Constitution’s 
transformative agenda.34 These rights give legal protection to the basic social and 
economic needs of individuals, and consequently offer a significant means of 
redressing both violations infringing upon socio-economic interests and the persistent 
legacy of poverty and inequality in South Africa. The Constitutional Court has 
adopted a reasonableness model of review to adjudicate socio-economic rights and in 
particular, claims based upon the positive obligations resting upon the State. 
However, scholars have argued that the Court should adopt a more substantive, 
interest-based approach in the application of the reasonableness model of review.35 
This approach would take into account the normative commitments and values 
underpinning socio-economic rights, and determine the obligations these impose upon 
the State and private actors.36 Furthermore, such an approach would engage with the 
specific needs of individuals and therefore be more responsive to their lived 
experience of socio-economic deprivation.37 It is within such an approach that section 
39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, which obliges courts to consider international 
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human rights law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, may find resonance. In 
particular, the Court may be able to gain valuable insight from international and 
regional human rights law when developing the scope and content of socio-economic 
rights. In this way, these standards have the potential to assist in deepening our 
understanding of socio-economic rights and guide the Court’s response towards 
violations of these rights. 
However, in an attempt to predict the future of international human rights law 
in the interpretation of socio-economic rights in South Africa, it is important to 
highlight the challenges that face the Court’s application of section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution in socio-economic rights adjudication. The first challenge concerns 
the Court’s attitude towards section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution and in 
particular, its approach to the purposes and relevance of this provision. As I illustrated 
in chapter 4, methodological inconsistencies permeate the consideration of 
international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, the 
methodological approach introduced in Makwanyane, and subsequently developed in 
Grootboom and Glenister, has remained largely embryonic. The Court’s failure to 
address these problems calls into question whether the Court views section 39(1)(b) 
of the 1996 Constitution as significant, or relevant, to the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights and whether international law is recognised as a valuable source in the 
interpretative exercise. 
The second challenge concerns the Court’s application of the reasonableness 
standard of review. The case analysis presented in chapter 5 highlights that the 
Constitutional Court’s initial engagement with international human rights was 
markedly substantial,38 despite the application of the reasonableness standard of 
review. However, subsequent practice has paid lip service to section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution, or to international human rights standards themselves, while very 
little indication exists that the Court envisions a prominent role for the application of 
section 39(1)(b) in the application of the reasonable standard of review. Furthermore, 
the more recent approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights reflected in 
Mazibuko paints a bleak outlook for the future application of section 39(1)(b) of the 
1996 Constitution. In particular, the Court’s approach is highly deferential and does 
not envisage a more substantive approach to the interpretation of socio-economic 
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rights, therefore narrowing the opportunity for the application of section 39(1)(b) of 
the 1996 Constitution. Thus, the relevance of the interpretative mandate in the 
substantive interpretation of socio-economic rights in South Africa appears to be 
under threat. 
Homelessness, poverty, and hunger are only a few of the challenges that many 
South Africans face today. Violations of socio-economic rights impact on our very 
means of survival and affect not only our quality of life, but erode the opportunity to 
live a life of dignity. The Constitutional Court has a vital role to play in determining 
the relevance of our constitutionally protected socio-economic rights to these 
struggles. In this regard, section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution can assist the Court 
in this undertaking. The analysis above indicates that the Court has considered 
international law within the context of socio-economic rights in a variety of ways. 
However, international human law has the potential to infuse the scope and content of 
our socio-economic rights in a way that can broaden and deepen our understanding of 
them. This in turn can transform the way socio-economic rights contribute to 
changing the lives of the impoverished. However, international law will only be able 
to play a relevant part in shaping socio-economic rights if the Court undertakes a 
more serious approach to giving effect to the purposes of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution, and makes a determined effort to acknowledge the mandate entrenched 
in this provision. Courts must endeavour to acquaint themselves with the substance of 
international and regional human rights law, in order to adequately determine, and 
appreciate, its relevance to the interpretation of socio-economic rights. In doing so, 
section 39(1)(b) will be able to contribute to realising the transformative purposes of 
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